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paramārthatas tu kasmān na yujyata ity āha paramārthenetyādi | [If asked] "Why is it not possible in ultimate reality?", [the text] states "in ultimate reality" etc. |
yaduktam "liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho na cāpohasya vidyata" iti | As has been stated: "The connection with gender, number, etc. does not exist for apoha." |
liṅgasaṅkhyādiyogas tu vyaktīnām api nāstyayam | This connection with gender, number, etc. does not exist even for individuals. |
icchāracitasaṅketanimitto nahi vāstavaḥ | [It is] based on convention created by will [and] is indeed not real. |
vastudharmatvameṣāṃ liṅgasaṅkhyādīnām asiddham | The status of these gender, number, etc. as properties of real things is not established. |
svatantrecchāviracitasaṅketamātrabhāvitvāt | [It is] due solely to conventions created by independent will. |
vyaktīnām apītyāpiśabdādapohasyāpi | By the word "api" [in the phrase] "of individuals also," the apoha is also [meant to be included]. |
prayogaḥ yo yadanvayavyatirekau nānuvidhatte, nāsau taddharmaḥ, yathā śītatvamagneḥ, nānuvidhatte ca liṅgasaṅkhyādi vastuto 'nvayavyatirekāviti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ | The application [is as follows]: That which does not follow the presence and absence of something is not its property, just as coolness [is not a property] of fire; and gender, number, etc. do not follow the presence and absence of real things – thus [this is] the non-perception of the pervader. |
taṭastaṭī taṭaṃ ceti nairūpyaṃ na ca vastunaḥ | [The words] "taṭaḥ," "taṭī," and "taṭam" [exist], but a single thing cannot have [these] multiple forms. |
śabalābhāsatāprāpteḥ sarveṣāṃ tatra cetasām | Because [if it did], all cognitions relating to it would become variegated in appearance. |
yadi hi liṅgaṃ vastugato dharmaḥ syāt, tadaikasmiṃs taṭākhye vastuni taṭastaṭī taṭamiti liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛtter ekasya vastunastrairūpyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt | If gender were indeed a property inherent in things, then due to the application of words with three genders – "taṭaḥ," "taṭī," and "taṭam" – to one thing called bank, a single thing would have to possess three forms. |
nacaikasya strīpunnapuṃsakākhyaṃ svabhāvatrayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt | And it is not reasonable for one [thing] to have three natures called feminine, masculine and neuter, because [this would] result in the loss of [its] unity. |
viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve sarvaṃ viśvamekameva vastu syāt | If something could maintain unity despite having mutually contradictory properties, then the entire universe would be just one thing. |
tataś ca sahotpattivināśaprasaṅgaḥ | And consequently, [everything] would arise and perish simultaneously. |
kiṃ ca sarvasyaivaikaśabdena śabdāntareṇa vā liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanāt tadviṣayāṇāṃ sarvacetasāṃ mecakādiratnavacchabalābhāsatāprasaṅgaḥ | Moreover, since everything is observed to be understood as having three genders whether through one word or another, all cognitions pertaining to them would appear variegated like a sapphire or other gems. |
athāpi syāt satyapi liṅgatrayayogitve sarvavastūnāṃ yadeva rūpaṃ vaktumiṣṭaṃ pratipādakena tanmātrāvabhāsānyeva vivakṣāvaśāccetāṃsi bhaviṣyantīti na śabalābhāsānītyata āha vivakṣānugatatve vetyādi | "Even though all things may possess the three genders, under the speaker's whim, the cognitions would appear only as envisaging that particular form which [the speaker] desires to express" – thus [one might object that] they would not be of variegated appearance. To this [the author] responds with "vivakṣānugatatve" etc. |
tadvaśādekarūpāṇi naikarūpaṃ ca vastu tat | Under that [speaker's] whim, the cognitions [would be] of one form, and yet that thing is not of one form. |
vivakṣānugatatve vā cetasām iti śeṣaḥ | "[If] in the case of the dependence of cognitions on the speaker's whim" – this is the completion [of the verse]. |
yadi hi vivakṣāvaśād ekarūpāṇi cetāṃsi bhavantītyaṅgīkriyate, tadā tānicetāṃsi tryātmakavastuviṣayāṇi na prāpnuvanti, tadākāraśūnyatvāt, cakṣur vijñānavacchabdaviṣayam | If it is accepted that cognitions become of one form through the speaker's whim, then those cognitions could not have as their object things of triple nature, because they would lack that [triple] form, just like visual cognition [cannot have] sound as its object. |
tadvaśād iti vivakṣāvaśāt | "Under that influence" means "through the speaker's whim." |
yo 'pi manyate saṃstyānaprasavasthitiṣu yathoktastrīpunnapuṃsakatvavyavastheti, tasyāpi na yuktam ityādarśayann āha sthitītyādi | [The author], showing that even the view of one who thinks "the determination of feminine, masculine and neuter gender applies as stated to [states of] dissolution, origination and continuance" is not correct, states "sthiti" etc. |
sthitiprasavasaṃstyānasaṃśrayā liṅgasaṃsthitiḥ yadi syādavibhāgena viliṅgatvaṃ prasajyate | If the establishment of gender were based on [states of] continuance, origination and dissolution, then indiscriminate possession of [all] genders would follow. |
liṅgasaṃsthitir yadi syād ityatra chedaḥ | There is a break [in the sentence] after "if the establishment of gender were [to be]." |
yadi hi sthityādyāśrayā liṅgasthitir liṅgavyavasthā, tadā taṭaśṛṅkhalādivat sarvapadārtheṣvavibhāgena trīṇi liṅgāni prāpnuvanti, sarvatra taṭādivat sthityāder vidyamānatvāt | If the establishment and regulation of gender were based on continuance etc., then all three genders would apply indiscriminately to all things like [they do to] 'riverbank' (taṭa) and 'chain' (śṛṅkhalā), because [states of] continuance etc. exist everywhere just as [they do] in the case of riverbank etc. |
anyathā taṭastaṭītaṭamityādāvapi liṅgatrayaṃ na syāt, viśeṣābhāvāt | Otherwise, the three genders should not exist even in [cases] like 'taṭaḥ', 'taṭī', 'taṭam' etc., due to [there being] no distinction. |
tasmād ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣaḥ | Therefore, [this leads to] the definitional fault of over-application. |
vyabhicāradarśanāccāvyāpiteti darśayann āha abhāva ityādi / | [The author] shows that [the definition] is too narrow due to seeing deviation, saying "abhāva" etc. |
abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchateti yaducyate / | When one speaks of "abhāvaḥ" [masculine], "nirupākhyam" [neuter], and "tucchatā" [feminine], |
tatra sthityādisambandhaḥ ko 'sastu parikalpyate // | what connection with continuance etc. could possibly be imagined there? |
asatyapi hi sthityādike śaśaviṣāṇādiṣvasadrūpeṣvabhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādibhiḥ śabdair liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanād avyāpinīyaṃ liṅgavyavasthā // | Even though continuance etc. are absent in non-existent things like a hare's horn, words of all three genders are seen to be used, such as "abhāvaḥ", "nirupākhyam", and "tucchatā", [showing that] this gender classification is too narrow. |
utpādaḥ prasavaścaiṣāṃ nāśaḥ saṃstyānamiṣyate / | For these [entities], birth is called "utpādaḥ" and "prasavaḥ", destruction is "nāśaḥ" and "saṃstyānam", |
ātmarūpaṃ tu bhāvānāṃ sthitirityabhidhīyate // | and continuance of entities in their own form is called "sthitiḥ". |
tatrotpāde na nāśo 'sti tatkimutpattirucyate / | In birth there is no destruction, so why is it called "utpattiḥ" [feminine]? |
nātmākārā sthitiścāsti tat kathaṃ janam gīyate // | And there is no continuance in [its] own form, so why is it called "janam" [neuter]? |
saṃstyāne na dvayaṃ cānyat tatkathaṃ vyapadiśyate / | In destruction the other two [states] are not present, so why is it designated [in different genders]? |
tirobhāvaś ca nāśaś ca tirobhāvanam ityapi // | [Why is it called] "tirobhāvaḥ" and "nāśaḥ" [both masculine] and "tirobhāvanam" [neuter]? |
sthitau sthitiḥ svabhāvaś ca hetunā kena vocyate / | By what reason is continuance called "sthitiḥ" [feminine] and "svabhāvaḥ" [masculine]? |
athāvibhaktamevaiṣāṃ rūpaṃ syād ekaliṅgatā // | If their form is undifferentiated, then there should be only one gender [for all]. |
itaścāvyāpinī, teṣveva sthityādiṣu pratyekaṃ liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛttidarśanāt / | And [the definition] is too narrow for this reason also: because in those very [states] of continuance etc., the use of words connected with all three genders is seen for each one. |
tathā hi prasava utpāda ucyate saṃstyānaṃ vināśaḥ ātmasvarūpaṃ tu sthitiḥ / | Thus "birth" [and] "origination" are spoken of, "dissolution" [means] "destruction", while "own-nature" [refers to] "continuance". |
tatra prasave sthitisaṃstyānayor abhāvāt katham utpāde utpattir jametyādeḥ strīnapuṃsakaliṅgasya pravṛttir bhavet / | In [the case of] origination, due to the absence of continuance and destruction, how could words like "utpattiḥ" [feminine] and "janma" [neuter] be applied? |
tathā saṃstyāne sthitiprasavayor abhāvāt kathaṃ tirobhāvo vināśastirobhāvanam ityādibhiḥ śabdair vyapadiśyeta / | Similarly, in [the case of] dissolution, due to the absence of continuance and origination, how could it be designated by such words as "tirobhāvaḥ" [masculine], "vināśaḥ" [masculine] and "tirobhāvanam" [neuter]? |
tathā sthitau saṃstyānaprasavayor asambhavāt sthitisvabhāvaścetyādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ sā sthitiḥ kena hetunocyata iti vācyam / | Similarly, since destruction and origination are impossible in [the case of] continuance, it must be explained by what reason it is spoken of by such words as "sthitiḥ" [feminine] and "svabhāvaḥ" [masculine]. |
athāpi syādeṣāṃ sthityādīnāṃ parasparamavibhaktarūpatvāt pratyekam eṣu liṅgatrayayogyatā bhaviṣyatīti / | It might be argued that "since these – continuance and the rest – have forms not differentiated from each other, each of them will be capable of [taking] all three genders." |
athāvibhaktam ityādi / | [The answer begins with] "If undifferentiated" and so forth. |
yadi hyeṣāṃ parasparamavibhaktaṃ rūpaṃ syāt tadaikam eva paramārthato liṅgaṃ syān na liṅgatrayam // | For if their form were undifferentiated from each other, then in reality there should be only one gender, not three. |
anyastvāha sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ strītvādayo gotvādaya iveti / | Another [person] says: "The feminine and the rest are specific universals, like cowness and such." |
gotvādaya ivetyādi / | [The reply begins with] "Like cowness" and so forth. |
gotvādaya ivaite 'pi yadi strītvādayo matāḥ / sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśāḥ // | If feminine and the rest are considered to be like cowness and such, then such [universals] are indeed rejected through the rejection of universals [in general]. |
pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ nirastatvāt, tadrūpāṇāṃ | Since specific universals were rejected earlier in the examination of universals, [all] such forms [are rejected]. |
strītvādīnām asambhavād asambhavīlakṣaṇam // | [The definition is invalid] due to the impossibility of [universals like] femininity and others. |
kiṃ ca teṣveva sāmānyaviśeṣeṣvantareṇāpyaparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ jātirbhāvaḥsāmānyamityādi strīpunnampusakaliṅgasya śabdasya pravṛttidarśanād avyāpitā ca lakṣaṇasyeti darśayati jātirbhāva ityādi / | Moreover, since we observe the application of feminine, masculine and neuter gender words like "jātiḥ," "bhāvaḥ," and "sāmānyam" to these particular universals even without another universal, [this shows] the definition is too narrow. |
jātirbhāvaś ca sāmānyamiti vā teṣu saṃmatam / | [The words] "jātiḥ," "bhāvaḥ," and "sāmānyam" are accepted [as applying] to these [universals]. |
na sāmānyāni yujyante sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi hi // | And other universals cannot properly exist in universals. |
niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti siddhāntāt / | Because [it is their] established doctrine that universals are devoid of [other] universals. |
etac ca vaiśeṣikasiddhāntāśrayeṇoktam / | This has been stated based on the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. |
yadā tu sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi sāmānyanīṣyante vaiyākaraṇaiḥ, yathoktam "arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ / vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ"// | However, the grammarians maintain that universals do exist in [other] universals, as stated [in Vākyapadīya 3.16]: "Even when both object and universal are denoted, all words denote the universal, since all entities exist characterized by [their] function." |
nahi śāstrāntaraparidṛṣṭā jātivyavasthā niyogato vaiyākaraṇair abhyupetavyā / | The grammarians need not necessarily accept the theories about universals as seen in other philosophical systems. |
pratyayābhidhānānvayavyāpārakāryonnīyamānarūpā hi jātayo nahi tāsāmiyattā kācit / | For universals, whose nature is inferred from the effects of the operation of the connection between cognition and expression, have no [fixed] limit. |
ato yaccoditakāryadarśanāt sāmānyādhārā jātiḥ satī jātaya ityasyāḥ śruter nibandhanam iti / | Therefore, the basis for the term "jātayaḥ" [universals] is that universal which has a common substratum [and] which is established from observing the aforementioned effects. |
vyāpāralakṣaṇā iti abhidhānapratyayavyāpārato vyavasthitalakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ / | [The phrase] "vyāpāralakṣaṇā" means that [their] characteristic nature is determined by the functions of words and cognitions. |
tadānantaroktam eva dūṣaṇaṃ "sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśā" iti // | The refutation [is] precisely what was stated immediately before: "such [universals] are indeed rejected through the rejection of universals [in general]." |
idaṃ ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha abhāva ityādi / abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādi vā katham / sāmāyikyeva tenaiṣā liṅgatritayasaṃsthitiḥ // | [The text] states this common refutation beginning with "abhāva": How [can there be] such [words] as "abhāvaḥ" [masculine], "nirupākhyatvam" [neuter], and "tucchatā" [feminine]? Therefore this system of three genders is purely conventional. |
nahyasatsu śaśaviṣāṇādiṣu jātirasti, vastudharmatvāt tasyetyatas teṣvabhāvādiśabdaprayogo na prāpnoti / | There is no universal in non-existent things like hare's horns, because it [i.e., universal] is a property of real entities; therefore the application of words like "abhāva" to those [non-existent things] should not be possible. |
tasmād avyāpinī liṅgavyavasthā / | Therefore the system of gender is not comprehensive [enough]. |
tenecchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvinyeveyaṃ liṅgatritayavyavastheti siddham // | Thus it is established that this system of three genders exists solely based on conventions created by [speakers'] will. |
saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeṣu kalpyate hi vivakṣayā / | Number too is purely conventional [and] is indeed conceived through [the speaker's] intention. |
bhedābhedavivekepi dārādivipinādivat // | Even in [cases of] discrimination between difference and non-difference, [it is] like [in the case of words] such as "dārā" and "vipina." |
saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeva, na vāstavī / | Number too is purely conventional, not real. |
dārādiṣvasatyapi vāstave bhede vivakṣāvaśenopakalpitatvāt / | Because in [words] like "dārā," even though there is no real difference, [their number is] determined by the force of [speakers'] intention. |
ato nāsiddho hetuḥ | Therefore [our] reason is not unproven. |
tathā hi bahutvaikatvādisaṅkhyā na vastugatabhedābhedalakṣaṇā, dārāḥ sikatā varṣā ityādāvasatyapi vastuto bhede bahutvasaṅkhyā parivartate | For plural or singular number is not characterized by real multiplicity or unity of things, [as] in words like "dārāḥ" (wife), "sikatā" (sand), "varṣā" (rain), etc., the plural number is used even though there is no real multiplicity. |
tathā vanaṃ tribhuvanaṃ jagat ṣaṇṇagarītyādiṣvasatyapyabhede 'rthasyaikatvasaṅkhyā vyapadiśyata iti | Similarly, in [words] like "vana" (forest), "tribhuvana" (three worlds), "jagat" (world), "ṣaṇṇagarī" (six cities), the singular number is used even though there is no [real] unity in the referent. |
ato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ | Therefore [our] reason is not unproven. |
nāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvadharmatvaprasaṅgāt | Nor is [our reason] inconclusive, because [if it were] everything would have the nature of everything [else]. |
sapakṣe bhāvāc ca na viruddhaḥ | And [our reason] is not contradictory because it exists in similar instances. |
nanvityādinā kumārilamatena hetor asiddhatāmāśaṅkate | [The opponent] raises the objection of the reason being unproven according to Kumārila's view, starting with "nanu." |
nanu vyaktau ca jātau ca dārādiścetyaprayujyate | "But words like 'dārāḥ' are used with reference to both the individual and the universal." |
vyakteravayavānāṃ vā saṃkhyāmādāya vartate | "[Such words] operate by taking the number either of individuals or of parts." |
vanaśabdaḥ punar vyaktīrjātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitaḥ | "The word 'vana,' on the other hand, denotes individuals qualified by the number of the universal." |
jātigataikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt | Because it denotes a substance qualified by the singular number inherent in the universal. |
athavā dhavādivyaktisamāśritā jātir eva vanaśabdenocyate, tenaikavacanaṃ | Or rather, only the universal residing in individuals like dhava trees is expressed by the word 'vana', hence [its] singular number. |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds [to this] starting with "nanu." |
nanu caitena vidhinā sarvam ekaṃ vaco hatam | "But in this way, all singular words would be invalidated." |
nānyatrāsti vivakṣā cetsaivāstvasya nibandhanam | "If [you say] there is no such intention in other cases, then let that very intention be the basis in this case too." |
etena yathoktena vidhinā sarvam vṛkṣa ityādyekavacanam hatam utsannaṃ | By this method as described above, all singular forms like 'vṛkṣaḥ' [would] become destroyed [and] eliminated |
syāt, sarvatraivāsya nyāyasya tulyatvāt / | [This] would be [so], because this reasoning applies equally everywhere |
tathā hyatrāpi śakyam evaṃ vaktum tatra vyaktau ca jātau ca vṛkṣādiścet prayujyata ityādi / | For here too it would be possible to say: "if the word 'vṛkṣa' etc. is used in reference to both the individual and the universal," and so forth |
atha matam anyatra vṛkṣādau, vyakter avayavānāṃ ca saṅkhyāvivakṣā nāstīti, yadyevaṃ na tarhi vastugatānvayādyanuvidhāyinī saṅkhyā, vivakṣāyā evānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt / | If it is thought that in other cases like 'vṛkṣa', there is no intention to express number with respect to individuals and parts, then number would not follow the actual presence or absence [of things], but rather would follow the presence and absence of the speaker's intention |
tataś ca saiva vivakṣā dārā ityādiṣvasya bahuvacanasya nibandhanam astu bhedābhāvepyekam api vastu bahutvena vivakṣyata ityato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ // | And therefore, let that same intention be the basis for the plural in words like 'dārāḥ', because even when there is no actual multiplicity, a single thing can be intended [to be expressed] as many, [and] thus our reason is not unproven |
jāterapi na saṅkhyāsti bhāve vā tadviśeṣitāḥ / kathaṃ sambaddhasambandhādyadi sambandhato 'pi vā // | The universal has no number at all, or [even] if [number] exists [in it], how could [individuals] be qualified by it? [Would it be] through the connection of what is connected, or through direct connection? |
nahi jāteḥ saṅkhyāsti dravyasamāśritatvāt tasyāḥ / | The universal indeed has no number, because it [the universal] inheres in substance alone |
atheyaṃ vaiśeṣikaprakriyā nāśrīyate, tadā bhāve vā saṅkhyāyāstayā kathaṃ vā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣitāḥ siddhyanti / | If this Vaiśeṣika doctrine is not accepted, and [if it is held that] number exists in the universal, then how could it be established that individuals like dhava trees are qualified by that [number]? |
syād etat sambandhasambandhāt tat sambandhād vā siddhyanti / | This might be [answered]: "It could be established either through the connection of what is connected, or through direct connection itself" |
tathā hi yadā jāter vyatirekiṇī saṅkhyā tadaikatvasaṅkhyāsambaddhayā jātyā dhavādivyaktīnāṃ sambandhāt pāramparyeṇa tayā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣyante, yadā tu jāter vyatiriktaiva saṅkhyā tadā sākṣād eva sambandhāt tayā viśeshanta ityato jātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitāḥ sidhyanti // | For when number is different from the universal, then through the connection of individuals like dhava with the universal [which is itself] connected with the singular number, those individuals like dhava are qualified by it [number] indirectly; but when number is not different from the universal, then through direct connection itself they are qualified by it [number], and thus it is established that [individuals] are qualified by the number of the universal |
yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] provides a reply with [the words] "yadyevam" etc. |
yadyevam abhidhīyeta vanam eko 'pi pādapaḥ | If it be so, then even a single tree could be spoken of as 'vana' [forest]; |
bahavo 'pi hi kathyante sambandhād eva so 'sti ca | Indeed, many [trees] are spoken of [as forest] only through connection, and that [connection] exists [in the single tree] also. |
yadi sambandhasambandhāt sambandhato vā dhavādivyaktiṣu vanaśabdasya pravṛttis tad eko 'pi pādapo vanam ityevam ucyeta, pravṛttinimittasya vidyamānatvāt | If the application of the word 'vana' to individual trees like dhava etc. is due to either the connection of the connected or due to connection itself, then even a single tree could be called 'vana', since the basis for [such] application is present [there]. |
tathā hi bahavo 'pi dhavādayo jātisaṅkhyāsambandhād eva vanam ity ucyante | For indeed, even many dhava and other [trees] are called 'vana' only through connection with the number of the universal, |
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