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tadatra hāsakaraṇaṃ mahāvidvatsūcakam | Therefore, [your] laughter at [us] on this point indicates [your] great learning [ironically]! |
yadi hi pāramārthikamekatvādyupavarṇanaṃ kṛtaṃ syāt tadā hāsyakāraṇam evasyād bhavataḥ | If indeed [our] description of one-ness and the rest had been [presented as] ultimately real, then there would indeed be cause for your laughter. |
yadāhi bhrāntipratipattyanurodhena kālpanikametad ācāryeṇopavarṇitaṃ tadā katham iva hāsyakāraṇam avatarati viduṣaḥ | However, since this has been described by [our] teacher as conceptual only, in accordance with common misconceptions, how indeed could it be a cause for laughter for a learned person? |
kiṃtu bhavāneva vivakṣitam artham avijñāya dūṣayan viduṣām atīva hāsyāspadamupajāyate | Rather, you yourself, by criticizing [what you have] not understood the intended meaning, have become an extreme object of laughter for the learned. |
tasmād yeṣveva śabdeṣu naṭyoga ityādāvāha avadhāraṇasāmarthyād ityādi | Therefore [regarding what] has been said about words containing negative particles and so forth, [and about] the power of emphasis and so on. |
avadhāraṇasāmarthyād anyāpoho 'pi gamyate | Through the power of emphasis, exclusion of others too is understood. |
svātmaiva gamyate yatra viphalo niyamo 'nyathā | Where the self itself is understood, the restriction would otherwise be futile. |
na kevalaṃ yatra naṭyogas tatrānyanivṛttyaṃśo 'vagamyate yatrāpi hi naṭyogo nāsti tatrāpi gamyata eva | Not only where there is a negative particle is the aspect of exclusion of others understood - even where there is no negative particle, it is indeed understood. |
iti svavācaivaitad bhavatā pratipāditaṃ svātmaiva gamyata ityavadhāraṇaṃ kurvatā | This has been established by you yourself through your own words when making the emphasis that "the self itself is understood." |
anyathā cāvadhāraṇavaiyarthyam eva syāt | Otherwise, the emphasis would indeed be meaningless. |
yasmād yatra svātmaiva gamyate tatrāvadhāraṇasāmarthyād anyāpoho 'pi gamyata iti sphuṭataram evāvasīyate | Because where "the self itself" is understood, it is quite clearly established that through the power of emphasis, exclusion of others too is understood. |
yasya tarhi na bāhyo 'rtho 'pyanyathāvṛtta iṣyate | [As for the objection that] "when there is not even an external object that could be different [from something else], as desired [by you]..." |
vandhyāsutādiśabdasya tena kvāpoha ucyate | Therefore, where is the apoha [exclusion] said to be in the case of terms like "son of a barren woman"? |
tathā hi yasya vandhyāsutādiśabdasya bāhyasutādikaṃ vastvanyavyāvṛttam apohāśrayo nāstyeva, tasya kimadhiṣṭhāno 'paho vācya ucyate, avaśyaṃ hi vastunādhiṣṭhānabhūtenāpohasya bhavitavyam, tasyānyāpoḍhapadārthāvyatirekāt | For such terms as "son of a barren woman," there exists no external entity like a son that could serve as the excluded contrary [and] basis for exclusion; so what could be the substrate of the apoha that is said to be denoted? For an apoha must necessarily have some entity as its substrate, since it is non-different from "what is excluded from others." |
rūpābhāvād ityādinā pratividhatte | [This] is answered by [the words] beginning with "due to absence of form." |
rūpābhāvād abhāvānāṃ śabdā jātyādivācakāḥ / nāśaṅkyā eva siddhās te nirbhāsasyaiva sūcakāḥ | Since non-entities have no form, words [referring to them] cannot even be suspected of denoting universals and such things; rather, it is established that they are merely indicators of an appearance. |
vandhyāsutādīnām abhāvānāṃ rūpasya kasyacit svabhāvasyābhāvān na tadviṣayāḥ śabdā jātyādivācakatvenāśaṅkyāḥ, vastuvṛttīnāṃ hi śabdānāṃ kiṃrūpamabhidheyamāhosvit pratibimbakam iti śaṅkā syāt, abhāvaś ca vastuvivekalakṣaṇa eveti tadvṛttīnāṃ śabdānāṃ katham iva vastuviṣayatvāśaṅkā bhavet | Since non-entities like "son of a barren woman" have no form or essential nature whatsoever, words referring to them cannot be suspected of denoting universals etc.; for only in the case of words referring to [real] entities could there be a question whether they denote some form or [merely] a reflection; and since non-entities are characterized precisely by their distinction from entities, how could words referring to them be suspected of pertaining to entities? |
ato nirviṣayatvaṃ sphuṭataram eva | Therefore [their] objectlessness is quite clear. |
etad eva darśayati arthetyādi | This very [point] is shown [by the words] beginning with "artha-." |
arthaśūnyābhijalpotthavāsanāmātranirmitam / pratibimbaṃ yadābhāti tacchabdaiḥ pratipādyate | What is conveyed by words is only the reflection that appears, [which is] created solely by impressions arising from conceptual cognitions empty of [real] objects. |
vandhyāsutādiśabdaiḥ | [That is, by] words like "son of a barren woman." |
[p.364] ye punar vastuviṣayāḥ śabdās teṣāṃ pratibimbakamātravācakatvasiddhau pramāṇayann āha tanmātretyādi / | Those words, however, that relate to real entities—in order to prove that they denote only the reflection [of conceptual content], he states [the following beginning with] "that alone." |
saṅketasavyapekṣatvāt kalpitārthābhidhānavat | [They are expressive of that reflection] because they depend upon convention, like words expressing imaginary things. |
ye saṅketasavyapekṣās te 'rthaśūnyābhijalpāhitavāsanāmātranirmitavikalpapratibimbakamātrāvadyotakāḥ, yathā vandhyāputrādiśabdāḥ kalpitārthābhidhāyinaḥ, saṅketasavyapekṣāś ca sasaṃśayā vivādāspadībhūtā ghaṭādayaḥ śabdā iti svabhāvahetuḥ | Words that depend upon convention are expressive of only the reflection of conceptual content produced by impressions made by objectless verbal expressions—like words such as "son of a barren woman" which express imaginary things—and the words under dispute such as "pot" etc. depend upon convention; this is a natural reason [for the thesis]. |
evaṃ svapakṣaṃ prasādhya parapakṣaniṣedhāya pramāṇayann āha paropagatetyādi | Having thus established his own position, [and now] presenting evidence to refute the opponent's position, he states [the verse] beginning with "paropagate." |
paropagatabhedādividhānapratipādakāḥ na caite dhvanayas tasmāt tadvadeveti gamyatām | These sounds are not denotative of specific individuality and other [categories] assumed by others; therefore they should be understood to be just like those [words expressing imaginary things]. |
bhedaḥ svalakṣaṇam, ādiśabdena jātyādiparigrahaḥ | "Bheda" means specific characteristic, and by the word "ādi" [in the compound] the universal and other [categories] are included. |
tasmād iti saṅketasāpekṣatvāt | "Therefore" means "because of dependence on convention." |
tadvadeveti kalpitārthābhidhānavat | "Just like those" means "like words expressing imaginary things." |
dvayor api hetvor anaikāntikatāṃ pariharann āha saṅketāsambhava ityādi | Addressing [the possibility that] both reasons might be inconclusive, he states [the verse] beginning with "saṅketāsambhava." |
saṅketāsambhavo hyatra bhedādau sādhitaḥ purā | For the impossibility of convention regarding specific individuality and other [categories] has been proved earlier. |
vaiphalyaṃ ca na taddhetutvoḥ sandigdhavyatirekitā | And [therefore] these reasons are neither futile nor of doubtful negative concomitance. |
aśakyasamayatvād ananyabhāktvācceti pūrvaṃ svalakṣaṇādau saṅketāsambhavasya saṅketavaiphalyasya ca prasādhitatvāt / | It has [already] been established before that convention is impossible in regard to the unique particular and other [entities], due to [its being] impossible to make conventions and due to [its] not relating to anything else, and [that it is] futile. |
tat tasmāt / | Therefore [it follows that] |
hetvor dvayor na sandigdhavipakṣavyatirekiteti // | The two reasons are neither doubtful nor concomitant with the contrary of the probandum. |
nanvityādinā paraḥ prathame hetāvanaikāntikatām udbhāvayati | With [the words] beginning with "nanu," the opponent points out the inconclusiveness in the first reason. |
nanu cāpohapakṣe 'pi kathaṃ saṅketasambhavaḥ / sāphalyaṃ ca kathaṃ tasya na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyati // | "But how is convention possible even in the case of apoha? And how can it be fruitful? For it cannot be established for both [parties]. |
vaktṛuśrotror na hi jñānaṃ vedyate tat parasparam / | For the cognition of the speaker and hearer is not mutually known to each other. |
saṅkete na ca taddṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāre samīkṣyate // | And what was seen at [the time of making] the convention is not observed in [actual] usage." |
yathāhi svalakṣaṇādau saṅketāsambhavo vaiphalyaṃ ca tathāpohapakṣe 'pi samānam, tataścākṛtasamayatvāt tanmātradyotakatvam api śabdānāṃ na yuktam ityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | "Just as there is impossibility and futility of convention in regard to the unique particular and other [entities], so it is the same even in the case of apoha; therefore, since no convention can be made, it is not reasonable that words should denote only that [apoha] - thus [there is] inconclusiveness of the reason." |
sāphalyaṃ ca katham iti / sambhavatīti śeṣaḥ / | "And how is it fruitful?" - [here] "is possible" should be supplied [to complete the sentence]. |
kathaṃ punas tatra saṅketāsambhava ity āha na dvayoḥ sa hi siddhyatīti / | [To the question:] "Why again is convention impossible in this case?" [the answer] is stated: "Because it cannot be established for both [parties]." |
hiśabdo hetau | The word "hi" [is used] in [the sense of] reason. |
yasmā[t] pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ saṅketaviṣayor dvayor vaktṛśrotror eko na siddhyati | Because the apoha in the form of a reflection cannot be established as one and the same [thing] as an object of convention for both speaker and hearer. |
kasmād ity āha na hi jñānam ityādi | [If one asks] why, [the text] states "because cognition..." and so forth. |
pratyātmasaṃvedanīyam evārvāgdarśanānāṃ jñānam | The cognition of those of limited vision is only that which is self-experienced. |
na hyanyadīyajñānam aparo 'paradarśanaḥ saṃvedayate | For one of limited vision cannot experience the cognition belonging to another. |
jñānād avyatiriktaś ca paramārthataḥ pratibimbātmakalakṣaṇāpohaḥ | And in reality, the apoha characterized by having the nature of a reflection is not distinct from cognition. |
tataś ca vaktṛśrotror dvayor api kasyacid ekasya saṅketaviṣayasyārthasyāsiddheḥ kutra saṅketaḥ kriyate gṛhyate vā | Therefore, since for both speaker and hearer no single object as the referent of convention can be established, where could convention be made or grasped? |
na hyasiddhe vastuni vaktā saṅketaṃ kartumīśāno 'pi śrotā gṛhītumatiprasaṅgāt | For when the thing is not established, neither can the speaker make a convention nor can the hearer grasp [it], as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence. |
tathā hi śrotā yatpratipadyate svavijñānārūḍham arthapratibimbakaṃ na tadvakrā saṃvedyate | For indeed, what the hearer apprehends—the reflection of the object appearing in his own cognition—is not experienced by the speaker. |
yat saṅketakāle pratibimbakamanubhūtaṃ śrotrā vaktā vā na tadvyavahārakāle 'nubhūyate | What reflection was experienced at the time of convention by either hearer or speaker is not experienced at the time of usage [of the word]. |
tasya kṣaṇakṣayitvena ciraniruddhatvāt / | Since that [object] has long ceased to exist due to [its] momentariness; |
yac ca vyavahārakāle 'nubhūyate na tat saṅketakāle dṛṣṭam / | And what is apprehended at the time of usage [of the word] was not seen at the time of making the convention; |
anyasyaiva tadānīm anubhūyamānatvāt / | Since what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different; |
nacānyatra saṅketādanyatra vyavahāro yukto 'tiprasaṅgād iti // | And it is not reasonable that usage [should be] based on one thing when the convention is based on something different, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence; |
svasya svasyetyādinā pratividhatte / | [The objection] is answered by [the verse beginning with] "svasya svasya" and so forth; |
svasya svasyābhāsasya vedane 'pi sa vartate / bāhyārthādhyavasāye yadvayor api samo yataḥ // | Even though each person cognizes his own appearance [of things], that [convention] applies [to both] since the determination of external objects is the same for both; |
nahi paramārthato jñānākāro 'pi śabdānāṃ vācyatayābhīṣṭā yena tatra saṅketāsambhavaścodyate yataḥ sarva evāyaṃ śābdo vyavahāraḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavadbhrānta iṣyate kevalam arthaśūnyābhijalpavāsanāprabodhācchabdebhyo 'rthāvasāyivikalpamātrotpādāt / | Indeed, the form of cognition is not accepted by us as being denoted by words in ultimate reality, whereby one might object to the impossibility of convention regarding it, because all this verbal usage is considered illusory, following one's own appearances, like the perception of two moons by two people with eye disease, [and] merely because of the awakening of impressions of objectless verbal associations, only conceptual determination concerning objects arises from words; |
tat pratibimbakaṃ śabdānāṃ vācyamityabhidhīyate jananāt natvabhidheyatayā / | The reflection of that is called the "denotation" of words because it is produced [by them], not because it is what is to be denoted; |
tatra yadyapi svasya svasyaivabhāsasya vaktṛśrotṛbhyāṃ paramārthataḥ saṃvedanaṃ tathāpi taimirikadvayasyeva bhrantibījasya tulyatvād dvayor api vaktṛśrotror bāhyārthādhyavasāyastulya eva / | Although in ultimate reality the speaker and hearer each cognize their own appearances, nevertheless, since the root of error is equal [in both] just as in the case of two people with eye disease, the determination of external objects is indeed the same for both speaker and hearer; |
tathāpi vaktur ayam abhimāno vartate yamevāham arthaṃ pratipādye tamevāyaṃ pratipadyata iti / | Nevertheless, the speaker has this conviction: "The very object that I make known, that very [object] this person understands." |
evaṃ śrotur api yojyam / | Thus [this idea] applies to the listener as well. |
ekārthādhyavasāyitvaṃ katham anayor vaktṛśrotroḥ parasparaṃ viditam iti cet | If it is asked how the fact of their both apprehending the same object is mutually known to these two, the speaker and listener— |
yadi nāma paramārthato na viditam tathāpi bhrāntibījasya tulyatvād astyeva paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvayavad bhrānta evāyaṃ vyavahāra iti niveditam etat / | Even if it is not known in ultimate reality, yet because the seed of error is equal [in both], there exists indeed, as we have explained, a mistaken usage according to each one's own cognition, just as in the case of two people with eye disease. |
tenaikārthādhyavasāyavaśāt saṅketakaraṇam upapadyata eva // | Therefore, due to [their] apprehension of the same object, the making of convention is indeed possible. |
timiropahatākṣo hi yathā prāha śaśidvayam / | Just as one whose eye is afflicted by disease speaks of "two moons" |
svasamāya tathā sarvā śābdī vyavahṛtir matā // | Similarly all verbal usage is considered [to be directed] to one like oneself. |
svasamāyeti / ātmatulyāyāparasmai taimirikāyetyarthaḥ // | "To one like oneself" means "to another person with eye disease who is similar to oneself." |
vyāpakatvaṃ ca tasyedam iṣṭamādhyavasāyikam / | This pervasiveness of that [convention] is accepted [only] on the basis of determination. |
mithyāvabhāsino hyete pratyayāḥ śabdanirmitāḥ // | For these cognitions produced by words are of false appearance. |
saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvaṃ ca vaktṛśrotṛbhyām adhyavasitārthapratibimbakasyāvasāyavaśād eveṣṭaṃ na paramārthataḥ vyāvahārakāle 'pi vaktṛśrotroḥ pūrvāparakāladṛṣṭayor arthayor aikayābhimānāt / | And the pervasiveness across time of convention and usage is accepted only due to the determination of the reflection of the determined object by speaker and listener, not in ultimate reality, because at the time of usage the speaker and listener [falsely] conceive of the unity of objects seen at earlier and later times. |
pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam iti// | Sense-perception is [that which is] free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous. |
atha paramārthataḥ kasmānneṣṭam ity āha mithyāvabhāsina ityādi// | [Question:] "Why is this not accepted as being ultimately real?" [Answer:] "[Because] they are false appearances," etc. |
iti śabdārthaparīkṣā// | Thus [ends] the examination of words and their meanings. |
tatra pramāṇe svarūpaphalagocarasaṅkhyāsu pareṣāṃ vipratipattiścaturvidhā/ | Regarding pramāṇa [means of valid cognition], there are four kinds of disagreements among others concerning [its] nature, result, object, and number. |
tannirākaraṇena spaṣṭaṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇamādarśayituṃ spaṣalakṣaṇasaṃyuktapramādvitayaniścitam ityetat samarthanārtham āha pratyakṣam ityādi/ | In order to show clearly the definition of pramāṇa by refuting these [disagreements], and to establish that "truth is ascertained by two pramāṇas endowed with clear characteristics," [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "pratyakṣam." |
pratyakṣamanumānaṃ ca yadupādhiprasiddhaye/ | The perception and inference which [are proposed] |
parairuktaṃ na tat siddham evaṃlakṣaṇakaṃ hi tat// | [when] stated by others for establishing their imposed concepts, are not established, for they have such characteristics. |
upādhiprasiddhaya iti/ | [The phrase] "for establishing their imposed concepts" [means]: |
guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhiprasiddhaye/ | For establishing imposed concepts such as quality, substance, action, universal, inherence, etc. |
parair iti/ vaiśeṣikādibhiḥ/ | By "others" [is meant] the Vaiśeṣikas and others. |
evam iti vakṣyamāṇam// | "Thus" [refers to what is] going to be explained. |
tatra savikalpakamajñānasvabhāvaṃ vā cakṣurādhikaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iti pratyakṣasvarūpavipratipattiḥ tannirākaraṇena tallakṣaṇam āha pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam iti/ | There is disagreement about the nature of perception: [some say] it is determinate cognition, [some say] it is of the nature of non-cognition, [some say] it consists of the eye and other [sense organs]. To refute these [views] and [establish] its definition, [the author] states that "perception is free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous." |
pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhabhrāntam abhilāpinī | [A perception is that which is] free from conceptual content, non-erroneous [and] verbally expressible. |
pratītiḥ kalpanā klṛptihetutvādyātmikā na tu | Cognition [which is] conceptual content is not of the nature of being the basis of verbal expression. |
tatra jñānasya kalpanāpoḍhatvam abhrāntatvaṃ cānūdya pratyakṣatvaṃ vidhīyate sarvatraiva lakṣyasya vidhīyamānatvāt | Here, after referring to cognition's freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneousness, [its] perceptuality is predicated, since in every case it is the defined [thing] that is predicated. |
yathā yaḥ kampate so 'śvattha iti | As in [the example] "That which shakes is the Aśvattha tree." |
lakṣyamatra pratyakṣam | Here the defined [thing] is perception. |
tallakṣaṇasyaiva prastutatvāt | Because it is its definition that is under discussion. |
natu kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntalakṣaṇaṃ prakṛtaṃ yena tadvidhīyata iti syāt | The definition of "free from conceptual content and non-erroneous" is not the subject matter, by virtue of which that could be predicated. |
kalpanāpratiṣedhāc ca jñānasya sāmarthyalabdhatvāt avatsā dhenurānīyatām iti yathā vatsapratiṣedhena godhenoḥ ityato jñānam iti noktam | "Cognition" is not [explicitly] stated because it is understood through the negation of conceptual content, just as in [the sentence] "Bring the cow without the calf," where "cow" [is understood] through the negation of "calf." |
kā punar atra kalpanābhipretā | What then is meant here by "conceptual content"? |
yadapoḍhaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam ity āha abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpaneti | [In response to] "What cognition free from [conceptual content] is perception?" he says "Conceptual content is cognition associated with verbal expression." |
atha yasyāṃ klṛptihetutvādyātmikāyāṃ śaṅkarasvāmiprabhṛtayo vistareṇa doṣamuktavantaḥ sāpi kiṃ gṛhītavyā uta netyāha klṛptihetutvādyātmikā natviti | [To the question] whether that [conception] should also be accepted against which Śaṅkarasvāmin and others have extensively raised objections regarding [its] being the basis of verbal expression, he says "It is not of the nature of being the basis of verbal expression." |
gṛhyata iti śeṣaḥ | "Is regarded as" is to be supplied [here]. |
tena tadāśrayeṇa yo doṣāḥ pareṇoktās te tat pakṣānaṅgīkārādeva nāvatarantītyuktam bhavati | Therefore the objections stated by others on that basis do not apply, because we do not accept that position. |
atītabhavaḥ pūrvajanma | Past life [means] previous birth |
klṛptirvyapadeśas taddhetutvaṃ jātyādīnām iti boddhavyam | It should be understood that [there is] a basis for verbal expression, [and] that universals etc. are the cause of that [expression] |
yato jātyādiviśeṣamantareṇa na vyapadeśo 'sti | Since there can be no verbal expression without distinguishing features such as universals etc. |
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