buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

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itthaṃ nirdiṣṭabhedena bhavatyevānvayo 'munā //	Thus there is indeed concomitance through the differences indicated in this way.
yadasato vyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇamatādrūpyāt tat sarvaṃ sthirādapi vyāvṛttaṃ, yathā buddhidīpādayaḥ /	That which is differentiated from the non-existent because of [its] non-identity [with it], that specific characteristic is also differentiated from permanent things, as [seen in] cognition, lamp-flame and such [things].
tathācedaṃ śabdādisvalakṣaṇam asadrūpaṃ na bhavatīti /	And thus this specific characteristic of sound and other [things] does not have the nature of the non-existent.
ayaṃ ca sattvādityasya hetor anvayo darśitaḥ //	And this concomitance of the reason "because of [its] existence" has been shown.
yadyevaṃ svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaḥ, katham idānīṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṃsidhyatītyata āha avivakṣitabhedaṃ cetyādi /	If thus the concomitance is with the specific characteristic alone, how then is inference regarding the universal characteristic established? To this [he] says "that [same thing] whose difference is not intended to be expressed" and so forth.
avivakṣitabhedaṃ ca tadeva parikīrtitam /	And that very [thing] whose difference is not intended to be expressed has been declared [as the universal].
sāmānyalakṣaṇatvena nāniṣṭer aparaṃ punaḥ //	[It is declared as] having the nature of a universal characteristic, [and] nothing else [is accepted] due to [its] being undesirable.
tadeva hi svalakṣaṇamavivakṣitabhedaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ityuktam /	For that very specific characteristic, when its difference is not intended to be expressed, is called the universal characteristic.
sāmānyena bhedāparāmarśena, lakṣyate vyavasīyata iti sāmānyalakṣaṇam /	[The term] "universal characteristic" [means that which] is characterized [or] determined through [its] commonality, without consideration of [its] differences.
nāparaṃ punar iti tīrthikābhimatam, tasyāniṣṭatvāt /	"Nothing else" [refers to] what is accepted by other philosophical schools, because of its being undesirable.
yathoktam "tasyaiva svapararūpābhyāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam" iti /	As has been said: "Because it is apprehended through both its own form and other's form, its object is considered to be twofold."
athadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātrasamāśrayāt / sāmānyaviṣayaṃ proktaṃ liṅgaṃ bhedāpratiṣṭhiteḥ //	Inasmuch as [the inferential mark] is based upon the thing-in-itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the indicative [mark] pertaining to the universal has been declared [to be] the indicative of the absence of diversity.
tena sāhacaryam api liṅgaśabdayoḥ svalakṣaṇenaiva kathyate /	Therefore, the concomitance of both the inferential mark and the word is declared to pertain to the specific characteristic itself.
nacāpyadarśanamātreṇāsmābhir vipakṣe liṅgasyābhāvo 'vasīyate / kiṃ tarhianupalambhaviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ //	We do not conclude the absence of an inferential mark in the counter-instance merely from non-perception, but rather from a specific type of non-apprehension.
śabalāpatyato bhede bāhuleyāśvayoḥ same / turaṅgaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ kiṃ tatra vartate //	When the difference from the variegated cow is equally [present] in both the black cow and the horse, why does cowness, as distinguished from [the class of] horses, subsist in that [black cow]?
idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati, sābaleyāc ca bāhuleyāc ca tulye 'pi bhede sati kimiti turaṅgamaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ tatraiva sābaleyādau vartate nāśva iti //	You ought to explain this: when there is an equal difference from both the variegated cow and the black cow, why does cowness, as distinguished from the horse, subsist only in those [cows] like the variegated one and not in the horse?
syād etat kimatra vaktavyaṃ, tasya hi gotvasyābhivyaktau sābaleyādireva samartho nāśvādiratas tatraiva tadvartate nānyatra /	One might say: "What is there to explain here? Only the variegated cow and similar [animals] are capable of manifesting cowness, not the horse and similar [animals]; therefore it subsists only there [in cows] and not elsewhere."
nacāyaṃ paryanuyogo yujyate, kasmāt tasyābhivyaktau sa eva sābaleyādiḥ samartho bhavati, {iti}yato vastusvabhāpratiniyamo 'yaṃ, nahi vastūnāṃ svabhāvaḥ paryanuyogam arhati /	Nor is this counter-question appropriate: "why is it that only the variegated cow and similar [animals] have the capacity to manifest it?" Because this is a restriction [based on] the inherent nature of things, and the nature of things cannot be questioned.
teṣāṃ svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt svabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyeti, atrāha tasyavyaktāvityādi /	Because these restrictions of different natures are produced by their own series of causes. Here [the opponent] says what follows regarding "its manifestation."
tatra vyaktau samarthātmā sa eveti yadīṣyate / tulyapratyavamarśe 'pi sa śakto na turaṅgamaḥ //	If it is maintained that "only that [cow] has the capacity for its manifestation," then even though the subsequent recognition is the same, that [cow] alone has the capacity [to manifest it], not the horse.
tasyeti gotvasya /	"It" [refers to] cowness.
sa eveti sāvaleyādir na punaraśvaḥ /	"That alone" [means] the variegated cow and similar [animals], not the horse.
yadyevaṃ satyapi bhede sāmānyamantareṇāpi tulyapratyavamarśotpādane sāvaleyādireva śakto na turaṅgama ityayam asmatpakṣo na virudhyata eva //	If this is so, then even when there is diversity and no commonalty [present], only the spotted cow and similar [cows], and not the horse, would be capable of producing the same determinate cognition – [and] this position of ours is indeed not contradictory.
tataś ca kiṃ jātam ity āha tādṛgityādi /	[Someone asks:] "What follows from this?" [The author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "tādṛk" [etc.].
tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca vidyate yatra vastuni / tatrābhāve 'pi gojāter ago 'pohaḥ pravartate //	In whatever entity such a determinate cognition exists, there the exclusion of non-cow operates, even in the absence of the universal 'cowness'.
tatraivāsatyam api gojāto vastubhūtāyām agopohaḥ pratibimbātmā pravartate //	Even in the absence of the real universal 'cowness', the exclusion of non-cow in the form of a reflection operates there.
yaccoktamindriyair ityādi, tadasiddham iti darśayann āha agobhinnaṃ cetyādi /	To show that what was said [beginning with] "by the senses" etc. is not established, [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "agobhinnam" etc.
agobhinnaṃ ca yadvastu tadakṣair vyavasīyate /	That entity which is "different from non-cow" is apprehended by the sense organs.
pratibimbaṃ tadadhyastaṃ svasaṃvittyāvagamyate //	The reflection that is superimposed upon it is apprehended through self-awareness.
idaṃ dṛṣṭvā ca lokena śabdas tatra prayujyate /	And having seen this, people apply the word to it.
sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya vyaktaṃ tenopapadyate //	The experience of its connection too is thereby clearly established.
tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva /	In this regard, the apoha in the form of the particular is indeed apprehended by the sense organs.
yat svārthapratibimbātmāpohaḥ sa paramārthato buddhisvabhāvatvāt svasaṃvedanapratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ /	The apoha which has the nature of a reflection of its own object is established through direct self-awareness alone, since it is ultimately of the nature of cognition.
cakāro 'nuktārthasamuccaye /	The particle "ca" [serves] for the inclusion of meanings not [directly] mentioned.
tena prasajyātmāpi sāmarthyāt pratīyata eva na tadātmā parātmeti darśitaṃ bhavati /	By this, even the prasajya-type [of apoha] is understood through implication, [and] it has been shown that the nature of one is not the nature of the other.
tenedam eva svalakṣaṇādirūpamapohaṃ dṛṣṭvā śabdo lokena prayujyate, natu sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ, tasyāsattvādapratibhāsanāc ca /	Therefore, it is upon seeing this very apoha in the form of svalakṣaṇa and so forth that words are used by people, not upon [seeing] a universal as a real entity, because of its non-existence and non-manifestation.
yadeva ca dṛṣṭvā lokena śabdaḥ prayujyate, tenaiva tasya sambandho 'vagamyate nānyenātiprasaṅgāt //	And that very [thing] upon seeing which people use words, through that alone its relation is understood, not through anything else, because [that] would lead to an unwanted consequence.
tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca yatra naivāsti vastuni / agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ vispaṣṭaṃ tatra gamyate //	And where such a determinate cognition does not exist regarding an entity, there the denotability by the word "non-cow" is clearly understood.
yaccoktaṃ siddhaścāgaurapohyetetyādi tatrāha gāvo 'gāvaścetyādi /	And regarding what was said [earlier] beginning with "and the established non-cow would be negated," [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "cows and non-cows."
gāvo 'gāvaś ca saṃsiddhā bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ /	Cows and non-cows are both well-established due to distinct determinate cognitions.
śabdas tu kevalo 'siddho yatheṣṭaṃ samprayujyate //	But the word alone is not established [and] is employed according to one's wish.
na hyanyagrahaṇaṃ vastu bhinnaṃ vittāvapekṣate /	For a distinct entity does not depend on the cognition of another for its apprehension.
anyonyāśrayadoṣo 'yaṃ tasmād asminnirāspadaḥ //	Therefore, this fault of mutual dependence has no basis here.
svata eva hi gavādayo bhāvā bhinnapratyavamarśaṃ janayanto vibhāgena samyaṅniścitāḥ /	Indeed, things like cows (gavādi), by themselves, generate distinct reflective awareness [of themselves] and are thus well ascertained in their distinct forms.
teṣu vyavahārārthaṃ vyavahartṛbhir yatheṣṭaṃ śabdo 'siddhaḥ prayujyate /	For the purpose of verbal usage regarding these [things], speakers employ words, which are [themselves] not established, according to their wish.
tathā hi yadi bhinnavastusvarūpaṃ pratipattyarthamanyapadārthagrahaṇam apekṣyate tadā syād itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, yāvatānyagrahaṇamantareṇaiva bhinnaṃ	If indeed the form of a distinct entity required the grasping of another entity for its apprehension, then there would be the fault of mutual dependence; however, the distinct [entity]
vastu saṃvedyate, tasmin bhinnākārapratyavamarśahetutayā vibhāgena siddhe sati gaur gaur iti ca yatheṣṭaṃ saṅketaḥ kriyata iti katham itaretarāśrayatvaṃ bhavet /	is cognized without grasping another [entity], and when it is established distinctly as the cause of reflective awareness of a distinct form, the convention is made according to wish as "cow, cow" - so how could there be mutual dependence?
vittāviti vittyartham //	The [word] "vittau" means "for the sake of cognition."
avedyabāhyatattvāpi prakṛṣṭopaplavādiyam / svollekhaṃ bāhyarūpeṇa śabdadhīradhyavasyati //	Even though not cognizing external reality, this verbal cognition, due to intense delusion, determines its own manifestation as having external form.
etāvat kriyate śabdair nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśantyapi /	This much alone is done by words; words do not even touch objects.
nāpohena viśiṣṭaś ca kaścid artho 'bhidhīyate //	And no object qualified by exclusion (apoha) is denoted [by words].
nahi paramārthena kaścid apohena viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate / yataḥ pratipāditametat, yathā na kiñcidapi śabdair vastu saṃspṛśyate, kvacid apisāmagryabhāvād iti /	Indeed, in ultimate reality, no object qualified by exclusion is denoted by words, because this has been explained: that no entity whatsoever is touched by words, due to the absence of [necessary] conditions anywhere.
tathā hi śābdī buddhirabāhyārthaviṣayāpi satī svollekhaṃ svākāraṃ bāhyārthatayādhyavasyantī jāyate na paramārthato vastusvabhāvaṃ spṛśati, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt //	For verbal cognition, even while not having external objects as its domain, arises determining its own manifestation [and] its own form as an external object, [but] does not touch the true nature of reality, because [its] determination is not in accordance with reality.
yadyevaṃ katham ācāryeṇoktaṃ nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhurityata āha arthāntaretyādi /	[Question:] "If that is so, then why has the Teacher declared that 'words like nīlotpala [blue lotus] express objects qualified by the exclusion of other things?'"
proktaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa tatrārtho 'yaṃ vivakṣitaḥ //	[As for] what has been stated by the author of the lakṣaṇa, this is the intended meaning here.
ko 'sāvartho vivakṣita ity āha anyānyatvenetyādi /	[Question:] "What is that intended meaning?" [Answer:] [It is explained by the words] beginning with "anyānyatvena."
anyānyatvena ye bhāvā hetunā karaṇena vā / viśiṣṭā bhinnajātīyair asaṅkīrṇā viniścitāḥ //	Those entities which are qualified by [their] difference from others, either as cause or instrument, are definitively known as unmixed with things of different kinds.
vṛkṣādīnāhatāndhvānas tadbhāvādhyavasāyinaḥ / jñānasyotpādanādetajjātyādeḥ pratiṣedhanam //	Words express these [entities], and because they produce cognition determining those entities, there is negation of [universal] class etc.
dvividho hyartho bāhyo buddhyārūḍhaś ca /	For objects are of two kinds: external and superimposed upon cognition.
tatra bāhye na paramārthato 'bhidhānaṃ śabdaiḥ, kevalaṃ tadapyavasāyivikalpotpādādupacārād uktaṃ śabdo 'rthānāheti /	Among these, regarding external [objects], there is no denotation by words in the ultimate sense; it is only figuratively said that "words denote objects" because [words] produce conceptual cognition determining those [objects].
avayavārthastūcyate anyānyatveneti /	But the meaning of the components is explained [by the phrase] "by difference from others."
anyasmād anyatvaṃ vyāvṛttiḥ, tenānyānyatvena hetunā karaṇena vā vṛkṣādayo bhāvā viśiṣṭā niścitāḥ /	Difference from others is exclusion; by that difference from others, either as cause or instrument, entities like trees are definitively cognized as qualified.
anyato vyāvṛttā niścitā iti yāvat /	That is to say, [they are] definitively cognized as excluded from others.
etenārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānityatra pade nivṛttyeti tṛtīyārtho vyākhyātaḥ /	By this, in the compound arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān, the term nivṛtti is explained as having an instrumental meaning.
dhvāna iti śabdaḥ //	'dhvāna' is [the term for] word.
yastu buddhyārūḍho 'rthas tasya mukhyata eva śabdair abhidhānam	That meaning which is imposed upon cognition is directly denoted by words.
buddhāvityādi / buddhau ye vā vivartante tānāhābhyantarānayam	[As stated in] "buddhau" etc.: those [meanings] which appear in cognition, those internal [ones], this [word denotes].
ayam iti /	This [refers to what was stated above].
dhvānaḥ /	[The term] 'dhvāna' [is meant here].
athārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭatvaṃ katham eṣāṃ yojanīyam ity āha nivṛttyā	[Question:] "How can their being qualified by the exclusion of other things be explained?" [He responds with] "nivṛttyā."
cetyādi /	[As stated in] "ca" etc.
anantaram iti anyānyatvenetyādinā teṣām api buddhasamārūḍhānām arthānām anyatovyāvṛttatayā pratipādanāt //	'Just previously' means that through [the statement beginning with] "anyānyatvena", those meanings imposed on cognition were also explained as being differentiated from others.
nanu yadi na kaścid eva vastvaṃśaḥ śabdena pratipādyate tat katham uktam ācāryeṇārthāntaranivṛttyā kaścid eva vastuno bhāgo gamyata ityata āha arthāntaraparāvṛttetyādi	[Objection:] "If no aspect of the real thing is expressed by a word, how [can we explain that] the teacher stated that 'some portion of the thing is understood through exclusion of other things'?" Therefore he says "arthāntaraparāvṛtti" etc.
arthāntaraparāvṛttyā gamyate tasya vastunaḥ / kaścid bhāga ti proktaṃ tadeva pratibimbakam //	When it is said that 'a certain portion of the thing is understood through exclusion of other things', what is meant is precisely that reflection [in cognition].
nanu buddhidharmatvāt pratibimbasya kathaṃ vastubhāgatvam upapadyata ityata	[Objection:] "Since reflection is a property of cognition, how can it be a portion of the real thing?"
āha arthāntaraparāvṛttyetyādi / arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanasaṃśrayāt /	[It] is spoken of thus beginning with "arthāntaraparāvṛtti," because [it] depends on the perception of an object excluded from other things.
arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanadvārāyātatvāt tatrārthāntaraparāvṛtte vastuni bhrāntais tādātmyenāropitatvāt tadeva pratibimbakamupacārād vastuno bhāga iti vyapadiśyate //	Because [it] comes about through the perception of an object excluded from other things, and because [it] is superimposed as identical [with the object] by deluded [persons] upon that object which is excluded from other things, therefore that very reflection is figuratively designated as a "portion of the object."
hetvarthaḥ karaṇārthaś ca pūrvavat tena vātmanā /	The instrumental [ending can indicate] both cause and instrument, as before, [in the phrase] "by that nature."
yadi vastu vijātīyān na syād bhinnaṃ na tat tathā //	If an object were not distinct from unlike things, then it would not be thus [apprehended].
pūrvavad iti /	[The phrase] "as before" [means the following]:
yathārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānāhetyatrānyānyatvenetyādinā darśitaṃ ta{thā}trāpi yojanīyam ity arthaḥ /	Just as it was shown in the section beginning with "things as qualified by the exclusion of others" through [the phrase] "by otherness," etc., so it should be applied here also - this is the meaning.
athavā sarvatraivetthambhūtalakṣaṇā tṛtīyeyam iti darśayati tena vātmaneti /	Or [the phrase] "tena vātmanā" shows that this instrumental [ending] in all cases indicates the characteristic of "being such."
nanu bādhāntaranivṛttir bāhyavastugato dharmaḥ, sā kathaṃ pratibimbādhigame hetubhāvaṃ karaṇabhāvaṃ vā pratipadyata ityatrāha yadi vastu vijātīyādityādi /	[In response to] the objection: "The exclusion of other things is a property belonging to the external object - how can it be either a cause or an instrument in the apprehension of the reflection?" - he states "yadi vastu vijātīyāt" etc.
yadi hi vijātīyāt padārthād vyāvṛttaṃ vastu na syāt tadā na tat pratibimbātmakaṃ tathā vijātīyaparāvṛttavastvātmanā vyavasīyeta, tasmad arthāntaraparāvṛtter hetubhāvaḥ karaṇabhāvaś ca yujyata iti bhāvaḥ //	For if the object were not excluded from unlike things, then in the form of [its] reflection it could not be determined as having the nature of an object excluded from unlike things; therefore the exclusion from other things is properly both a cause and an instrument - this is the meaning.
agonivṛttiranyatvaṃ tasya cātmagataiva sā /	Difference is the exclusion of non-cow, and that [exclusion] belongs to its very nature.
bhedoktāvapyabhāvastu kevalo na nivartate	Even when the difference has been asserted, the mere [thing] does not disappear.
tadviśeṣaṇabhāve 'pi vastudhīr na vihīyate	Even when [something] has the nature of a qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease.
kalpanānirmitaṃ cedamabhede 'pi viśeṣaṇam	Even when there is non-difference, this qualification exists [as] constructed by conceptual thought.
sopakṛṣya tato dharmaḥ sthāpito bhedavāniva	That property, having been abstracted from there, is established as if having difference.
yena daṇḍādivat tasya jāyate hi viśeṣaṇam	Whereby it becomes its qualification, just like a stick and other [things].
yadi hyanyavyāvṛttir bhāvarūpā vastuno viśeṣaṇatvenābhipretā syāt tadaitat sarvaṃ dūṣaṇamupapadyate	If the exclusion of others were intended to be something positive qualifying the thing, then all these objections would be applicable.
yāvatā vastusvarūpaivānyanivṛttir viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyate, tena viśeṣaṇānurūpaiva viśeṣyabuddhir bhavatyeva	However, the exclusion of others which is taken as the qualification is nothing but the nature of the thing itself; therefore the cognition of the qualified necessarily conforms to the qualification.
tathā hi agonivṛttir yā gaor abhidhīyate sāśvādibhyo gor yadanyatvaṃ tatsvabhāvaiva nānyā	For when one speaks of the "exclusion of the cow from non-cow," that is just the difference of cow from horse etc., [which is] its very nature, nothing else.
tataś ca yadyapyasau vyatirekeṇāgonivṛttir gorityabhidhīyate bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ, tathāpi paramārthatas tasya gorātmagataiva sā	And thus even though that exclusion of cow from non-cow is expressed negatively when one only wants to reject other differences, nevertheless in reality it belongs to the very essence of that cow.
yathānyatvaṃ nahyanyatvaṃ nāmānyasmād vastuno 'nyat apitu tadeva	Just like difference - for "difference" is not something different from the different thing but rather is that very [thing].
anyathā tad vastu tato 'nyasminna siddhyet	Otherwise that thing could not be established as different from another.
tat tasmāt, viśeṣaṇabhāve 'pyanyavyāvṛtter viśeṣye vastudhīr bhavatyeva	Therefore, even when the exclusion of others has the nature of a qualification, there is indeed a cognition of the thing in what is qualified.
syād etad vyatiriktam eva hi viśeṣyād viśeṣaṇaṃ loke prasiddham, yathā daṇḍaḥ puruṣasya	One might object: "In ordinary experience, a qualification is well-known to be distinct from what is qualified, like a stick [is distinct] from its bearer."
vyāvṛttiścāvyatiriktā vastunaḥ, tat katham asau tasya viśeṣaṇaṃ yujyata	"And [you say] exclusion is not distinct from the thing, so how can it properly be its qualification?"
nahi paramārthena na kiñcit kasyacid viśeṣaṇaṃ yuktam, anupakārakasya viśeṣaṇatvāyogāt	In reality, nothing can properly be a qualification of anything, because what does not help [something else] cannot be a qualification.

itthaṃ nirdiṣṭabhedena bhavatyevānvayo 'munā //

Thus there is indeed concomitance through the differences indicated in this way.

yadasato vyāvṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇamatādrūpyāt tat sarvaṃ sthirādapi vyāvṛttaṃ, yathā buddhidīpādayaḥ /

That which is differentiated from the non-existent because of [its] non-identity [with it], that specific characteristic is also differentiated from permanent things, as [seen in] cognition, lamp-flame and such [things].

tathācedaṃ śabdādisvalakṣaṇam asadrūpaṃ na bhavatīti /

And thus this specific characteristic of sound and other [things] does not have the nature of the non-existent.

ayaṃ ca sattvādityasya hetor anvayo darśitaḥ //

And this concomitance of the reason "because of [its] existence" has been shown.

yadyevaṃ svalakṣaṇenaivānvayaḥ, katham idānīṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayamanumānaṃsidhyatītyata āha avivakṣitabhedaṃ cetyādi /

If thus the concomitance is with the specific characteristic alone, how then is inference regarding the universal characteristic established? To this [he] says "that [same thing] whose difference is not intended to be expressed" and so forth.

avivakṣitabhedaṃ ca tadeva parikīrtitam /

And that very [thing] whose difference is not intended to be expressed has been declared [as the universal].

sāmānyalakṣaṇatvena nāniṣṭer aparaṃ punaḥ //

[It is declared as] having the nature of a universal characteristic, [and] nothing else [is accepted] due to [its] being undesirable.

tadeva hi svalakṣaṇamavivakṣitabhedaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ityuktam /

For that very specific characteristic, when its difference is not intended to be expressed, is called the universal characteristic.

sāmānyena bhedāparāmarśena, lakṣyate vyavasīyata iti sāmānyalakṣaṇam /

[The term] "universal characteristic" [means that which] is characterized [or] determined through [its] commonality, without consideration of [its] differences.

nāparaṃ punar iti tīrthikābhimatam, tasyāniṣṭatvāt /

"Nothing else" [refers to] what is accepted by other philosophical schools, because of its being undesirable.

yathoktam "tasyaiva svapararūpābhyāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ matam" iti /

As has been said: "Because it is apprehended through both its own form and other's form, its object is considered to be twofold."

athadrūpaparāvṛttavastumātrasamāśrayāt / sāmānyaviṣayaṃ proktaṃ liṅgaṃ bhedāpratiṣṭhiteḥ //

Inasmuch as [the inferential mark] is based upon the thing-in-itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the indicative [mark] pertaining to the universal has been declared [to be] the indicative of the absence of diversity.

tena sāhacaryam api liṅgaśabdayoḥ svalakṣaṇenaiva kathyate /

Therefore, the concomitance of both the inferential mark and the word is declared to pertain to the specific characteristic itself.

nacāpyadarśanamātreṇāsmābhir vipakṣe liṅgasyābhāvo 'vasīyate / kiṃ tarhianupalambhaviśeṣād iti bhāvaḥ //

We do not conclude the absence of an inferential mark in the counter-instance merely from non-perception, but rather from a specific type of non-apprehension.

śabalāpatyato bhede bāhuleyāśvayoḥ same / turaṅgaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ kiṃ tatra vartate //

When the difference from the variegated cow is equally [present] in both the black cow and the horse, why does cowness, as distinguished from [the class of] horses, subsist in that [black cow]?

idaṃ hi bhavān vaktumarhati, sābaleyāc ca bāhuleyāc ca tulye 'pi bhede sati kimiti turaṅgamaparihāreṇa gotvaṃ tatraiva sābaleyādau vartate nāśva iti //

You ought to explain this: when there is an equal difference from both the variegated cow and the black cow, why does cowness, as distinguished from the horse, subsist only in those [cows] like the variegated one and not in the horse?

syād etat kimatra vaktavyaṃ, tasya hi gotvasyābhivyaktau sābaleyādireva samartho nāśvādiratas tatraiva tadvartate nānyatra /

One might say: "What is there to explain here? Only the variegated cow and similar [animals] are capable of manifesting cowness, not the horse and similar [animals]; therefore it subsists only there [in cows] and not elsewhere."

nacāyaṃ paryanuyogo yujyate, kasmāt tasyābhivyaktau sa eva sābaleyādiḥ samartho bhavati, {iti}yato vastusvabhāpratiniyamo 'yaṃ, nahi vastūnāṃ svabhāvaḥ paryanuyogam arhati /

Nor is this counter-question appropriate: "why is it that only the variegated cow and similar [animals] have the capacity to manifest it?" Because this is a restriction [based on] the inherent nature of things, and the nature of things cannot be questioned.

teṣāṃ svahetuparamparākṛtatvāt svabhāvabhedapratiniyamasyeti, atrāha tasyavyaktāvityādi /

Because these restrictions of different natures are produced by their own series of causes. Here [the opponent] says what follows regarding "its manifestation."

tatra vyaktau samarthātmā sa eveti yadīṣyate / tulyapratyavamarśe 'pi sa śakto na turaṅgamaḥ //

If it is maintained that "only that [cow] has the capacity for its manifestation," then even though the subsequent recognition is the same, that [cow] alone has the capacity [to manifest it], not the horse.

tasyeti gotvasya /

"It" [refers to] cowness.

sa eveti sāvaleyādir na punaraśvaḥ /

"That alone" [means] the variegated cow and similar [animals], not the horse.

yadyevaṃ satyapi bhede sāmānyamantareṇāpi tulyapratyavamarśotpādane sāvaleyādireva śakto na turaṅgama ityayam asmatpakṣo na virudhyata eva //

If this is so, then even when there is diversity and no commonalty [present], only the spotted cow and similar [cows], and not the horse, would be capable of producing the same determinate cognition – [and] this position of ours is indeed not contradictory.

tataś ca kiṃ jātam ity āha tādṛgityādi /

[Someone asks:] "What follows from this?" [The author] responds with [the verse beginning with] "tādṛk" [etc.].

tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca vidyate yatra vastuni / tatrābhāve 'pi gojāter ago 'pohaḥ pravartate //

In whatever entity such a determinate cognition exists, there the exclusion of non-cow operates, even in the absence of the universal 'cowness'.

tatraivāsatyam api gojāto vastubhūtāyām agopohaḥ pratibimbātmā pravartate //

Even in the absence of the real universal 'cowness', the exclusion of non-cow in the form of a reflection operates there.

yaccoktamindriyair ityādi, tadasiddham iti darśayann āha agobhinnaṃ cetyādi /

To show that what was said [beginning with] "by the senses" etc. is not established, [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "agobhinnam" etc.

agobhinnaṃ ca yadvastu tadakṣair vyavasīyate /

That entity which is "different from non-cow" is apprehended by the sense organs.

pratibimbaṃ tadadhyastaṃ svasaṃvittyāvagamyate //

The reflection that is superimposed upon it is apprehended through self-awareness.

idaṃ dṛṣṭvā ca lokena śabdas tatra prayujyate /

And having seen this, people apply the word to it.

sambandhānubhavo 'pyasya vyaktaṃ tenopapadyate //

The experience of its connection too is thereby clearly established.

tatra svalakṣaṇātmā tāvad apoha indriyair avagamyata eva /

In this regard, the apoha in the form of the particular is indeed apprehended by the sense organs.

yat svārthapratibimbātmāpohaḥ sa paramārthato buddhisvabhāvatvāt svasaṃvedanapratyakṣata eva siddhaḥ /

The apoha which has the nature of a reflection of its own object is established through direct self-awareness alone, since it is ultimately of the nature of cognition.

cakāro 'nuktārthasamuccaye /

The particle "ca" [serves] for the inclusion of meanings not [directly] mentioned.

tena prasajyātmāpi sāmarthyāt pratīyata eva na tadātmā parātmeti darśitaṃ bhavati /

By this, even the prasajya-type [of apoha] is understood through implication, [and] it has been shown that the nature of one is not the nature of the other.

tenedam eva svalakṣaṇādirūpamapohaṃ dṛṣṭvā śabdo lokena prayujyate, natu sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ, tasyāsattvādapratibhāsanāc ca /

Therefore, it is upon seeing this very apoha in the form of svalakṣaṇa and so forth that words are used by people, not upon [seeing] a universal as a real entity, because of its non-existence and non-manifestation.

yadeva ca dṛṣṭvā lokena śabdaḥ prayujyate, tenaiva tasya sambandho 'vagamyate nānyenātiprasaṅgāt //

And that very [thing] upon seeing which people use words, through that alone its relation is understood, not through anything else, because [that] would lead to an unwanted consequence.

tādṛkpratyavamarśaś ca yatra naivāsti vastuni / agośabdābhidheyatvaṃ vispaṣṭaṃ tatra gamyate //

And where such a determinate cognition does not exist regarding an entity, there the denotability by the word "non-cow" is clearly understood.

yaccoktaṃ siddhaścāgaurapohyetetyādi tatrāha gāvo 'gāvaścetyādi /

And regarding what was said [earlier] beginning with "and the established non-cow would be negated," [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "cows and non-cows."

gāvo 'gāvaś ca saṃsiddhā bhinnapratyavamarśataḥ /

Cows and non-cows are both well-established due to distinct determinate cognitions.

śabdas tu kevalo 'siddho yatheṣṭaṃ samprayujyate //

But the word alone is not established [and] is employed according to one's wish.

na hyanyagrahaṇaṃ vastu bhinnaṃ vittāvapekṣate /

For a distinct entity does not depend on the cognition of another for its apprehension.

anyonyāśrayadoṣo 'yaṃ tasmād asminnirāspadaḥ //

Therefore, this fault of mutual dependence has no basis here.

svata eva hi gavādayo bhāvā bhinnapratyavamarśaṃ janayanto vibhāgena samyaṅniścitāḥ /

Indeed, things like cows (gavādi), by themselves, generate distinct reflective awareness [of themselves] and are thus well ascertained in their distinct forms.

teṣu vyavahārārthaṃ vyavahartṛbhir yatheṣṭaṃ śabdo 'siddhaḥ prayujyate /

For the purpose of verbal usage regarding these [things], speakers employ words, which are [themselves] not established, according to their wish.

tathā hi yadi bhinnavastusvarūpaṃ pratipattyarthamanyapadārthagrahaṇam apekṣyate tadā syād itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ, yāvatānyagrahaṇamantareṇaiva bhinnaṃ

If indeed the form of a distinct entity required the grasping of another entity for its apprehension, then there would be the fault of mutual dependence; however, the distinct [entity]

vastu saṃvedyate, tasmin bhinnākārapratyavamarśahetutayā vibhāgena siddhe sati gaur gaur iti ca yatheṣṭaṃ saṅketaḥ kriyata iti katham itaretarāśrayatvaṃ bhavet /

is cognized without grasping another [entity], and when it is established distinctly as the cause of reflective awareness of a distinct form, the convention is made according to wish as "cow, cow" - so how could there be mutual dependence?

vittāviti vittyartham //

The [word] "vittau" means "for the sake of cognition."

avedyabāhyatattvāpi prakṛṣṭopaplavādiyam / svollekhaṃ bāhyarūpeṇa śabdadhīradhyavasyati //

Even though not cognizing external reality, this verbal cognition, due to intense delusion, determines its own manifestation as having external form.

etāvat kriyate śabdair nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśantyapi /

This much alone is done by words; words do not even touch objects.

nāpohena viśiṣṭaś ca kaścid artho 'bhidhīyate //

And no object qualified by exclusion (apoha) is denoted [by words].

nahi paramārthena kaścid apohena viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ śabdair abhidhīyate / yataḥ pratipāditametat, yathā na kiñcidapi śabdair vastu saṃspṛśyate, kvacid apisāmagryabhāvād iti /

Indeed, in ultimate reality, no object qualified by exclusion is denoted by words, because this has been explained: that no entity whatsoever is touched by words, due to the absence of [necessary] conditions anywhere.

tathā hi śābdī buddhirabāhyārthaviṣayāpi satī svollekhaṃ svākāraṃ bāhyārthatayādhyavasyantī jāyate na paramārthato vastusvabhāvaṃ spṛśati, yathātattvamanadhyavasāyāt //

For verbal cognition, even while not having external objects as its domain, arises determining its own manifestation [and] its own form as an external object, [but] does not touch the true nature of reality, because [its] determination is not in accordance with reality.

yadyevaṃ katham ācāryeṇoktaṃ nīlotpalādiśabdā arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānarthānāhurityata āha arthāntaretyādi /

[Question:] "If that is so, then why has the Teacher declared that 'words like nīlotpala [blue lotus] express objects qualified by the exclusion of other things?'"

proktaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa tatrārtho 'yaṃ vivakṣitaḥ //

[As for] what has been stated by the author of the lakṣaṇa, this is the intended meaning here.

ko 'sāvartho vivakṣita ity āha anyānyatvenetyādi /

[Question:] "What is that intended meaning?" [Answer:] [It is explained by the words] beginning with "anyānyatvena."

anyānyatvena ye bhāvā hetunā karaṇena vā / viśiṣṭā bhinnajātīyair asaṅkīrṇā viniścitāḥ //

Those entities which are qualified by [their] difference from others, either as cause or instrument, are definitively known as unmixed with things of different kinds.

vṛkṣādīnāhatāndhvānas tadbhāvādhyavasāyinaḥ / jñānasyotpādanādetajjātyādeḥ pratiṣedhanam //

Words express these [entities], and because they produce cognition determining those entities, there is negation of [universal] class etc.

dvividho hyartho bāhyo buddhyārūḍhaś ca /

For objects are of two kinds: external and superimposed upon cognition.

tatra bāhye na paramārthato 'bhidhānaṃ śabdaiḥ, kevalaṃ tadapyavasāyivikalpotpādādupacārād uktaṃ śabdo 'rthānāheti /

Among these, regarding external [objects], there is no denotation by words in the ultimate sense; it is only figuratively said that "words denote objects" because [words] produce conceptual cognition determining those [objects].

avayavārthastūcyate anyānyatveneti /

But the meaning of the components is explained [by the phrase] "by difference from others."

anyasmād anyatvaṃ vyāvṛttiḥ, tenānyānyatvena hetunā karaṇena vā vṛkṣādayo bhāvā viśiṣṭā niścitāḥ /

Difference from others is exclusion; by that difference from others, either as cause or instrument, entities like trees are definitively cognized as qualified.

anyato vyāvṛttā niścitā iti yāvat /

That is to say, [they are] definitively cognized as excluded from others.

etenārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānityatra pade nivṛttyeti tṛtīyārtho vyākhyātaḥ /

By this, in the compound arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān, the term nivṛtti is explained as having an instrumental meaning.

dhvāna iti śabdaḥ //

'dhvāna' is [the term for] word.

yastu buddhyārūḍho 'rthas tasya mukhyata eva śabdair abhidhānam

That meaning which is imposed upon cognition is directly denoted by words.

buddhāvityādi / buddhau ye vā vivartante tānāhābhyantarānayam

[As stated in] "buddhau" etc.: those [meanings] which appear in cognition, those internal [ones], this [word denotes].

ayam iti /

This [refers to what was stated above].

dhvānaḥ /

[The term] 'dhvāna' [is meant here].

athārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭatvaṃ katham eṣāṃ yojanīyam ity āha nivṛttyā

[Question:] "How can their being qualified by the exclusion of other things be explained?" [He responds with] "nivṛttyā."

cetyādi /

[As stated in] "ca" etc.

anantaram iti anyānyatvenetyādinā teṣām api buddhasamārūḍhānām arthānām anyatovyāvṛttatayā pratipādanāt //

'Just previously' means that through [the statement beginning with] "anyānyatvena", those meanings imposed on cognition were also explained as being differentiated from others.

nanu yadi na kaścid eva vastvaṃśaḥ śabdena pratipādyate tat katham uktam ācāryeṇārthāntaranivṛttyā kaścid eva vastuno bhāgo gamyata ityata āha arthāntaraparāvṛttetyādi

[Objection:] "If no aspect of the real thing is expressed by a word, how [can we explain that] the teacher stated that 'some portion of the thing is understood through exclusion of other things'?" Therefore he says "arthāntaraparāvṛtti" etc.

arthāntaraparāvṛttyā gamyate tasya vastunaḥ / kaścid bhāga ti proktaṃ tadeva pratibimbakam //

When it is said that 'a certain portion of the thing is understood through exclusion of other things', what is meant is precisely that reflection [in cognition].

nanu buddhidharmatvāt pratibimbasya kathaṃ vastubhāgatvam upapadyata ityata

[Objection:] "Since reflection is a property of cognition, how can it be a portion of the real thing?"

āha arthāntaraparāvṛttyetyādi / arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanasaṃśrayāt /

[It] is spoken of thus beginning with "arthāntaraparāvṛtti," because [it] depends on the perception of an object excluded from other things.

arthāntaraparāvṛttavastudarśanadvārāyātatvāt tatrārthāntaraparāvṛtte vastuni bhrāntais tādātmyenāropitatvāt tadeva pratibimbakamupacārād vastuno bhāga iti vyapadiśyate //

Because [it] comes about through the perception of an object excluded from other things, and because [it] is superimposed as identical [with the object] by deluded [persons] upon that object which is excluded from other things, therefore that very reflection is figuratively designated as a "portion of the object."

hetvarthaḥ karaṇārthaś ca pūrvavat tena vātmanā /

The instrumental [ending can indicate] both cause and instrument, as before, [in the phrase] "by that nature."

yadi vastu vijātīyān na syād bhinnaṃ na tat tathā //

If an object were not distinct from unlike things, then it would not be thus [apprehended].

pūrvavad iti /

[The phrase] "as before" [means the following]:

yathārthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭānāhetyatrānyānyatvenetyādinā darśitaṃ ta{thā}trāpi yojanīyam ity arthaḥ /

Just as it was shown in the section beginning with "things as qualified by the exclusion of others" through [the phrase] "by otherness," etc., so it should be applied here also - this is the meaning.

athavā sarvatraivetthambhūtalakṣaṇā tṛtīyeyam iti darśayati tena vātmaneti /

Or [the phrase] "tena vātmanā" shows that this instrumental [ending] in all cases indicates the characteristic of "being such."

nanu bādhāntaranivṛttir bāhyavastugato dharmaḥ, sā kathaṃ pratibimbādhigame hetubhāvaṃ karaṇabhāvaṃ vā pratipadyata ityatrāha yadi vastu vijātīyādityādi /

[In response to] the objection: "The exclusion of other things is a property belonging to the external object - how can it be either a cause or an instrument in the apprehension of the reflection?" - he states "yadi vastu vijātīyāt" etc.

yadi hi vijātīyāt padārthād vyāvṛttaṃ vastu na syāt tadā na tat pratibimbātmakaṃ tathā vijātīyaparāvṛttavastvātmanā vyavasīyeta, tasmad arthāntaraparāvṛtter hetubhāvaḥ karaṇabhāvaś ca yujyata iti bhāvaḥ //

For if the object were not excluded from unlike things, then in the form of [its] reflection it could not be determined as having the nature of an object excluded from unlike things; therefore the exclusion from other things is properly both a cause and an instrument - this is the meaning.

agonivṛttiranyatvaṃ tasya cātmagataiva sā /

Difference is the exclusion of non-cow, and that [exclusion] belongs to its very nature.

bhedoktāvapyabhāvastu kevalo na nivartate

Even when the difference has been asserted, the mere [thing] does not disappear.

tadviśeṣaṇabhāve 'pi vastudhīr na vihīyate

Even when [something] has the nature of a qualification, the cognition of the thing does not cease.

kalpanānirmitaṃ cedamabhede 'pi viśeṣaṇam

Even when there is non-difference, this qualification exists [as] constructed by conceptual thought.

sopakṛṣya tato dharmaḥ sthāpito bhedavāniva

That property, having been abstracted from there, is established as if having difference.

yena daṇḍādivat tasya jāyate hi viśeṣaṇam

Whereby it becomes its qualification, just like a stick and other [things].

yadi hyanyavyāvṛttir bhāvarūpā vastuno viśeṣaṇatvenābhipretā syāt tadaitat sarvaṃ dūṣaṇamupapadyate

If the exclusion of others were intended to be something positive qualifying the thing, then all these objections would be applicable.

yāvatā vastusvarūpaivānyanivṛttir viśeṣaṇatvenopādīyate, tena viśeṣaṇānurūpaiva viśeṣyabuddhir bhavatyeva

However, the exclusion of others which is taken as the qualification is nothing but the nature of the thing itself; therefore the cognition of the qualified necessarily conforms to the qualification.

tathā hi agonivṛttir yā gaor abhidhīyate sāśvādibhyo gor yadanyatvaṃ tatsvabhāvaiva nānyā

For when one speaks of the "exclusion of the cow from non-cow," that is just the difference of cow from horse etc., [which is] its very nature, nothing else.

tataś ca yadyapyasau vyatirekeṇāgonivṛttir gorityabhidhīyate bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ, tathāpi paramārthatas tasya gorātmagataiva sā

And thus even though that exclusion of cow from non-cow is expressed negatively when one only wants to reject other differences, nevertheless in reality it belongs to the very essence of that cow.

yathānyatvaṃ nahyanyatvaṃ nāmānyasmād vastuno 'nyat apitu tadeva

Just like difference - for "difference" is not something different from the different thing but rather is that very [thing].

anyathā tad vastu tato 'nyasminna siddhyet

Otherwise that thing could not be established as different from another.

tat tasmāt, viśeṣaṇabhāve 'pyanyavyāvṛtter viśeṣye vastudhīr bhavatyeva

Therefore, even when the exclusion of others has the nature of a qualification, there is indeed a cognition of the thing in what is qualified.

syād etad vyatiriktam eva hi viśeṣyād viśeṣaṇaṃ loke prasiddham, yathā daṇḍaḥ puruṣasya

One might object: "In ordinary experience, a qualification is well-known to be distinct from what is qualified, like a stick [is distinct] from its bearer."

vyāvṛttiścāvyatiriktā vastunaḥ, tat katham asau tasya viśeṣaṇaṃ yujyata

"And [you say] exclusion is not distinct from the thing, so how can it properly be its qualification?"

nahi paramārthena na kiñcit kasyacid viśeṣaṇaṃ yuktam, anupakārakasya viśeṣaṇatvāyogāt

In reality, nothing can properly be a qualification of anything, because what does not help [something else] cannot be a qualification.