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icchāmātrapratibaddho hi śabdānām artheṣu niyogaḥ, tathā hi cakṣurūpālokamanaskāreṣu rūpavijñānaikaphaleṣu yadi kaścid icchāvaśād vināpyekenānugāmitā sāmānyena ityādikāṃ śrutiṃ niveśayet, tat kiṃ tasya kaścit pratiroddhā bhavet / | For the application of words to meanings is bound by mere will, so if someone were to apply a verbal expression through [their] will to the eye, color, light and attention - which have the single result of color-cognition - even without a pervading universal, who could prevent them? |
yataḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api bhavadbhiścakṣur vijñānajanakā iṣyante / | Because you [yourselves] accept that universals, particulars and inherence are also producers of visual cognition. |
teṣu na sāmānyasamavāyo 'sti niḥsāmānyatvāt sāmānyasya, samavāyasya ca dvitīyasamavāyābhāvāt // | In these [particulars], there is no Universal or Inherence, because a Universal cannot possess [another] Universal, and because in [the case of] Inherence, there cannot be a second Inherence. |
nanu ca ghaṭādierkakāryakārī katham ucyate / yāvatā tat kāryamudakadhāraṇādi tadgrāhakaṃ ca vijñānaṃ svalakṣaṇabhedād bhidyata evetyata āha ghaṭādīnāṃ cetyādi / | [Says] the opponent: "How can the jar and such things be said to perform the same function, when their effects, such as holding water etc., and the cognition that apprehends them, differ due to the difference in their specific characteristics?" |
ghaṭādīnāṃ ca yat kāryaṃ jalāder dhāraṇādikam / | [That which is] the effect of jars etc., [namely] the holding of water etc., |
ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvād ekamucyate / jñānaṃ tathāpi taddhetubhāvād arthā abhedinaḥ // | Although the effects differ due to the difference in specific characteristics, the cognition is called one because it is the cause of a single comprehensive awareness. |
tathāpi jñānākhyaṃ tāvat kāryamekārthādhyavasāyhiparāmarśajñānaheutayaikamity ucyate tasya ca jñānasya hetubhāvād arthā api madhūdakādyāharaṇādilakṣaṇā ghaṭādivyaktilakṣaṇāścābhedina ityucyante, tad darśayati tathāpi taddhetubhāvād arthā abhedinā iti / | Nevertheless, the effect called cognition is said to be one because it is the cause of the comprehensive awareness of a single object, and because this cognition is the cause, the objects characterized by the holding of honey, water etc., and characterized by individual jars etc., are also said to be non-different. |
ucyata iti prakṛtaṃ vacanapariṇāmād bahuvacanāntaṃ sambadhyate / | The word "ucyate" [which was] previously [used] is to be connected [with what follows] in its plural form due to the change in construction. |
apiśabdo bhinnakramo 'rthā ityanantaraṃ sambadhyate / | The particle "api" is to be construed after "arthāḥ". |
tenaikārthakriyākāritvam upapadyata eva / | Thus, [their] performing the same purposeful action is indeed established. |
nanu caivam anavasthā prāpnoti / | [Says the opponent:] "But in this way, there would be infinite regress. |
tathā hi yo 'sau pratyavamarśapratyayastasyāpi svalakṣaṇabhedena bhidyamānatvād ekatvam asiddham / | For that comprehensive awareness itself, being different due to the difference in specific characteristics, cannot be established as one." |
tataś ca tasyāpyekatvasiddhaye paramekākārapratyavamarśakāryamanusarato 'navasthā syāt / tataścānavasthitaikakāryatayā na kvacid ekaśrutiniveśaḥ siddhyet / | Hence, for establishing the oneness of that also, an infinite regress would result from pursuing [the need for] a further unified comprehensive cognition; and consequently, due to there being no fixed single function, the application of a single word would not be established anywhere. |
naitad asti / | This is not so. |
svata eva sarveṣāṃ pratyavamarśapratyayānām ekārthādhyavasāyitvasya siddhatvāt / | Because all comprehensive cognitions are inherently established as determining a single object. |
tenāyam artho bhavati / | This, therefore, is the meaning [that follows]. |
ekākārapratyavamarśahetutvāt jñānākhyaṃ kāryamekamity ucyate taddhetubhāvāccārthā api ghaṭādaya ekatvavyavapadeśabhāja iti // | Because it is the cause of a unified comprehensive cognition, the effect called "cognition" is said to be one; and because they are the basis of that [cognition], objects like jars also become worthy of the designation of oneness. |
tatra sāmānyavacanā uktāḥ śabdā ghaṭādayaḥ / vijātīyavyavacchinnapratibimbaikahetavaḥ // | There, words like "jar" are said to be common denotatives, having as their single basis the reflection distinguished from heterogeneous [things]. |
kaścid eko 'pi samprakṛtyaiva sāmagryantarāntaḥpātavaśād anekārthakriyākārī bhavati / | Even a single thing, while remaining one by nature, becomes the performer of multiple functions through the intervention of other accessories. |
tatrāntareṇāpi vastubhūtasāmānyādidharmabhedamatat kāryapadārthabhedabāhulyād anekadharmasamāropād anekā śritir niveśyate // | In such cases, even without real differences in properties like universals, multiple attributions arise due to the multiplicity of differences among things not performing those functions, and hence multiple words become applicable [to that thing]. |
atrodāharaṇam āha yathetyādi / | [The author] cites an example [beginning] with "yathā" etc. |
yathā sapratighaṃ rūpaṃ sanidarśanam ityapi / | For instance, [visible] form is [spoken of] both as "having resistance" (sapratigha) and as "visible" (sanidarśana); |
prayatnānantarajñāto yathā vā śrāvaṇo dhvaniḥ // | And likewise sound is [known] both as "cognized after effort" (prayatnānantarajñāta) and as "auditory" (śrāvaṇa). |
svadeśe parasyotpattipratibandhakāritvād rūpaṃ sapratighamity ucyate / | Form is called "having resistance" because it prevents the arising of another [form] in its own location. |
nidarśanam cakṣur vijñānaṃ tajjanakatvāt saha tena vartata iti sanidarśanam / | [Form] is called "visible" because it co-exists with visual cognition by being its producer. |
dvitīyam apy udāharaṇam āha prayatnetyādi / | [The author] gives a second example [beginning with] "prayatna" etc. |
yathāhi dhvanireko 'pi sanprayatnāntarajñānaphalatayā prayatnānantaraṃ jñāta ity ucyate / | For although sound is a single entity, it is called "cognized after effort" because it is the result of cognition following effort. |
śrotrajñānaphalatvāc ca śrāvaṇaḥ / śravaṇaṃ hi śrutiḥ, śrotrajñānamiti yāvat / | And it is called "auditory" because it is the result of auditory cognition; for śravaṇa means śruti, that is, auditory cognition. |
tat pratibhāsitayā tatra bhavaḥ śrāvaṇaḥ / yadvā śravaṇena gṛhyata iti śrāvaṇaḥ // | [The term] śrāvaṇa [refers to] what appears in that [auditory cognition], or alternatively śrāvaṇa [means] "what is grasped by hearing." |
atatkāraṇabhedena kvacicchabdo niveśyate / | In some cases, a word is employed based on the difference of what is not its [primary] cause. |
prayatnottho yathāśabdo bhrāmaraṃ vā yathā madhu // | [Just] as sound [is] arising from effort, and [just] as honey [is produced] by the large bees. |
evam atatkāryakāraṇapadārthabheda ekasmin vastuni śrutibhedo darśitaḥ / | Thus it has been shown that different words [can] apply to one single thing based on the distinction of effects and causes not belonging to it. |
idānīṃ tat kāryakāraṇapadārthavyavacchedamātrapratipādanecchayāntareṇāpi sāmānyaṃ śruter bhedaniveśanaṃ darśayannāha tat kāryetyādi / | Now, wishing to explain merely the exclusion of effects and causes of things, he shows another general basis for the application of different words by stating "tat kārya" etc. |
tat kāryahetuviśleṣāt kvacicchrutirihocyate / | In some cases here, a word is applied based on the exclusion of those effects and causes. |
aśrāvaṇaṃ yathā rūpaṃ vidyuddvāyatnajā yathā // | For example, [how] form [is called] "non-audible" and [how] lightning [is called] "not produced by effort." |
tau pūrvoktau kāryahetū yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | Those previously mentioned effects and causes belonging to which [things], they are so called. |
tebhyo viśleṣo vyāvṛttiḥ / | The "separation" (viśleṣa) from these [means] exclusion. |
kā punar asau śrutir ity āha aśrāvaṇamityādi / | [To the question] "What then is this word?", he says "aśrāvaṇam" etc. |
śrotrajñānaphalaśabdavyavacchedenāśrāvaṇaṃ rūpam ity ucyate / | Form is called "non-audible" through the exclusion of sound, which is the effect of auditory cognition. |
tathā prayatnakāraṇaghaṭādipadārthavyavacchedena vidyudaprayatnajetyabhidhīyate // | Similarly, through the exclusion of things like pots [which have] effort as [their] cause, lightning is termed "not produced by effort." |
ityādinā prabhedena vibhinnārthanibandhanāḥ | Due to these and other distinctions, [different] exclusions are postulated on the basis of differentiated meanings |
vyāvṛttayaḥ prakalpyante tanniṣṭhāḥ śrutayas tathā | [Different] exclusions are postulated, and likewise [also] the words [which are] based on those [exclusions] |
yathāsaṅketamevāto 'saṅkīrṇārthābhidhāyinaḥ | Therefore, according to convention alone, [these] words denote distinct meanings |
śabdā vivekato vṛttāḥ paryāyā na bhavanti naḥ | [These] words, being applied with discrimination, are not synonyms in our view |
ādigrahaṇenāvasthāviśeṣavācakā bālādiśabdā nairātmyādiśabdāś ca gṛhyante | By the term "ādi" [here] are included words expressing particular states like "bāla" [child] etc., and words like "nairātmya" [soullessness] etc. |
vibhinnārthanibandhanā iti | [The expression] "based on differentiated meanings" [means the following:] |
vibhinnas tatas tato vyāvṛtto 'rtho nibandhanaṃ yāsāṃ vyāvṛttīnāṃ tās tathoktāḥ | Those exclusions whose basis consists of meanings differentiated from this and that are called thus |
tatheti vyāvṛttivat | [The word] "tathā" [means] "like exclusions" |
tanniṣṭhā iti vyāvṛttārthaniṣṭhāḥ | [The expression] "tanniṣṭhāḥ" means "based on excluded [i.e., differentiated] meanings" |
praṇālikayā tathāvidhapadārthādhigatihetutvāt | Because they are indirectly the cause of understanding such word-meanings |
śrutaya iti śabdāḥ // | "śrutayaḥ" [means] "words." |
syād etat mābhūt paryāyatvam eṣām, arthabhedasya parikalpitatvāt sāmānyaviśeṣavācitvavyavasthā tu vinā sāmānyaviśeṣābhyāṃ katham eṣāṃ siddhyatītyata āha bahvalpetyādi / | [One might object:] "Let it be that these [words] are not synonymous because of the assumed difference in meaning, but how can their status as denoting universals and particulars be established without [the existence of] universals and particulars?" |
bahvalpaviṣayatvena tat saṅketānumānataḥ / sāmānyabhedavācyatvam apyeṣāṃ na virudhyate // | Through inference of convention based on [their] applying to many or few [referents], there is no contradiction in their denoting universal distinctions. |
vṛkṣaśabdo hi sarveṣveva dhavakhadirapalāśādiṣvavṛkṣavyavacchedamātrānumānaṃ pratibimbakaṃ janayati / | For the word "vṛkṣa" produces in reference to all dhava, khadira, palāśa etc. trees a reflective cognition that is merely the inference of the exclusion of non-trees. |
tenāsya bahu{viśa}yatvāt sāmānyaṃ vācyam ucyate / | Therefore, because it applies to many [things], what it denotes is called a universal. |
dhavādiśabdasya tu khadirādivyāvṛttiḥ katipayapādapāvasāyivikalpotpādakatvād viśeṣo vācya ucyate // | But for the word "dhava" etc., because it produces a conception terminating in only a few trees through the exclusion of khadira etc., what it denotes is called a particular. |
tāśca vyāvṛttayo 'rthānā kalpanāmātranirmitāḥ / nāpohyādhārabhedena bhidyante paramārthataḥ // | And these exclusions of things, constructed by mere conceptualization, do not truly differ either through difference in what is excluded or through [difference in their] substrates. |
yadi hi pāramārthiko 'pohyabhedenādhārabhedenāpohabhedo 'bhīṣṭaḥ syāt tadaitad dūṣaṇaṃ syāt, yāvatā kalpanayā sajātīyavijātīyapadārthabhedanibandhanā vyāvṛttayo bhinnāḥ kalpyante na paramārthataḥ // | For if the difference in exclusion based on difference in what is excluded or difference in substrate were held to be real, then this criticism would apply; however, the exclusions are conceptually assumed to be different based on the difference between similar and dissimilar things, not in reality. |
tāsāṃ hi bāhyarūpatvaṃ kalpitaṃ tan na vāstavam / | For their external nature is [merely] conceptualized, not real. |
bhedābhedau ca tattvena vastunyeva vyavasthitau // | And difference and non-difference in reality exist only in actual things. |
kasmād vāstavaṃ bhavatītyāha bhedābhedau cetyādi // | [To the question] "Why is it not real?" [the text] states "difference and non-difference etc." |
paramārthatas tu vikalpā eva bhidyanta iti darśayati svabījāneketyādi / | [The text] shows that in reality only conceptual constructs are different, [as stated in the verse beginning] "svabījāneka." |
svabījānekaviśliṣṭavastusaṅketaśaktitaḥ / vikalpās tu vibhidyante tadrūpādhyavasāyinaḥ // | The conceptual contents [vikalpāḥ] differ among themselves through the power of their root-cause [svabīja], the object as differentiated from many [things], and convention, [these contents being] determinate of that form. |
naikātmatāṃ prapadyante na bhidyante ca khaṇḍaśaḥ / | [Things] neither attain unity nor become divided into parts. |
svalakṣaṇātmakā arthā vikalpaḥ plavate tvasau // | Objects consist of unique particulars [svalakṣaṇa], but it is that conceptual thought which fluctuates. |
svabījam vātādivikalpavāsanā, anekasmād viśliṣṭaṃ vastu ca saṅketaśceti vigrahaḥ, teṣāṃ śaktiḥ sāmarthyam, tato vijātīyānekapadārthavyāvṛttavatuvyavasāyino vikalpā bhidyante / | The root-cause is the latent impression [vāsanā] of conceptual thought regarding wind and so forth, the object differentiated from many [things], and convention - through the power [śakti] of these, the conceptual contents that determine an object as excluded from many heterogeneous entities become differentiated. |
natvarthāḥ / | But not the objects [themselves]. |
tathā hi vṛkṣatvādisāmanyarūpeṇa naikātmatāṃ dhavādayaḥ pratipadyante nāpi kṣaṇikātmakādidharmabhedena khaṇḍaśo bhidyante / | Thus the dhava and other [trees] do not attain unity in the form of the universal "treeness" and so forth, nor do they become divided into parts through the differentiation of properties such as momentariness. |
kevalaṃ vikalpa eva tathā plavate natvarthaḥ / | Only the conceptual thought fluctuates thus, not the object. |
yathoktam "saṃsṛjyante na bhidyante svato 'rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ / | As it has been said: "Objects in ultimate reality neither combine nor divide of themselves; |
rūpamekamanekaṃ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ" // | Their appearing as one or many is [due to] the fluctuation of cognition." |
ekadharmānvayāsattve 'pyapohyāpohagocarāḥ / vailakṣaṇyena gamyante bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ // | Even in the absence of an inherent common property, what is excluded and what contains the exclusion are apprehended as distinct through their appearing as different in distinct reflective awareness. |
apohyaścāpohagocarāśceti vigrahaḥ | The compound consists of "apohya" and "apohagocara" |
tatrāpohyā aśvādayaḥ, gośabdasya tadapohena pravṛttatvāt | There the "apohya" [refers to] horses etc., because the word "cow" functions by excluding them |
apohagocarāḥ śābaleyādayaḥ, tadviṣayatvād agopohasya | The "apohagocara" [refers to] variegated [cows] etc., because the exclusion of non-cow pertains to them |
tena yadyapyekasya sāmānyarūpasyānvayo nāsti | Thus, even though there is no concomitance of any single universal |
tathāpyabhinnapratyavamarśahetavo ye te prasiddhasārūpyā bhavanti | Nevertheless, those [things] which cause cognition of non-difference have well-known similarity |
ye tu viparītās te viparītā iti | While those which are opposite are [considered] opposite |
ekapratyavamarśe hi kecid evopayoginaḥ | For only certain [things] are useful in [producing] a single cognition |
prakṛtyā bhedavattve 'pi nānya ityupapāditam | Though naturally different, not others - thus it has been explained |
pratipāditametat sāmānyaparīkṣāyām | This has been explained in the examination of universals |
yathā dhātryādayo 'ntareṇāpi sāmānyamekārthakriyākāriṇo bhavanti | Just as āmalakī etc., even without a universal, perform a single purposeful action |
tathaiva pratyavamarśahetavo bhinnā api bhāvāḥ kecid eva bhaviṣyanti | Similarly, only certain entities, though different, will be causes of [single] cognition |
atadrūpaparāvṛttaṃ vastumātraṃ svalakṣaṇam | The particular is merely the thing itself, excluded from what is not of its form |
yatnena kriyamāṇo 'yam anvayo na virudhyate | This concomitance, when carefully made, is not contradictory |
yadyapi sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ nāsti | Even though there is no universal as a real entity |
tathāpi vijātīyavyāvṛttasvalakṣaṇamātreṇaivānvayaḥ kriyamāṇo na virudhyate | Nevertheless, concomitance made merely through particulars excluded from heterogeneous [things] is not contradictory |
katham ity āha | [Someone] asks "how?" |
yasminnadhūmato bhinnaṃ vidyate hi svalakṣaṇam | Where there exists a particular differentiated from non-smoke |
tasminnanagnito 'pyasti parāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇam | There exists also a particular excluded from non-fire |
yathā mahānase ceha vidyate 'dhūmabhedi tat | As [seen] here in the kitchen, that which is differentiated from non-smoke exists |
tasmād anagnito bhinnaṃ vidyate 'tra svalakṣaṇam // | Therefore, the specific individuality [which is] differentiated from non-fire exists here. |
yasminniti / pradeśe / | "Wherein" [means] "in that place." |
iha ca vidyate svalakṣaṇamadhūmato bhedīti pakṣadharmopadarśanam / | And here exists the specific individuality [which is] differentiated from non-smoke - this shows the presence of the property of the subject [pakṣadharma]. |
tasmād ityādinā pramāṇaphalopadarśanam / | Through [the words] "therefore" etc., [there is] the showing of the result of the valid means of knowledge. |
yadi vā vayavapañcakam api svalakṣaṇenānvaye kriyamāṇe śakyo padarśanam iti darśayati // | Or else, when concomitance with specific individualities is being established, all five components can be shown - thus [the text] indicates. |
idaṃ ca kāryahetāvuktam / | And this has been stated in [the case of] the effect-based reason. |
svabhāvahetāvāha asata ityādi / | [The text] states regarding the nature-based reason [starting with the words] "from the non-existent" etc. |
asato naraśṛṅgāder yac ca bhinnaṃ svalakṣaṇam / buddhidīpādivatsarvaṃ vyāvṛttaṃ tat sthirādapi // | That specific individuality which is differentiated from non-existent things like a man's horns is also differentiated from permanent things, just like cognition, lamp-flame, etc. |
asadrūpaṃ tathā cedaṃ na śabdādisvalakṣaṇam / | And similarly this specific individuality of sound etc. is not of the nature of the non-existent. |
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