buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

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iṣṭās te samuccayagocarās tathāvidhā na bhaveyur ity arthaḥ	The meaning is that these desired collective referents would not be of that nature.
yaścāyam ago 'poho gaur na bhavatīti gośabdasyārthaḥ sa kiṃ bhāvo 'thābhāvaḥ / yadi bhāvaḥ sa kiṃ gaurarthāgauriti / yadi gauḥ nāsti vivādaḥ	Moreover, this meaning of the word 'go' [cow] which is the exclusion of non-cow, i.e., "that which is not non-cow" - is it [something] positive or negative? If positive, is it the cow or the non-cow? If it is the cow, there is no dispute.
athāgauḥ gośabdasyāgaurartha ityatiśabdārthakauśalam	If [you say] the non-cow is the meaning of the word 'go', that would be an extraordinary expertise in word meanings!
athābhāvaḥ tan na yuktam praiṣasampratipattyoraviṣayatvāt	If [you say it is something] negative, that is not reasonable, as it cannot be the object of injunction or understanding.
na hi śabdaśravaṇād abhāve praiṣaḥ sampratipattiś ca bhavet	For indeed, from hearing a word, neither injunction nor understanding can occur with respect to a mere absence.
tadetad darśayati abhāvo 'pi na yukto 'yam ityādi /	This is what [he] shows [by saying] "nor is negation proper" and so forth.
praiṣaṇaṃ praiṣaḥ pratipādakena śroturarthe viniyogaḥ so 'yaṃ pratipādakadharmaḥ /	Praiṣa means praiṣaṇa [which is] the directing of the hearer for a purpose by the speaker; this is a property of the speaker.
sampratipattiḥ śrotṛdharmaḥ /	Comprehension is a property of the hearer.
ādiśabdena bhāvadharmāḥ sarve vāhadohādayo gṛhyante /	By the word ādi [in "and so forth"], all positive properties like "carrier," "milker" and others are included.
api ca śabdārthaḥ pratītyā pratīyate na ca gośabdādabhāvaṃ kaścit pratipadyate //	Moreover, the meaning of words is understood through [direct] cognition, and no one ever understands negation from the word "cow."
nāgaur gaur iti śabdārthaḥ kasmāccāpoha iṣyate /	Why is the meaning of the word held to be apoha [in the form] "a cow is not a non-cow"?
kena hyagotvamāsaktaṃ gaur yenaitadapohyate //	For who has attributed non-cowness to a cow, that it should be excluded here?
agaurapoho yaścāyaṃ gavi śabdārtha ucyate / sa kiṃ gorvyatirikto vāvyatirikta upeyate //	And this exclusion of non-cow which is said to be the meaning of the word with respect to cow—is it accepted as different or non-different from the cow?
vibhinno 'pyāśrito vā syād athavā syād anāśritaḥ /	If [it is] different, would it be dependent [on something] or independent?
āśritatve guṇaḥ prāpto na dravyavacanaṃ tataḥ //	If [it is] dependent, it becomes a quality, and therefore [the word] would not denote a substance.
ato gaur itiśabdena guṇamātrābhidhānataḥ / sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syān na gaurgacchati tiṣṭhati //	Therefore, since the word "cow" would denote only a quality, there could not be co-reference [in sentences like] "the cow goes" [or] "the cow stands."
athānāśrita evāyaṃ yadyarthas tasya ko bhavet /	And if this meaning were completely independent, what would be its [referent]?
yenāsau pratiṣedhāya gaur iti vyapadiśyate //	By which it is designated as "cow" for the purpose of negation.
atha cāvyatirikto 'yam anyāpohastvayeṣyate / gaurevāyam ataḥ prāptaḥ kimuktam adhikaṃ tataḥ //	If this exclusion of others [anyāpoha] is accepted by you as non-different [from the cow], then it simply becomes the cow itself – what more needs to be said about that?
caśabdaḥ samuccaye /	The word 'ca' denotes conjunction.
kasmān na bhavatā gaur ityetasya nāgaurityeṣo 'pohalakṣaṇaḥ śabdārtha ucyata iti vākyārthaḥ /	Why do you not state that the meaning of the word 'gaur' [cow] is characterized by the exclusion [apoha] in the form of 'not non-cow'?
kasmāt punar na vaktavyā ity āha kenetyādi /	[The Buddhist] asks "Why should it not be stated thus?"
itaścāyukto 'poho vikalpānupapatteḥ / tathā hi yo 'yam agorapoho gavi sa kiṃ govyatiriktaḥāhosvidavyatiriktaḥyadyatiriktaḥ sa kimāśrito 'thānāśritaḥ /	For this [further] reason also apoha is untenable, due to the impossibility of [resolving] the alternatives. For this exclusion of non-cow in [relation to] cow – is it different from cow or non-different? If different, is it dependent or independent?
yadyaśritas tadāśritatvād guṇaḥ prāptaḥ, tataś ca gośabdena guṇa evābhidhīyate nāgaur iti gaus tiṣṭhati gaur gacchatīti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti / athānāśritas tadā kenārthenāgorapoha iti ṣaṣṭhī syāt / athāvyatiritas tadā gaurevāsāviti na kiñcit kṛtaṃ bhavati //	If dependent, then being dependent it becomes a quality, and thus the word 'cow' would denote only a quality, not the [substance] cow, so co-reference in [expressions] like "the cow stands" [and] "the cow moves" would not be possible. If independent, then what meaning would the genitive case have in [the expression] "exclusion of non-cow"? If non-different, then it is just the cow itself and nothing is accomplished [by positing it].
pratibhāvamapoho 'yam eko 'neko 'pivā bhavet / yadyeko 'nekagoyukto gotvameva bhavedasau //	Would this apoha be one or many with respect to [different] entities? If one, then being connected with many cows, it would just be cowness itself.
anekatve 'pi cānantyaṃ piṇḍavatsamprayujyate /	And if [it is] many, infinity would apply [to it] just as [it does] to individuals.
tena bhedavadevāsya vācyatā nopayujyate //	Therefore, just like [individual] differences, this [apoha] cannot serve as what is to be denoted.
ayaṃ cāpohaḥ prativastveko 'neko veti vaktavyam / yadyekas tadānekagodravyasambandhī gotvam evāsau bhavet /	And it must be stated whether this apoha is one or many with respect to each entity. If one, then being related to many cow-substances, it would be just cowness itself.
athānekas tataḥ piṇḍavadānantyādākhyānānupapatter avācya eva syāt //	If many, then due to infinity like individuals, it would be impossible to express and thus would be undenotable.
anyāpohaś ca kiṃ vācyaḥ kiṃ vāvācyo 'yam iṣyate	Is this anyāpoha [exclusion of others] meant to be denoted or not denoted?
vācyo 'pi vidhirūpeṇa yadi vānyaniṣedhataḥ	[If it is denoted], is it denoted as something positive or as negation of others?
vidhyātmanāsya vācyatve tyājyamekāntadarśanam	If it is denoted as something positive, [then] the extremist view must be abandoned.
sarvatrānyanirāso 'yaṃ śabdārtha iti varṇitam	[The extremist view] has been described as "in all cases, the exclusion of others is the meaning of words."
athāpyavācya evāyaṃ yadyapohastvayeṣyate / tenānyāpohakṛcchabda iti bhādhyeta te vacaḥ	If, on the other hand, you hold that this apoha is not denoted, then your statement that "words effect the exclusion of others" would be contradicted.
kiñcedaṃ tāvat praṣṭavyo bhavati bhavān, kimapoho vācyo 'thāvācya iti	First of all, you must be asked this: is apoha denoted or not denoted?
vācyatve vidhirūpeṇa vā vācyaḥ syād anyavyāvṛttyā vā	If it is denoted, would it be denoted as something positive or as exclusion of others?
tatra yadi vidhirūpeṇa tadā naikāntikaḥ śabdārtho 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti	If [it is denoted] as something positive, then the [statement] "the meaning of words is the exclusion of others" is not universally true.
athānyavyāvṛttyeti pakṣas tadā tasyāpyanyavyavacchedasyāpareṇānyavyavacchedarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ tasyāpyapareṇetyavyavasthā syāt	If the position is that [it is denoted] as exclusion of others, then that exclusion of others would have to be denoted by another exclusion of others, and that too by another - thus there would be no end [to the regression].
athāvācyas tadānyaśabdārthāpohaṃ śabdaḥ karotīti vyāhanyeta	If [apoha] is held to be not denoted, then the [statement] that "a word effects the exclusion of what is denoted by other words" would be contradicted.
sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmāekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhate	Because there is no difference in all cases, because the substratum is not disrupted, and because all purposes are fulfilled, the characteristics of universals - namely unity, eternality and complete inherence in each [individual] - reside in apoha alone.
tasmād guṇotkarṣādāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhu	Therefore, due to its superior qualities, [the view that] "the meaning of words is just the internal exclusion [of others]" is correct.
api caikatvanityatvapratyekasamavāyinaḥ / nirupākhyeṣvapoheṣu kurvatostatra kaḥ paraḥ	Moreover, who would attribute unity, eternality and inherence in each [individual] to featureless apohas? [It would be like] making [cloth] without threads.
tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyogas teṣu kevalam / bhaved anyanivṛttyaṃśaḥ svātmaivānyatra gamyate	Therefore, the aspect of exclusion of others would exist only in those words where there is a negative connection; in all other cases, the thing itself is what is understood.
yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga iti	[It applies] only in those words where there is a connection with the negative particle
abhakṣyo grāmasūka ityādiṣu	As in [expressions] such as "abhakṣyo grāmasūkaraḥ" ["the village pig is not to be eaten"]
svātmaiveti	[It means] the essential nature itself
svarūpam eva vidhilakṣaṇam	The characteristic of the injunction is indeed [its] own form
anyatreti naṭrahite	[It applies] elsewhere, [that is,] where the negative particle is absent
anyāpohāparijñānād evam ete kudṛṣṭayaḥ	These false views arise thus from not understanding the exclusion of others [anyāpoha]
svayaṃ tuṣṭā durātmāno nāśayanti parānapi	These evil-natured ones, [though] satisfied themselves, destroy others too
tathā hi dvividho 'pohaḥ paryudāsaniṣedhataḥ	Indeed, apoha is of two kinds: through paryudāsa [implicative negation] and niṣedha [simple negation]
dvividhaḥ paryudāso 'pi buddhyātmārthātmabhedataḥ	Paryudāsa too is of two kinds: through distinction of mental content and distinction of object content
paryudāsaniṣedhata iti	[This means] through paryudāsa and niṣedha
paryudāsānniṣedhāc ca paryudāsalakṣaṇaḥ prasajyapratiṣedhaśceti yāvat	That is to say, [there is] the characteristic of paryudāsa and prasajyapratiṣedha [non-implicative negation], due to [the difference between] paryudāsa and niṣedha
buddhyātmārthātmabhedata iti	[This means] through distinction of mental content and object content
tatra buddhyātmā buddhipratibhāso 'rtheṣvanugataikarūpatvenādhyavasitaḥ	Here, the mental content is the cognitive appearance determined as having a single form pervading objects
arthātmā arthasvabhāvo vijātīyavyāvṛttyarthasvalakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ	The object content is the nature of the object, [namely] the specific characteristic [distinguished] through exclusion of heterogeneous [things] - this is the meaning
anayor bhedo vibhāga iti samāsaḥ	The compound means "the division [which is] the distinction between these two"
ekapratyavamarśasya ya uktā hetavaḥ purā / abhayādisamā arthāḥ prakṛtyaivānyabhedinaḥ //	The causes of unitary cognition that were explained previously—[namely] objects like harītakī and so forth—are by their very nature distinct from one another.
tānupāśritya yajjñāte bhātyarthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthātmatābhāve 'pyarthā ityeva niścitam //	Based on these [objects], that which appears in cognition as a reflection of objects is determined as "objects" even though [there is] no objective reality in the conceptual [cognition].
pureti pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ "yathā dhātryabhayādīnā"mtiyādinoktāḥ /	[The word] "previously" [refers to what was] explained in the examination of universals [with the words] "like harītakī and so forth."
tatroktam yathā harītakyādayo bahavo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekaṃ jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanti / tathā sāvaleyādayo 'pyarthāḥ satyapi bhede prakṛtyaikākārapratyavamarśasya hetavo bhaviṣyantyantareṇāpi vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyam iti /	It was explained there that just as many things like harītakī etc., even without [sharing] a universal, perform one [common] function characterized by alleviating fever etc., similarly objects like black [cows] etc., even though different [from each other], become causes of unitary cognition by their very nature, even without [there being] any real universal.
abhayādisamā iti / harītakyāditulyāḥ /	[The phrase] "similar to harītakī etc." [means] equivalent to harītakī and so forth.
ekārthakāritayā sāmyam /	The similarity [consists in] producing one [and the same] effect.
tānupāśrityeti /	[The phrase] "based on these" [continues as follows].
tānabhayādisamānarthānāśritya hetukṛtya tadanubhavabalena yadutpannaṃ vikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ tatra yadarthākāratayārthapratibimbakam arthābhāso bhāti	Based on those objects similar to harītakī etc., through the force of experiencing them as causes, there arises a conceptual cognition in which appears a semblance of objects as a reflection of objects in the form of objects.
tādātmyena tatrānyāpoha ityeṣā saṃjñokteti sambandhaḥ /	Through identity with that [reflection], this is called "exclusion of others" – this is the connection.
etac ca jñāna ityanena samānādhikaraṇam /	And this [word "conceptual"] is in grammatical agreement with [the word] "cognition."
arthātmatābhāve 'pīti / bāhyārthātmatāyā abhāve 'pi /	Even though the character of the external object [bāhyārtha] is absent
niścitam iti adhyavasitam	[It is] definitely ascertained
atha kathaṃ tasyāpoha ityeṣa vyapadeśa ity āha pratibhāsāntarād ityādi	Now [someone] asks: "Why has this designation 'apoha' been given to it?" [The answer] is stated beginning with "pratibhāsāntarāt"
pratibhāsāntarād bhedād anyavyāvṛttavatutaḥ / prātpihetutayāśliṣṭavastudvārā gater api // vijātīyaparāvṛttaṃ tatphalaṃ yat svalakṣaṇam / tasminnadhyavasāyād vā tādātmyenāsya viplutaiḥ // tatrānyapoha ityeṣā saṃjñoktā sanibandhanā	The designation 'anyāpoha' [exclusion of others] has been given with reason: because it appears as distinct from other appearances, because it has the character of being excluded from others, because [cognition] proceeds through an excluded entity, and because it is apprehended in identity with the particular [svalakṣaṇa] which is the result consisting in exclusion of heterogeneous [things] by those confused about its identity
caturbhir nimittair apoha iti tasyākhyā	The term 'apoha' is applied to it for four reasons
vikalpāntarāropitapratibhāsāntarād bhedena svayaṃ pratibhāsanānmukhyataḥ / apohyata ityapoho 'nyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti vyutpatteḥ	Primarily, because it appears by itself as distinct from other appearances superimposed by other conceptual constructions, based on the derivation "what is excluded [apohyate] from others is apoha, [hence] exclusion from others [anyāpoha]"
upacārāt tu tribhiḥ kāraṇe kāryadharmāropād vā yadāha anyavyāvṛtta vastunaḥ prātihetutayeti	The other three reasons are metaphorical, through attributing properties of the effect to the cause, as stated in "because it has the nature of being excluded from others"
kārye vā kāraṇadharmopacārāt taddarśayati aśliṣṭavastudvārā gater apīti	Or through attributing properties of the cause to the effect, as shown in "because [cognition] proceeds through an unconnected entity"
aśliṣṭam anyāsambaddham, anyato vyāvṛttam iti yāvat	'Unconnected' [aśliṣṭa] means 'not connected with others', that is, 'excluded from others'
tadeva vastudvāramupāyaḥ, tadanubhavabalena tathāvidhavikalpotpatteḥ	That very entity is the means, because such conceptual construction arises through the force of experiencing it
vijātīyāpohapadārthena sahaikyena bhrāntaiḥ pratipattṛbhiradhyavasitatvācceti caturthaṃ kāraṇam taddarśayati vijātīyetyādi	The fourth reason is shown beginning with "vijātīya", namely that it is apprehended by cognizers who are confused about its identity with the meaning consisting in exclusion of heterogeneous [things]
asyeti vikalpabuddhyārūḍhasyārthapratibimbasya	[This refers to] the reflection of the object that has arisen in conceptual cognition
sanibandhaneti saha nibandhanena pratibhāsāntarād bhedādinoktena caturvidhena vartata iti sanibandhanā	[It exists] together with its basis in the form of the four [reasons] mentioned, such as differentiation from other appearances
arthātmanopohasya svarūpaṃ darśayann āha svalakṣaṇe 'pītyādi	Showing the nature of apoha in the form of the object, he states "[it applies] even to the unique particular" and so forth
svalakṣaṇe 'pi taddhetāvanyaviśleṣabhāvataḥ // anyāpoha ityeṣā saṃjñoktā sanibandhaneti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ	"Even in the case of the unique particular, due to the presence of differentiation from others, this designation 'exclusion of others' is stated [to apply] with [its] basis" - this is connected with the previous [statement]
tatra nibandhanamāha anyaviśleṣabhāvata iti / anyasmād vijātīyādviśleṣo vyāvṛttis tasya bhāvāt	Here he states the basis [by saying] "due to the presence of differentiation from others" - [that is,] due to the presence of separation, i.e., exclusion from what is different, i.e., heterogeneous
etena mukhyata eva svalakṣaṇe 'nyāpohavyapadeśa ityuktaṃ bhavati	By this it is stated that the designation "exclusion of others" applies primarily to the unique particular itself
prasajyapratiṣedhaś ca gaurgaur na bhavatyayam	And [there is] absolute negation [in the form] "this cow is not a non-cow"
ativispaṣṭa evāyam anyāpoho 'vagamyate	This exclusion of others is apprehended very clearly indeed
tatrāyaṃ prathamaḥ śabdair apohaḥ pratipādyate	Among these, this first [type of] exclusion is expressed by words
bāhyārthādhyavasāyinyā buddheḥ śabdātsamudbhavāt	Because from words arises a cognition that determines an external object
prathama iti / yathoktārthapratibimbātmā /	"Prathama" ("first"), i.e., that which consists in the reflection of the object as described above.
tatra kāraṇam āha bāhyārthādhyavasāyinyā ityādi /	The reason for this is explained [in the phrase beginning with] "bāhyārthādhyavasāyinyā."
yadeva hi śābde jñāne pratibhāsate sa eva śabdārtho yuktaḥ, na cātra prasajyapratiṣedhādhyavasāyo 'sti na cāpīndriyajñānavastvalakṣaṇapratibhāsaḥ, kiṃ tarhi---/	That alone which appears in verbal cognition should be regarded as the denotation of words; and in this [verbal cognition] there is neither an apprehension of absolute negation nor an appearance of specific individuality [as found] in sense-cognition; rather—
bāhyārthādhyavasāyinī kevalaṃ śābdī buddhir upajāyate /	Only that verbal cognition arises which apprehends the external object.
tena tadevārthapratibimbakaṃ śābde jñāne sākṣāt tadātmatayā pratibhāsanācchabdārtho yukto nānya iti bhāvaḥ /	Therefore, only that reflection of the object which appears directly in verbal cognition as identical with it can properly be the denotation of the word, nothing else—this is the meaning.
yaścāpi śabdasyārthena saha vācyavācakabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ prasiddho nāsau kāryakāraṇabhāvād anyo 'vatiṣṭhate, apitu kāryakāraṇabhāvātmaka eveti darśayati tadrūpapratibimbasyetyādi /	And that well-known relation characterized as denoted-denotative which [exists] between word and meaning does not exist as different from the cause-effect relationship, but rather is of the nature of cause and effect itself—this is shown [in the phrase beginning with] "tadrūpapratibimbasya."
vācyavācakabhāvo 'yaṃ jāto hetuphalātmakaḥ /	This denoted-denotative relationship has arisen as being of the nature of cause and effect.
tat adhyavasitabahirbhāvatvalakṣaṇaṃ rūpam svabhāvo yasya tat tathoktam, tadrūpaṃ ca tat pratibimbaṃ ceti samāsaḥ, tasya tadrūpapratibimbasya dhiyaḥ sambandhinaḥ śabdājjanmanyutpāde sati sa vācyavācakalakṣaṇo nirūpyamāṇaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvātmaka eva jātaḥ /	When the arising of cognition related to that reflection-in-that-form (wherein "that form" means that whose nature is characterized by apprehended externality, and the compound means "that form and that reflection") has occurred from the word, that relationship characterized as denoted-denotative, upon examination, has arisen as being of the nature of cause and effect only.
tathā hi śabdapratibimbasya janakatvādvācaka ucyate, tac ca pratibimbaṃ śabdena janyamānatvād vācyam /	Thus the word is called "denotative" because it is productive of the reflection, and that reflection is [called] "denoted" because it is produced by the word.
tena yaduktam ---"niṣedhamātraṃ naivehaṃ śābde jñāne 'vabhāsate, iti tadasaṃgatam, niṣedhamātrasya śabdārthatvānabhyupagamād iti bhāvaḥ /	Therefore what was stated—that "mere negation does not appear in verbal cognition"—is irrelevant, because mere negation is not accepted as being the denotation of words—this is the meaning.
prasajyapratiṣedho 'pi sāmarthyena pratīyate /	Absolute negation too is apprehended through implication.

iṣṭās te samuccayagocarās tathāvidhā na bhaveyur ity arthaḥ

The meaning is that these desired collective referents would not be of that nature.

yaścāyam ago 'poho gaur na bhavatīti gośabdasyārthaḥ sa kiṃ bhāvo 'thābhāvaḥ / yadi bhāvaḥ sa kiṃ gaurarthāgauriti / yadi gauḥ nāsti vivādaḥ

Moreover, this meaning of the word 'go' [cow] which is the exclusion of non-cow, i.e., "that which is not non-cow" - is it [something] positive or negative? If positive, is it the cow or the non-cow? If it is the cow, there is no dispute.

athāgauḥ gośabdasyāgaurartha ityatiśabdārthakauśalam

If [you say] the non-cow is the meaning of the word 'go', that would be an extraordinary expertise in word meanings!

athābhāvaḥ tan na yuktam praiṣasampratipattyoraviṣayatvāt

If [you say it is something] negative, that is not reasonable, as it cannot be the object of injunction or understanding.

na hi śabdaśravaṇād abhāve praiṣaḥ sampratipattiś ca bhavet

For indeed, from hearing a word, neither injunction nor understanding can occur with respect to a mere absence.

tadetad darśayati abhāvo 'pi na yukto 'yam ityādi /

This is what [he] shows [by saying] "nor is negation proper" and so forth.

praiṣaṇaṃ praiṣaḥ pratipādakena śroturarthe viniyogaḥ so 'yaṃ pratipādakadharmaḥ /

Praiṣa means praiṣaṇa [which is] the directing of the hearer for a purpose by the speaker; this is a property of the speaker.

sampratipattiḥ śrotṛdharmaḥ /

Comprehension is a property of the hearer.

ādiśabdena bhāvadharmāḥ sarve vāhadohādayo gṛhyante /

By the word ādi [in "and so forth"], all positive properties like "carrier," "milker" and others are included.

api ca śabdārthaḥ pratītyā pratīyate na ca gośabdādabhāvaṃ kaścit pratipadyate //

Moreover, the meaning of words is understood through [direct] cognition, and no one ever understands negation from the word "cow."

nāgaur gaur iti śabdārthaḥ kasmāccāpoha iṣyate /

Why is the meaning of the word held to be apoha [in the form] "a cow is not a non-cow"?

kena hyagotvamāsaktaṃ gaur yenaitadapohyate //

For who has attributed non-cowness to a cow, that it should be excluded here?

agaurapoho yaścāyaṃ gavi śabdārtha ucyate / sa kiṃ gorvyatirikto vāvyatirikta upeyate //

And this exclusion of non-cow which is said to be the meaning of the word with respect to cow—is it accepted as different or non-different from the cow?

vibhinno 'pyāśrito vā syād athavā syād anāśritaḥ /

If [it is] different, would it be dependent [on something] or independent?

āśritatve guṇaḥ prāpto na dravyavacanaṃ tataḥ //

If [it is] dependent, it becomes a quality, and therefore [the word] would not denote a substance.

ato gaur itiśabdena guṇamātrābhidhānataḥ / sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syān na gaurgacchati tiṣṭhati //

Therefore, since the word "cow" would denote only a quality, there could not be co-reference [in sentences like] "the cow goes" [or] "the cow stands."

athānāśrita evāyaṃ yadyarthas tasya ko bhavet /

And if this meaning were completely independent, what would be its [referent]?

yenāsau pratiṣedhāya gaur iti vyapadiśyate //

By which it is designated as "cow" for the purpose of negation.

atha cāvyatirikto 'yam anyāpohastvayeṣyate / gaurevāyam ataḥ prāptaḥ kimuktam adhikaṃ tataḥ //

If this exclusion of others [anyāpoha] is accepted by you as non-different [from the cow], then it simply becomes the cow itself – what more needs to be said about that?

caśabdaḥ samuccaye /

The word 'ca' denotes conjunction.

kasmān na bhavatā gaur ityetasya nāgaurityeṣo 'pohalakṣaṇaḥ śabdārtha ucyata iti vākyārthaḥ /

Why do you not state that the meaning of the word 'gaur' [cow] is characterized by the exclusion [apoha] in the form of 'not non-cow'?

kasmāt punar na vaktavyā ity āha kenetyādi /

[The Buddhist] asks "Why should it not be stated thus?"

itaścāyukto 'poho vikalpānupapatteḥ / tathā hi yo 'yam agorapoho gavi sa kiṃ govyatiriktaḥāhosvidavyatiriktaḥyadyatiriktaḥ sa kimāśrito 'thānāśritaḥ /

For this [further] reason also apoha is untenable, due to the impossibility of [resolving] the alternatives. For this exclusion of non-cow in [relation to] cow – is it different from cow or non-different? If different, is it dependent or independent?

yadyaśritas tadāśritatvād guṇaḥ prāptaḥ, tataś ca gośabdena guṇa evābhidhīyate nāgaur iti gaus tiṣṭhati gaur gacchatīti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti / athānāśritas tadā kenārthenāgorapoha iti ṣaṣṭhī syāt / athāvyatiritas tadā gaurevāsāviti na kiñcit kṛtaṃ bhavati //

If dependent, then being dependent it becomes a quality, and thus the word 'cow' would denote only a quality, not the [substance] cow, so co-reference in [expressions] like "the cow stands" [and] "the cow moves" would not be possible. If independent, then what meaning would the genitive case have in [the expression] "exclusion of non-cow"? If non-different, then it is just the cow itself and nothing is accomplished [by positing it].

pratibhāvamapoho 'yam eko 'neko 'pivā bhavet / yadyeko 'nekagoyukto gotvameva bhavedasau //

Would this apoha be one or many with respect to [different] entities? If one, then being connected with many cows, it would just be cowness itself.

anekatve 'pi cānantyaṃ piṇḍavatsamprayujyate /

And if [it is] many, infinity would apply [to it] just as [it does] to individuals.

tena bhedavadevāsya vācyatā nopayujyate //

Therefore, just like [individual] differences, this [apoha] cannot serve as what is to be denoted.

ayaṃ cāpohaḥ prativastveko 'neko veti vaktavyam / yadyekas tadānekagodravyasambandhī gotvam evāsau bhavet /

And it must be stated whether this apoha is one or many with respect to each entity. If one, then being related to many cow-substances, it would be just cowness itself.

athānekas tataḥ piṇḍavadānantyādākhyānānupapatter avācya eva syāt //

If many, then due to infinity like individuals, it would be impossible to express and thus would be undenotable.

anyāpohaś ca kiṃ vācyaḥ kiṃ vāvācyo 'yam iṣyate

Is this anyāpoha [exclusion of others] meant to be denoted or not denoted?

vācyo 'pi vidhirūpeṇa yadi vānyaniṣedhataḥ

[If it is denoted], is it denoted as something positive or as negation of others?

vidhyātmanāsya vācyatve tyājyamekāntadarśanam

If it is denoted as something positive, [then] the extremist view must be abandoned.

sarvatrānyanirāso 'yaṃ śabdārtha iti varṇitam

[The extremist view] has been described as "in all cases, the exclusion of others is the meaning of words."

athāpyavācya evāyaṃ yadyapohastvayeṣyate / tenānyāpohakṛcchabda iti bhādhyeta te vacaḥ

If, on the other hand, you hold that this apoha is not denoted, then your statement that "words effect the exclusion of others" would be contradicted.

kiñcedaṃ tāvat praṣṭavyo bhavati bhavān, kimapoho vācyo 'thāvācya iti

First of all, you must be asked this: is apoha denoted or not denoted?

vācyatve vidhirūpeṇa vā vācyaḥ syād anyavyāvṛttyā vā

If it is denoted, would it be denoted as something positive or as exclusion of others?

tatra yadi vidhirūpeṇa tadā naikāntikaḥ śabdārtho 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti

If [it is denoted] as something positive, then the [statement] "the meaning of words is the exclusion of others" is not universally true.

athānyavyāvṛttyeti pakṣas tadā tasyāpyanyavyavacchedasyāpareṇānyavyavacchedarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ tasyāpyapareṇetyavyavasthā syāt

If the position is that [it is denoted] as exclusion of others, then that exclusion of others would have to be denoted by another exclusion of others, and that too by another - thus there would be no end [to the regression].

athāvācyas tadānyaśabdārthāpohaṃ śabdaḥ karotīti vyāhanyeta

If [apoha] is held to be not denoted, then the [statement] that "a word effects the exclusion of what is denoted by other words" would be contradicted.

sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmāekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā apoha evāvatiṣṭhate

Because there is no difference in all cases, because the substratum is not disrupted, and because all purposes are fulfilled, the characteristics of universals - namely unity, eternality and complete inherence in each [individual] - reside in apoha alone.

tasmād guṇotkarṣādāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhu

Therefore, due to its superior qualities, [the view that] "the meaning of words is just the internal exclusion [of others]" is correct.

api caikatvanityatvapratyekasamavāyinaḥ / nirupākhyeṣvapoheṣu kurvatostatra kaḥ paraḥ

Moreover, who would attribute unity, eternality and inherence in each [individual] to featureless apohas? [It would be like] making [cloth] without threads.

tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyogas teṣu kevalam / bhaved anyanivṛttyaṃśaḥ svātmaivānyatra gamyate

Therefore, the aspect of exclusion of others would exist only in those words where there is a negative connection; in all other cases, the thing itself is what is understood.

yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga iti

[It applies] only in those words where there is a connection with the negative particle

abhakṣyo grāmasūka ityādiṣu

As in [expressions] such as "abhakṣyo grāmasūkaraḥ" ["the village pig is not to be eaten"]

svātmaiveti

[It means] the essential nature itself

svarūpam eva vidhilakṣaṇam

The characteristic of the injunction is indeed [its] own form

anyatreti naṭrahite

[It applies] elsewhere, [that is,] where the negative particle is absent

anyāpohāparijñānād evam ete kudṛṣṭayaḥ

These false views arise thus from not understanding the exclusion of others [anyāpoha]

svayaṃ tuṣṭā durātmāno nāśayanti parānapi

These evil-natured ones, [though] satisfied themselves, destroy others too

tathā hi dvividho 'pohaḥ paryudāsaniṣedhataḥ

Indeed, apoha is of two kinds: through paryudāsa [implicative negation] and niṣedha [simple negation]

dvividhaḥ paryudāso 'pi buddhyātmārthātmabhedataḥ

Paryudāsa too is of two kinds: through distinction of mental content and distinction of object content

paryudāsaniṣedhata iti

[This means] through paryudāsa and niṣedha

paryudāsānniṣedhāc ca paryudāsalakṣaṇaḥ prasajyapratiṣedhaśceti yāvat

That is to say, [there is] the characteristic of paryudāsa and prasajyapratiṣedha [non-implicative negation], due to [the difference between] paryudāsa and niṣedha

buddhyātmārthātmabhedata iti

[This means] through distinction of mental content and object content

tatra buddhyātmā buddhipratibhāso 'rtheṣvanugataikarūpatvenādhyavasitaḥ

Here, the mental content is the cognitive appearance determined as having a single form pervading objects

arthātmā arthasvabhāvo vijātīyavyāvṛttyarthasvalakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ

The object content is the nature of the object, [namely] the specific characteristic [distinguished] through exclusion of heterogeneous [things] - this is the meaning

anayor bhedo vibhāga iti samāsaḥ

The compound means "the division [which is] the distinction between these two"

ekapratyavamarśasya ya uktā hetavaḥ purā / abhayādisamā arthāḥ prakṛtyaivānyabhedinaḥ //

The causes of unitary cognition that were explained previously—[namely] objects like harītakī and so forth—are by their very nature distinct from one another.

tānupāśritya yajjñāte bhātyarthapratibimbakam / kalpake 'rthātmatābhāve 'pyarthā ityeva niścitam //

Based on these [objects], that which appears in cognition as a reflection of objects is determined as "objects" even though [there is] no objective reality in the conceptual [cognition].

pureti pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ "yathā dhātryabhayādīnā"mtiyādinoktāḥ /

[The word] "previously" [refers to what was] explained in the examination of universals [with the words] "like harītakī and so forth."

tatroktam yathā harītakyādayo bahavo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekaṃ jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kurvanti / tathā sāvaleyādayo 'pyarthāḥ satyapi bhede prakṛtyaikākārapratyavamarśasya hetavo bhaviṣyantyantareṇāpi vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyam iti /

It was explained there that just as many things like harītakī etc., even without [sharing] a universal, perform one [common] function characterized by alleviating fever etc., similarly objects like black [cows] etc., even though different [from each other], become causes of unitary cognition by their very nature, even without [there being] any real universal.

abhayādisamā iti / harītakyāditulyāḥ /

[The phrase] "similar to harītakī etc." [means] equivalent to harītakī and so forth.

ekārthakāritayā sāmyam /

The similarity [consists in] producing one [and the same] effect.

tānupāśrityeti /

[The phrase] "based on these" [continues as follows].

tānabhayādisamānarthānāśritya hetukṛtya tadanubhavabalena yadutpannaṃ vikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ tatra yadarthākāratayārthapratibimbakam arthābhāso bhāti

Based on those objects similar to harītakī etc., through the force of experiencing them as causes, there arises a conceptual cognition in which appears a semblance of objects as a reflection of objects in the form of objects.

tādātmyena tatrānyāpoha ityeṣā saṃjñokteti sambandhaḥ /

Through identity with that [reflection], this is called "exclusion of others" – this is the connection.

etac ca jñāna ityanena samānādhikaraṇam /

And this [word "conceptual"] is in grammatical agreement with [the word] "cognition."

arthātmatābhāve 'pīti / bāhyārthātmatāyā abhāve 'pi /

Even though the character of the external object [bāhyārtha] is absent

niścitam iti adhyavasitam

[It is] definitely ascertained

atha kathaṃ tasyāpoha ityeṣa vyapadeśa ity āha pratibhāsāntarād ityādi

Now [someone] asks: "Why has this designation 'apoha' been given to it?" [The answer] is stated beginning with "pratibhāsāntarāt"

pratibhāsāntarād bhedād anyavyāvṛttavatutaḥ / prātpihetutayāśliṣṭavastudvārā gater api // vijātīyaparāvṛttaṃ tatphalaṃ yat svalakṣaṇam / tasminnadhyavasāyād vā tādātmyenāsya viplutaiḥ // tatrānyapoha ityeṣā saṃjñoktā sanibandhanā

The designation 'anyāpoha' [exclusion of others] has been given with reason: because it appears as distinct from other appearances, because it has the character of being excluded from others, because [cognition] proceeds through an excluded entity, and because it is apprehended in identity with the particular [svalakṣaṇa] which is the result consisting in exclusion of heterogeneous [things] by those confused about its identity

caturbhir nimittair apoha iti tasyākhyā

The term 'apoha' is applied to it for four reasons

vikalpāntarāropitapratibhāsāntarād bhedena svayaṃ pratibhāsanānmukhyataḥ / apohyata ityapoho 'nyasmād apoho 'nyāpoha iti vyutpatteḥ

Primarily, because it appears by itself as distinct from other appearances superimposed by other conceptual constructions, based on the derivation "what is excluded [apohyate] from others is apoha, [hence] exclusion from others [anyāpoha]"

upacārāt tu tribhiḥ kāraṇe kāryadharmāropād vā yadāha anyavyāvṛtta vastunaḥ prātihetutayeti

The other three reasons are metaphorical, through attributing properties of the effect to the cause, as stated in "because it has the nature of being excluded from others"

kārye vā kāraṇadharmopacārāt taddarśayati aśliṣṭavastudvārā gater apīti

Or through attributing properties of the cause to the effect, as shown in "because [cognition] proceeds through an unconnected entity"

aśliṣṭam anyāsambaddham, anyato vyāvṛttam iti yāvat

'Unconnected' [aśliṣṭa] means 'not connected with others', that is, 'excluded from others'

tadeva vastudvāramupāyaḥ, tadanubhavabalena tathāvidhavikalpotpatteḥ

That very entity is the means, because such conceptual construction arises through the force of experiencing it

vijātīyāpohapadārthena sahaikyena bhrāntaiḥ pratipattṛbhiradhyavasitatvācceti caturthaṃ kāraṇam taddarśayati vijātīyetyādi

The fourth reason is shown beginning with "vijātīya", namely that it is apprehended by cognizers who are confused about its identity with the meaning consisting in exclusion of heterogeneous [things]

asyeti vikalpabuddhyārūḍhasyārthapratibimbasya

[This refers to] the reflection of the object that has arisen in conceptual cognition

sanibandhaneti saha nibandhanena pratibhāsāntarād bhedādinoktena caturvidhena vartata iti sanibandhanā

[It exists] together with its basis in the form of the four [reasons] mentioned, such as differentiation from other appearances

arthātmanopohasya svarūpaṃ darśayann āha svalakṣaṇe 'pītyādi

Showing the nature of apoha in the form of the object, he states "[it applies] even to the unique particular" and so forth

svalakṣaṇe 'pi taddhetāvanyaviśleṣabhāvataḥ // anyāpoha ityeṣā saṃjñoktā sanibandhaneti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ

"Even in the case of the unique particular, due to the presence of differentiation from others, this designation 'exclusion of others' is stated [to apply] with [its] basis" - this is connected with the previous [statement]

tatra nibandhanamāha anyaviśleṣabhāvata iti / anyasmād vijātīyādviśleṣo vyāvṛttis tasya bhāvāt

Here he states the basis [by saying] "due to the presence of differentiation from others" - [that is,] due to the presence of separation, i.e., exclusion from what is different, i.e., heterogeneous

etena mukhyata eva svalakṣaṇe 'nyāpohavyapadeśa ityuktaṃ bhavati

By this it is stated that the designation "exclusion of others" applies primarily to the unique particular itself

prasajyapratiṣedhaś ca gaurgaur na bhavatyayam

And [there is] absolute negation [in the form] "this cow is not a non-cow"

ativispaṣṭa evāyam anyāpoho 'vagamyate

This exclusion of others is apprehended very clearly indeed

tatrāyaṃ prathamaḥ śabdair apohaḥ pratipādyate

Among these, this first [type of] exclusion is expressed by words

bāhyārthādhyavasāyinyā buddheḥ śabdātsamudbhavāt

Because from words arises a cognition that determines an external object

prathama iti / yathoktārthapratibimbātmā /

"Prathama" ("first"), i.e., that which consists in the reflection of the object as described above.

tatra kāraṇam āha bāhyārthādhyavasāyinyā ityādi /

The reason for this is explained [in the phrase beginning with] "bāhyārthādhyavasāyinyā."

yadeva hi śābde jñāne pratibhāsate sa eva śabdārtho yuktaḥ, na cātra prasajyapratiṣedhādhyavasāyo 'sti na cāpīndriyajñānavastvalakṣaṇapratibhāsaḥ, kiṃ tarhi---/

That alone which appears in verbal cognition should be regarded as the denotation of words; and in this [verbal cognition] there is neither an apprehension of absolute negation nor an appearance of specific individuality [as found] in sense-cognition; rather—

bāhyārthādhyavasāyinī kevalaṃ śābdī buddhir upajāyate /

Only that verbal cognition arises which apprehends the external object.

tena tadevārthapratibimbakaṃ śābde jñāne sākṣāt tadātmatayā pratibhāsanācchabdārtho yukto nānya iti bhāvaḥ /

Therefore, only that reflection of the object which appears directly in verbal cognition as identical with it can properly be the denotation of the word, nothing else—this is the meaning.

yaścāpi śabdasyārthena saha vācyavācakabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ prasiddho nāsau kāryakāraṇabhāvād anyo 'vatiṣṭhate, apitu kāryakāraṇabhāvātmaka eveti darśayati tadrūpapratibimbasyetyādi /

And that well-known relation characterized as denoted-denotative which [exists] between word and meaning does not exist as different from the cause-effect relationship, but rather is of the nature of cause and effect itself—this is shown [in the phrase beginning with] "tadrūpapratibimbasya."

vācyavācakabhāvo 'yaṃ jāto hetuphalātmakaḥ /

This denoted-denotative relationship has arisen as being of the nature of cause and effect.

tat adhyavasitabahirbhāvatvalakṣaṇaṃ rūpam svabhāvo yasya tat tathoktam, tadrūpaṃ ca tat pratibimbaṃ ceti samāsaḥ, tasya tadrūpapratibimbasya dhiyaḥ sambandhinaḥ śabdājjanmanyutpāde sati sa vācyavācakalakṣaṇo nirūpyamāṇaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvātmaka eva jātaḥ /

When the arising of cognition related to that reflection-in-that-form (wherein "that form" means that whose nature is characterized by apprehended externality, and the compound means "that form and that reflection") has occurred from the word, that relationship characterized as denoted-denotative, upon examination, has arisen as being of the nature of cause and effect only.

tathā hi śabdapratibimbasya janakatvādvācaka ucyate, tac ca pratibimbaṃ śabdena janyamānatvād vācyam /

Thus the word is called "denotative" because it is productive of the reflection, and that reflection is [called] "denoted" because it is produced by the word.

tena yaduktam ---"niṣedhamātraṃ naivehaṃ śābde jñāne 'vabhāsate, iti tadasaṃgatam, niṣedhamātrasya śabdārthatvānabhyupagamād iti bhāvaḥ /

Therefore what was stated—that "mere negation does not appear in verbal cognition"—is irrelevant, because mere negation is not accepted as being the denotation of words—this is the meaning.

prasajyapratiṣedho 'pi sāmarthyena pratīyate /

Absolute negation too is apprehended through implication.