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na tadātmā parātmeti sambandhe sati vastubhiḥ / vyāvṛttavastvadhigamo 'pyarthādeva bhavatyataḥ / | When there is connection with things [in the form] "this nature is not that nature," the apprehension of excluded things also occurs from the meaning itself. |
tenāyam api śabdasya svārtha ityupacaryate / na tu sākṣādayaṃ śābdo dvividho 'poha ucyate // | Hence this [meaning] is also figuratively spoken of as the "own meaning" of the word; however, these two kinds of apoha are not directly called [the word's] verbal [meaning]. |
evaṃ ceti janyatvena / | [It is] "thus" in the sense of being something produced. |
kasmāt punaḥ sāmarthyena prasajyapratiṣedhaḥ pratīyata iti darśayann āha | [The author], showing [the answer to] "how is absolute negation understood through implication?", says: |
na tadātmeti / | [It means] "not of that nature." |
tasya gavādipratibimbasyātmā yaḥ parasyāśvādipratibimbasyātmā svabhāvo ---na bhavatīti kṛtvā / | [This is said] because the nature which is the essence of this reflection of 'cow' etc. is not the nature which is the essence of the other [thing], [namely] the reflection of 'horse' etc. |
evaṃ prasajyalakṣaṇāpohasya nāntarīyakatayā pratīter gauṇaṃ śabdārthatvaṃ pratipādya svalakṣaṇasyāpi pratipādayann āha sambandhe satītyādi / | Having thus explained that the word-meaning status of apoha characterized by absolute negation is secondary due to [its] being invariably concomitant, [the author], explaining [the same] also for the particular (svalakṣaṇa), says "when there is connection" etc. |
tatra sambandhaḥ śabdasya vastuni pāramparyeṇa kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇaḥ pratibandhaḥ / | Here, the "connection" of the word with the object is an indirect relation characterized by cause and effect. |
prathamaṃ yathāsthitavastvanubhavas tato vivakṣā tatas tālvādiparispandastataḥ śabda ityevaṃ paramparayā yadā śabdasya vastubhir bāhyair agnādibhiḥ sambandhaḥ syāt tadā tasmin sambandhe sati vijātīyavyāvṛttasyāpi vastuno 'rthāpattito 'dhigamo bhavati / | First there is the experience of the object as it exists, then the desire to speak, then the movement of the palate etc., then the word - when there is such an indirect connection of the word with external objects like fire etc., then, when this connection exists, there occurs the understanding through presumption of the object as excluded from heterogeneous [things]. |
ato dvividho 'pi svalakṣaṇātmā / apiśabdātprasajyātmā ca // | Therefore both kinds [of meaning] - that having the nature of the particular and, as indicated by "api", that having the nature of absolute negation [are figuratively spoken of as the word's meaning]. |
ācāryadiṅnāgasyopari yadudyotakareṇoktam yadi śabdasyāpoho 'bhidheyo 'rthastadābhidheyārthavyatirekeṇāsya svārtho vaktavyaḥ, atha sa evāsya svārthastathāpi vyāhatam etad anyaśabdārthāpohaṃ hi svārthe kurvatī śrutirabhidhatta ity ucyata iti asya hi vākyasyāyam arthas tadānīṃ bhavati abhidadhānābhidhatta iti / | What Uddyotakara said regarding Ācārya Diṅnāga: "If apoha is the denotable meaning of the word, then its own meaning must be stated as distinct from the denotable meaning. But if that [apoha] itself is its own meaning, then this contradicts [your statement] that 'an utterance is said to denote when it effects the exclusion of other word-meanings in its own meaning' - for this sentence would then mean that 'a non-denoting [utterance] denotes'." |
svalakṣaṇam api hi śabdasyopacārātsvārtha iti pratipāditamatastamin svalakṣaṇātmake svārthe 'rthāntaravyavacchedaṃ pratibimbāntarad vyāvṛttaṃ pratibibmātmakam apohaṃ kurvatī janayantī śrutir abhidhatta ity ucyate ityetad ācāryīyaṃ vacanam avirodhī | The Specific Individuality (svalakṣaṇa) indeed is also the word's 'own meaning' by implication, as has been explained before; and when operating on this 'own meaning' in the form of the Specific Individuality, the word, while producing the exclusion of other meanings [and] generating the Apoha in the form of a reflection distinguished from other reflections, is said to 'denote' [that meaning] -- thus there is no contradiction in the Teacher's statement. |
bāhyārthetyādinaitad evācāryīyaṃ vacanam ācaṣṭe | This very statement of the Teacher is explained by [the phrase] beginning with "external object." |
natu svalakṣaṇātmānaṃ spṛśetyeṣā vibhedinam / tanmātrāṃśātirekeṇa nāstyasyā abhidhākriyā | [The word] does not touch the differentiating essence in the form of the specific individuality; beyond merely producing that [reflection], there is no [other] denotative function of this [word]. |
ayam ācāryasyābhiprāyaḥ | This is the Teacher's intended meaning. |
na śabdasya bāhyārthādhyavasāyivikalpapratibimbotpādavyatirekeṇānyo bāhyābhidhānavyāpāraḥ sambhavati | There exists no function of the word in denoting external objects other than producing a reflection of the conceptual cognition that determines external objects. |
nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām | Because all entities are devoid of [real] activity. |
ato bāhyārthādhyavasāyena pravṛttivikalpapratibimbaṃ janayantī śrutiḥ svārtham abhidhatta ity ucyata iti | Therefore, when the word generates a reflection of the conceptual cognition that operates through determining external objects, it is said that "it denotes its own meaning." |
natu vibheditaṃ sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam eṣāṃ spṛśati, akiñcitkaratvāt | But it does not touch the differentiating specific individuality which is distinguished from similar and dissimilar things, because that would serve no purpose. |
tanmātrāṃśātirekeṇa | [There is nothing] beyond merely [producing] that portion [i.e., the reflection]. |
tathāvidhapratibimbajanakatvavyatirekeṇa nāparā śruter abhidhākriyāstītyarthaḥ // | Apart from producing the aforementioned Reflection, there is no other denotative function of the śruti [word]. |
evam apohasya svarūpam abhidhāya sāmprataṃ paroktāni dūṣaṇānyuddhartum ārabhate / | Having thus explained the nature of apoha, [the Author] now begins to address and refute the objections raised by others. |
tatra yaduktaṃ "yadi gaur iti śabdaścedi"tyādi, tatrāha tasya cetyādi / | Regarding what was said [by Bhāmaha]: "if the word 'gaur' [cow] etc.", he [the Author] responds with "tasya ca" etc. |
tasya ca pratibimbasya gatāvevānugamyate / | [The word's meaning] is understood only in terms of that Reflection itself. |
sāmarthyād anyaviśleṣo nāstyānyātmakatā yataḥ // | The exclusion of others [occurs] through [the word's] capacity, since there is no other essential nature [to it]. |
gobuddhim eva hi śabdo janayati, anyaviśleṣas tu sāmārthyād gamyate, natu śabdāt tasya gopratibimbasya pratibhāsāntarātmarahitatvāt anyathā niyatarūpasya tasya pratipattir eva na syāt / | For the word produces only the cognition of cow, while the exclusion of others is understood through [its] capacity, not from the word [directly], because that cow-reflection is devoid of any other appearance—otherwise its fixed form could not be apprehended at all. |
tenaiva gośabdena gobuddher janyamānatvāt // | Because the cognition of cow is produced by that very word 'cow' itself. |
nanu jñānaphalāḥ śabdā ityādāvāha divābhojanetyādi / | Now regarding [the statement] "words have knowledge as their result" etc., he states [the example about] eating during the day, etc. |
divābhojanavākyāder ivāsyāpi phaladvayam / | Like the sentence about eating during the day, this too has two results. |
sākṣāt sāmarthyato yasmān nānvayo 'vyatirekavān // | Because there is no affirmation that is devoid of negation, [whether] direct or through implication. |
yathāhi divā na bhuṅkte pīno devadatta ityasya vākyasya sākṣād divābhojanapratiṣedhaḥ svārthābhidhānaṃ, gamyastu rātribhojanavidhiḥ, na sākṣāt, tadvad gaurityāder anvayapratipādakasya śabdasyānvayajñānaṃ sākṣātphalam, vyatirekagatis tu sāmarthyāt / | Just as in the sentence "fat Devadatta does not eat during the day," the direct meaning is the prohibition of eating during the day, while the injunction of eating at night is merely implied [and] not direct, similarly for the word 'cow' etc., which expresses affirmation, the knowledge of affirmation is the direct result, while the understanding of exclusion comes through implication. |
atra kāraṇamāha yasmād ityādi / | Here he states the reason with "yasmāt" etc. |
yasmād anvayo vidher avyatirekavān nāsti | Because there is no affirmation [which is] not accompanied by negation |
nahi vijātīyād avyāvṛttasya kasyacit sambhavo 'sti | For nothing can exist that is not differentiated from things unlike itself |
tenaikasya śabdasya phaladvayam aviruddham eva | Therefore there is nothing contradictory in a single word having two effects |
kasmād ity āha nābhimukhyenetyādi | [Someone asks:] "Why?" [The answer] begins with "not directly" [in the next verse] |
nābhimukhyena kurute yasmāc chabda idaṃ dvayam / svārthābhidhānam anyasya vinivṛttiṃ ca vastutaḥ | Because a word does not directly bring about these two things: the denotation of its own meaning and the exclusion of other things |
yadi sākṣād ekasya śabdasya vidhir niṣedhajñānalakṣaṇaṃ phaladvayaṃ yugapad | If both effects—characterized by affirmation and negation—were produced directly and simultaneously by a single word [there would be contradiction] |
yadi tu divābhojanavākyavad ekaṃ sākṣāt aparaṃ sāmarthyalabhyaṃ phalam itīṣṭaṃ, tadā na virodhaḥ | However, if it is accepted that, like in the expression "not eating during the day," one [effect] is direct while the other is obtained through implication, then there is no contradiction |
yac coktaṃ prāg agaur iti vijñānam ityādi / tad api nirastam | What was stated earlier about "the cognition of non-cow" and so forth—that too is rejected |
anabhyupagamāt / na hy agopratiṣedham ābhimukhyena gośabdaḥ karotīty upagatam asmābhiḥ | Because [we] do not accept [this view]; for we have never accepted that the word "cow" directly produces the negation of non-cow |
kiṃ tarhi sāmarthyād iti pratipāditam | Rather, it has been explained [that this happens] through implication |
tādṛśaḥ pratibhāsaś ca sāmānyaṃ gotvam iṣyate / | The universal "cowness" is also held to be an appearance of this kind [i.e., superimposed]. |
sarvatra śābaleyādau samānatvāvasāyataḥ // | Because it is apprehended as being identical in all [instances] like in variegated [cows] and others. |
tādṛśa iti / | [The phrase] "of this kind" [is explained as follows]. |
atropapattimāha sarvatretyādi / sarvatra śābaleyādau gaurgaur iti samarūpatayāvasānāt teṣāṃ tat sāmānyamity ucyate // | Here [the author] explains the reasoning by [the phrase] "in all" etc.: because in all [instances] like variegated [cows] etc., [the cognition] "cow, cow" occurs in identical form, therefore this universal of theirs is spoken of [in this way]. |
bāhyavasturūpatvam api tasya bhrāntapratipattṛvaśād vyavahriyate, na paramārthata iti darśayati vastvityadhyavasāyācceti / | Its appearance as an external entity is spoken of due to the power of mistaken cognition, not in ultimate reality - this is what is shown by [the phrase] "because it is cognized as an entity." |
vastvityādhyavasāyāc ca vastvityapi taducyate / | Because it is cognized as an entity, therefore it is also called an entity. |
jhaṭitvyeva hi tajjñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ jātaṃ svabījataḥ // | For that mistaken cognition arises suddenly from its own seed. |
nanu yadi kadācinmukhyavastubhūtaṃ sāmānyaṃ bāhyavastvāśritamupalabdhaṃ bhavet tadā sādharmyadarśanāt tatra sāmānyaṃ bhrāntir bhavet, yāvatā mukhyārthāsambhave saiva bhavatāṃ sāmānyabhrāntir anupapannety āśaṅkyāha jhaṭity eva hītyādi / | [Someone] raises this objection: "If at some time a real universal existing as a primary entity dependent on external things were to be apprehended, then an illusion of universal might occur due to seeing similarity; however, when there is no possibility of a primary meaning [of universal], that very illusion of universal which you maintain becomes impossible" - [to this the author] responds with "suddenly indeed" etc. |
jhaṭiti sāmānyadarśanādyanapekṣya ādijñānādivadantarupaplavād etajjātaṃ jñānam / | This cognition arises suddenly, without depending on seeing any universal, due to internal disturbance, just like the initial cognition [of two moons, etc.]. |
nahi sarvā bhrāntayaḥ sādharmyadarśanād eva bhavanti / | For not all illusions arise only from seeing similarity. |
tena siddhasādhyatādoṣo na bhavatīti darśayann āha sa evetyādi / | [He] shows that there is no fault of proving what is [already] proven, saying "sa eva" etc. |
sa eva ca tadākāraśabdārtho 'poha ucyate / sāmānyaṃ vasturūpaṃ ca tathā bhrāntyāvasāyataḥ // | That very same form [of cognition] is called both the word-meaning [and] apoha, and [it appears] as a universal [and] as a real entity due to conceptual error. |
sa eva buddhyākāro bāhyatayādhyasto 'poha iti śabdārtha iti bāhyavastubhūtaṃ sāmānyam iti cocyate / | That very same form of cognition, superimposed as something external, is called "apoha," "word-meaning," and "universal existing as an external entity." |
atra kāraṇam āha tathā bhrāntyāvasāyata iti / | [He] states the reason for this [by saying] "due to conceptual error." |
sāmānyarūpatvena vasturūpatvena cāvasāyāt / | Because it is cognized as having the form of a universal and the form of a real entity. |
śabdārthatvāpoharūpatvayoḥ prāgeva kāraṇamuktam | The reason for [its] being word-meaning and having the form of apoha has already been stated before. |
kasmāt punaḥ paramārthataḥ sāmānyaṃ tan na bhavatītyāha sāmānyetyādi / | [He] asks why that is not a universal in ultimate reality, saying "sāmānya" etc. |
sāmānyavasturūpatvaṃ na yuktaṃ tvasya bhāvikam / | Its nature as a real universal entity is not logically possible. |
buddher ananyarūpaṃ hi yāyādarthāntaraṃ katham // paramārthato hi buddher avyatirikto 'sau, tat katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet, yenārthānāṃ tat sāmānyaṃ bhāvato bhavet / yathoktaṃ "jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet" iti / | For how could something non-different from cognition apply to another thing? Since it is indeed non-different from cognition in ultimate reality, how could it apply to another thing, by which it could be a real universal of [external] things? As has been stated: "How could something non-different from cognition apply to another thing?" |
tasmāt siddhasādhyatādoṣo na bhavati, na hi bhavadbhir buddhyākāro gotvākhyaṃ sāmānyamavasturūpam, iṣṭam kiṃ tarhi/ | Therefore there is no fault of proving what is [already] proven, for you do not accept that the universal called "cowness" is a form of cognition and not a real entity. |
bāhyaśābaleyādigatam ekamanugāmi pāramārthikaṃ gotvādisāmānyamupakalpitamato na siddhasādhyateti bhāvaḥ / | On the other hand, [you] postulate the universal 'cowness' etc. as a real entity that follows [all individual cows] including the external, the piebald, etc., therefore [your argument] commits the fallacy of proving what is [already] proved. |
yaccoktam ---"niṣedhamātrarūpaśce"tyādi, tasyānabhyupagatatvād eva na doṣaḥ / | As for what was said [beginning with] "if [it were] merely in the form of negation", since we do not accept that [position], there is no fault [in our argument]. |
yadyapyavyatirikto 'yamākāro buddhirūpataḥ / tathāpi bāhyarūpatvaṃ bhāntais tasyāvasīyate // | Although this form [of apoha] is non-different from the form of cognition, nevertheless its external nature is apprehended [only] by deluded persons. |
subodham // | This is easily understood. |
tasya nārthānapekṣatvaṃ pāramparyāt tadāgateḥ / | It is not independent of the object, since that [cognition] arises through a mediating process. |
tenātmanā ca vastutvaṃ naivāstītyupapāditam // | And in that form, there is certainly no positive existence [for it], as has been explained. |
yatra hi pāramparyād vastuni pratibandho 'sti tasya bhrāntasyāpi sato vikalpasya maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇibuddhivan na bāhyārthānapekṣatvamasti / | Indeed where there is a connection with an object through a mediating process, even though [the conception] is erroneous, that conceptual cognition is not independent of the external object - just as the cognition of a jewel [arising] from the radiance of a jewel. |
ato 'siddhaṃ bāhyārthānapekṣatvam / | Therefore, independence from external objects is not established. |
yaduktam ---"vasturūpā ca sā buddhiḥ" ityādi, tatrāha tenetyādi / yadyapi vasturūpā sā buddhis tathāpi tasyās tena bāhyātmanā buddhyantarātmanā ca vastutvaṃ nāstītyupapāditam "na tadātmā parātmā" ityādinā / | Regarding what was said [beginning with] "and that cognition is in the form of a real entity", the response is given beginning with "in that form". Although that cognition is in the form of a real entity, nevertheless it has been explained through [statements] beginning with "neither that self nor another self" that it has no real existence either in the form of something external or in the form of another cognition. |
tena buddher buddhyantarāpoho na gamyata ityasiddhaṃ sāmarthyena gamyamānatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Therefore the claim that "the exclusion of other cognitions is not apprehended by cognition" is not established, because it is [in fact] apprehended through implication. |
pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padād apy upajāyate / | The exclusion which is in the form of a reflection arises even from a word. |
pratibhākhyo jhaṭityeva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ // | This [reflection-like apoha] is indeed what we readily recognize as the meaning of words. |
yathaiva hi pratibimbātmakapratibhākhyo 'poho bāhyārtho 'smābhirupavarṇitas tathaiva padārthe 'pi / | Just as we have described the external object as apoha having the nature of a reflection characterized by intuition, so [it is] also in the case of word-meaning. |
yasmāt padādapi pratibimbātmako 'poha utpadyata eva tenāsmākam ayameva pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padārtho 'pi mato na kevalaṃ bāhyārtha ityapiśabdaḥ / tena vipratipatter bhāvānnopālambho yukta iti bhāvaḥ // | Since even from a word an apoha having the nature of a reflection is indeed produced, therefore for us this very reflection-like apoha is accepted as the word-meaning also, not just as the external object - this is [the meaning of] the word 'api'. Therefore, since there is no disagreement [between us], the criticism [against us] is not justified. |
svarūpotpādamātrāddhi nānyamaṃśaṃ bibharti sā / | For merely from the arising of its own form, it [cognition] does not bear any other aspect. |
yata eva hi svarūpotpādamātād anyamaṃśaṃ sā buddhir na bibharti tata eva svasvabhāvavyavasthitatvād buddher buddhyantarādvyavacchedaḥ pratīyate, anyathā hyanyasya rūpaṃ bibhratī kathaṃ tato vyavacchinnā pratīyete / | Indeed, precisely because that cognition does not bear any other aspect apart from the mere arising of its own form, because of being established in its own nature, the exclusion of [one] cognition from another cognition is apprehended; otherwise, if it were bearing the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that [other]? |
teneti svavyatiriktapadārthasvarūpānavadhāraṇena // | 'For that reason' means because of not ascertaining the nature of any meaning different from itself. |
yathaivāvidyamānasya na bhedaḥ pāramārthikaḥ / | Just as for what is non-existent, difference cannot be ultimately real, |
abhedo 'pi tathaiveti tena paryāyatā bhavet // | so also [would be the case with] non-difference; hence [all words] would become synonyms. |
yathaiva hyapohasya niḥsvabhāvatvād avidyamānarūpasya parasparato bhedo nāstītyucyate tathaivābhedo 'pīti tat katham abhinnārthābhāve paryāyatvaprasañjanaṃ kriyate // | Just as, due to apoha being without essence and having no real form, it is said that there is no mutual difference [between apohas], similarly [it is said that] there is also no non-difference. Therefore, when there is no really non-different entity, how can the undesired consequence of [words being] synonyms be pressed [against us]? |
etad eva spaṣṭīkurvannāha abhedo hyekarūpatvād iti / | Making this very point clear, he says "because non-difference [would result] from having one form." |
abhedo hyekarūpatvaṃ nīrūpeṣu ca tat kutaḥ / ekatve 'rthasya paryāyāḥ prāpnuvanti ca vācakāḥ // | "Non-difference" means having the same form; how can this [sameness of form] exist in formless things? Words become synonymous only when their referent is one [and the same]. |
yadi nāma nīrūpeṣvekarūpatvaṃ nāsti tathāpi kimiti paryāyatā na bhavet | [Question:] "Even if there is no sameness of form in formless things, why should [these words] not be synonymous?" |
iti cedāha ekatve 'rthasyetyādi // | [Answer:] "[As stated above:] When their referent is one [and the same], [words become synonymous]." |
rūpābhāve 'pi caikatvaṃ kalpanānirmitaṃ yathā / vibhedo 'pi tathaiveti kutaḥ paryāyatā tataḥ // | Just as unity [can be] constructed through imagination even in the absence of form, difference too [can be] likewise [imagined]; how then could there be synonymity? |
rūpābhāve 'pīti / svabhāvābhāve 'pītyarthaḥ // | "In the absence of form" means "in the absence of [inherent] nature." |
yadyevaṃ paryāyāparyāyavyavasthā kathaṃ śabdānām prasiddhetyāha bhāvatastvityādi / | [Question:] "If this is so, how is the classification of words as synonymous and non-synonymous commonly established?" |
bhāvatastu na paryāyā nāparyāyāś ca vācakāḥ / nahyekaṃ bāhyameteṣām anekaṃ ceti varṇitam // | In reality, words are neither synonymous nor non-synonymous, for it has been explained that their external referent is neither one nor many. |
yadi hi paramārthato bhinnam abhinnaṃ vā kiñcid vācyaṃ vastu śabdānāṃ syāttadāparyāyatā paryāyatā vā bhavet / yāvatā svalakṣaṇaṃ jātis tadyogo jātimaṃstathetyādinā varṇitaṃ yathaiṣāṃna kiñcid vācyamastīti // | If words had some real referent that was either different or non-different, then they could be either non-synonymous or synonymous; however, it has been explained [earlier] through [the discussion of] specific characteristics, universals, and [entities] possessing universals, that these [words] have no [real] referent whatsoever. |
kathaṃ sā tarhi paryāyādivyavasthetyāha kiṃtvityādi / | How then is there the restriction regarding [words being] synonymous and non-synonymous? [One] answers with "kiṃtu" etc. |
kiṃtvaneko 'pi yadyekakaryakārī ya īkṣyate / tatraikadharmāropeṇa śrutirekā niveśyate // | But whenever multiple [things] are seen to be performing one function, a single verbal expression is applied to them through the imposition of a single property. |
tatrāntareṇāpi sāmānyaṃ sāmānyaśabdatvavyavasthāyā idaṃ nibandhanam, yadbahūnām ekārthakriyākāritvam / | Even without a universal, this is the basis for the application of a common word: that many [things] perform a single purposeful action. |
prakṛtyaiva hi kecid bhāvā bahavo 'pyekārthakriyākāriṇo bhavanti / | For by their very nature, some entities, though many, are performers of a single purposeful action. |
teṣām ekārthakriyāsāmarthyapratipādanāya vyavahartṛbhir lāghavārthamekarūpādhyāropeṇaikā śrutir niveśyate / | To express their capacity for performing a single purposeful action, speakers apply a single verbal expression to them through the imposition of a single form, for the sake of brevity. |
yathā bahuṣu rūpādiṣu madhūdakādyāharaṇalakṣaṇaikārthakriyāsamartheṣu ghaṭa ityeṣā śrutir niveśyate // | For example, when many things like color etc. are capable of the single purposeful action characterized by containing honey, water etc., this verbal expression "ghaṭa" [jar] is applied. |
kathaṃ punar ekenānugāminā vinā bahuṣvekā śrutir yujyata ity āha locanādāvityādi / | [One] asks: "How can a single verbal expression be properly applied to many [things] without a single pervading [factor]?" [The other] answers with "locanādi" etc. |
locanādau yathā rūpavijñānaikaphale kvacit / | For instance, in [things] like the eye etc., which have the single result of color-cognition in some cases. |
kaścidyadi śrutiṃ kuryād vinaikenānugāminā // | If someone were to create a verbal expression without [there being] a single pervading [factor]. |
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