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anyatheti / | [The word] 'otherwise' [means]: |
yadi jaḍadhībhir āśaṅkitaṃ na nivartayed ity arthaḥ / | if it does not exclude what is doubted by those of dull intelligence - this is the meaning. |
syād etat na hi śrotrā kiñcicchaṅkitam ity āha kiñciddhītyādi / | One might object: "Indeed the hearer has not doubted anything." [To this] he says "If anything..." etc. |
yadi hi śrotā na kvacid arthe saṃśete tat kimiti parasmād upadeśamapekṣate niścayārthaṃ hi paraṃ pṛcchati, anyathonmattaḥ syāt / | For if the hearer has no doubt about any meaning, then why does he seek instruction from another? For one asks another for the sake of certainty; otherwise one would be insane. |
syād etat yadi nāma śrotur āśaṅkāsthānam asti, tathāpi tacchabdena na nivarttyata evetyāha atat saṃskārakam ityādi / | One might object: "Even if, granted, the hearer has something to doubt, nevertheless it cannot be excluded by that word." [To this] he says "That which does not produce understanding..." etc. |
tat saṃskāro yasmin śabda iti tadatat saṃskārakaṃ / | [That is a] word which has this embellishment [and] which brings about that embellishment. |
śeṣād vibhāṣeti kap / | The affix 'kap' is optionally added according to [the rule] "śeṣād vibhāṣā". |
bruvanniti pratipādakaḥ / | [The word] "bruvan" means "one who explains". |
svasthadhīḥ katham iti unmattaka eva syād ity arthaḥ / | [The phrase] "how [can one be] of sound mind" means that [such a person] would indeed be insane. |
śrotṛsaṃskārāyaiva śabdānāṃ prayogāt // | Because words are used solely for the refinement of listeners. |
atra kasmin vākye kiṃ tanmūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ yannivartyata ity āha cakṣur jñānādivijñeyam ityādi / | Here [someone] asks: "In which sentence [and] what is that point of doubt in the mind of that confused person which is being refuted?" [The answer begins with] "cognizable through visual perception, etc." |
cakṣurjñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādīti yaduycate / | When it is stated that "form and so forth are cognizable through visual perception and other [means]." |
teneti cakṣur jñānādivijñeyaṃ rūpādītyanena vākyena // | By this, [namely] by this sentence "form and so forth are cognizable through visual perception and other [means]." |
kiṃ tadāropitam ity āha na cakṣurāśritenaivetyādi / | [Someone] asks "What is that which is superimposed?" [The answer] begins with "not through visual cognition alone." |
na cakṣurāśritenaiva rūpaṃ nīlādi vedyate / kintu śrotrāśritenāpi nityenaikena cetasā // | Blue and other forms are not cognized through visual cognition alone, but also through the single eternal consciousness associated with hearing. |
śrotrāśritenāpi nityena cetasā nīlādirūpaṃ vedyata ityevaṃ yanmandadhiyā.... / | Thus [it is] supposed by [someone] of dull intellect that blue and other forms are cognized through the eternal consciousness associated with hearing. |
samāropitaṃ taccakṣur vijñānavijñeyaṃ rūpam ityanena vākyena niṣidhyate / | That [supposition about] form being cognizable through [any] cognition is negated by this sentence [about visual cognition]. |
cakṣurāśritavijñānavijñeyam eva rūpaṃ na śrotrādivijñānavijñeyam ity arthaḥ // | Form is cognizable only through cognition dependent on the eye, not through cognition dependent on the ear and other [organs] - this is the meaning. |
sarvajñajñānavijñeyā dharmāścaite bhavanti kim // abhāvā api kiṃ jñeyā na jñānaṃ janayanti ye / | Are these dharmas cognizable through the cognition of the omniscient one? Are even absences, which do not generate cognition, knowable? |
ityādivibhramodbhūtau vijñeyapadamucyate // evaṃ sarvadharmāḥ kiṃ kṣaṇikatvādirūpeṇa vijñeyā / | When such confusions arise, the word "cognizable" is used. Thus [the question is]: are all dharmas cognizable in terms of momentariness and so forth? |
āhosvin na / | Or are they not? |
atra yadakṣaṇikatvādinā jñeyatvādirūpamāropitaṃ dharmeṣu tannivartyate // | Here, that which is superimposed on dharmas in terms of non-momentariness etc., in the form of knowability etc., is negated. |
kathaṃ tadvacanamātreṇa nivartayituṃ śakyata ityetad āha tādṛgityādi / | How can this be negated by mere words? This is what is addressed by [the verse beginning with] "tādṛg". |
jñeyo 'bhāve 'pi saṃvṛttyā sthāpanādamunātmanā // | [Something] is knowable even in absence, conventionally, through establishment in that form. |
tādṛgiti kṣaṇikatvādirūpeṇa tasya pramāṇasiddhatvāt / | "In that form" means: because it is established through valid means of cognition in terms of momentariness etc. |
athābhāvasya kathaṃ jñeyatvaṃ siddham ityata āha jñeya ityādi / amunātmaneti / | Now, how is the knowability of absence established? This is why [the text] says "jñeya" etc. [And] "in that form" [means]: |
abhāvarūpeṇa / | In the form of absence. |
kevalasyopalambhe yā pratītirupajāyate / | Whatever cognition arises in the apprehension of [something] alone [i.e., in isolation]. |
ayamatra samudāyārthaḥ naiva kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattir asti, kiṃtu vākyeṣūpalabdhasyārthavataḥ śabdasya sādṛśyenāpahṛtabuddheḥ kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattyabhimānaḥ | There is no cognition [of meaning] from merely hearing an isolated word; rather, when one has [previously] apprehended a meaningful word in sentences, due to similarity [with that previous occurrence], one's mind is carried away and there is a presumption of understanding meaning from hearing the isolated word. |
tathā hi yeṣveva vākyeṣu prameyaśabdamupalabdhavān śrotā tadartheṣveva sā buddhir apratiṣṭitārthā plavamānarūpā samupajāyate | For indeed, in whatever sentences the hearer has [previously] apprehended the word "prameya", only with reference to those [same] meanings does that unfixed, wavering cognition arise. |
tac ca ghaṭādiśabdānām api tulyam | And this is equally [true] for words like "ghaṭa" [jar] and others. |
tathā hi kiṃ ghaṭenodakamānayānyutāñjalineti prastāve ghaṭeneti prayoge | For example, when the question "Shall [I] bring water in a jar or with cupped hands?" is asked, and "in a jar" is used [in response]... |
prastāvānabhijñasya yāvatsu vākyeṣu ghaṭeneti prayogo dṛṣṭas tāvatāmartheṣvākāṅkṣāvatī pūrvavākyānusārād eva pratipattir bhavati | For one who does not know the context, an expectant understanding arises in accordance with previous sentences in which the usage "in a jar" has been seen. |
yaduktam apohyakalpanāyāṃ cetyādi tatrāha apohyetyādi apohyakalpanāyāṃ ca varaṃ vastveva kalpitam | Regarding what was said about "assuming the excluded", [the opponent] says: "Rather than assuming the excluded, it is better to assume the thing itself." |
ityetad vyāhataṃ proktaṃ niyamenānyavarjanāt | This statement is contradictory, because there is invariably exclusion of something else. |
vastveva kalpyate tatra yadeva hi vivakṣitam | In that case, only that thing itself is assumed which is meant to be expressed. |
kṣepo vivakṣitasyāto na tu sarvaṃ vivakṣitam | Therefore [there is] exclusion of what is meant to be expressed, but not everything is meant to be expressed. |
vastveva hyadhyavasāyavaśācchabdārthatvena kalpitamasmābhir yadeva hi vivakṣitaṃ, nāvastu | Indeed, it is a real thing that is assumed by us as the meaning of the word through determination - namely what is meant to be expressed - not a non-thing. |
tena tat pratītau sāmarthyād avivakṣitasyākṣepo vyāvṛttiravagamyata eveti | Hence, when that [word-meaning] is apprehended, there is, through implication, necessarily the exclusion [understood] of what is not intended to be expressed. |
nāvyāpinī śabdārthavyavasthā / | [Thus] the determination of word and meaning is not non-pervasive. |
yadeva ca mūḍhamaterāśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadevādhikṛtyoktam ācāryeṇa "ajñeyaṃ kalpitam kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numāna"miti // | With reference to precisely those cases which are grounds for doubt in the mind of the dull-witted, the Teacher has stated: "Having postulated the unknowable, through its exclusion [we arrive at] the inference of the knowable." |
jñānākāraniṣedhas tu svavedyatvān na śakyate / | The denial of the form of cognition, however, is not possible because of [its] self-evidence. |
vidyate hi nirālambamāropakamanekadhā // | For there exist many superimpositions without [any real] substrate. |
jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścinniyataḥ pratigocaram / avaśyābhyupagantavyaḥ svabhāvaś ca sa eva ca // | Some intrinsic nature of cognition, which is fixed with respect to each object, must necessarily be accepted, and that indeed is its essential nature. |
asmābhirukta ākāraḥ pratibimbaṃ tadābhatā / ullekhaḥ pratibhāsaś ca saṃjñābhedastvakāraṇam // | What we call "form," "reflection," "semblance," "manifestation," and "appearance" [refer to the same thing] - the difference in terms is without [real] cause. |
na śakyata iti / | "[It is] not possible" - thus [it is said]. |
kathaṃ svasaṃvedyatvaṃ siddhaṃ jñānākārasyetyāha vidyate hītyādi / | [To the question] "How is the self-evidence of the form of cognition established?" [the text] states "For there exist" etc. |
svapnādiṣvarthamantareṇāpi nirālambanamāgṛhītārthākāramāropakaṃ jñānamāgopālam atisphuṭam eva svasaṃvedanapratyakṣasiddham / | In dreams and similar [states], even without [real] objects, superimposing cognition without substrate, taking the form of grasped objects, is clearly established through direct self-awareness [even] for every cowherd. |
naca deśakālāntarāvasthito 'rthastena rūpeṇa saṃvedyata iti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ, tasya tadrūpābhāvāt / | It is not right to say that "an object situated in a different place and time can be cognized in that [same] form," because that [object] does not exist in that form. |
na cānyena rūpeṇānyasya saṃvedanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | And it is not proper for one thing to be cognized in the form of another thing, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
kiñcāvaśyaṃ tadbhavadbhir jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścid viśeṣo 'rthakṛto 'bhyupagantavyo yena bodharūpatāsāmpye 'pi prativiṣayaṃ nīlasyaiva saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti vibhāgena vibhajyate jñānam / | Moreover, you must necessarily admit that there is some intrinsic particularity in cognition caused by the object, by which, even though [all cognitions] are similar in being conscious awareness, cognition is differentiated according to each object, such that there is cognition of blue alone and not of yellow. |
tadabhyupagame ca sāmarthyāt sākāram eva jñānamabhyupagataṃ syāt / | And upon admitting this, by logical necessity, it would [follow that] cognition must have form. |
ākāravyatirekeṇānyasya svabhāvaviśeṣatvenāvadhārayitum aśakyatvāt / | Because without form it would be impossible to ascertain anything else as having a particular nature. |
ato bhavatā svabhāvaviśeṣa iti sa eva śabdāntareṇokteḥ, asmābhistvākāra ullekha ityādinā śabdeneti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ / | Therefore, what you express with different words as "particular nature" is the same as what we express with words like "form" and "appearance," so the dispute is merely about names. |
evam ityādiśabdānāṃ naivam ityādi vidyate / apohyam iti vispaṣṭaṃ prakārāntaralakṣaṇam / | For words like "evam" [thus], there exists [the opposite like] "na evam" [not thus], which clearly indicates another mode that is to be excluded. |
evam etannaivam iti prakārāntaram āropitam evam ityādiśabdair vyavacchidyamānaṃ sphuṭataram avasīyata eveti nāvyāpitā śabdārthavyavasthāyāḥ / | Therefore, another mode that is imposed [by saying] "it is thus, it is not thus" is clearly understood to be excluded by words like "evam," and thus our theory of word-meaning is not incomplete. |
evaṃ kumārilenoktaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ prativihitam, idānīm udyotakaroktaṃ pratividhīyate / | [Thus] the criticisms stated by Kumārila have been refuted, [and] now those stated by Udyotakara are being answered. |
tatra yaduktaṃ "sarvaśabdasya kaścārtho vyavacchedyaḥ prakalpyate" iti / | In this regard, it has been stated [by Udyotakara]: "What meaning is assumed to be excluded in the case of the word 'sarva' ['all']?" |
tatrā vyavahāropanīte cetyādi / | The answer to that is [as stated in the section beginning with] "vyavahāropanīte." |
atrāpi jñāyādipadavat kevalasya sarvaśabdasyāprayogād vākyasthasyaiva nityaṃ prayoga iti yadeva mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ tadeva nivartyamasti / | Here also, just as with words like 'jñeya' ['knowable'], since the word 'sarva' is never used alone [but] is always used within a sentence, what is to be excluded is precisely that which might be a source of doubt for those of dull intellect. |
abhidhitsita iti / abhidhātum iṣtaḥ // | 'Abhidhitsitaḥ' [means] "intended to be expressed." |
ko 'sāvartho 'bhidhātum iṣṭa ity āha sarve dharmā ityādi / sarve dharmā nirātmānaḥ sarve vā puruṣā gatāḥ / | [To the question] "What is that meaning intended to be expressed?" [the answer is given through examples like] "all dharmas are without self" [or] "all men are gone." |
kecid eva nirātmano bāhyā dṛṣṭā ghaṭādayaḥ / | [Some have] the misconception that "only external things like jars are without self." |
gamanaṃ kasyaciccaivaṃ bhrāntis tadvinivartate // | And [some have] the misconception that "only some [can] go" - these [misconceptions] are what is excluded. |
ekādyasarvam iti cedityādāvāha sarvāṅgapratiṣedhaścetyādi / | When it is asked whether [what is excluded is] "non-all" starting with "one," etc., [the answer] is stated [in the section beginning with] "the negation of all parts." |
svārthāpohaprasaṅgo 'yaṃ tasmād ajñatayocyate // | Therefore, this objection about "exclusion of its own meaning" is stated out of ignorance. |
yadi hi sarvasyāṅgasya pratiṣedhaḥ tasmin vyavahāropanīte vākyasthe sarvaśabde vivakṣitaḥ syāt tadā svārthāpohaḥ prasajyate / | If the negation of every part were meant when the word 'sarva' [all] occurs in a sentence in actual usage, then [the undesirable consequence of] exclusion of its own meaning would follow. |
yāvatā yadeva mūḍhadhiyā śaṅkitaṃ tadeva niṣidhyata iti kutaḥ svārthāpavāditvadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ / | Insofar as only that which is doubted by confused minds is negated, how could there be any fault of excluding its own meaning? |
evaṃ hyādiśabdeṣvapi vācyam // | The same should be said regarding words like 'ādi' [etc.] as well. |
na bhāvo nāpi cābhāvo 'pṛthagekatvalakṣaṇaḥ / nāśritānāśrito 'poho naikānekaś ca vastutaḥ // | [The apoha] is neither an entity nor a non-entity, [it] has neither the characteristic of diversity nor of unity, [it] is neither dependent nor independent, and [it] is neither one nor many in reality. |
kasmād bhāvo na bhavatītyāha tathāsau nāstītyādi / | [If one asks:] "Why is it not an entity?" [The answer] states "It does not exist thus" and so forth. |
tathāsau nāsti tattvena yathāsau vyavasīyate / tan na bhāvo na cābhāvo vastutvenāvasāyataḥ // | It does not truly exist in the way in which it is apprehended; therefore [it is] neither an entity nor a non-entity, since it is apprehended as something real. |
bāhyarūpatayāsau bhrāntair avasīyate na, cāsau tathāvasthita ityato bāhyarūpatvābhāvān na bhāvaḥ / | It is apprehended by deluded [people] as having external form, yet it does not exist in that way; therefore, due to lacking external form, [it is] not an entity. |
athābhāvaḥ kasmān na bhavatītyāha na cābhāvo vastutvenāvasāyata iti / | [If one asks:] "Why can it not be a non-entity?" [The answer] states: "Nor [is it] a non-entity, because it is apprehended as something real." |
atha pṛthaktvaikatvādilakṣaṇaḥ kasmān na bhavatītyāha bhedābhedādaya ityādi / | [If one asks:] "Why can it not have the characteristic of diversity or unity, etc.?" [The answer] states: "Difference, non-difference, etc." |
bhedābhedādayaḥ sarve vastusatpariniṣṭhitāḥ / | All [characteristics] such as difference and non-difference reside in real entities. |
niḥsvabhāvaśca śabdārthas tasmād ete nirāspadāḥ // | And the word-meaning [śabdārtha] is devoid of intrinsic nature [niḥsvabhāva], therefore these [characteristics] have no basis. |
bhedābhedādayaḥ vyatirekāvyatirekādayaḥ / | [These are] difference and non-difference, etc., [meaning] distinction and non-distinction, etc. |
ādiśabdenāśritatvādayo gṛhyante nahi vastugatā eva dharmās tat katham apohekalpanāśilpighaṭitavigrahe pratiṣṭhāṃ labheran / | By the word "etc." [ādi], [properties like] being dependent and so forth are included. Indeed, these properties belong only to real entities, so how could they find a basis in apoha, which has its form constructed by the artisan of conceptual thought? |
yaccoktam ---"kriyārūpatvād apohasya viṣayo vaktavya" iti, tadasiddham, śabdavācyasyāpohasya pratibimbātmakatvāt / | As for what has been said -- "Since apoha has the nature of action, its object must be specified" -- this is not established, because the apoha that is denoted by the word has the nature of a reflection. |
tac ca pratibimbakamadhyavasitabāhyavasturūpatvān na pratiṣedhamātram / ata eva kiṃ goviṣayo 'thāgoviṣaya ityasya vikalpadvayasyānupapattiḥ, goviṣayatvenaiva tasya vidhirūpatayāpyavasīyamānatvāt // | And this [reflection], being in the form of an external object that is determined through reflection, is not mere negation. Therefore there is no possibility of the two alternatives -- whether it has cow as its object or non-cow as its object -- because it is determined as having a positive form specifically with reference to cow. |
anyārthavinivṛttiṃ ca sākṣācchabdaḥ karoti naḥ / | For us, the word directly effects the exclusion of other meanings. |
kṛte svārthābhidhāne tu sāmarthyāt sāvagamyate // na tadātmā parātmeti vistareṇopapāditam / | But when the expression of its own meaning has been accomplished, through [the word's] capacity it becomes understood [in the form] "its nature is not the nature of another," as has been explained in detail. |
parapakṣānabhijñena tasmād etad ihocyate // kena hyagotvam āsaktaṃ goryenaitadapohyate / | Therefore this is stated here by one who does not know the opponent's position: "Who has attributed non-cowness to the cow, that it needs to be excluded?" |
iti naivābhimukhyena śabdenaitad apohyate // | Thus, this is certainly not what is directly excluded by the word. |
yadi hi pradhānenānyanivṛttimevaśabdaḥ pratipādayet tadaitat syāt, yāvatārthapratibimbakam eva yathoktaṃ prathamataraḥ karoti, tadgatau ca sāmarthyād eva nivartanaṃ gamyata iti siddhāntānabhijñatayā yatkiñcidabhihitam etad itisaṃkṣepārthaḥ / | If the word were to convey the exclusion of others as [its] primary [meaning], then this [objection] would be [valid]; however, as has been said, it first produces only a reflection of the object, and when that is understood, the exclusion becomes known through [the word's] capacity alone. This [objection] has been stated through ignorance of [our] doctrine -- this is something insignificant. This is the summary meaning. |
śeṣaḥ subodham // | The rest [of this] is easily understood. |
yaduktam ---"kimayam apoho vācya" ityādi, tatrāha katam enetyādi / katham ena ca śabdena vācyatvaṃ paripṛcchyate / apohasya kimetena yadi vā kiṃ ghaṭādinā // | When it is asked "Is this apoha denotable?", etc., [the author] responds to this by saying "by which [word]", etc. By which word is this denotability being asked about? [Is it denotability] of apoha by this [word apoha], or [denotability] by [words like] 'jar', etc.? |
śabdārthaḥ kimapoho vā vidhirveti nirūpaṇe / apoha iti bhātyetadyat tadevaṃ pratīyate // | In examining whether the meaning of a word is apoha or something positive, what appears [to us] is that apoha is what is thus comprehended. |
pratibimbaṃ hi śabdārtha iti sākṣād iyaṃ matiḥ // | For our direct understanding is that the meaning of a word is [its] reflected image. |
ghaṭavṛkṣādiśabdāś ca tadeva pratibimbakam / bruvanti jananāt sākṣād arthād anyatkṣipanti tu // | And words like 'jar', 'tree', etc. directly denote that very reflected image through [its] production, while they exclude other [meanings] only indirectly. |
tasmān na vidhidoṣo 'sti nāniṣṭā ca prasajyate / avācyapakṣadoṣas tu tadanaṅgīkṛter na naḥ // | Therefore there is neither any fault regarding [our view of] the positive [entity], nor does any undesirable consequence follow. And the fault of the "non-denotable" position does not apply to us because we do not accept that [position]. |
tatrānyāpohavācyatvavikalpo yadyanyopohaśabdamadhikṛtyādhikriyate tadā vidhirūpeṇaivāsau tena śabdena vācya ityabhyupagamān nāniṣṭāpattir yuktā / | Regarding the alternative about the denotability of "exclusion of others", if this is urged with reference to the term "exclusion of others", then since we accept that it is denoted by that word only in a positive form, the undesirable consequence is not appropriate. |
tathā hi kiṃ vidhiḥ śabdārtha āhosvid anyāpoha iti prastāve 'nyāpohaḥ śabdārtha ityukte pratipattur yathoktapratibimbalakṣaṇānyapohādhyavasāyī pratyayaḥ samupajāyate / | That is, when the question arises whether the meaning of a word is something positive or the exclusion of others, and it is said that "exclusion of others is the meaning of the word", there arises in the hearer a cognition that determines the exclusion of others characterized by the aforementioned reflected image. |
arthāt tu vidhirūpaśabdārthaniṣedhaḥ / | But the negation of positive word-meanings [comes] only by implication. |
atha ghaṭādiśabdam adhikṛtya tatrāpi yathoktapratibimbalakṣaṇāpohaḥ sākṣād ghaṭādiśabdair upajanyamānatvād vidhirūpeṇa ca taiḥ pratipādyate, sāmarthyāt tvanyanivṛtter adhigama iti nāniṣṭāpattiḥ / | Now with reference to words like 'jar', etc., even there the apoha characterized by the aforementioned reflected image is directly produced by words like 'jar', etc., and is conveyed by them in a positive form, while the understanding of the exclusion of others [comes] through implication—thus there is no undesirable consequence. |
na cāpyavyavasthādoṣaḥ / | And there is no fault of infinite regress. |
sāmarthyād anyanivṛtter gamyamānatvād anuvācyatayāvācyapakṣasyānaṅgīkṛtatvād eva na tat pakṣabhāvidoṣodayāvakāśa iti darśayati avācyapakṣadoṣastviti // | [The text] shows by [the words] "the fault of the 'non-denotable' position" that since the exclusion of others is understood through implication as something secondary to what is denoted, and since we do not accept the position of non-denotability, there is no occasion for the rise of faults pertaining to that position. |
api caikatvanityatvetyādāvāha ekatvetyādi / | And regarding [words] like "oneness", "permanence", etc., [the author] speaks [starting with the words] "regarding oneness", etc. |
ekatvanityatādiś ca kalpito na tu tāttvikaḥ | [The notions of] one-ness, eternality and the like are [merely] conceptual, not real. |
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