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tasyānyāpohalakṣaṇasya śabdārthasyānyāpoḍhāt padārthād apṛthaktvād avyatirekād iti yāvat
That is to say, because the meaning of words characterized by exclusion of others is not different from [and] not separate from the object which is excluded from others
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyetyādi
[As for the phrase beginning with] "qualifier and qualified"
subodham
[This is] easily understood
kevalād nīlaśabdāder viśiṣṭaṃ pratibimbakam kokilotpalabhṛṅgādau plavamānaṃ pravartate
From the mere word "blue" etc., a distinct reflection arises, floating among [things like] the cuckoo, lotus, bee, and so forth
pikāñjanādyapohena viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ punaḥ tadindīvaraśabdena sthāpyate pariniścitam
Through exclusion of the cuckoo, collyrium, etc., [that reflection] becomes further specified and is definitively established by the word "lotus"
sāmānādhikaraṇyādirevam asmin na bādhitaḥ
Thus co-reference and such are not contradicted in this [theory]
parapakṣe tu sarveṣāṃ tadvyavasthātidurghaṭā
But in the opponent's view, the establishment of all these [relations] is extremely difficult
nīlam ityukte pītādivyāvṛttānyapadārthavyavasāyibhramarakokilāñjanādiṣu saṃśayyamānarūpaṃ vikalpapratibimbakamudeti
When [the word] "nīla" [blue] is uttered, there arises a conceptual reflection [which is] of doubtful form with regard to bees, cuckoos, collyrium and other objects that are determined [as blue] [and] excluded from yellow and other [colors].
taccotpalaśabdena kikilādibhyo vyavacchedyānutpalavyāvṛttavastuviṣaye vyavasthāpyamānaṃ pariniścitātmakaṃ pratīyate
And this [conceptual reflection], when [combined] with the word "utpala" [lotus], is understood as fully determined, being established in reference to an object that is differentiated from cuckoos and such, [and] excluded from non-lotuses.
tena parasparaṃ yathoktabuddhipratibimbakāpekṣayā vyavacchedyavyavacchekabhāvānnīlotpalaśabdayor viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo na virudhyate
Thus, with respect to the aforementioned conceptual reflection, due to the mutual relationship of differentiator and differentiated, the qualifier-qualified relationship between the words "nīla" and "utpala" is not contradictory.
dvābhyāṃ vānīlānutpalavyāvṛttaikapratibimbātmakavastupratipādanādekārthavṛttitayā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca bhavati
Or, because both [words together] express a thing that has the nature of a single reflection excluded from non-blue and non-lotus, there is co-reference due to their occurring with the same referent.
avayavārthastūcyate plavamānam iti
The meaning of the component is expressed [by the word] "plavamāna" [floating].
alabhamānapratiṣṭhaṃ saṃśayarūpam iti yāvat
That is to say, [it means] having no fixed basis, being of doubtful form.
pikaśabdaḥ kokilaparyāyaḥ
The word "pika" is a synonym for cuckoo.
śeṣaṃ subodham
The remainder is easily understood.
syād etad asmatpakṣe 'pi sāmānādhikaraṇyādiraviruddha eva
One might think that "even in our position too, co-reference and such are indeed not contradicted."
tasya sāmānādhikaraṇyāder vyavasthā tadvyavasthā
That establishment of co-reference and such is that [aforementioned] establishment.
kathaṃ durghaṭetyāha
[Someone] asks "Why is it impossible?"
tathāhyekena śabdena sarvathoktaṃ svalakṣaṇam
For thus, by a single word the particular characteristic is completely expressed.
tathācābhihite tasmin kasmād bhedāntare 'matiḥ
And thus, when that has been expressed, why [should there be] non-cognition of other differences?
yadarthamaparaḥ śabdaḥ prayujyetātra vastutaḥ
For what purpose would another word be employed here in reality?
sarvathābhihite no cet tadanekaṃ prasajyate
If [it is] not completely expressed, then it follows that it [becomes] multiple.
vidhiśabdārthavādipakṣe nīlādiśabdenaivaikenotpalādisvalakṣaṇe 'bhihite kimutpalamāhosvidañjanam ityevam ajñānaṃ viśeṣāntare na prāpnoti, sarvātmanātasya vastunaḥ pratipāditatvāt / ekasyaikadaikapratipattrapekṣayā jñātājñātatvavirodhāt /
According to those who hold that words denote positive entities, when the single word "blue" expresses the specific individuality of the lotus and other [blue things], why should there be any uncertainty ["is this a lotus or collyrium?"] regarding other particulars, since the thing [blue] has been denoted in its entirety? Because it is contradictory for one and the same thing to be both known and unknown to the same cognizer at the same time.
taddarśayati kasmād bhedāntare 'matiriti /
This is what is shown [in the text] by [the words] "why [should there be] non-cognition regarding other differences?"
amatirajñānam / kutsitā yā matir amatiḥ /
"Amati" [means] non-cognition; "amati" [is] that cognition which is defective.
tataś ca saṃśayaviparyāsābhāvād utpalādiśabdāntaraprayogākāṅkṣā prayoktuś ca na prāpnotīti darśayati yadarthamityādi /
Thus, due to the absence of doubt and error, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to use other words like "lotus" etc. This is shown by [the words] "for the sake of which" etc.
yadartham iti / yasyā amater nivṛttyartham ity arthaḥ /
"For the sake of which" means: for the purpose of removing which non-cognition.
athāpi syāt tadvastvekadeśenābhihitaṃ na sarvātmanā, tena svabhāvāntarābhidhānāyāparaḥ śabdo 'nveṣyata evetyata āha sarvathetyādi /
It might be argued that "when the thing has been denoted [by 'blue'], it has been denoted only partially, not in its entirety; therefore another word is indeed sought for expressing other characteristics." To this [the author] responds with "in every way" etc.
na hyekasya vastuna ekadeśāḥ santi yenaikadeśenābhidhānaṃ syāt, ekatvānekatvayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt /
For a single thing does not have parts by which there could be partial denotation, because unity and multiplicity are mutually exclusive characteristics.
tataś ca yāvantaścaikadeśās tāvantyeva kevalaṃ bhavatā vastūni pratipāditānīti naikamanekaṃ siddhyet /
Therefore, you would merely be establishing as many distinct things as there are parts, and thus neither unity nor multiplicity would be established.
syād etan na nīlaśabdena dravyamabhidhīyate kiṃ tarhinīlākhyo guṇas tatsamavetā vā nīlatvajātiḥ utpalaśabdenāpyutpalajātirevocyate, na dravyaṃ, tena bhinnārthābhidhānād utpalaśabdāntarākāṅkṣā yujyata evetyata āha nīlajātir ityādi /
One might argue thus: "The word 'blue' does not denote a substance, but rather either the quality called blue or the universal 'blueness' inherent in it, and likewise the word 'lotus' denotes only the universal 'lotusness', not a substance. Therefore, since they denote different things, the desire for another word 'lotus' is indeed justified." To this [the author] responds with "the universal blue" etc.
nīlajātir guṇo vāpi nīlaśabdena cedgataḥ / anyendīvarajātis tu vyavaseyotpalaśruteḥ //
If either the universal blue or the quality [blue] is denoted by the word "blue," then another [universal], namely the universal lotus, would have to be understood from the word "lotus."
evaṃ sati tayor bhedād bakulotpalaśabdavat / sāmānādhikaraṇyādi sutarāṃ nipapadyate //
Thus, since there is a difference between the two [words], just like in [the case of] the words 'bakula' and 'utpala', co-ordination and other [such relations] become entirely justified.
anyendīvarajātiristviti / anyā cāsāvindīvarajātiśceti samāsaḥ /
The compound 'anyendīvarajāti' means 'another indīvara-universal', [and it] is to be analyzed as a karmadhāraya compound where 'anyā' qualifies 'indīvarajātiḥ'.
vyavasātavyā / utpalaśruter iti pañcamyantam /
[The word] is to be determined. 'utpalaśruteḥ' has the ablative ending.
asmin pakṣe sutarāmeva sāmānādhikaraṇyamanupapannaṃ bakulotpalaśabdayor ivaikasminnarthe nīlotpalaśabdayor vṛttyabhāvāt /
In this view, co-ordination becomes even more impossible, because, just as with the words 'bakula' and 'utpala', the words 'nīla' and 'utpala' cannot have application to one and the same thing.
nahi bhavati bakulamutpalam iti //
For there cannot be [an expression] "bakula [is] utpala."
syād etat nīlaśabdo yadyapi jātiguṇaviśeṣavacanaḥ, tathāpi taddvāreṇa nīlaguṇatajjātibhyāṃ sambaddhaṃ dravyam api tenābhidhīyate tathotpalaśabdenāpi jātidvāreṇa tadeva dravyamabhidhīyata iti /
[One might argue that] although the word 'nīla' denotes a specific universal and quality, through these it also denotes the substance connected with the blue quality and its universal, and similarly the word 'utpala' through [its] universal denotes that very same substance.
atas tayor ekārthavṛttisambhavāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati, na bakulotpalaśabdayor ityata āha guṇatajjātītyādi / guṇatajjātisambaddhaṃ dravyaṃ cet pratipādyate / nīlaśabdena yadyevaṃ vyarthā syād utpalaśrutiḥ //
Therefore, since their application to one object is possible, there would be co-ordination, unlike with the words 'bakula' and 'utpala'. To this [the opponent] says: "If the substance connected with the quality and its universal is expressed by the word 'nīla', then the utterance of 'utpala' would be redundant."
tābhyāṃ yadeva sambaddhaṃ tadevotpalajātimat /
That which is connected with these two is precisely what possesses the lotus-universal.
nīlaśrutyaiva tatroktaṃ vyarthā nīlotpalaśrutiḥ //
Since this has already been expressed by the word 'nīla' alone, the expression 'nīlotpala' would be redundant.
guṇaś ca nīlākhyaḥ, tajjātiś ca nīlatvākhyeti guṇatajjātī, tābhyāṃ sambaddham iti vigrahaḥ /
The analysis is: the quality named 'blue' and its universal named 'blueness' are the quality and its universal, [and] that which is connected with these two [is what is meant].
nīlaśabdenaiva tasya dravyasya pratipāditatvāt vyarthā syād utpalaśrutiḥ
Since that substance has already been expressed by the word 'nīla' alone, the word 'utpala' would be useless.
etad eva darśayati tābhyām ityādi
This is shown by [the phrase beginning with] "by these two" and so forth.
tābhyām iti guṇatajjātibhyām
"By these two" means by the quality and its universal.
syād etat yadyapi nīlaśabdena guṇatajjātimaddravyamabhidhīyate, tathāpi tasya nīlaśabdasyānekārthavṛttidarśanāt pratipattur utpalārthe niścitarūpā na buddhir upajāyate kikilāder api nīlatvāt
This objection might arise: "Although the word 'nīla' denotes a substance possessing that quality and universal, yet since that word 'nīla' is observed to occur with multiple meanings, no definite cognition arises in the hearer regarding [its referring to] a lotus, since a kingfisher and other [things] also possess blueness."
ato 'rthāntarasaṃśayavyavacchedād utpalaśruteḥ prayogaḥ sārthaka eva iti
"Therefore the use of the word 'utpala' is indeed meaningful, as it serves to exclude doubt about [it referring to] other objects."
tadasamyak prakṛtarthānabhijñātayā abhidhānāt
This [objection] is incorrect, as it is stated due to not understanding the topic under discussion.
vidhiśabdārthapakṣe hi sāmānādhikaraṇyādi nopapadyata ityetad atra prakṛtam
For what is under discussion here is that co-reference and so forth cannot be explained under the view that words denote positive entities.
yadi ca utpalaśabdaḥ saṃśayavyavacchedāyaiva vyāpriyate na dravyapratipattaye na tarhi vidhiḥ śabdārthaḥ syāt utpalaśabdena bhrāntisamāropitākāravyavacchedamātrasyaiva pratipādanāt
And if the word 'utpala' functions only to exclude doubt and not to denote a substance, then a positive entity would not be the meaning of the word, since the word 'utpala' would only serve to exclude an erroneously superimposed form.
parasparaviruddhaṃ cedam abhidhīyate nīlaśabdena utpalādikaṃ dravyam abhidhīyate atha ca pratipattuḥ tatra niścayo na jāyata iti
Moreover, what is stated is mutually contradictory: [to say] that "the substance lotus etc. is denoted by the word 'nīla'" and yet "no certainty arises for the hearer regarding it."
na hi yatra saṃśayo jāyate sa śabdārtho yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt
For that about which doubt arises cannot reasonably be the meaning of a word, as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence.
nāpi niścayena viṣayīkṛte vastuni saṃśayo 'vakāśaṃ labhate
Nor is there room for doubt regarding an object that has been grasped with certainty.
syād etat yadyapi nīlotpalaśabdayor ekasminnarthe vṛttir nāsti, tadarthayostu guṇajātyorekasmin dravye vṛttir astīti
[It] might be objected: "Even though the words 'nīla' and 'utpala' are not applicable to the same [referent], what is denoted by them – [namely] the quality and the universal – subsist in the same substance."
ato 'rthadvārakamanayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyatīti tadetad ayuktamatiprasaṅgāt
Therefore [one might think] there would be co-reference between these two through [their] referents, [but] this is incorrect due to undesired consequences.
evaṃ hi rūparasaśabdayor api sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syāt, tadarthayo rūparasayorekasmin pṛthivyādidravye vṛtteḥ
For in this way there would also be co-reference between the words 'rūpa' and 'rasa', since what they denote – [namely] color and taste – subsist in the same substance like earth.
kiṃ ca nīlamutpalamityekārthaviṣayā buddhir na prāpnoti, ekadravyasamavetayorguṇajātyor dvābhyāṃ pṛthakpṛthagabdhidhānāt, na caikārthaviṣayajñānānutpāde śabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyamastītyalaṃ bahunā
Moreover, the cognition of 'nīlam utpalam' would not result in [reference to] a single object, since the quality and universal inhering in a single substance would be separately denoted by the two [words], and when there is no arising of cognition of a single object, there can be no co-reference between words – [so] enough [said] about this.
syād etat na yadeva nīlaguṇatajjātibhyāṃ sambaddhaṃ vastu tadevotpalaśabdenocyate, kiṃ tarhianyadeva, tenotpalaśrutir vyarthā na bhaviṣyatīti
[One] might object: "The thing that is connected with the quality blue and its universal is not exactly what is denoted by the word 'utpala', but rather something else, therefore the word 'utpala' will not be meaningless."
yadītyavacchedaḥ
There is a break after "yadi".
bhinnāśraye syātām iti
[The two words] would have different substrates.
athāpi syāt yadyapi tadeva dravyaṃ nīlaśabdenocyate, utpalaśabdenāpi tadeva
Even then [one] might say: "Although that very substance is denoted by the word 'nīla', and that very same [substance] by the word 'utpala'..."
tathāpi nīlaśabdo notpalajātisambandhirūpeṇa dravyamabhidhatte, kiṃ tarhinīlaguṇatajjātisambandhirūpeṇaiva, tenotpalajātisambandhirūpatvamasyābhidhātumutpalaśrutiḥ pravartamānā nānarthikā bhaviṣyati
"...nevertheless the word 'nīla' does not denote the substance as related to the universal 'lotus', but rather only as related to the quality blue and its universal, therefore the word 'utpala' when used to denote its relation to the universal 'lotus' will not be meaningless."
athotpalatvasambandhirūpatvena na codayet
If [the word 'nīla'] would not express [the substance] as related to lotus-ness...
atha nīlam iti dhvanirutpalatvasambandhirūpatvena guṇatajjātisambaddhaṃ dravyaṃ na codayed iti sambandhaḥ
If the sound 'nīlam' would not express the substance connected with the quality and its universal as related to lotus-ness – this is the connection [of the argument].
syānnāmotpalatāyogirūpatvamatadātmakam / utpalatvena sambaddhaṃ tvābhyāṃ sambaddham eva tat
[The substance] might indeed not be essentially related to lotus-ness, but what is connected with lotus-ness is indeed connected with both of these [i.e., the blue quality and its universal].
nīlaśrutyā ca tat proktaṃ śābdyātra viṣayīkṛtam /
This [argument] is stated by the word "nīla" [blue] and is made the object [of cognition] through verbal cognition.
na hi nīlaguṇatajjātisambandhirūpatvāt anyadevotpalajātisambandhirūpaṃ
The form [of the substance] as related to the quality blue and its universal is indeed not different from [its] form as related to the universal 'lotus'.
yena nīlotpalādisambandhirūpatvābhidhāne dravyasyotpalajātisambandhirūpatvābhidhānaṃ na bhavet
By which [difference] when expressing the form [of substance] as related to 'blue lotus' etc., there would not be an expression of the substance's form as related to the universal 'lotus'.
yāvataikasmāt dravyādayor api sambandharūpatvayor avyatirekatadvāttayorapyekatvamevetyayuktamekarūpābhidhāne pararūpānabhidhānaṃ kiñcābhyupagamyocyate bhavatu nāmotpalatva sambandhirūpatvam nīlavajjātisambandhirūpatvāt anyato
Since there is no difference between the two relational forms from one substance, through that non-difference there is indeed unity of both, therefore it is incorrect that in expressing one form there is no expression of the other form.
tathā hi yattadanaṃśaṃ vastūtpalajātyā sambaddhaṃ tadevābhyāṃ nīlaguṇatājātibhyāṃ sambaddhyate nānyat
For that very partless entity which is connected with the universal 'lotus' is the same that is connected with both the quality blue and its universal, not anything else.
taccāṃśatvāt sarvātmanā nīlaśrutyaivābhihitaṃ śābdyā ca buddhyā vyavasāyātmikayā viṣayīkṛtā
And that [entity], being partless, is expressed in its entirety by the word "nīla" alone and is made the object by the determinative verbal cognition.
iti kimaparamanabhihitamasya svarūpamasti yadabhidhānāyotpalaśrutiḥ sārthikā bhavet
Thus what other unexpressed nature of this [entity] exists for expressing which the word "utpala" would be meaningful?
na cedbhedavinirmukte kārtsnyabhedavikalpanam
If [you say] there cannot be an alternation between wholeness and parts in what is devoid of plurality...
na vākyārthaparijñānā idam hyatra vivakṣitaṃ
[This objection shows] non-understanding of the sentence meaning, for this is what is intended here.
bhedavinirmukta iti
"Devoid of plurality" means [a thing] without parts.
kārtsnyabhedavikalpanam iti sarvātmanā viṣayīkṛtam vyaikadeśenetyevaṃ kārstnyabhedābhyāṃ vikalpanaṃ
"Alternation between wholeness and parts" means the alternation through wholeness and parts thus: "whether [something is] made an object in its entirety or partially."
tadetat vākyārthāparijñānāt uktam
This [objection] is stated due to non-understanding of the sentence meaning.
nīlaśabdena sarvātmanā tatprakāśitam
By the word 'nīla' [blue] that [thing] has been expressed in its entirety.
tathā hi prathamenaiva nīlaśabdena sarvātmanā tatprakāśitamityasyāyamartho vivakṣitaḥ
The meaning intended by our statement that "by the very first word 'nīla' [blue] that [thing] has been expressed in its entirety" is as follows.
yādṛśaṃ tadvastu tādṛśamevābhihitam
The thing has been expressed exactly as it is.
na tasya kaścitsvabhāvastyakto yadabhidhānāyotpalaśrutirvyāpriyeta
No aspect of it has been left unexpressed for which the word 'utpala' [lotus] would need to be employed.
niraṃśatvāt tasya vastuna ityato vākchalametat
Since that thing has no parts, this [argument by Uddyotakara] is mere verbal quibbling.
evaṃ yathācotpalaśrutiranarthiko tathānyeṣāmapyanityādiśabdānāṃ prayogo 'narthakaḥ prāpnoti
Just as the utterance of [the word] 'utpala' would be meaningless, so too would the use of other words like 'anitya' [non-eternal] become pointless.
sati prayoge paryāyatvam eva syāt tarupādapādiśabdavat
If such words were used, they would merely be synonyms, like the words 'taru' and 'pādapa' [both meaning 'tree'].
etenaiva prakāreṇa nānyeṣāmapyudīraṇam
In this very same way, there is no [need for] the utterance of other [words] either.
udīraṇam iti
'Udīraṇam' means utterance.
uktāviti uccāraṇe
'Uktau' means in the uttering.
taduktam "anyathaikena śabdena vyāpta ekatra vastuni / buddhyā vā nānyaviṣaya iti paryāyatā bhaved"
This has been stated [thus]: "When a thing has been entirely comprehended by one word or by one cognition, there remains no other object [to be expressed], hence [any other word] would be a synonym."
asmākāṃ tu na śabdena bāhyārthaḥ pratipādyate
For us, however, no external object is expressed by a word.
yataḥ sarvātmanā tābhyāṃ viṣayīkaraṇātparam / śabdajñānāntaraṃ tatra paryāyatvaṃ prayāsyati
Therefore, since the object has been completely apprehended by these two [word and cognition], any subsequent verbal cognition would [merely] attain the status of a synonym.
tābhyām iti śabdajñānābhyām
'By these two' means by word and cognition.
param iti
[This explains] 'param' [subsequent].
uttarakālam //1118//
[The word means] "subsequent" [or] "coming later on"
pratibimbaṃ tu śabdena krameṇaivopajanyate /
The reflection alone is produced by the word in sequential order;
ekatvena ca tadbhāti bāhyatvena ca vibhramāt //
and that [reflection] appears as one and as external due to delusion.
sāmānādhikaraṇyādi pratibimbānurodhataḥ /
Co-reference and other [relations] follow from [the nature of] the reflection.
paramārthena śabdās tu matā nirviṣayā ime //
In ultimate reality, however, these words are considered to be without objects.
nīlaśabdena hi prathamataramanīlapadārthavyāvṛttamutpalādiṣu plavamānarūpatayā teṣām apratikṣepakamadhyavasitabāhyarūpaṃ vikalpapratibimbakam upajanyate
When the word "nīla" [blue] [is uttered], first a conceptual reflection is produced which is differentiated from non-blue things, which has a floating form over lotuses etc., which does not exclude them, [and] which has an external form that is conceptually determined.
punar utpalaśrutyā tadevānutpalavyāvṛttamāropitabāhyaikavastusvarūpamupajanyate
Then, through hearing [the word] "utpala" [lotus], that same [reflection] is produced as differentiated from non-lotus [things and] as having the nature of a single external object superimposed [upon it].
tadevaṃ krameṇānīlānutpalavyāvṛttamadhyavasitabāhyaikarūpaṃ bhrāntaṃ vikalpapratibimbakam upajanyata iti tadanurodhāt sāṃvṛtaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyādi yujyata eva
Thus in sequence, an illusory conceptual reflection is produced which is differentiated from both non-blue and non-lotus [things], which has a single external form that is conceptually determined, [and] in accordance with this, conventional co-reference etc. becomes possible indeed.