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itthaṃ nirdiṣṭabhedena bhavatyevānvayo 'munā // | Thus there is indeed concomitance through the differences indicated in this way. |
yadasato vyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇamatādrūpyāt tat sarvaṃ sthirādapi vyāvṛttaṃ, yathā buddhidīpādayaḥ / | That which is differentiated from the non-existent because of [its] non-identity [with it], that specific characteristic is also differentiated from permanent things, as [seen in] cognition, lamp-flame and such [things]. |
tathācedaṃ śabdādisvalakṣaṇam asadrūpaṃ na bhavatīti / | And thus this specific characteristic of sound and other [things] does not have the nature of the non-existent. |
ayaṃ ca sattvādityasya hetor anvayo darśitaḥ // | And this concomitance of the reason "because of [its] existence" has been shown. |
yadyevaṃ svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaḥ, katham idānīṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṃsidhyatītyata āha avivakṣitabhedaṃ cetyādi / | If thus the concomitance is with the specific characteristic alone, how then is inference regarding the universal characteristic established? To this [he] says "that [same thing] whose difference is not intended to be expressed" and so forth. |
avivakṣitabhedaṃ ca tadeva parikīrtitam / | And that very [thing] whose difference is not intended to be expressed has been declared [as the universal]. |
sāmānyalakṣaṇatvena nāniṣṭer aparaṃ punaḥ // | [It is declared as] having the nature of a universal characteristic, [and] nothing else [is accepted] due to [its] being undesirable. |
tadeva hi svalakṣaṇamavivakṣitabhedaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ityuktam / | For that very specific characteristic, when its difference is not intended to be expressed, is called the universal characteristic. |
sāmānyena bhedāparāmarśena, lakṣyate vyavasīyata iti sāmānyalakṣaṇam / | [The term] "universal characteristic" [means that which] is characterized [or] determined through [its] commonality, without consideration of [its] differences. |
nāparaṃ punar iti tīrthikābhimatam, tasyāniṣṭatvāt / | "Nothing else" [refers to] what is accepted by other philosophical schools, because of its being undesirable. |
yathoktam "tasyaiva svapararūpābhyāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam" iti / | As has been said: "Because it is apprehended through both its own form and other's form, its object is considered to be twofold." |
athadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātrasamāśrayāt / sāmānyaviṣayaṃ proktaṃ liṅgaṃ bhedāpratiṣṭhiteḥ // | Inasmuch as [the inferential mark] is based upon the thing-in-itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the indicative [mark] pertaining to the universal has been declared [to be] the indicative of the absence of diversity. |
tena sāhacaryam api liṅgaśabdayoḥ svalakṣaṇenaiva kathyate / | Therefore, the concomitance of both the inferential mark and the word is declared to pertain to the specific characteristic itself. |
nacāpyadarśanamātreṇāsmābhir vipakṣe liṅgasyābhāvo 'vasīyate / kiṃ tarhianupalambhaviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ // | We do not conclude the absence of an inferential mark in the counter-instance merely from non-perception, but rather from a specific type of non-apprehension. |
śabalāpatyato bhede bāhuleyāśvayoḥ same / turaṅgaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ kiṃ tatra vartate // | When the difference from the variegated cow is equally [present] in both the black cow and the horse, why does cowness, as distinguished from [the class of] horses, subsist in that [black cow]? |
idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati, sābaleyāc ca bāhuleyāc ca tulye 'pi bhede sati kimiti turaṅgamaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ tatraiva sābaleyādau vartate nāśva iti // | You ought to explain this: when there is an equal difference from both the variegated cow and the black cow, why does cowness, as distinguished from the horse, subsist only in those [cows] like the variegated one and not in the horse? |
syād etat kimatra vaktavyaṃ, tasya hi gotvasyābhivyaktau sābaleyādireva samartho nāśvādiratas tatraiva tadvartate nānyatra / | One might say: "What is there to explain here? Only the variegated cow and similar [animals] are capable of manifesting cowness, not the horse and similar [animals]; therefore it subsists only there [in cows] and not elsewhere." |
nacāyaṃ paryanuyogo yujyate, kasmāt tasyābhivyaktau sa eva sābaleyādiḥ samartho bhavati, {iti}yato vastusvabhāpratiniyamo 'yaṃ, nahi vastūnāṃ svabhāvaḥ paryanuyogam arhati / | Nor is this counter-question appropriate: "why is it that only the variegated cow and similar [animals] have the capacity to manifest it?" Because this is a restriction [based on] the inherent nature of things, and the nature of things cannot be questioned. |
teṣāṃ svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt svabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyeti, atrāha tasyavyaktāvityādi / | Because these restrictions of different natures are produced by their own series of causes. Here [the opponent] says what follows regarding "its manifestation." |
tatra vyaktau samarthātmā sa eveti yadīṣyate / tulyapratyavamarśe 'pi sa śakto na turaṅgamaḥ // | If it is maintained that "only that [cow] has the capacity for its manifestation," then even though the subsequent recognition is the same, that [cow] alone has the capacity [to manifest it], not the horse. |
tasyeti gotvasya / | "It" [refers to] cowness. |
sa eveti sāvaleyādir na punaraśvaḥ / | "That alone" [means] the variegated cow and similar [animals], not the horse. |
yadyevaṃ satyapi bhede sāmānyamantareṇāpi tulyapratyavamarśotpādane sāvaleyādireva śakto na turaṅgama ityayam asmatpakṣo na virudhyata eva // | If this is so, then even when there is diversity and no commonalty [present], only the spotted cow and similar [cows], and not the horse, would be capable of producing the same determinate cognition – [and] this position of ours is indeed not contradictory. |
tataś ca kiṃ jātam ity āha tādṛgityādi / | [Someone asks:] "What follows from this?" [The author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "tādṛk" [etc.]. |
tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca vidyate yatra vastuni / tatrābhāve 'pi gojāter ago 'pohaḥ pravartate // | In whatever entity such a determinate cognition exists, there the exclusion of non-cow operates, even in the absence of the universal 'cowness'. |
tatraivāsatyam api gojāto vastubhūtāyām agopohaḥ pratibimbātmā pravartate // | Even in the absence of the real universal 'cowness', the exclusion of non-cow in the form of a reflection operates there. |
yaccoktamindriyair ityādi, tadasiddham iti darśayann āha agobhinnaṃ cetyādi / | To show that what was said [beginning with] "by the senses" etc. is not established, [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "agobhinnam" etc. |
agobhinnaṃ ca yadvastu tadakṣair vyavasīyate / | That entity which is "different from non-cow" is apprehended by the sense organs. |
pratibimbaṃ tadadhyastaṃ svasaṃvittyāvagamyate // | The reflection that is superimposed upon it is apprehended through self-awareness. |
idaṃ dṛṣṭvā ca lokena śabdas tatra prayujyate / | And having seen this, people apply the word to it. |
sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya vyaktaṃ tenopapadyate // | The experience of its connection too is thereby clearly established. |
tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva / | In this regard, the apoha in the form of the particular is indeed apprehended by the sense organs. |
yat svārthapratibimbātmāpohaḥ sa paramārthato buddhisvabhāvatvāt svasaṃvedanapratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ / | The apoha which has the nature of a reflection of its own object is established through direct self-awareness alone, since it is ultimately of the nature of cognition. |
cakāro 'nuktārthasamuccaye / | The particle "ca" [serves] for the inclusion of meanings not [directly] mentioned. |
tena prasajyātmāpi sāmarthyāt pratīyata eva na tadātmā parātmeti darśitaṃ bhavati / | By this, even the prasajya-type [of apoha] is understood through implication, [and] it has been shown that the nature of one is not the nature of the other. |
tenedam eva svalakṣaṇādirūpamapohaṃ dṛṣṭvā śabdo lokena prayujyate, natu sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ, tasyāsattvādapratibhāsanāc ca / | Therefore, it is upon seeing this very apoha in the form of svalakṣaṇa and so forth that words are used by people, not upon [seeing] a universal as a real entity, because of its non-existence and non-manifestation. |
yadeva ca dṛṣṭvā lokena śabdaḥ prayujyate, tenaiva tasya sambandho 'vagamyate nānyenātiprasaṅgāt // | And that very [thing] upon seeing which people use words, through that alone its relation is understood, not through anything else, because [that] would lead to an unwanted consequence. |
tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca yatra naivāsti vastuni / agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ vispaṣṭaṃ tatra gamyate // | And where such a determinate cognition does not exist regarding an entity, there the denotability by the word "non-cow" is clearly understood. |
yaccoktaṃ siddhaścāgaurapohyetetyādi tatrāha gāvo 'gāvaścetyādi / | And regarding what was said [earlier] beginning with "and the established non-cow would be negated," [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "cows and non-cows." |
gāvo 'gāvaś ca saṃsiddhā bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ / | Cows and non-cows are both well-established due to distinct determinate cognitions. |
śabdas tu kevalo 'siddho yatheṣṭaṃ samprayujyate // | But the word alone is not established [and] is employed according to one's wish. |
na hyanyagrahaṇaṃ vastu bhinnaṃ vittāvapekṣate / | For a distinct entity does not depend on the cognition of another for its apprehension. |
anyonyāśrayadoṣo 'yaṃ tasmād asminnirāspadaḥ // | Therefore, this fault of mutual dependence has no basis here. |
svata eva hi gavādayo bhāvā bhinnapratyavamarśaṃ janayanto vibhāgena samyaṅniścitāḥ / | Indeed, things like cows (gavādi), by themselves, generate distinct reflective awareness [of themselves] and are thus well ascertained in their distinct forms. |
teṣu vyavahārārthaṃ vyavahartṛbhir yatheṣṭaṃ śabdo 'siddhaḥ prayujyate / | For the purpose of verbal usage regarding these [things], speakers employ words, which are [themselves] not established, according to their wish. |
tathā hi yadi bhinnavastusvarūpaṃ pratipattyarthamanyapadārthagrahaṇam apekṣyate tadā syād itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, yāvatānyagrahaṇamantareṇaiva bhinnaṃ | If indeed the form of a distinct entity required the grasping of another entity for its apprehension, then there would be the fault of mutual dependence; however, the distinct [entity] |
vastu saṃvedyate, tasmin bhinnākārapratyavamarśahetutayā vibhāgena siddhe sati gaur gaur iti ca yatheṣṭaṃ saṅketaḥ kriyata iti katham itaretarāśrayatvaṃ bhavet / | is cognized without grasping another [entity], and when it is established distinctly as the cause of reflective awareness of a distinct form, the convention is made according to wish as "cow, cow" - so how could there be mutual dependence? |
vittāviti vittyartham // | The [word] "vittau" means "for the sake of cognition." |
avedyabāhyatattvāpi prakṛṣṭopaplavādiyam / svollekhaṃ bāhyarūpeṇa śabdadhīradhyavasyati // | Even though not cognizing external reality, this verbal cognition, due to intense delusion, determines its own manifestation as having external form. |
etāvat kriyate śabdair nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśantyapi / | This much alone is done by words; words do not even touch objects. |
nāpohena viśiṣṭaś ca kaścid artho 'bhidhīyate // | And no object qualified by exclusion (apoha) is denoted [by words]. |
nahi paramārthena kaścid apohena viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate / yataḥ pratipāditametat, yathā na kiñcidapi śabdair vastu saṃspṛśyate, kvacid apisāmagryabhāvād iti / | Indeed, in ultimate reality, no object qualified by exclusion is denoted by words, because this has been explained: that no entity whatsoever is touched by words, due to the absence of [necessary] conditions anywhere. |
tathā hi śābdī buddhirabāhyārthaviṣayāpi satī svollekhaṃ svākāraṃ bāhyārthatayādhyavasyantī jāyate na paramārthato vastusvabhāvaṃ spṛśati, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt // | For verbal cognition, even while not having external objects as its domain, arises determining its own manifestation [and] its own form as an external object, [but] does not touch the true nature of reality, because [its] determination is not in accordance with reality. |
yadyevaṃ katham ācāryeṇoktaṃ nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhurityata āha arthāntaretyādi / | [Question:] "If that is so, then why has the Teacher declared that 'words like nīlotpala [blue lotus] express objects qualified by the exclusion of other things?'" |
proktaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa tatrārtho 'yaṃ vivakṣitaḥ // | [As for] what has been stated by the author of the lakṣaṇa, this is the intended meaning here. |
ko 'sāvartho vivakṣita ity āha anyānyatvenetyādi / | [Question:] "What is that intended meaning?" [Answer:] [It is explained by the words] beginning with "anyānyatvena." |
anyānyatvena ye bhāvā hetunā karaṇena vā / viśiṣṭā bhinnajātīyair asaṅkīrṇā viniścitāḥ // | Those entities which are qualified by [their] difference from others, either as cause or instrument, are definitively known as unmixed with things of different kinds. |
vṛkṣādīnāhatāndhvānas tadbhāvādhyavasāyinaḥ / jñānasyotpādanādetajjātyādeḥ pratiṣedhanam // | Words express these [entities], and because they produce cognition determining those entities, there is negation of [universal] class etc. |
dvividho hyartho bāhyo buddhyārūḍhaś ca / | For objects are of two kinds: external and superimposed upon cognition. |
tatra bāhye na paramārthato 'bhidhānaṃ śabdaiḥ, kevalaṃ tadapyavasāyivikalpotpādādupacārād uktaṃ śabdo 'rthānāheti / | Among these, regarding external [objects], there is no denotation by words in the ultimate sense; it is only figuratively said that "words denote objects" because [words] produce conceptual cognition determining those [objects]. |
avayavārthastūcyate anyānyatveneti / | But the meaning of the components is explained [by the phrase] "by difference from others." |
anyasmād anyatvaṃ vyāvṛttiḥ, tenānyānyatvena hetunā karaṇena vā vṛkṣādayo bhāvā viśiṣṭā niścitāḥ / | Difference from others is exclusion; by that difference from others, either as cause or instrument, entities like trees are definitively cognized as qualified. |
anyato vyāvṛttā niścitā iti yāvat / | That is to say, [they are] definitively cognized as excluded from others. |
etenārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānityatra pade nivṛttyeti tṛtīyārtho vyākhyātaḥ / | By this, in the compound arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān, the term nivṛtti is explained as having an instrumental meaning. |
dhvāna iti śabdaḥ // | 'dhvāna' is [the term for] word. |
yastu buddhyārūḍho 'rthas tasya mukhyata eva śabdair abhidhānam | That meaning which is imposed upon cognition is directly denoted by words. |
buddhāvityādi / buddhau ye vā vivartante tānāhābhyantarānayam | [As stated in] "buddhau" etc.: those [meanings] which appear in cognition, those internal [ones], this [word denotes]. |
ayam iti / | This [refers to what was stated above]. |
dhvānaḥ / | [The term] 'dhvāna' [is meant here]. |
athārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭatvaṃ katham eṣāṃ yojanīyam ity āha nivṛttyā | [Question:] "How can their being qualified by the exclusion of other things be explained?" [He responds with] "nivṛttyā." |
cetyādi / | [As stated in] "ca" etc. |
anantaram iti anyānyatvenetyādinā teṣām api buddhasamārūḍhānām arthānām anyatovyāvṛttatayā pratipādanāt // | 'Just previously' means that through [the statement beginning with] "anyānyatvena", those meanings imposed on cognition were also explained as being differentiated from others. |
nanu yadi na kaścid eva vastvaṃśaḥ śabdena pratipādyate tat katham uktam ācāryeṇārthāntaranivṛttyā kaścid eva vastuno bhāgo gamyata ityata āha arthāntaraparāvṛttetyādi | [Objection:] "If no aspect of the real thing is expressed by a word, how [can we explain that] the teacher stated that 'some portion of the thing is understood through exclusion of other things'?" Therefore he says "arthāntaraparāvṛtti" etc. |
arthāntaraparāvṛttyā gamyate tasya vastunaḥ / kaścid bhāga ti proktaṃ tadeva pratibimbakam // | When it is said that 'a certain portion of the thing is understood through exclusion of other things', what is meant is precisely that reflection [in cognition]. |
nanu buddhidharmatvāt pratibimbasya kathaṃ vastubhāgatvam upapadyata ityata | [Objection:] "Since reflection is a property of cognition, how can it be a portion of the real thing?" |
āha arthāntaraparāvṛttyetyādi / arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanasaṃśrayāt / | [It] is spoken of thus beginning with "arthāntaraparāvṛtti," because [it] depends on the perception of an object excluded from other things. |
arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanadvārāyātatvāt tatrārthāntaraparāvṛtte vastuni bhrāntais tādātmyenāropitatvāt tadeva pratibimbakamupacārād vastuno bhāga iti vyapadiśyate // | Because [it] comes about through the perception of an object excluded from other things, and because [it] is superimposed as identical [with the object] by deluded [persons] upon that object which is excluded from other things, therefore that very reflection is figuratively designated as a "portion of the object." |
hetvarthaḥ karaṇārthaś ca pūrvavat tena vātmanā / | The instrumental [ending can indicate] both cause and instrument, as before, [in the phrase] "by that nature." |
yadi vastu vijātīyān na syād bhinnaṃ na tat tathā // | If an object were not distinct from unlike things, then it would not be thus [apprehended]. |
pūrvavad iti / | [The phrase] "as before" [means the following]: |
yathārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānāhetyatrānyānyatvenetyādinā darśitaṃ ta{thā}trāpi yojanīyam ity arthaḥ / | Just as it was shown in the section beginning with "things as qualified by the exclusion of others" through [the phrase] "by otherness," etc., so it should be applied here also - this is the meaning. |
athavā sarvatraivetthambhūtalakṣaṇā tṛtīyeyam iti darśayati tena vātmaneti / | Or [the phrase] "tena vātmanā" shows that this instrumental [ending] in all cases indicates the characteristic of "being such." |
nanu bādhāntaranivṛttir bāhyavastugato dharmaḥ, sā kathaṃ pratibimbādhigame hetubhāvaṃ karaṇabhāvaṃ vā pratipadyata ityatrāha yadi vastu vijātīyādityādi / | [In response to] the objection: "The exclusion of other things is a property belonging to the external object - how can it be either a cause or an instrument in the apprehension of the reflection?" - he states "yadi vastu vijātīyāt" etc. |
yadi hi vijātīyāt padārthād vyāvṛttaṃ vastu na syāt tadā na tat pratibimbātmakaṃ tathā vijātīyaparāvṛttavastvātmanā vyavasīyeta, tasmad arthāntaraparāvṛtter hetubhāvaḥ karaṇabhāvaś ca yujyata iti bhāvaḥ // | For if the object were not excluded from unlike things, then in the form of [its] reflection it could not be determined as having the nature of an object excluded from unlike things; therefore the exclusion from other things is properly both a cause and an instrument - this is the meaning. |
agonivṛttiranyatvaṃ tasya cātmagataiva sā / | Difference is the exclusion of non-cow, and that [exclusion] belongs to its very nature. |
bhedoktāvapyabhāvastu kevalo na nivartate | Even when the difference has been asserted, the mere [thing] does not disappear. |
tadviśeṣaṇabhāve 'pi vastudhīr na vihīyate | Even when [something] has the nature of a qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease. |
kalpanānirmitaṃ cedamabhede 'pi viśeṣaṇam | Even when there is non-difference, this qualification exists [as] constructed by conceptual thought. |
sopakṛṣya tato dharmaḥ sthāpito bhedavāniva | That property, having been abstracted from there, is established as if having difference. |
yena daṇḍādivat tasya jāyate hi viśeṣaṇam | Whereby it becomes its qualification, just like a stick and other [things]. |
yadi hyanyavyāvṛttir bhāvarūpā vastuno viśeṣaṇatvenābhipretā syāt tadaitat sarvaṃ dūṣaṇamupapadyate | If the exclusion of others were intended to be something positive qualifying the thing, then all these objections would be applicable. |
yāvatā vastusvarūpaivānyanivṛttir viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyate, tena viśeṣaṇānurūpaiva viśeṣyabuddhir bhavatyeva | However, the exclusion of others which is taken as the qualification is nothing but the nature of the thing itself; therefore the cognition of the qualified necessarily conforms to the qualification. |
tathā hi agonivṛttir yā gaor abhidhīyate sāśvādibhyo gor yadanyatvaṃ tatsvabhāvaiva nānyā | For when one speaks of the "exclusion of the cow from non-cow," that is just the difference of cow from horse etc., [which is] its very nature, nothing else. |
tataś ca yadyapyasau vyatirekeṇāgonivṛttir gorityabhidhīyate bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ, tathāpi paramārthatas tasya gorātmagataiva sā | And thus even though that exclusion of cow from non-cow is expressed negatively when one only wants to reject other differences, nevertheless in reality it belongs to the very essence of that cow. |
yathānyatvaṃ nahyanyatvaṃ nāmānyasmād vastuno 'nyat apitu tadeva | Just like difference - for "difference" is not something different from the different thing but rather is that very [thing]. |
anyathā tad vastu tato 'nyasminna siddhyet | Otherwise that thing could not be established as different from another. |
tat tasmāt, viśeṣaṇabhāve 'pyanyavyāvṛtter viśeṣye vastudhīr bhavatyeva | Therefore, even when the exclusion of others has the nature of a qualification, there is indeed a cognition of the thing in what is qualified. |
syād etad vyatiriktam eva hi viśeṣyād viśeṣaṇaṃ loke prasiddham, yathā daṇḍaḥ puruṣasya | One might object: "In ordinary experience, a qualification is well-known to be distinct from what is qualified, like a stick [is distinct] from its bearer." |
vyāvṛttiścāvyatiriktā vastunaḥ, tat katham asau tasya viśeṣaṇaṃ yujyata | "And [you say] exclusion is not distinct from the thing, so how can it properly be its qualification?" |
nahi paramārthena na kiñcit kasyacid viśeṣaṇaṃ yuktam, anupakārakasya viśeṣaṇatvāyogāt | In reality, nothing can properly be a qualification of anything, because what does not help [something else] cannot be a qualification. |
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