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svayaṃ niścitārtho hi samayakṛtsamayaṃ karoti, nacāpohaḥ kenacid indriyair vyavasīyate / | For the convention-maker establishes the convention based on [his] own ascertained meaning, and the apoha is never apprehended by any sense organs; |
prathamam vyavahārakālāt pūrvam, saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhakāla ity arthaḥ / | 'Previously' [means] prior to the time of usage, that is, at the time of establishing the relation between name and named. |
tasyāvastutvād indriyāṇāṃ ca vastuviṣayatvāditi bhāvaḥ / | [This is] because it [apoha] is non-existent and because sense organs have [only] existent things as their objects. |
syād etad anyavyāvṛtta svalakṣaṇamupalabhya śabdaḥ prayokṣyata ityata āha nānyatretyādi / | If it be argued that the word could be used upon apprehending the particular [svalakṣaṇa] as differentiated from others, [the author] states "nowhere else" etc. |
anyāpohād anyatra svalakṣaṇa ity arthaḥ // | 'Anywhere else' means in the particular [svalakṣaṇa] which is other than the exclusion of others. |
pūrvoktena prabandhena nānumāpyatra vidyate / | By what has been stated before, there can be no inference here either; |
sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya tena naivopapadyate // | and for that reason, the experience of [its] relation too is certainly not possible. |
tatra pūrvoktaḥ prabandhaḥ ---"na cānvayavinirmuktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayor"ityādiḥ / | [Regarding] the previously mentioned passage "there is no operation of word and inferential sign devoid of positive connection" etc. |
sambandhānubhavo 'pīti / | [There is] the experience of relation also. |
śabdena saheti śeṣaḥ / na kevalaṃ pūrvoktāśvavailakṣaṇyādir nopapadyata ityapiśabdena darśayati / | [The word should be completed as] "together with the word." The particle api shows that not only is the previously mentioned distinction from horses etc. untenable. |
teneti tasmāt / | [The word] tena [means] "for that reason." |
tadevamakṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam / | Thus it has been shown that the reason "because no convention can be made" is inconclusive. |
akṛtasamayatve 'pyapohe śabdapravṛttyabhyupagamāt // | Because the application of words to apoha is admitted even though no convention can be made regarding it. |
agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ bhavatāṃ ca kathaṃ punaḥ / na dṛṣṭo yatra gośabdaḥ sambandhānubhavakṣaṇe // | How then do you [know] the denotability by the word "non-cow"? [Because] the word "cow" was not seen [to apply] at the moment of experiencing the relation. |
idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati / | For this is what you ought to say. |
katham aśvādīnām agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ gośabdānabhidheyatvaṃ bhavadbhir avagamyate iti / | How do you understand that horses etc. are denoted by the word "non-cow," [that is], that they are not denoted by the word "cow"? |
bauddha āha na dṛṣṭo yatretyādi sambandhānubhavakṣaṇa iti / saṅketapratipattivelāyām ity arthaḥ // | The Buddhist says "[Because] the [word 'cow'] was not seen [to apply]" etc., "at the moment of experiencing the relation," meaning "at the time of understanding the convention." |
ekasmād ityādinā paro dūṣaṇamāha | The opponent [Kumārila] presents [his] objection starting with [the word] "ekasmāt" [as follows]. |
ekasmān na hi gopiṇḍādyadanyat sarvameva tat / bhaved apohyamityetan na sāmānyasya vācyatā // | All things other than a single individual cow would have to be excluded by the apoha, [and] thus it would not be [possible to] establish that universals are what is denoted [by words]. |
yadi hi yadeva saṅketānubhavavelāyām upalabdhaṃ tato 'nyatra gośabdapravṛttirneṣyate, tadaikasmāt saṅketena viṣayīkṛtācchābaleyādikād gopiṇḍātsakāśād yadanyad bāhuleyādi tadapi gośabdenāpohyaṃ bhavet | If [you hold that] the word 'cow' cannot apply anywhere except to that [individual] which was perceived at the time of experiencing the convention, then everything else, including [other cows like] the black one, would have to be excluded by the word 'cow' — with the exception of that single spotted individual cow which was made the object of the convention. |
tataś ca sāmānyaṃ vācyam ityetan na siddhyet | And consequently, it could not be established that a universal is what is denoted [by the word]. |
siddhaścāgaurapohyeta goniṣedhātmakaś ca saḥ | [Only] an established entity that is non-cow could be excluded [by apoha], and that [non-cow] consists in the negation of cow. |
tatra gaureva vaktavyo naṭā yaḥ pratiṣidhyate | Therefore it must be explained what this 'cow' is which is being negated [in 'non-cow']. |
sa cedagonivṛttyātmā bhaved anyonyasaṃśrayaḥ | If this [cow] consists in the negation of non-cow, there would be mutual dependency. |
agovyavacchedena gopratipattiḥ, sacāgaur goniṣedhātmā, tataścāgaur ityatrottarapadārtho vaktavyo yo na gaurgaurityatra naṭā pratiṣidhyeta | The cognition of 'cow' [occurs] through the exclusion of non-cow; and that non-cow consists in the negation of cow; therefore in [the compound] 'non-cow', the meaning of the latter term must be explained — [that meaning] which is negated by the negative particle in [the expression] 'not cow'. |
na hyanirjñātasvarūpasya niṣedhaḥ śakyate kartum | For it is not possible to negate something whose own nature is not [already] known. |
athāpi syāt kimatra vaktavyam agonivṛttyātmāsau gauriti | "It might be argued: 'What needs to be explained here? This cow is [already known to be] of the nature of non-cow negation.'" |
sa iti / gauḥ / | "'Sa' [in the text] means 'cow'" |
tathāhyagonivṛttisvabhāvatvād goragopratipattidvāreṇaiva pratītiḥ agoś ca | "Thus, since the cow has the nature of non-cow negation, its cognition [can occur] only through the cognition of the non-cow" |
gopratiṣedhātmakatvād gopratipattidvārikaiva pratītir iti sphuṭataramavataratītaretarāśrayatvam | "And since non-cow has the nature of cow-negation, its cognition [can occur] only through the cognition of cow - thus mutual interdependence clearly emerges" |
athāpi syād agośabdena yo gaur niṣedhyate sa vidhirūpa eva siddho 'pohārtham agovyavacchedalakṣaṇāpohasiddhyarthaṃ | "It might be argued: 'The cow that is negated by the word non-cow is established as a positive entity itself, for the sake of apoha, i.e., for establishing the apoha characterized by the exclusion of non-cow'" |
tenetarāśrayatvaṃ na bhaviṣyatīti | "Therefore there will be no mutual interdependence" |
yadyevaṃ, sarvasya śabdasyāpoho 'rtha ityevam apohakalpanaṃ vṛthā, vidhirūpasya śabdārthasya bhāvāt | "If this is so, then the assumption that apoha is the meaning of all words becomes pointless, since [you accept] the existence of positive meaning for words" |
tasmān na kaścid vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthaḥ siddho 'ṅgīkartavyas tadanaṅgīkaraṇe cetaretarāśrayadoṣo durnivāraḥ | "Therefore no positive meaning of words should be accepted as established; and if [such meaning] is not accepted, then the fault of mutual interdependence becomes unavoidable" |
gavyasiddhe tvagaur nāsti tadabhāve tu gauḥ kutaḥ / nādhārādheyavṛttyādisambandhaścāpyabhāvayoḥ | "If cow is not established, there is no non-cow; and if that [non-cow] does not exist, how can there be cow? And between two negations, there can be no relation like that of container and contained" |
ācāryadiṅnāgena viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvasamarthanārtham uktam "nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhuḥ" | "For the purpose of establishing the relation of qualified and qualifier, Ācārya Diṅnāga has stated: 'Words like blue lotus express things qualified by the negation of other things'" |
yasya hi yena saha kaścid vāstavaḥ sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tat tena viśiṣṭam iti yuktaṃ vaktum | "For when some real relation is established between two things, then it is appropriate to say that one is qualified by the other" |
nīlotpalayor anīlotpalavyavacchedarūpatvenābhāvarūpayor ādhārādheyādisambandhaḥ na sambhavati nīrūpatvāt | In the case of blue lotus, since both [elements] are of the nature of negation [being] the exclusion of non-blue and non-lotus, [and thus] being mere absences devoid of form, there cannot be any relation between them such as that of container and contained. |
ādigrahaṇena saṃyogasamavāyaikārthasamavāyādisambandhagrahaṇam | By the term "ādi" ["and the rest"], relations such as conjunction, inherence, inherence in the same substrate and so forth are included. |
asati vāstave sambandhe tadviśiṣṭasya pratipattir na yuktā atiprasaṅgāt | In the absence of a real relation, the cognition of something as qualified by something else is not possible, as [this would lead to] undesirable consequences. |
athāpi syāt na eva asmākam anīlādivyāvṛttyā viśiṣṭaḥ anutpalādivyavacchedaḥ abhimataḥ yataḥ ayaṃ doṣaḥ syāt | [Even] if [someone objects] that for us the exclusion of non-lotus etc. is not meant to be qualified by the exclusion of non-blue etc., [such] that this fault would arise. |
kiṃ tarhi anīlānutpalābhyāṃ vyāvṛttaṃ vastu eva tathā vyavasthitam | Rather, what is established is simply an entity excluded from non-blue and non-lotus. |
tadarthāntaranivṛttyā viśiṣṭaṃ śabdena ucyate iti ayam arthaḥ atra abhipretaḥ | The meaning intended here is that what is expressed by the word is [an entity] qualified by the exclusion of other things. |
na ca asādhāraṇaṃ vastu gamyate 'pohavattayā | And a unique entity is not apprehended as possessing exclusion [apoha]. |
kathaṃ vā parikalpyeta sambandhaḥ vastvavastunoḥ | Or how could a relation be conceived between an entity and a non-entity? |
avastu apohaḥ asādhāraṇaṃ tu vastu na ca avastuvastunoḥ sambandhaḥ yuktaḥ vastudvayādhāratvāt tasya | The apoha is a non-entity while the unique [thing] is an entity, and a relation between a non-entity and an entity is not possible, because a relation must be based on two entities. |
api ca bhavatu nāma sambandhaḥ tathāpi viśeṣaṇatvam apohasya na yuktam iti darśayati | Moreover, even if there were a relation, still the apoha cannot serve as a qualifier - this is what [the next verse] shows. |
svarūpasattvamātreṇa na syāt kiñcid viśeṣaṇam / | Nothing can serve as a qualification merely by [virtue of] its own existence. |
svabuddhyā rajyate yena viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam // | That by which the qualified [thing] is colored through its own cognition, that [becomes] its qualification. |
nahi sattāmātreṇotpalādīnāṃ nīlādi viśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati / | Indeed, [the property of being] blue and so forth does not become a qualification of lotuses and such merely by [its] existence. |
kiṃ tarhijñātaṃ sadyatsvākārānuraktayā buddhyā viśeṣyaṃ rañjayati tadviśeṣaṇamucyate // | What then? When something, upon being cognized, colors the qualified [thing] with a cognition tinged by its own form, then [only] is it called its qualification. |
nacāpohe 'yaṃ prakāraḥ sambhavatīti darśayati na cāpītyādi / | And this process is not possible in [the case of] exclusion (apoha), as [the author] shows with [the words] "and neither..." etc. |
na cāpyaśvādiśabdebhyo jāyate 'pohabhodhanam / | And the terms "horse" etc. do not generate a cognition of exclusion. |
viśeṣyabuddhiriṣṭeha na cājñātaviśeṣaṇā // | And the cognition of the qualified that is accepted here cannot be one whose qualification is uncognized. |
na hyaśvādibuddhyāpoho vyavasīyate kiṃ tarhivastveva / | For exclusion is not ascertained through the cognition of horse etc., rather only the real thing [is]. |
tataścāpohasya bodhāsambhavān na tena svabuddhyā rajyate 'śvādiḥ / | And therefore, due to the impossibility of cognizing exclusion, the horse etc. is not colored by it through its own cognition. |
syād etad ajñāto 'pyapoho viśeṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha viśeṣyetyādi / | One might think "Even uncognized, exclusion could be a qualification" - [to this] he states [the verse beginning with] "the qualified" etc. |
na jñātaṃ viśeṣaṇaṃ yasyāḥ sā tathoktā // | That [cognition] whose qualification is not cognized is called such [i.e., impossible]. |
na cānyarūpamanyādṛkkuryājjñānaṃ viśeṣaṇam | A qualification cannot bring about a cognition that has a different form [and] appears different [from itself]. |
kathaṃ cānyādṛśe jñāne taducyeta viśeṣaṇam | And how could that be called a qualification in [relation to] a cognition that appears different [from it]? |
sarvam eva hi viśeṣaṃ svākārānurūpaṃ viśeṣye buddhiṃ janayaddṛṣṭam | For every qualification is observed to generate in the qualified [object] a cognition conforming to its own form. |
na tvanyādṛśaṃ viśeṣaṇamanyādṛśīṃ buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayati | But a qualification of one kind does not generate a different kind of cognition in the qualified [object]. |
na hi nīlamutpale raktam iti pratyayamutpādayati, daṇḍo vā kuṇḍalīti | For the blue does not produce the cognition "red" with respect to a lotus, nor does a staff [produce the cognition] "wearing earrings" [with respect to its bearer]. |
na cātrāśvādiṣvabhāvānuraktā śābdī buddhirupajāyate | And in this case, the verbal cognition that arises regarding horses etc. is not tinged with negativity. |
kiṃ tarhibhāvākārādhyavasāyinī | Rather, it determines [things] in the form of positive entities. |
syād etad anyādṛśam api jñānaṃ janayad viśeṣaṇam ucyata | One might object that "even while generating a different cognition, it can [still] be called a qualification." |
kathaṃ cānyādṛśa ityādi | [The answer is given in] "how can... etc." |
yadi syāt ko doṣa | [If one asks:] "What would be the harm if it were so?" |
athānyathā viśeṣe 'pi syād viśeṣaṇakalpanā | If there could be an assumption of qualification even with respect to a qualified [thing] that is different, |
tathā sati hi yat kiñcit prapadyeta viśeṣaṇam | then in that case, anything whatsoever could serve as a qualification. |
atha yadi bhavato viśeṣaṇānanurūpatayānyathā vyavasthite 'pi viśeṣe syād, viśeṣaṇakalpanā, tathā sati sarvam eva nīlādi sarvasya viśeṣaṇaṃ syāt tataścāvyavasthā syāt | If, according to you, there could be an assumption of qualification even with respect to a qualified [thing] that is established as different [and] not conforming to the qualification, then in that case everything like blue etc. could be the qualification of everything, and consequently there would be no fixed rule. |
abhāvagamyarūpe ca na viśeṣye 'sti vastutā / | If the qualificand is cognizable in the form of absence, then [it] does not have entity-ness. |
viśeṣitamapohena vastu vācyaṃ na te 'styataḥ // | Therefore, for you there exists no entity that could be denoted [by words] as qualified by exclusion. |
abhāvo 'pohaḥ, tenāpohena tādrūpyādgamyam abhāvagamyam, abhāvagamyaṃ rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasya vastunas tat tathoktam / | 'Absence' [means] exclusion; 'cognizable through absence' [means] cognizable due to having the same form as that exclusion; that entity whose nature is a form cognizable through absence is called thus. |
yadyabhāvarūpeṇa vastunaḥ pratītiḥ syāt tadā tasya vastutvam eva na syāt, bhāvābhāvayor virodhāt / | If an entity's cognition were to be in the form of absence, then it would not have entity-ness at all, due to the contradiction between presence and absence. |
prakṛtamupasaṃharann āha viśeṣitamityādi // | Concluding the topic at hand, [he] states "viśeṣitam" etc. |
syād etad anyavyāvṛtta eva vastuni śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttir dṛśyate, nāpoharahite | This might be [objected]: The operation of words and inferential marks is seen only with respect to an entity excluded from others, not [with respect to one] devoid of exclusion. |
yadyapyapohanirmukte na vṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ / | Even though there is no operation of words and inferential marks in [what is] free from exclusion, |
yadi nāma tadvastvanyato vyāvṛttaṃ, tathāpi tatrotpadyamānaḥ śabdaliṅgodbhavo bodho 'nyavyāvṛttiṃ satīm api nāvalambate, kiṃ tarhivastvaṃśamevābhidhāvati tatraivānurāgāt / | Even if that entity is indeed excluded from others, still the cognition arising there from words and inferential marks does not depend on the exclusion from others even though it exists, but rather runs toward the entity-aspect alone, because of attachment to that very [aspect]. |
ya evāṃśo vastunaḥ śābdena laiṅgikena vā pratyayenāvasīyate sa eva tasya viṣayo nānavasīyamānaḥ sannapi | That very aspect of the entity which is apprehended by verbal or inferential cognition is its object, not [something] which, even though existing, is not apprehended. |
na cāpyetad yuktam, yadanyavyāvṛtte vastuni śabdaliṅgayoḥ pravṛttirityetad darśayati na cetyādi / | And this is not correct either - [he] shows this [point] that "words and inferential marks operate on an entity excluded from others" [by saying] "na ca" etc. |
na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastu buddhau viparivartate / | And the uncommon entity does not revolve in cognition. |
na cāpi nirvikalpatvāt tasya yuktādhigamyatā // | Nor can it [the specific characteristic] be rightly cognizable, because of [its] being indeterminate. |
anyavyāvṛttaṃ hi vastu bhavadbhavatāṃ matena svalakṣaṇamasādhāraṇameva bhavet, naca tacchabdaliṅgajāyāṃ buddhau viparivartata iti bhavatāṃ matam / tasya nirvikalpabuddhigrāhyatvāt / | According to your doctrine, a thing that is "excluded from others" can only be the unique specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), and it is your view that this does not appear in cognition produced by words and inferential signs, because it is graspable only by indeterminate cognition. |
śabdaliṅgajabuddheś ca sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt / | Because cognition born of words and inferential signs has the universal characteristic as its object. |
athāpi svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvamasyā abhyupagamyate tadapi yuktyā na saṅgacchata iti darśayann āha na cāpītyādi / | Even if it is accepted that this [cognition] has the specific characteristic as its object, this does not accord with reason - this is what is shown by the words beginning with "na cāpi." |
na hyasādhāraṇaṃ vastu śabdaliṅgajapratyayādhigamyaṃ tatra sarvavikalpānāmpratyastamayāt / | For the unique entity is not cognizable through cognition born of words and inferential signs, because all conceptual constructions are absent in it. |
tathā hi vikalpo jātyādiviśeṣaṇasaṃsparśenaiva pravartate naca śuddhavastuparigraheṇa // | For conceptual thought operates only through contact with qualifiers such as universals and not through grasping the pure object. |
śabdenāgamyamānaṃ ca viśeṣyam iti sāhasam / | [To say that] what is not apprehended by words is [nevertheless] qualified is [too] bold a statement. |
tena sāmānyameṣṭavyaṃ viṣayo buddhiśabdayoḥ // | Therefore, the universal should be accepted as the object of both cognition and words. |
yadā cāśabdavācyatvaṃ na vyaktīnām apohyatā / | When particulars cannot be expressed by words, [they] cannot be [what is] excluded. |
vyaktīnām iti / | [This refers to] "of the particulars." |
asādhāraṇavasturūpāṇām avācyatvānnāpohyatā, anuktasya nirākartumaśakyatvāt / | Unique individual entities cannot be excluded, because what is not expressed [in language] cannot be denied. |
apohyeta sāmānyam iti / tasya vācyatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | Only the universal can be excluded, because it alone is what is expressible [through words]. |
syād etad yadi nāma sāmānyamapohyeta, tathāpi kathaṃ tasya vastutvaṃ sidhyatītyata āha nāpohyatvam ityādi / | One might ask: "Even if the universal were excluded, how would that establish its existence as an entity?" To this [the author] responds [by referring to verse 956]. |
abhāvānām iti apohānāṃ / | "Of negations" means "of exclusions" (apohas). |
yadi bhaved vastutvam eva syāt / | If [exclusions of exclusions] existed, they would necessarily be positive entities. |
abhāvānām abhāvarūpatyāgād ity arthaḥ / etad uktaṃ bhavati yadyapohānām apohyatvaṃ bhavet, tadaiṣāmabhāvarūpatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ bhavet, tat pratiṣedhe ca bhavatyabhāvairabhāvarūpatvaṃ tyaktaṃ syāt / | This means: because negations would abandon their negative nature. The explanation is as follows: if exclusions were subject to exclusion, then their negative nature would be negated, and with this negation, the negations would abandon their negative nature. |
tataścābhāvānām apohalakṣaṇānām abhāvarūpatyāgād vastutvam eva bhaved ityeka / | And consequently, through the abandonment of their negative nature, these negations characterized as exclusions would become positive entities. |
anye tvāhuḥ abhāvābhāvavarjanād iti / abhāvānām abhāvābhāvād ity arthaḥ / na hyabhāvasvabhāvā apohā apohya yujyante / | Others explain the phrase "through the abandonment of the negation of negations" thus: because there can be no negation of negations. For exclusions (apohas), which are negative in nature, cannot properly be excluded. |
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