buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

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paramārthatas tu kasmān na yujyata ity āha paramārthenetyādi	[If asked] "Why is it not possible in ultimate reality?", [the text] states "in ultimate reality" etc.
yaduktam "liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho na cāpohasya vidyata" iti	As has been stated: "The connection with gender, number, etc. does not exist for apoha."
liṅgasaṅkhyādiyogas tu vyaktīnām api nāstyayam	This connection with gender, number, etc. does not exist even for individuals.
icchāracitasaṅketanimitto nahi vāstavaḥ	[It is] based on convention created by will [and] is indeed not real.
vastudharmatvameṣāṃ liṅgasaṅkhyādīnām asiddham	The status of these gender, number, etc. as properties of real things is not established.
svatantrecchāviracitasaṅketamātrabhāvitvāt	[It is] due solely to conventions created by independent will.
vyaktīnām apītyāpiśabdādapohasyāpi	By the word "api" [in the phrase] "of individuals also," the apoha is also [meant to be included].
prayogaḥ yo yadanvayavyatirekau nānuvidhatte, nāsau taddharmaḥ, yathā śītatvamagneḥ, nānuvidhatte ca liṅgasaṅkhyādi vastuto 'nvayavyatirekāviti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ	The application [is as follows]: That which does not follow the presence and absence of something is not its property, just as coolness [is not a property] of fire; and gender, number, etc. do not follow the presence and absence of real things – thus [this is] the non-perception of the pervader.
taṭastaṭī taṭaṃ ceti nairūpyaṃ na ca vastunaḥ	[The words] "taṭaḥ," "taṭī," and "taṭam" [exist], but a single thing cannot have [these] multiple forms.
śabalābhāsatāprāpteḥ sarveṣāṃ tatra cetasām	Because [if it did], all cognitions relating to it would become variegated in appearance.
yadi hi liṅgaṃ vastugato dharmaḥ syāt, tadaikasmiṃs taṭākhye vastuni taṭastaṭī taṭamiti liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛtter ekasya vastunastrairūpyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt	If gender were indeed a property inherent in things, then due to the application of words with three genders – "taṭaḥ," "taṭī," and "taṭam" – to one thing called bank, a single thing would have to possess three forms.
nacaikasya strīpunnapuṃsakākhyaṃ svabhāvatrayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt	And it is not reasonable for one [thing] to have three natures called feminine, masculine and neuter, because [this would] result in the loss of [its] unity.
viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve sarvaṃ viśvamekameva vastu syāt	If something could maintain unity despite having mutually contradictory properties, then the entire universe would be just one thing.
tataś ca sahotpattivināśaprasaṅgaḥ	And consequently, [everything] would arise and perish simultaneously.
kiṃ ca sarvasyaivaikaśabdena śabdāntareṇa vā liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanāt tadviṣayāṇāṃ sarvacetasāṃ mecakādiratnavacchabalābhāsatāprasaṅgaḥ	Moreover, since everything is observed to be understood as having three genders whether through one word or another, all cognitions pertaining to them would appear variegated like a sapphire or other gems.
athāpi syāt satyapi liṅgatrayayogitve sarvavastūnāṃ yadeva rūpaṃ vaktumiṣṭaṃ pratipādakena tanmātrāvabhāsānyeva vivakṣāvaśāccetāṃsi bhaviṣyantīti na śabalābhāsānītyata āha vivakṣānugatatve vetyādi	"Even though all things may possess the three genders, under the speaker's whim, the cognitions would appear only as envisaging that particular form which [the speaker] desires to express" – thus [one might object that] they would not be of variegated appearance. To this [the author] responds with "vivakṣānugatatve" etc.
tadvaśādekarūpāṇi naikarūpaṃ ca vastu tat	Under that [speaker's] whim, the cognitions [would be] of one form, and yet that thing is not of one form.
vivakṣānugatatve vā cetasām iti śeṣaḥ	"[If] in the case of the dependence of cognitions on the speaker's whim" – this is the completion [of the verse].
yadi hi vivakṣāvaśād ekarūpāṇi cetāṃsi bhavantītyaṅgīkriyate, tadā tānicetāṃsi tryātmakavastuviṣayāṇi na prāpnuvanti, tadākāraśūnyatvāt, cakṣur vijñānavacchabdaviṣayam	If it is accepted that cognitions become of one form through the speaker's whim, then those cognitions could not have as their object things of triple nature, because they would lack that [triple] form, just like visual cognition [cannot have] sound as its object.
tadvaśād iti vivakṣāvaśāt	"Under that influence" means "through the speaker's whim."
yo 'pi manyate saṃstyānaprasavasthitiṣu yathoktastrīpunnapuṃsakatvavyavastheti, tasyāpi na yuktam ityādarśayann āha sthitītyādi	[The author], showing that even the view of one who thinks "the determination of feminine, masculine and neuter gender applies as stated to [states of] dissolution, origination and continuance" is not correct, states "sthiti" etc.
sthitiprasavasaṃstyānasaṃśrayā liṅgasaṃsthitiḥ yadi syādavibhāgena viliṅgatvaṃ prasajyate	If the establishment of gender were based on [states of] continuance, origination and dissolution, then indiscriminate possession of [all] genders would follow.
liṅgasaṃsthitir yadi syād ityatra chedaḥ	There is a break [in the sentence] after "if the establishment of gender were [to be]."
yadi hi sthityādyāśrayā liṅgasthitir liṅgavyavasthā, tadā taṭaśṛṅkhalādivat sarvapadārtheṣvavibhāgena trīṇi liṅgāni prāpnuvanti, sarvatra taṭādivat sthityāder vidyamānatvāt	If the establishment and regulation of gender were based on continuance etc., then all three genders would apply indiscriminately to all things like [they do to] 'riverbank' (taṭa) and 'chain' (śṛṅkhalā), because [states of] continuance etc. exist everywhere just as [they do] in the case of riverbank etc.
anyathā taṭastaṭītaṭamityādāvapi liṅgatrayaṃ na syāt, viśeṣābhāvāt	Otherwise, the three genders should not exist even in [cases] like 'taṭaḥ', 'taṭī', 'taṭam' etc., due to [there being] no distinction.
tasmād ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣaḥ	Therefore, [this leads to] the definitional fault of over-application.
vyabhicāradarśanāccāvyāpiteti darśayann āha abhāva ityādi /	[The author] shows that [the definition] is too narrow due to seeing deviation, saying "abhāva" etc.
abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchateti yaducyate /	When one speaks of "abhāvaḥ" [masculine], "nirupākhyam" [neuter], and "tucchatā" [feminine],
tatra sthityādisambandhaḥ ko 'sastu parikalpyate //	what connection with continuance etc. could possibly be imagined there?
asatyapi hi sthityādike śaśaviṣāṇādiṣvasadrūpeṣvabhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādibhiḥ śabdair liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanād avyāpinīyaṃ liṅgavyavasthā //	Even though continuance etc. are absent in non-existent things like a hare's horn, words of all three genders are seen to be used, such as "abhāvaḥ", "nirupākhyam", and "tucchatā", [showing that] this gender classification is too narrow.
utpādaḥ prasavaścaiṣāṃ nāśaḥ saṃstyānamiṣyate /	For these [entities], birth is called "utpādaḥ" and "prasavaḥ", destruction is "nāśaḥ" and "saṃstyānam",
ātmarūpaṃ tu bhāvānāṃ sthitirityabhidhīyate //	and continuance of entities in their own form is called "sthitiḥ".
tatrotpāde na nāśo 'sti tatkimutpattirucyate /	In birth there is no destruction, so why is it called "utpattiḥ" [feminine]?
nātmākārā sthitiścāsti tat kathaṃ janam gīyate //	And there is no continuance in [its] own form, so why is it called "janam" [neuter]?
saṃstyāne na dvayaṃ cānyat tatkathaṃ vyapadiśyate /	In destruction the other two [states] are not present, so why is it designated [in different genders]?
tirobhāvaś ca nāśaś ca tirobhāvanam ityapi //	[Why is it called] "tirobhāvaḥ" and "nāśaḥ" [both masculine] and "tirobhāvanam" [neuter]?
sthitau sthitiḥ svabhāvaś ca hetunā kena vocyate /	By what reason is continuance called "sthitiḥ" [feminine] and "svabhāvaḥ" [masculine]?
athāvibhaktamevaiṣāṃ rūpaṃ syād ekaliṅgatā //	If their form is undifferentiated, then there should be only one gender [for all].
itaścāvyāpinī, teṣveva sthityādiṣu pratyekaṃ liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛttidarśanāt /	And [the definition] is too narrow for this reason also: because in those very [states] of continuance etc., the use of words connected with all three genders is seen for each one.
tathā hi prasava utpāda ucyate saṃstyānaṃ vināśaḥ ātmasvarūpaṃ tu sthitiḥ /	Thus "birth" [and] "origination" are spoken of, "dissolution" [means] "destruction", while "own-nature" [refers to] "continuance".
tatra prasave sthitisaṃstyānayor abhāvāt katham utpāde utpattir jametyādeḥ strīnapuṃsakaliṅgasya pravṛttir bhavet /	In [the case of] origination, due to the absence of continuance and destruction, how could words like "utpattiḥ" [feminine] and "janma" [neuter] be applied?
tathā saṃstyāne sthitiprasavayor abhāvāt kathaṃ tirobhāvo vināśastirobhāvanam ityādibhiḥ śabdair vyapadiśyeta /	Similarly, in [the case of] dissolution, due to the absence of continuance and origination, how could it be designated by such words as "tirobhāvaḥ" [masculine], "vināśaḥ" [masculine] and "tirobhāvanam" [neuter]?
tathā sthitau saṃstyānaprasavayor asambhavāt sthitisvabhāvaścetyādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ sā sthitiḥ kena hetunocyata iti vācyam /	Similarly, since destruction and origination are impossible in [the case of] continuance, it must be explained by what reason it is spoken of by such words as "sthitiḥ" [feminine] and "svabhāvaḥ" [masculine].
athāpi syādeṣāṃ sthityādīnāṃ parasparamavibhaktarūpatvāt pratyekam eṣu liṅgatrayayogyatā bhaviṣyatīti /	It might be argued that "since these – continuance and the rest – have forms not differentiated from each other, each of them will be capable of [taking] all three genders."
athāvibhaktam ityādi /	[The answer begins with] "If undifferentiated" and so forth.
yadi hyeṣāṃ parasparamavibhaktaṃ rūpaṃ syāt tadaikam eva paramārthato liṅgaṃ syān na liṅgatrayam //	For if their form were undifferentiated from each other, then in reality there should be only one gender, not three.
anyastvāha sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ strītvādayo gotvādaya iveti /	Another [person] says: "The feminine and the rest are specific universals, like cowness and such."
gotvādaya ivetyādi /	[The reply begins with] "Like cowness" and so forth.
gotvādaya ivaite 'pi yadi strītvādayo matāḥ / sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśāḥ //	If feminine and the rest are considered to be like cowness and such, then such [universals] are indeed rejected through the rejection of universals [in general].
pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ nirastatvāt, tadrūpāṇāṃ	Since specific universals were rejected earlier in the examination of universals, [all] such forms [are rejected].
strītvādīnām asambhavād asambhavīlakṣaṇam //	[The definition is invalid] due to the impossibility of [universals like] femininity and others.
kiṃ ca teṣveva sāmānyaviśeṣeṣvantareṇāpyaparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ jātirbhāvaḥsāmānyamityādi strīpunnampusakaliṅgasya śabdasya pravṛttidarśanād avyāpitā ca lakṣaṇasyeti darśayati jātirbhāva ityādi /	Moreover, since we observe the application of feminine, masculine and neuter gender words like "jātiḥ," "bhāvaḥ," and "sāmānyam" to these particular universals even without another universal, [this shows] the definition is too narrow.
jātirbhāvaś ca sāmānyamiti vā teṣu saṃmatam /	[The words] "jātiḥ," "bhāvaḥ," and "sāmānyam" are accepted [as applying] to these [universals].
na sāmānyāni yujyante sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi hi //	And other universals cannot properly exist in universals.
niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti siddhāntāt /	Because [it is their] established doctrine that universals are devoid of [other] universals.
etac ca vaiśeṣikasiddhāntāśrayeṇoktam /	This has been stated based on the Vaiśeṣika doctrine.
yadā tu sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi sāmānyanīṣyante vaiyākaraṇaiḥ, yathoktam "arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ / vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ"//	However, the grammarians maintain that universals do exist in [other] universals, as stated [in Vākyapadīya 3.16]: "Even when both object and universal are denoted, all words denote the universal, since all entities exist characterized by [their] function."
nahi śāstrāntaraparidṛṣṭā jātivyavasthā niyogato vaiyākaraṇair abhyupetavyā /	The grammarians need not necessarily accept the theories about universals as seen in other philosophical systems.
pratyayābhidhānānvayavyāpārakāryonnīyamānarūpā hi jātayo nahi tāsāmiyattā kācit /	For universals, whose nature is inferred from the effects of the operation of the connection between cognition and expression, have no [fixed] limit.
ato yaccoditakāryadarśanāt sāmānyādhārā jātiḥ satī jātaya ityasyāḥ śruter nibandhanam iti /	Therefore, the basis for the term "jātayaḥ" [universals] is that universal which has a common substratum [and] which is established from observing the aforementioned effects.
vyāpāralakṣaṇā iti abhidhānapratyayavyāpārato vyavasthitalakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ /	[The phrase] "vyāpāralakṣaṇā" means that [their] characteristic nature is determined by the functions of words and cognitions.
tadānantaroktam eva dūṣaṇaṃ "sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśā" iti //	The refutation [is] precisely what was stated immediately before: "such [universals] are indeed rejected through the rejection of universals [in general]."
idaṃ ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha abhāva ityādi / abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādi vā katham / sāmāyikyeva tenaiṣā liṅgatritayasaṃsthitiḥ //	[The text] states this common refutation beginning with "abhāva": How [can there be] such [words] as "abhāvaḥ" [masculine], "nirupākhyatvam" [neuter], and "tucchatā" [feminine]? Therefore this system of three genders is purely conventional.
nahyasatsu śaśaviṣāṇādiṣu jātirasti, vastudharmatvāt tasyetyatas teṣvabhāvādiśabdaprayogo na prāpnoti /	There is no universal in non-existent things like hare's horns, because it [i.e., universal] is a property of real entities; therefore the application of words like "abhāva" to those [non-existent things] should not be possible.
tasmād avyāpinī liṅgavyavasthā /	Therefore the system of gender is not comprehensive [enough].
tenecchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvinyeveyaṃ liṅgatritayavyavastheti siddham //	Thus it is established that this system of three genders exists solely based on conventions created by [speakers'] will.
saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeṣu kalpyate hi vivakṣayā /	Number too is purely conventional [and] is indeed conceived through [the speaker's] intention.
bhedābhedavivekepi dārādivipinādivat //	Even in [cases of] discrimination between difference and non-difference, [it is] like [in the case of words] such as "dārā" and "vipina."
saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeva, na vāstavī /	Number too is purely conventional, not real.
dārādiṣvasatyapi vāstave bhede vivakṣāvaśenopakalpitatvāt /	Because in [words] like "dārā," even though there is no real difference, [their number is] determined by the force of [speakers'] intention.
ato nāsiddho hetuḥ	Therefore [our] reason is not unproven.
tathā hi bahutvaikatvādisaṅkhyā na vastugatabhedābhedalakṣaṇā, dārāḥ sikatā varṣā ityādāvasatyapi vastuto bhede bahutvasaṅkhyā parivartate	For plural or singular number is not characterized by real multiplicity or unity of things, [as] in words like "dārāḥ" (wife), "sikatā" (sand), "varṣā" (rain), etc., the plural number is used even though there is no real multiplicity.
tathā vanaṃ tribhuvanaṃ jagat ṣaṇṇagarītyādiṣvasatyapyabhede 'rthasyaikatvasaṅkhyā vyapadiśyata iti	Similarly, in [words] like "vana" (forest), "tribhuvana" (three worlds), "jagat" (world), "ṣaṇṇagarī" (six cities), the singular number is used even though there is no [real] unity in the referent.
ato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ	Therefore [our] reason is not unproven.
nāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvadharmatvaprasaṅgāt	Nor is [our reason] inconclusive, because [if it were] everything would have the nature of everything [else].
sapakṣe bhāvāc ca na viruddhaḥ	And [our reason] is not contradictory because it exists in similar instances.
nanvityādinā kumārilamatena hetor asiddhatāmāśaṅkate	[The opponent] raises the objection of the reason being unproven according to Kumārila's view, starting with "nanu."
nanu vyaktau ca jātau ca dārādiścetyaprayujyate	"But words like 'dārāḥ' are used with reference to both the individual and the universal."
vyakteravayavānāṃ vā saṃkhyāmādāya vartate	"[Such words] operate by taking the number either of individuals or of parts."
vanaśabdaḥ punar vyaktīrjātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitaḥ	"The word 'vana,' on the other hand, denotes individuals qualified by the number of the universal."
jātigataikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt	Because it denotes a substance qualified by the singular number inherent in the universal.
athavā dhavādivyaktisamāśritā jātir eva vanaśabdenocyate, tenaikavacanaṃ	Or rather, only the universal residing in individuals like dhava trees is expressed by the word 'vana', hence [its] singular number.
nanvityādinā pratividhatte	[The author] responds [to this] starting with "nanu."
nanu caitena vidhinā sarvam ekaṃ vaco hatam	"But in this way, all singular words would be invalidated."
nānyatrāsti vivakṣā cetsaivāstvasya nibandhanam	"If [you say] there is no such intention in other cases, then let that very intention be the basis in this case too."
etena yathoktena vidhinā sarvam vṛkṣa ityādyekavacanam hatam utsannaṃ	By this method as described above, all singular forms like 'vṛkṣaḥ' [would] become destroyed [and] eliminated
syāt, sarvatraivāsya nyāyasya tulyatvāt /	[This] would be [so], because this reasoning applies equally everywhere
tathā hyatrāpi śakyam evaṃ vaktum tatra vyaktau ca jātau ca vṛkṣādiścet prayujyata ityādi /	For here too it would be possible to say: "if the word 'vṛkṣa' etc. is used in reference to both the individual and the universal," and so forth
atha matam anyatra vṛkṣādau, vyakter avayavānāṃ ca saṅkhyāvivakṣā nāstīti, yadyevaṃ na tarhi vastugatānvayādyanuvidhāyinī saṅkhyā, vivakṣāyā evānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt /	If it is thought that in other cases like 'vṛkṣa', there is no intention to express number with respect to individuals and parts, then number would not follow the actual presence or absence [of things], but rather would follow the presence and absence of the speaker's intention
tataś ca saiva vivakṣā dārā ityādiṣvasya bahuvacanasya nibandhanam astu bhedābhāvepyekam api vastu bahutvena vivakṣyata ityato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ //	And therefore, let that same intention be the basis for the plural in words like 'dārāḥ', because even when there is no actual multiplicity, a single thing can be intended [to be expressed] as many, [and] thus our reason is not unproven
jāterapi na saṅkhyāsti bhāve vā tadviśeṣitāḥ / kathaṃ sambaddhasambandhādyadi sambandhato 'pi vā //	The universal has no number at all, or [even] if [number] exists [in it], how could [individuals] be qualified by it? [Would it be] through the connection of what is connected, or through direct connection?
nahi jāteḥ saṅkhyāsti dravyasamāśritatvāt tasyāḥ /	The universal indeed has no number, because it [the universal] inheres in substance alone
atheyaṃ vaiśeṣikaprakriyā nāśrīyate, tadā bhāve vā saṅkhyāyāstayā kathaṃ vā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣitāḥ siddhyanti /	If this Vaiśeṣika doctrine is not accepted, and [if it is held that] number exists in the universal, then how could it be established that individuals like dhava trees are qualified by that [number]?
syād etat sambandhasambandhāt tat sambandhād vā siddhyanti /	This might be [answered]: "It could be established either through the connection of what is connected, or through direct connection itself"
tathā hi yadā jāter vyatirekiṇī saṅkhyā tadaikatvasaṅkhyāsambaddhayā jātyā dhavādivyaktīnāṃ sambandhāt pāramparyeṇa tayā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣyante, yadā tu jāter vyatiriktaiva saṅkhyā tadā sākṣād eva sambandhāt tayā viśeshanta ityato jātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitāḥ sidhyanti //	For when number is different from the universal, then through the connection of individuals like dhava with the universal [which is itself] connected with the singular number, those individuals like dhava are qualified by it [number] indirectly; but when number is not different from the universal, then through direct connection itself they are qualified by it [number], and thus it is established that [individuals] are qualified by the number of the universal
yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte	[The author] provides a reply with [the words] "yadyevam" etc.
yadyevam abhidhīyeta vanam eko 'pi pādapaḥ	If it be so, then even a single tree could be spoken of as 'vana' [forest];
bahavo 'pi hi kathyante sambandhād eva so 'sti ca	Indeed, many [trees] are spoken of [as forest] only through connection, and that [connection] exists [in the single tree] also.
yadi sambandhasambandhāt sambandhato vā dhavādivyaktiṣu vanaśabdasya pravṛttis tad eko 'pi pādapo vanam ityevam ucyeta, pravṛttinimittasya vidyamānatvāt	If the application of the word 'vana' to individual trees like dhava etc. is due to either the connection of the connected or due to connection itself, then even a single tree could be called 'vana', since the basis for [such] application is present [there].
tathā hi bahavo 'pi dhavādayo jātisaṅkhyāsambandhād eva vanam ity ucyante	For indeed, even many dhava and other [trees] are called 'vana' only through connection with the number of the universal,

paramārthatas tu kasmān na yujyata ity āha paramārthenetyādi

[If asked] "Why is it not possible in ultimate reality?", [the text] states "in ultimate reality" etc.

yaduktam "liṅgasaṅkhyādisambandho na cāpohasya vidyata" iti

As has been stated: "The connection with gender, number, etc. does not exist for apoha."

liṅgasaṅkhyādiyogas tu vyaktīnām api nāstyayam

This connection with gender, number, etc. does not exist even for individuals.

icchāracitasaṅketanimitto nahi vāstavaḥ

[It is] based on convention created by will [and] is indeed not real.

vastudharmatvameṣāṃ liṅgasaṅkhyādīnām asiddham

The status of these gender, number, etc. as properties of real things is not established.

svatantrecchāviracitasaṅketamātrabhāvitvāt

[It is] due solely to conventions created by independent will.

vyaktīnām apītyāpiśabdādapohasyāpi

By the word "api" [in the phrase] "of individuals also," the apoha is also [meant to be included].

prayogaḥ yo yadanvayavyatirekau nānuvidhatte, nāsau taddharmaḥ, yathā śītatvamagneḥ, nānuvidhatte ca liṅgasaṅkhyādi vastuto 'nvayavyatirekāviti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ

The application [is as follows]: That which does not follow the presence and absence of something is not its property, just as coolness [is not a property] of fire; and gender, number, etc. do not follow the presence and absence of real things – thus [this is] the non-perception of the pervader.

taṭastaṭī taṭaṃ ceti nairūpyaṃ na ca vastunaḥ

[The words] "taṭaḥ," "taṭī," and "taṭam" [exist], but a single thing cannot have [these] multiple forms.

śabalābhāsatāprāpteḥ sarveṣāṃ tatra cetasām

Because [if it did], all cognitions relating to it would become variegated in appearance.

yadi hi liṅgaṃ vastugato dharmaḥ syāt, tadaikasmiṃs taṭākhye vastuni taṭastaṭī taṭamiti liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛtter ekasya vastunastrairūpyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt

If gender were indeed a property inherent in things, then due to the application of words with three genders – "taṭaḥ," "taṭī," and "taṭam" – to one thing called bank, a single thing would have to possess three forms.

nacaikasya strīpunnapuṃsakākhyaṃ svabhāvatrayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt

And it is not reasonable for one [thing] to have three natures called feminine, masculine and neuter, because [this would] result in the loss of [its] unity.

viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve sarvaṃ viśvamekameva vastu syāt

If something could maintain unity despite having mutually contradictory properties, then the entire universe would be just one thing.

tataś ca sahotpattivināśaprasaṅgaḥ

And consequently, [everything] would arise and perish simultaneously.

kiṃ ca sarvasyaivaikaśabdena śabdāntareṇa vā liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanāt tadviṣayāṇāṃ sarvacetasāṃ mecakādiratnavacchabalābhāsatāprasaṅgaḥ

Moreover, since everything is observed to be understood as having three genders whether through one word or another, all cognitions pertaining to them would appear variegated like a sapphire or other gems.

athāpi syāt satyapi liṅgatrayayogitve sarvavastūnāṃ yadeva rūpaṃ vaktumiṣṭaṃ pratipādakena tanmātrāvabhāsānyeva vivakṣāvaśāccetāṃsi bhaviṣyantīti na śabalābhāsānītyata āha vivakṣānugatatve vetyādi

"Even though all things may possess the three genders, under the speaker's whim, the cognitions would appear only as envisaging that particular form which [the speaker] desires to express" – thus [one might object that] they would not be of variegated appearance. To this [the author] responds with "vivakṣānugatatve" etc.

tadvaśādekarūpāṇi naikarūpaṃ ca vastu tat

Under that [speaker's] whim, the cognitions [would be] of one form, and yet that thing is not of one form.

vivakṣānugatatve vā cetasām iti śeṣaḥ

"[If] in the case of the dependence of cognitions on the speaker's whim" – this is the completion [of the verse].

yadi hi vivakṣāvaśād ekarūpāṇi cetāṃsi bhavantītyaṅgīkriyate, tadā tānicetāṃsi tryātmakavastuviṣayāṇi na prāpnuvanti, tadākāraśūnyatvāt, cakṣur vijñānavacchabdaviṣayam

If it is accepted that cognitions become of one form through the speaker's whim, then those cognitions could not have as their object things of triple nature, because they would lack that [triple] form, just like visual cognition [cannot have] sound as its object.

tadvaśād iti vivakṣāvaśāt

"Under that influence" means "through the speaker's whim."

yo 'pi manyate saṃstyānaprasavasthitiṣu yathoktastrīpunnapuṃsakatvavyavastheti, tasyāpi na yuktam ityādarśayann āha sthitītyādi

[The author], showing that even the view of one who thinks "the determination of feminine, masculine and neuter gender applies as stated to [states of] dissolution, origination and continuance" is not correct, states "sthiti" etc.

sthitiprasavasaṃstyānasaṃśrayā liṅgasaṃsthitiḥ yadi syādavibhāgena viliṅgatvaṃ prasajyate

If the establishment of gender were based on [states of] continuance, origination and dissolution, then indiscriminate possession of [all] genders would follow.

liṅgasaṃsthitir yadi syād ityatra chedaḥ

There is a break [in the sentence] after "if the establishment of gender were [to be]."

yadi hi sthityādyāśrayā liṅgasthitir liṅgavyavasthā, tadā taṭaśṛṅkhalādivat sarvapadārtheṣvavibhāgena trīṇi liṅgāni prāpnuvanti, sarvatra taṭādivat sthityāder vidyamānatvāt

If the establishment and regulation of gender were based on continuance etc., then all three genders would apply indiscriminately to all things like [they do to] 'riverbank' (taṭa) and 'chain' (śṛṅkhalā), because [states of] continuance etc. exist everywhere just as [they do] in the case of riverbank etc.

anyathā taṭastaṭītaṭamityādāvapi liṅgatrayaṃ na syāt, viśeṣābhāvāt

Otherwise, the three genders should not exist even in [cases] like 'taṭaḥ', 'taṭī', 'taṭam' etc., due to [there being] no distinction.

tasmād ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣaḥ

Therefore, [this leads to] the definitional fault of over-application.

vyabhicāradarśanāccāvyāpiteti darśayann āha abhāva ityādi /

[The author] shows that [the definition] is too narrow due to seeing deviation, saying "abhāva" etc.

abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchateti yaducyate /

When one speaks of "abhāvaḥ" [masculine], "nirupākhyam" [neuter], and "tucchatā" [feminine],

tatra sthityādisambandhaḥ ko 'sastu parikalpyate //

what connection with continuance etc. could possibly be imagined there?

asatyapi hi sthityādike śaśaviṣāṇādiṣvasadrūpeṣvabhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādibhiḥ śabdair liṅgatrayapratipattidarśanād avyāpinīyaṃ liṅgavyavasthā //

Even though continuance etc. are absent in non-existent things like a hare's horn, words of all three genders are seen to be used, such as "abhāvaḥ", "nirupākhyam", and "tucchatā", [showing that] this gender classification is too narrow.

utpādaḥ prasavaścaiṣāṃ nāśaḥ saṃstyānamiṣyate /

For these [entities], birth is called "utpādaḥ" and "prasavaḥ", destruction is "nāśaḥ" and "saṃstyānam",

ātmarūpaṃ tu bhāvānāṃ sthitirityabhidhīyate //

and continuance of entities in their own form is called "sthitiḥ".

tatrotpāde na nāśo 'sti tatkimutpattirucyate /

In birth there is no destruction, so why is it called "utpattiḥ" [feminine]?

nātmākārā sthitiścāsti tat kathaṃ janam gīyate //

And there is no continuance in [its] own form, so why is it called "janam" [neuter]?

saṃstyāne na dvayaṃ cānyat tatkathaṃ vyapadiśyate /

In destruction the other two [states] are not present, so why is it designated [in different genders]?

tirobhāvaś ca nāśaś ca tirobhāvanam ityapi //

[Why is it called] "tirobhāvaḥ" and "nāśaḥ" [both masculine] and "tirobhāvanam" [neuter]?

sthitau sthitiḥ svabhāvaś ca hetunā kena vocyate /

By what reason is continuance called "sthitiḥ" [feminine] and "svabhāvaḥ" [masculine]?

athāvibhaktamevaiṣāṃ rūpaṃ syād ekaliṅgatā //

If their form is undifferentiated, then there should be only one gender [for all].

itaścāvyāpinī, teṣveva sthityādiṣu pratyekaṃ liṅgatrayayogiśabdapravṛttidarśanāt /

And [the definition] is too narrow for this reason also: because in those very [states] of continuance etc., the use of words connected with all three genders is seen for each one.

tathā hi prasava utpāda ucyate saṃstyānaṃ vināśaḥ ātmasvarūpaṃ tu sthitiḥ /

Thus "birth" [and] "origination" are spoken of, "dissolution" [means] "destruction", while "own-nature" [refers to] "continuance".

tatra prasave sthitisaṃstyānayor abhāvāt katham utpāde utpattir jametyādeḥ strīnapuṃsakaliṅgasya pravṛttir bhavet /

In [the case of] origination, due to the absence of continuance and destruction, how could words like "utpattiḥ" [feminine] and "janma" [neuter] be applied?

tathā saṃstyāne sthitiprasavayor abhāvāt kathaṃ tirobhāvo vināśastirobhāvanam ityādibhiḥ śabdair vyapadiśyeta /

Similarly, in [the case of] dissolution, due to the absence of continuance and origination, how could it be designated by such words as "tirobhāvaḥ" [masculine], "vināśaḥ" [masculine] and "tirobhāvanam" [neuter]?

tathā sthitau saṃstyānaprasavayor asambhavāt sthitisvabhāvaścetyādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ sā sthitiḥ kena hetunocyata iti vācyam /

Similarly, since destruction and origination are impossible in [the case of] continuance, it must be explained by what reason it is spoken of by such words as "sthitiḥ" [feminine] and "svabhāvaḥ" [masculine].

athāpi syādeṣāṃ sthityādīnāṃ parasparamavibhaktarūpatvāt pratyekam eṣu liṅgatrayayogyatā bhaviṣyatīti /

It might be argued that "since these – continuance and the rest – have forms not differentiated from each other, each of them will be capable of [taking] all three genders."

athāvibhaktam ityādi /

[The answer begins with] "If undifferentiated" and so forth.

yadi hyeṣāṃ parasparamavibhaktaṃ rūpaṃ syāt tadaikam eva paramārthato liṅgaṃ syān na liṅgatrayam //

For if their form were undifferentiated from each other, then in reality there should be only one gender, not three.

anyastvāha sāmānyaviśeṣāḥ strītvādayo gotvādaya iveti /

Another [person] says: "The feminine and the rest are specific universals, like cowness and such."

gotvādaya ivetyādi /

[The reply begins with] "Like cowness" and so forth.

gotvādaya ivaite 'pi yadi strītvādayo matāḥ / sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśāḥ //

If feminine and the rest are considered to be like cowness and such, then such [universals] are indeed rejected through the rejection of universals [in general].

pūrvaṃ sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ nirastatvāt, tadrūpāṇāṃ

Since specific universals were rejected earlier in the examination of universals, [all] such forms [are rejected].

strītvādīnām asambhavād asambhavīlakṣaṇam //

[The definition is invalid] due to the impossibility of [universals like] femininity and others.

kiṃ ca teṣveva sāmānyaviśeṣeṣvantareṇāpyaparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ jātirbhāvaḥsāmānyamityādi strīpunnampusakaliṅgasya śabdasya pravṛttidarśanād avyāpitā ca lakṣaṇasyeti darśayati jātirbhāva ityādi /

Moreover, since we observe the application of feminine, masculine and neuter gender words like "jātiḥ," "bhāvaḥ," and "sāmānyam" to these particular universals even without another universal, [this shows] the definition is too narrow.

jātirbhāvaś ca sāmānyamiti vā teṣu saṃmatam /

[The words] "jātiḥ," "bhāvaḥ," and "sāmānyam" are accepted [as applying] to these [universals].

na sāmānyāni yujyante sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi hi //

And other universals cannot properly exist in universals.

niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīti siddhāntāt /

Because [it is their] established doctrine that universals are devoid of [other] universals.

etac ca vaiśeṣikasiddhāntāśrayeṇoktam /

This has been stated based on the Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

yadā tu sāmānyeṣvaparāṇi sāmānyanīṣyante vaiyākaraṇaiḥ, yathoktam "arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ / vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ"//

However, the grammarians maintain that universals do exist in [other] universals, as stated [in Vākyapadīya 3.16]: "Even when both object and universal are denoted, all words denote the universal, since all entities exist characterized by [their] function."

nahi śāstrāntaraparidṛṣṭā jātivyavasthā niyogato vaiyākaraṇair abhyupetavyā /

The grammarians need not necessarily accept the theories about universals as seen in other philosophical systems.

pratyayābhidhānānvayavyāpārakāryonnīyamānarūpā hi jātayo nahi tāsāmiyattā kācit /

For universals, whose nature is inferred from the effects of the operation of the connection between cognition and expression, have no [fixed] limit.

ato yaccoditakāryadarśanāt sāmānyādhārā jātiḥ satī jātaya ityasyāḥ śruter nibandhanam iti /

Therefore, the basis for the term "jātayaḥ" [universals] is that universal which has a common substratum [and] which is established from observing the aforementioned effects.

vyāpāralakṣaṇā iti abhidhānapratyayavyāpārato vyavasthitalakṣaṇā ity arthaḥ /

[The phrase] "vyāpāralakṣaṇā" means that [their] characteristic nature is determined by the functions of words and cognitions.

tadānantaroktam eva dūṣaṇaṃ "sāmānyasya nirāsena te 'pāstā eva tādṛśā" iti //

The refutation [is] precisely what was stated immediately before: "such [universals] are indeed rejected through the rejection of universals [in general]."

idaṃ ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha abhāva ityādi / abhāvo nirupākhyatvaṃ tucchatetyādi vā katham / sāmāyikyeva tenaiṣā liṅgatritayasaṃsthitiḥ //

[The text] states this common refutation beginning with "abhāva": How [can there be] such [words] as "abhāvaḥ" [masculine], "nirupākhyatvam" [neuter], and "tucchatā" [feminine]? Therefore this system of three genders is purely conventional.

nahyasatsu śaśaviṣāṇādiṣu jātirasti, vastudharmatvāt tasyetyatas teṣvabhāvādiśabdaprayogo na prāpnoti /

There is no universal in non-existent things like hare's horns, because it [i.e., universal] is a property of real entities; therefore the application of words like "abhāva" to those [non-existent things] should not be possible.

tasmād avyāpinī liṅgavyavasthā /

Therefore the system of gender is not comprehensive [enough].

tenecchāracitasaṅketamātrabhāvinyeveyaṃ liṅgatritayavyavastheti siddham //

Thus it is established that this system of three genders exists solely based on conventions created by [speakers'] will.

saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeṣu kalpyate hi vivakṣayā /

Number too is purely conventional [and] is indeed conceived through [the speaker's] intention.

bhedābhedavivekepi dārādivipinādivat //

Even in [cases of] discrimination between difference and non-difference, [it is] like [in the case of words] such as "dārā" and "vipina."

saṅkhyāpi sāmāyikyeva, na vāstavī /

Number too is purely conventional, not real.

dārādiṣvasatyapi vāstave bhede vivakṣāvaśenopakalpitatvāt /

Because in [words] like "dārā," even though there is no real difference, [their number is] determined by the force of [speakers'] intention.

ato nāsiddho hetuḥ

Therefore [our] reason is not unproven.

tathā hi bahutvaikatvādisaṅkhyā na vastugatabhedābhedalakṣaṇā, dārāḥ sikatā varṣā ityādāvasatyapi vastuto bhede bahutvasaṅkhyā parivartate

For plural or singular number is not characterized by real multiplicity or unity of things, [as] in words like "dārāḥ" (wife), "sikatā" (sand), "varṣā" (rain), etc., the plural number is used even though there is no real multiplicity.

tathā vanaṃ tribhuvanaṃ jagat ṣaṇṇagarītyādiṣvasatyapyabhede 'rthasyaikatvasaṅkhyā vyapadiśyata iti

Similarly, in [words] like "vana" (forest), "tribhuvana" (three worlds), "jagat" (world), "ṣaṇṇagarī" (six cities), the singular number is used even though there is no [real] unity in the referent.

ato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ

Therefore [our] reason is not unproven.

nāpyanaikāntikaḥ sarvasya sarvadharmatvaprasaṅgāt

Nor is [our reason] inconclusive, because [if it were] everything would have the nature of everything [else].

sapakṣe bhāvāc ca na viruddhaḥ

And [our reason] is not contradictory because it exists in similar instances.

nanvityādinā kumārilamatena hetor asiddhatāmāśaṅkate

[The opponent] raises the objection of the reason being unproven according to Kumārila's view, starting with "nanu."

nanu vyaktau ca jātau ca dārādiścetyaprayujyate

"But words like 'dārāḥ' are used with reference to both the individual and the universal."

vyakteravayavānāṃ vā saṃkhyāmādāya vartate

"[Such words] operate by taking the number either of individuals or of parts."

vanaśabdaḥ punar vyaktīrjātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitaḥ

"The word 'vana,' on the other hand, denotes individuals qualified by the number of the universal."

jātigataikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt

Because it denotes a substance qualified by the singular number inherent in the universal.

athavā dhavādivyaktisamāśritā jātir eva vanaśabdenocyate, tenaikavacanaṃ

Or rather, only the universal residing in individuals like dhava trees is expressed by the word 'vana', hence [its] singular number.

nanvityādinā pratividhatte

[The author] responds [to this] starting with "nanu."

nanu caitena vidhinā sarvam ekaṃ vaco hatam

"But in this way, all singular words would be invalidated."

nānyatrāsti vivakṣā cetsaivāstvasya nibandhanam

"If [you say] there is no such intention in other cases, then let that very intention be the basis in this case too."

etena yathoktena vidhinā sarvam vṛkṣa ityādyekavacanam hatam utsannaṃ

By this method as described above, all singular forms like 'vṛkṣaḥ' [would] become destroyed [and] eliminated

syāt, sarvatraivāsya nyāyasya tulyatvāt /

[This] would be [so], because this reasoning applies equally everywhere

tathā hyatrāpi śakyam evaṃ vaktum tatra vyaktau ca jātau ca vṛkṣādiścet prayujyata ityādi /

For here too it would be possible to say: "if the word 'vṛkṣa' etc. is used in reference to both the individual and the universal," and so forth

atha matam anyatra vṛkṣādau, vyakter avayavānāṃ ca saṅkhyāvivakṣā nāstīti, yadyevaṃ na tarhi vastugatānvayādyanuvidhāyinī saṅkhyā, vivakṣāyā evānvayavyatirekānuvidhānāt /

If it is thought that in other cases like 'vṛkṣa', there is no intention to express number with respect to individuals and parts, then number would not follow the actual presence or absence [of things], but rather would follow the presence and absence of the speaker's intention

tataś ca saiva vivakṣā dārā ityādiṣvasya bahuvacanasya nibandhanam astu bhedābhāvepyekam api vastu bahutvena vivakṣyata ityato nāsiddhatā hetoḥ //

And therefore, let that same intention be the basis for the plural in words like 'dārāḥ', because even when there is no actual multiplicity, a single thing can be intended [to be expressed] as many, [and] thus our reason is not unproven

jāterapi na saṅkhyāsti bhāve vā tadviśeṣitāḥ / kathaṃ sambaddhasambandhādyadi sambandhato 'pi vā //

The universal has no number at all, or [even] if [number] exists [in it], how could [individuals] be qualified by it? [Would it be] through the connection of what is connected, or through direct connection?

nahi jāteḥ saṅkhyāsti dravyasamāśritatvāt tasyāḥ /

The universal indeed has no number, because it [the universal] inheres in substance alone

atheyaṃ vaiśeṣikaprakriyā nāśrīyate, tadā bhāve vā saṅkhyāyāstayā kathaṃ vā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣitāḥ siddhyanti /

If this Vaiśeṣika doctrine is not accepted, and [if it is held that] number exists in the universal, then how could it be established that individuals like dhava trees are qualified by that [number]?

syād etat sambandhasambandhāt tat sambandhād vā siddhyanti /

This might be [answered]: "It could be established either through the connection of what is connected, or through direct connection itself"

tathā hi yadā jāter vyatirekiṇī saṅkhyā tadaikatvasaṅkhyāsambaddhayā jātyā dhavādivyaktīnāṃ sambandhāt pāramparyeṇa tayā dhavādivyaktayo viśeṣyante, yadā tu jāter vyatiriktaiva saṅkhyā tadā sākṣād eva sambandhāt tayā viśeshanta ityato jātisaṅkhyāviśeṣitāḥ sidhyanti //

For when number is different from the universal, then through the connection of individuals like dhava with the universal [which is itself] connected with the singular number, those individuals like dhava are qualified by it [number] indirectly; but when number is not different from the universal, then through direct connection itself they are qualified by it [number], and thus it is established that [individuals] are qualified by the number of the universal

yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte

[The author] provides a reply with [the words] "yadyevam" etc.

yadyevam abhidhīyeta vanam eko 'pi pādapaḥ

If it be so, then even a single tree could be spoken of as 'vana' [forest];

bahavo 'pi hi kathyante sambandhād eva so 'sti ca

Indeed, many [trees] are spoken of [as forest] only through connection, and that [connection] exists [in the single tree] also.

yadi sambandhasambandhāt sambandhato vā dhavādivyaktiṣu vanaśabdasya pravṛttis tad eko 'pi pādapo vanam ityevam ucyeta, pravṛttinimittasya vidyamānatvāt

If the application of the word 'vana' to individual trees like dhava etc. is due to either the connection of the connected or due to connection itself, then even a single tree could be called 'vana', since the basis for [such] application is present [there].

tathā hi bahavo 'pi dhavādayo jātisaṅkhyāsambandhād eva vanam ity ucyante

For indeed, even many dhava and other [trees] are called 'vana' only through connection with the number of the universal,