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vastuviṣayatvāt pratiṣedhasyeti yāvat / | That is to say, because negation [can] only [have] positive entities as [its] objects. |
tasmād vyaktaḥ sphuṭo 'pohāntare 'ścādāvapohāntarasya gavāder apoho bhavan sāmānyabhūtasyaiveti niścīyate / | Therefore it is definitively established that when there is exclusion of one exclusion (such as "cow") in another exclusion (such as "horse"), it can only be an exclusion of something that has become universal. |
ataḥ siddhamapohyatvād vastutvaṃ sāmānyasyeti // | Therefore it is established that the Universal has the character of [being] a real entity, due to [its] being what is excluded. |
apicāpohānāṃ parasparato vailakṣaṇyaṃ vā syād availakṣaṇyaṃ vā, tatrādye | Moreover, the Apohas could be either different or non-different from one another. In the first case [of difference]... |
abhāvasya agośabdābhidheyasya abhāvo yo gośabdābhidheyo 'rthaḥ / sa cet tasmāt pūrvoktād abhāvād vilakṣaṇo 'nya ity arthaḥ / | If the negation [of that] which is denoted by the word 'non-cow' [and] the negation which is denoted by the word 'cow' were different from that previously mentioned negation, [that is,] something other [than it], ... |
tadānīṃ bhāva eva bhavet abhāvanivṛttimātrarūpatvād bhāvasya / | ... then it would necessarily be a positive entity, because a positive entity consists merely in the absence of negation. |
no ced vilakṣaṇas tadā gaurapyagorbhavataḥ prasajyate tadavailakṣaṇyena tādātmyapratipatteḥ // | If it is not different, then [according to] your [view], a cow would also become a non-cow, because non-difference entails identity. |
syād etad gavāśvādiśabdaiḥ svalakṣaṇānyeva parasparato vyāvṛttānyapohyantenābhāvaḥ tenāpohyatvena teṣāṃ vastutvaprasaṅgāpādānaṃ nāniṣṭamiti | One might say: "By words like 'cow' and 'horse', only particular characteristics [which are] mutually excluded [are what] is excluded - not negations; therefore the consequence of their becoming positive entities is not undesirable." |
yadyapyanyeṣu śabdeṣu vastunaḥ syād apohyatā / sacchabdasya tvabhāvākhyān nāpohyaṃ bhinnamiṣyate // | Even though in [the case of] other words what is excluded may be a positive entity, in [the case of] the word "sat" [being], nothing different from what is called negation is accepted as [being] excluded. |
yadyapi sacchabdād anyeṣu gavādiṣabdeṣu vastunaḥ parvatāder apohyatā sidhyati, sacchabdasya svabhāvākhyād apohyānnānyadapohyam asti, abhāva evāpohya | Although in [the case of] words other than "sat" [being], such as "cow" etc., what is excluded may be established as an entity like [a] mountain etc., in [the case of] the word "sat" itself, there is nothing that can be excluded other than what is called negation - only negation can be excluded. |
asadvyavahāravyavacchedena sacchabdasya pravṛttatvāt // | Because the word "sat" [being] functions by excluding non-being usage. |
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha tatrāsato 'pītyādi / | "And so [one asks] 'What is the fault in that?' Thus [the author] states 'tatrāsato 'pi' etc." |
tatrāsato 'pi bhāvatvam iti kleśo mahānbhavet / | "In that case, even for the non-existent there would be existence [as a positive entity], which would be a great calamity." |
tadasiddho na sattāsti na vā sattā prasiddhyati // | "When that [negation] is not established, there is no existence, nor can existence be established." |
pūrvavad abhāvābhāvavarjanād asato 'pohe vastutvam eva syāt / | "As [shown] previously, due to negations abandoning their negative character, in the case of exclusion of the non-existent, [the exclusion] would be nothing but a positive entity." |
tataścāpohavādino 'bhyupagamādiviruddhamasato 'pi vastutvaṃ prasaktam api mahadbata kaṣṭam āpatitam / | "And thus, since this would entail the positive nature even of the non-existent, which contradicts the Apohist's own position, alas, a great calamity has befallen [them]." |
astvabhāvasyāpi vastutvam iti cedāha tadasiddhāv ityādi / | "If [one] says 'Let negation too have positive nature,' [the author] states 'When that is not established' etc." |
tasyābhāvasyāsiddhau satyāṃ na sattā kasyacid bhāvasya siddhyet / | "When that negation is not established, existence could not be established for any positive entity." |
abhāvavyavacchedena tasya bhavan matena sthitalakṣaṇatvāt / | "Because according to your view, its [i.e., existence's] definition is established through exclusion of non-existence." |
tasya cābhāvasyāpohyatve sati vastutvaprasaṅgena svarūpāsiddher asattāpi na siddhyati, tasyāḥ sattāvyavacchedarūpatvāt, sattāyāś ca yathoktena prakāreṇāyogāt // | "And when that non-existence becomes something to be excluded, due to the consequence of [its] being a positive entity and the non-establishment of [its] own nature, even non-existence cannot be established, because it has the form of exclusion of existence, and because existence is impossible in the manner stated above." |
yat pūrvamuktam ---"apohyaiḥ sa bahiḥsaṃsthair bhidyete"tyādi, yaccoktam ---"avastutvād apohānāṃ naiva bheda" ityādi / | "What was stated before—that 'it is differentiated by the external excluded things' etc., and what was stated—that 'there can be no difference among apohas because they are non-entities' etc." |
tatra kecid bauddhāḥ parihāramāhuḥ na khalvapohyabhedā{dā}dhārabhedād | "To this, some Buddhists give [this] reply: 'Indeed, [the difference is] not due to the difference of excluded things nor due to the difference of substrata.'" |
vāpohānāṃ bhedo 'pi tvanādikālapravṛttavicitravitattvārthavikalpavāsanābhedānvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api bhinnaviṣayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinneṣvartheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinna ivārthātmāna ivāsvabhāvā apyapohāḥ samāropyante te ca tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānāṃ | [The diversity of] Apohas, though featureless in themselves, are superimposed on diverse external objects as if they had the nature of those objects, [being superimposed] by cognitions which, though essentially objectless, appear as if resting on diverse objects and are connected with different conceptual impressions of various real things operating since beginningless time; and these [Apohas], being thus superimposed, appear as diverse and as existing, so that the diversity and positive nature of Apohas [seems to] arise from the diversity of impressions. |
bhaviṣyatītyatrāha na cāpītyādi | To this [objection] he responds with [the words] "na cāpi" etc. |
na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi vā | Neither diversity nor positive nature [of Apohas can arise] from the diversity of impressions. |
nirviṣayo na kaścit pratyayo 'stīti nirloḍitametad vijñānavādavicāre | That there is no cognition without an object has been thoroughly examined in the discussion of Vijñānavāda. |
tataś ca vitathārthānāṃ vikalpānām ayogāt tadāhitāpi vāsanā kuto bhaviṣyati | Therefore, since conceptual cognitions of unreal objects are impossible, how could there be any impression deposited by them? |
avastunīti ālambanabhūte vastunyasati nirviṣayavijñānāyogena vāsanādhāyakavijñānābhāvāt kuto vāsanetyarthaḥ / tataś ca vāsanābhāvāt kuto vāsanākṛto 'pohānāṃ bhedaḥ sadrūpatā vā bhaviṣyati | "[The term] 'avastuni' [means] when there is no real entity serving as a substratum; since cognition without an object is impossible, there can be no cognition that could produce impressions - hence how could there be any impression? And when there is no impression, how could the diversity or positive nature of Apohas arise from impressions?" |
bhavadbhiḥ śabdabhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyante | [According to] you, even the diversity of words cannot be obtained from these [impressions] as their cause. |
na hyāsādhāraṇaḥ śabdo vācakaḥ prāgadṛṣṭitaḥ | For no unique denotative word [can exist], as it could not have been perceived before. |
tatra śabdāntarāpohaṃ sāmānye parikalpite / tathaivāvasturūpatvācchabdabhedo na kalpyate | In this case, even if a universal in the form of exclusion of other words is assumed, since it would likewise be unreal in nature, no diversity of words can be conceived. |
vācakānāṃ yathā naiva vācyavācakayor mithaḥ | Just as [there can be no diversity] among denotative [words], so also [there can be no diversity] between the denoted and the denotative. |
na cāpyapohyabhedena bhedo 'stītyupapāditam | And it has [already] been established that there can be no diversity based on the difference of what is excluded. |
śabdānāṃ bhinnasāmānyavacanānāṃ viśeṣavacanānāṃ ca parasparato bhedaḥ śabdabhedaḥ / | "Śabdabheda" [means] the mutual difference between words denoting different universals and [words] denoting particulars. |
tannimitta iti sa vāsanābhedo vācyāpohabhedo vā nimittaṃ kāraṇamasyeti tannimittaḥ / | "Tannimitta" [means that] the difference in impressions or the difference in excluded meanings is its cause. |
nanu pratyakṣata eva śabdānāṃ kāraṇabhedād viruddhadharmādhyāsāc ca bhedaḥ prasiddha evetyāha na hyasādhāraṇa ityādi / | [If one objects:] "Surely the difference among words is directly perceived due to differences in their causes and due to the superimposition of contradictory properties?" [The author] responds "na hy asādhāraṇaḥ" etc. |
vācakaṃ hi śabdam adhikṛtyaitaducyate na ca śrotrajñānāvaseyoḥ yaḥ svalakṣaṇātmāsādhāraṇaśabdo vācakaḥ / | This is said with reference to denotative words, and the unique word that is grasped by auditory cognition, having the nature of a particular, cannot be denotative. |
kasmād ity āha prāgadṛṣṭita iti / | [If one asks] "Why?", [the answer is] because it was not seen before. |
yo hi vyavahārakālāvasthāyī śabdaḥ sa vyavahārakālāt prāk saṅketakāle na dṛṣṭaḥ yo dṛṣṭas tasya ciraniruddhatvān na tena vyavahāraḥ na ca saṅketakāle yo na dṛṣṭas tena vyavahāro yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | For the word that exists at the time of usage was not seen before that usage at the time of convention; and the word that was seen [then] cannot be used due to having long ceased to exist; and usage based on a word that was not seen at the time of convention is not reasonable, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
tasmān na svalakṣaṇasya vācakatvam / | Therefore, a particular cannot be denotative. |
bhavatām api cātra vivāda eva / | Even among you [opponents], there is indeed disagreement on this point. |
yathoktam nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakateṣyate / tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt sāmānyaṃ tūpadekṣyate // | As it has been said: "Neither particular objects nor particular words can be denoted or denotative, because they were not seen before; rather, the universal will be explained [as being denoted]." |
tasmād vācakaṃ śabdamadhikṛtyābhidhānād adoṣaḥ / tatraivam avasthite sati śabdāntarāpohaḥ śabdasāmānyaṃ vācakaṃ yadi kalpyate yathārthāntarāpoho 'rthasāmānyaṃ tadā tathaiva pūrvoktena vidhinā saṃsṛṣṭaikatvanānātvetyādinoktena vācyāpohānām iva śabdāpohānām api parasparato bhedo na ghaṭate / | Therefore there is no fault in what was stated regarding denotative words. This being established, if the exclusion of other words [in the form of] the word-universal is considered denotative, just as the exclusion of other things [constitutes] the object-universal, then just as was previously explained through the method of "mixed unity and multiplicity" etc., there can be no mutual difference among word-exclusions, just as [there is none] among meaning-exclusions. |
nīrūpatvāt | Because they [i.e. the apohas] are featureless. |
yathā cāpohyabhedād api bhedo na vikalpyate tathā na viśeṣaḥ svatastasyetyādinā pratipāditam | And just as there can be no difference due to differences among the excluded things, so also [it has been] explained that there can be no inherent difference between [the apohas], etc. |
tadevaṃ pratijñāyāḥ pratītyabhyupetabādhā pratipāditā | Thus has been explained the contradiction of [the opponent's] own assumption regarding cognition of the thesis. |
sāmprataṃ vācyavācakatvābhāvaprasaṅgāpādanābhyupetabādhādidoṣaṃ pratipipādayiṣuḥ pramāṇayann āha na gamyetyādi | Now, wishing to prove the fault of contradiction with [the opponent's] own assumptions regarding the impossibility of the denoted-denotative relation etc., he states "na gamya" etc. |
na gamyagamakatvaṃ syād avastutvād apohayoḥ | There could be no relation of indicated and indicator between the two apohas, because they are non-entities. |
bhavatpakṣe yathā loke khapuṣpaśaśaśṛṅgayoḥ | Just as, in your view, [there is no such relation] in common experience between a sky-flower and a hare's horn. |
ye avastunī na tayor gamyagamakatvam asti yathā khapuṣpaśaśaśṛṅgayoḥ avastunī ca vācyavācakāpohau bhavetām iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ | Between those two which are non-entities, there is no relation of indicated and indicator, just as between a sky-flower and a hare's horn; and the denoted and denotative apohas would [both] be non-entities - [this is proved] by the perception of contradiction with the pervader. |
vṛṣṭimeghāsator dṛṣṭvā yadyanaikāntikaṃ vadet / vastvastvevātra matpakṣe bhavatpakṣe 'pyadaḥ kutaḥ | If someone, having observed [the relation] between non-existent rain and cloud, should claim [our reason to be] inconclusive, [then we reply that] according to our view there is indeed an entity here - but how could that be in your view? |
vṛṣṭimeghayor asatī asattve abhāvāviti yāvat | [The words] "asatī" referring to rain and cloud [mean] "non-existent", that is, "negations", since the expression is primarily concerned with positive entities. |
tayor dṛṣṭvā gamyagamakamityadhikṛtam | Having observed the indicated-indicator relation between those two [is what is] under discussion. |
yadyanaikāntikamavastutvād iti hetuṃ vaded bauddhastadapyayuktam yasmāt tadviviktākāśālokātmakaṃ vastu matpakṣe 'trāpi vṛṣṭimeghābhāvaprayoge 'styeva | If the Buddhist should claim that our reason "because they are non-entities" is inconclusive, that too is incorrect, because according to our view, even in this case of the application of the absence of rain and clouds, there exists an entity in the form of sky and light devoid of them. |
abhāvasya vastutvapratipādanāt | Because negation has been established to be an entity. |
bhavatas tu bauddhasya pakṣe ado 'pi etadvṛṣṭimeghābhāvayor gamyagamakatvaṃ kutaḥ naiva / | But in your [view], O Bauddha, how could there even be this relation of indicator and indicated between rain and cloud? [There could] not [be such a relation] at all. |
apiśabdo bhinnakramaḥ ada ityasyānantaraṃ sambadhyate / | The particle 'api' is out of sequence [and] should be connected immediately after 'adaḥ'. |
tenāyam artho bhavati / | This is the meaning that results from that. |
na kevalāmapohayor vivādāspadībhūtayor gamyagamakatvaṃ bhavato na yuktam etad api vṛṣṭimeghābhāvayor gamyagamakatvaṃ na yujyata eveti // | Not only is the relation of indicator and indicated between the two apohas that are the subject of dispute not possible for you, but also this relation between rain and cloud is certainly not possible. |
kiñca yadetad bhavadbhir anvayopasarjanayor vyatirekapradhānayoḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ svaviṣayapratipādakatvaṃ varṇyate yac ca adṛṣṭEranyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt / | Moreover, what you describe as the capacity of words and marks to denote their objects, [where] positive [meaning] is subordinate and exclusion is primary, and [what you say about] seeing one's own meaning even in a part of another word's meaning when [that other meaning] is not seen... |
śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritetyādi varṇitam tadapohābhyupagame na yuktamityetat pratipādayann āha vidhirūpaścetyādi / vidhirūpaśca śabdārtho yena nābhyupagamyate / | [The author] states "vidhirūpaśca" etc. to demonstrate that what has been described about the ease of relation from hearing and about non-deviation etc. is not possible under the acceptance of apoha [theory]. "[One] by whom the meaning of words is not accepted as having a positive form..." |
na bhaved vyatireko 'pi tasya tat pūrvako hyasau //966/ | "For him there would not be exclusion either, since that [exclusion] presupposes that [positive form]." |
tatpūrvaka iti vidheḥ pūrvakaḥ / vidher nivṛttilakṣaṇatvād vyatirekasyeti bhāvaḥ / | "Presupposing that" means "presupposing the positive." The idea is that exclusion has the characteristic of being the negation of the positive. |
apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍāḥ / | "[Words] have different meanings due to differences in what is excluded; [but] they are ineffective in [conveying] the differences of their own meanings." |
ekatrābhikāryatvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyakāḥ // | "They become qualifier and qualified because they operate toward one [thing]." |
tanmātrākāṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjhitaḥ / nopāttaḥ saṃśayotpatteḥ sāmye caikārthatā tayoḥ // | Due to the expectation of merely that [difference], the difference is not abandoned through their own commonality, [but] it is not accepted due to the arising of doubt, and in [their] equality there is unity of meaning between those two. |
tadetannopapadyata iti darśayann āha apohamātravācyatvam ityādi | Showing that "this is not logically possible," he states "[regarding] the fact that [words] denote mere exclusion" etc. |
apohamātravācyatvaṃ yadihābhyupagamyate / nīlotpalādiśabdeṣu śabdalārthābhidhāyiṣu // | If it is accepted here that [words] denote mere exclusion in words like "nīlotpala" etc., which express mixed meanings... |
nāpi tatretaras tasmān na viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇe | Therefore neither is there the other [exclusion] there, [and thus] there [can be] no qualifier and qualified. |
pūrvamarthayor eva viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo nirastaḥ | Previously, the relationship of qualifier and qualified between the two meanings was rejected. |
idānīṃ śabdayor api nirasyata iti na punaruktatā | Now it is being rejected also for the two words, thus there is no repetition. |
tatra parasparaṃ vyavacchedakabhāvo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ sa ca vākya eva vyavasthāpyate yathā nīlamutpalam iti | In this case, the relationship of qualifier and qualified is a mutually differentiating nature, and this is established only in a sentence, as in "[This is] a blue lotus." |
tathā vyadhikaraṇayor api bhavati yathā rājñaḥ puruṣa ityādau | Similarly, it occurs also between non-co-referential [terms], as in "king's man" etc. |
bhinnanimittaprayuktayos tvekasminnarthe vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam tac ca nīlotpalam ityādau vṛttāveva vyavasthāpyate | Co-reference is the application to one meaning of two [terms] prompted by different causes, and this is established only in compounds like "nīlotpala" etc. |
tatra nīlotpalādiśabdeṣu śabalārthābhidhāyiṣu yadetat sāmānādhikaraṇyādi tasya na siddhiḥ | In these words like "nīlotpala" which express mixed meanings, this co-reference etc. cannot be established. |
śabalorthaḥ citraḥ yathoktam na hi tat kevalaṃ nīlaṃ ca kevalam utpalam / samudāyābhidheyatvāt iti | The mixed meaning is variegated, as has been stated: "For it is neither merely blue nor merely lotus, because what is denoted is the combination." |
kasmāt siddhir na bhavatītyāha na hītyādi | He states "for not..." etc. [in response to the question] "Why can it not be established?" |
yasmād anīlatvavyudāso 'nutpalavyudāso nāsti / tatra anutpalatyuktau / itaraḥ nīlavyudāsaḥ | Because the exclusion of non-blue is not the exclusion of non-lotus; when the exclusion of non-lotus [is mentioned] there, the other [namely] the exclusion of non-blue [is not entailed]. |
sa cyutiśabdāpekṣayā draṣṭavyaḥ / | [The masculine form] is to be understood with reference to the term 'cyuti'. |
itarā anīlacyutir ity arthaḥ / | The [feminine form] 'itarā' means 'exclusion of the non-blue'. |
nānayoḥ parasparamādhārādheyasambandho 'sti nīrūpatvād iti yāvat / | Between these two there is no relation of container and contained, because [they are] both formless. |
nacāsati sambandhe viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo yukto 'tiprasaṅgād ityuktam / | And when there is no relation, there can be no relation of qualifier and qualified, as [this] would lead to absurd consequences. |
etena yuṣman mate śabalārthābhidhāyitvam eva nāsti sarveṣām abhāvavācitvādityuktaṃ bhavati / | By this it is shown that in your view there can be no mixed meaning [of words], since all [words] denote mere absence. |
tasmān na viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇe yukte / | Therefore, the relation of qualifier and qualified is not possible. |
syād etan mābhūdarthayor viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvas tadvācakayos tu śabdayoḥ kimiti na bhavatītyata āha śabdayor ityādi / | [If] this objection were raised: "Even if there is no relation of qualifier and qualified between the meanings, why should it not exist between the words that express them?" — to this [the author] says "between words" etc. |
abhidheyadvāreṇaiva hi tadabhidhāyinoḥ śabdayor viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva upacaryate abhidheye ca tasyāsambhave satyabhidhāne 'pi kutas tadāropaḥ // | Indeed, the relation of qualifier and qualified is attributed to words that express [meanings] only through what is denoted; hence when that [relation] is impossible in what is denoted, how can there be any attribution of it even in expression? |
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca na bhinnatvādapohayoḥ / | And co-reference is not possible due to the difference of the apohas [exclusions]. |
arthataścet tadiṣyeta kīdṛśyādheyatā tayoḥ // | If it [co-reference] were accepted on the basis of the meaning, what kind of inherence would there be between the two? |
ekasminnarthe vṛttau satyāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhavati / | Co-reference occurs [only] when there is application [of two terms] to one [and the same] meaning. |
na ca nīlotpalaśabdayor eka[p.309]sminnarthe vṛttiḥ sambhavati / | And it is not possible for the words "nīla" and "utpala" to have application to one [and the same] referent. |
tadvācyayor anīlānutpalavyavacchedalakṣaṇayor apohayor bhinnatvāt / | Because the two apohas which are characterized as the exclusion of non-blue and the exclusion of non-lotus [and] which are denoted by these [words] are different. |
tathā hi bhavadbhir eva uktam apohyabhedād bhinnārthā iti / prayogaḥ na nīlotpalādiśabdāḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavahāraviṣayāḥ bhinnaviṣayatvāt ghaṭapaṭādiśabdavat / | For it has indeed been stated by you yourself that "[words] have different meanings due to the difference of what is to be excluded." The application [is]: Words like "blue lotus" cannot be the objects of co-reference because they have different objects, like the words "pot," "cloth," etc. |
athāpi syād yatraiva hi anutpalavyudāso vartate tatraiva anīlavyudāso 'pi sthita iti ataḥ nīlotpalaśabdavācyayor apohayor ekasminnarthe vṛtter arthadvārakaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ śabdayor api nirdiśyata iti ataḥ āha arthataś cetyādi / | But if it might be [objected] that "precisely where the exclusion of non-lotus exists, precisely there the exclusion of non-blue also stands," and therefore co-reference of the two words can also be specified through meaning, as the two apohas denoted by the words "blue" and "lotus" have application to one [and the same] referent, [then] therefore [the author] states "and from the standpoint of meaning" etc. |
tayor iti anīlānutpalavyudāsayoḥ / naiva kācid vāstavī tayor ādheyatā sambhavati nīrūpasya kvacid avasthānāsambhavāt yathā vandhyāputrasya iti bhāvaḥ // | "Of these two" means "of the exclusion of non-blue and the exclusion of non-lotus." No real inherence whatsoever of these two is possible, because something formless cannot exist anywhere, just like a barren woman's son - this is the meaning. |
na cāsādhāraṇaṃ vastu gamyate 'nyac ca nāsti te / | And no unique entity is apprehended, and nothing else exists for you. |
agamyamānam aikārthyaṃ śabdayoḥ kvopayujyate // | Where would the single-meaning-ness of the two words, which is not [even] apprehended, be of use? |
yasmāt tad eva tāvad asādhāraṇaṃ nīlotpalādi vastu na śabdena gamyate tatra sarvavikalpānāṃ pratyastamayād ity uktam / | Since that very unique entity like blue lotus is not apprehended through a word, because all conceptual constructions are absent there, as has been stated. |
tataś ca tasmin ādhārabhūte vastuni ajñāte tadadhikaraṇayor apohayos tadādheyatā kathaṃ grahītuṃ śakyate dharmigrahaṇanāntarīyakatvād dharmagrahaṇasya iti bhāvaḥ / | And consequently, when that substrate entity is unknown, how can the inherence of those two apohas which have that as their locus be grasped, since the grasping of a property is necessarily preceded by [the grasping of] the property-bearer - this is the meaning. |
athāpi syād asādhāraṇārthavyatirekeṇa tayor anyad eva adhikaraṇam asti ataḥ ayam adoṣa iti ataḥ āha anyac ca ityādi / | But if it might be [objected] that "there exists a completely different substrate of these two distinct from the unique entity, therefore this is not a fault," then therefore [the author] states "and anything else" etc. |
syād etadyadi nāmaikārthyaṃ na gamyate tathāpi vastusthityāvasthitamevetyāha agamyamānamityādi / | It might be urged that "even if the co-ordination is not actually cognized, yet it exists in the actual state of things." |
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