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etad uktaṃ bhavati kalpanāvaiparītyena jñānam eva pratyakṣatvena darśayatā jñānadharmatvaṃ kalpanāyā darśitam | This means that by showing cognition itself as perception in contradistinction to conceptual construction, [the text] shows that conceptual construction is a property of cognition. |
tathācāyam artho bhavati yajjñānaṃ nāmādyabhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tat prathyakṣaṃ, yat tu jñānaṃ tathāvikalpakaṃ tat kalpanātmakatvān na pratyakṣam | And thus the meaning becomes: that cognition which is non-determinate through imposed identity with name etc. is perception, but that cognition which is determinate in that way is not perception because it has the nature of conceptual construction. |
sāmarthyād abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpaneti pratyakṣavaiparītyena sidhyati | By implication, it is established through contrast with perception that conceptual construction is verbal cognition. |
yadvā svamatopavarṇanam eva kevalamācāryeṇa kṛtam | Alternatively, the teacher has given only an exposition of his own view. |
yadvā viśeṣaṇaṃ bhedo yenānyāpohakṛcchrutiḥ | Or, the qualifier is differentiation, by which exclusion of others is effected through verbal expression. |
jātyādīnāṃ vyavacchedamanena ca karotyayam | And this [differentiation] performs the exclusion of universals etc. |
bhedo viśeṣaṇaṃ vyāvṛttir ity arthaḥ | The meaning is: differentiation, qualifier, [and] exclusion [are synonymous]. |
tasyābhidhāyakaṃ, na jātyādīnāṃ, tasyābhedopacāra iti vigrahaḥ | The analysis is: [the word] is the denoter of that [differentiation], not of universals etc., [and there is] imposed identity of that [differentiation]. |
tathā yadi pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham, kathaṃ tat pratyakṣaśabdenocyate | Thus if perception is free from conceptual construction, how is it expressed by the word "perception"? |
etac ca sarvaṃ parihṛtam eveti yojanayann āha evaṃ pratītirūpā cetyādi | [The author], connecting [the ideas], states that all this has indeed been addressed, saying "and [conceptual construction] has the form of cognition" etc. |
evaṃ pratītirūpā ca yadevaṃ kalpanā matā / tādātmyapratiṣedhaś ca pratyakṣasyopavarṇyate | Conceptual construction is thus considered to have the form of cognition, and the denial of [its] identity with perception is described. |
tadādhyakṣādiśabdena vācyatve 'pi na bādhyate | [This] is not inconsistent with [its] being denoted by such words as "adhyakṣa" and the like. |
kalpanāviraho 'dhyakṣe na hi sā śabdavācyatā | In sense-perception there is absence of conceptual content, and this is not the same as [being] expressible by words. |
anyathā rūpagandhādeḥ sāvikalpakatā bhavet | Otherwise, color, odor and the like would become determinate [cognitions]. |
ato nāspadamevedaṃ yadāhuḥ kudhiyaḥ pare | Therefore there is no basis for what these dull-witted others have claimed. |
yadi pratyakṣaśabdena pratyakṣam abhidhīyate kathaṃ tat kalpanāpoḍham ayuktaṃ gamyate katham | If sense-perception is denoted by the word "sense-perception," how can its being free from conceptual content be considered improper? |
tādātmyapratiṣedha iti | [It is] a denial of identity. |
yatraiṣā kalpanā nāsti tat pratyakṣamityanena granthena lakṣaṇakāras tādātmyapratiṣedhaṃ karoti | By the text "where this conceptual content does not exist, that is sense-perception," the author of the definition makes a denial of identity. |
evambhūtaṃ kalpanātmakaṃ yajjñānaṃ na bhavatītyarthaḥ | The meaning is that [sense-perception] is not knowledge that has conceptual content as its nature. |
natvādheyaniṣedham iti prathamaṃ tāvad acodyam | [It is] not a denial of attribution - thus the first [objection] is not valid. |
dvitīyamapyacodyam eva, yato nānabhidheyārthaḥ kalpanāpoḍhārtho varṇitaḥ | The second [objection] too is not valid, since "free from conceptual content" is not described as meaning "inexpressible." |
kiṃ tarhiavikalpakārthaḥ | Rather, [it means] "non-conceptual." |
avikalpakam api jñānaṃ yadyapyabhidhīyate śabdenādhyavasāyānurodhāt | Even though non-conceptual cognition is indeed denoted by words, [this is] in accordance with determination. |
tathāpi rūpādivan na vikalpakatāṃ yāsyastīti yatkiñcid etat // | And yet this [perception] will not become determinate, being in this respect like color and other [sensory qualities] [which, though expressed by words, do not become determinate]. |
syād etat bhavatvevaṃ yathopavarṇitā kalpanā / | Let this be granted: "Let conceptual cognition be as [previously] described." |
kalpanāpoḍhaṃ tu kathaṃ siddham ity āha pratyakṣam ityādi / | [One asks:] "But how is it established that [perception] is free from conceptual construction?" [The author] states [the answer by referring to] "pratyakṣam" etc. |
anena svasaṃvittyā pratyakṣataḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ siddha ityādarśayati // | This shows that the absence of conceptual construction is established directly through one's own experience. |
nāsāveva vikalpo hi tamarthaṃ pratipadyate / | For that same conceptual cognition does not apprehend that object; |
atītādyabhidhātyāgāt tannāmaghaṭanāptitaḥ // | Because [if it did, there would be] the abandoning of expressing the past etc., and [there would be] the attainment of connection with the name of that [object]. |
yadi hi sa eva vikalpas tamarthaṃ pratipadyeta tadātītādyarthābhidhānatyāgena tasyaiva nīlāder nāma yojayet / | For if that same conceptual cognition were to apprehend that object, then by abandoning the expression of past and other meanings, it would connect with the name of that very [object] such as blue. |
ekatrābhilāpadvayasaṃsargāpratīter atītādyabhidhātyāgādityuktam / | The abandonment of expressing the past etc. has been stated [to occur] because of the impossibility of association with two expressions in one [cognition]. |
tasyābhimukhībhūtasya nāma, tannāma, tasya ghaṭanā yojanā, tasyā āptiḥ prātiḥ / prasaṅga iti yāvat // | [The compound] "tannāma" [means] the name of that which is present [before one], its connection [means] association, its āpti [means] attainment - that is to say, its occurrence. |
syān matam anya eva tarhi vikalpas tadā tamarthaṃ pratipadyata ityevaṃ kasmān na vijñāyata ity āha tadā tannāmetyādi / tadā tannāmasaṃsargī vikalpo 'styaparo na ca / | [If] it might be thought: "Why then is it not understood that some other conceptual cognition apprehends that object at that time?" - [the author] states "tadā tannāma" etc. [to show that] there is no other conceptual cognition associated with that name at that time. |
dṛśyasyāpratisaṃvitter aniṣṭeś ca dvayoḥ sakṛt | Due to [both] the non-apprehension of the visible object and the undesirability of two [conceptual contents] occurring simultaneously |
anena yathākramaṃ, pratyakṣavirodham abhyupagamavirodhaṃ ca sakṛdvikalpadvayapratijñāyām āha dvayor iti | By this [statement] he points out two [objections] in sequence regarding the claim of two simultaneous conceptual contents: [its being] contrary to perception and contrary to [their own] accepted doctrine, [when he says] "of both" |
vikalpayetyādinopasaṃharati | [The text] concludes with [the words] beginning with "vikalpa" |
vikalpakamato jñānasahabhāvyanubhūyate | That which determines [the object] is experienced simultaneously with cognition |
tasmād indriyavijñānamakalpanamidaṃ sphuṭam | Therefore this sense-cognition is clearly non-conceptual |
krameṇaivopajāyante vijñānānīti cen matam | If it is held that "cognitions arise only in sequence" |
sakṛdbhāvābhimānas tu śīghravṛtter alātavat | [Then we reply:] "The impression of simultaneity [arises] due to rapid succession, as in [the case of] the firebrand" |
yadi krameṇopajayante kathaṃ yugapat pravedyanta ity āha sakṛdbhāvābhimānastviti | To [the question] "if [cognitions] arise in sequence, how are they known simultaneously?", he states "[the impression of] simultaneity..." |
alāta ivālātavat | "As in [the case of] the firebrand" means "like the firebrand" |
yathālāte śīghrabhramaṇāt sakṛccakrākārā pratītis taddarśanānāṃ ghaṭānādevaṃ jñānāṃ śīghrotpattitaḥ sakṛdbhāvābhimāna iti | Just as in [the case of] a firebrand, due to rapid rotation, there is a perception of a single circular form of those perceptions [of the firebrand], similarly there is an impression of simultaneity due to the rapid arising of cognitions |
athavā alātaśabdena viṣayiṇī jñāne viṣayopacārāt tadviṣayāṇi jñānānyucyante | Or, by the word "alāta", through metaphorical extension of the object to the cognition which has it as [its] object, the cognitions having that [firebrand] as [their] object are meant |
pūrvavadvatiḥ | The suffix "vat" [is to be understood] as before |
na tadābhimukhībhūtabhāvanām ānuṣaṅgavān / vikalpo vidyate dṛśya ityevoktaṃ n.ṇā // | There is no conceptual content [vikalpa] which is associated with the name of the object present before [one's] eyes - this alone has been stated for men. |
evaṃ manyate na sakṛdbhāvaprasādhanamatra prakṛtam, kiṃ tarhidhiyaḥ kalpanāvirahaḥ / | It is understood thus: what is being established here is not their simultaneous existence, but rather the absence of conceptual construction in cognition. |
sa cānyatra gatacittasyāpyabhimukhībhūtapadārthānubhavakāle tannāmasaṃsargiṇo vikalpasyopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhyā sidhyatīti nātra kiñciddūṣaṇam uktam / | And this [absence] is proved by the non-apprehension of the otherwise apprehensible conceptual content associated with its name at the time of experiencing an object present before [one's eyes], even when one's mind has gone elsewhere; and no fault has been pointed out in this regard. |
tathā hi yadi nāma krameṇa jñāne saṃvedyeta natu vikalpaḥ saṃvedyata iti na prakṛtasya vyāghātaḥ //1248// | For even if the two cognitions are apprehended in succession, the conceptual content is not apprehended; thus there is no contradiction with our main position. |
na cāyaṃ sakṛdbhāvābhimāno 'pi bhrānta ityādarśayann āha bhrāntirityādi / | And showing that this notion of simultaneous existence is not mistaken either, [the author] states "bhrāntiḥ" etc. |
bhrāntis tadabhimānaś ca tadvyaktaṃ ca nirantaram / tadeva cārthavijñānayaugapadyamataḥ sphuṭam // bhranatir neti prakṛtaṃ sambandhanīyam / | "Error," "its notion," and "its manifestation" [are] continuous, and therefore the simultaneity of object-cognition is clearly [established]. "Not an error" is to be connected with what was stated before. |
tadabhimāna iti / | [The term] "its notion" means: |
tasya sakṛdbhāvasyābhimāna iti vigrahaḥ / | The compound means: the notion of their simultaneous existence. |
bādhakapramāṇavaśād vibhrāntivyavasthānaṃ, nacātra bādhakam asti, yena bhrāntiḥ syāt / | An error is established due to the force of contradicting valid cognition, but here there is no such contradiction by which this could be an error. |
kathaṃ nāstītyāha tadvyaktaṃ ca nirantaram iti / | [To the question] "How is there no [contradiction]?" he states: "and its manifestation is continuous." |
tadityabhimukhībhūtārthasaṃvedanaṃ nirantaraviṣayāntarāsaktacittasamakālaṃspaṣṭam ānubhūyate / | [It is] clearly perceived that the cognition of an object directly before [one's eyes] occurs simultaneously with [one's] mind being attracted to other objects without interruption. |
tadeva cidṛśamarthavijñānaṃ pratyakṣamucyata iti kuto bhrāntiḥ // | And it is precisely this kind of object-cognition that is called "direct perception" - so where [could there be any] error in this? |
na kevalaṃ sakṛdbhāvaś ca bhrāntatvavyavasthāṃ prati na kiñcitsādhakam asti, pratyuta bādhakam astīti darśayann āha nartakītyādi / | Not only is there nothing to establish the erroneousness of simultaneity, but there is [actually] evidence to the contrary, [which] he shows by speaking of "the dancing girl" and so forth. |
nartakīdṛṣṭyavasthādāvakhilaṃ vedyate sakṛt / bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi bhrāntiḥ sā cā{ścodā---}śuvṛttitaḥ // | In situations like watching a dancing girl, everything is cognized simultaneously, even though [there are] many intervening [factors]; and if this [simultaneity] were an error due to quick succession... |
latātālādibuddhīnām atyarthaṃ laghuvarttanam / | [Then consider that] the succession of cognitions of [words] like "latā" and "tāla" is even quicker. |
sakṛdbhāvābhimāno 'taḥ kimatrāpi na vartate // śuddhe ca mānase kalpe vyavasīyeta na kramaḥ / alpā ca sarvabuddhīnām āśuvṛttiścirāsthiteḥ // | Why then is there no appearance of simultaneity in this case too? And in purely mental operations, no sequence should be discerned, since all cognitions occur quickly and do not persist long. |
ataḥ sarvatra viṣaye na kramagrahaṇaṃ bhavet / | Therefore, in all these cases [of quick succession], no sequence should be perceived. |
sakṛdgrahaṇabhāsas tu bhavecchabdādibodhavat // | However, the appearance of simultaneous apprehension would occur, just as in the cognition of sound and other [sensations]. |
ekaikā dhīḥ pañcabhir dhībhir vyavadhīyamānāpi nartakīdarśanādyavasthāyām avyavahiteva pratibhāti / | In situations like watching a dancing girl, each individual cognition, even though separated by five other cognitions, appears as if uninterrupted. |
tathā hi yadaiva nartakīmutpaśyati tadaiva gītādiśabdaṃ śṛṇoti, karpūrādirasamāsvādayati, nāsikāpuṭavinyastakusumāmodaṃ jighrati, vyajanānīlādisparśaṃ, ca spṛśati vastrābharaṇādidānādi ca cintayati / | For indeed, at the very moment when one sees the dancing girl, one [also] hears the sounds of singing etc., tastes the flavor of camphor etc., smells the fragrance of flowers placed at the nostrils, feels the touch of fans and air etc., and thinks about giving clothes, ornaments, and other [gifts]. |
tataś ca yadi bahubhir vyavadhāne 'pi buddhīnāṃ sakṛdbhāvabhrāntirāśūtpattibalād upajāyate, tadā latā tālaḥ saro rasa ityevamādāveikaikajñānavyavadhānād varṇaśrutīnām atyarthaṃ laghuvartanam astīti sakṛdvarṇapratibhāsaḥprāpnoti | Thus, even when there are many intervening [factors], if the illusion of simultaneity arises among cognitions due to their quick succession, then in [cases] like "latā-tāla" and "sara-rasa," where there is an intervention of single cognitions, the utterance of letters being extremely quick, there arises the appearance of simultaneous letters. |
tataś ca saro rasa ityādau śabde śrūyamāṇe śrutibhedo 'rthapratītibhedaś ca na syāt | Therefore, when words like "saraḥ-rasaḥ" are heard, there would be no distinction in their hearing nor in the cognition of their meanings. |
kinca buddher vijātīyacakṣurādivijñānāvyavahite nānāvidyārthacintārūpe vikalpe samutpadyamāne śīghravṛttir astīti na kramavyavasāyaḥ prāpnoti | Moreover, when conceptual content arising in the form of contemplation of various scholarly matters [occurs] uninterrupted by heterogeneous cognitions of eye etc., [due to] its quick occurrence, no determination of sequence is possible. |
sarvāsāṃ ca buddhīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvena cirānavasthānād āśuvṛttirastīti kasyacid arthasya na kramavatī pratītiḥ syāt | And since all cognitions are momentary and do not persist for long, their occurrence being quick, there could not be sequential cognition of any object. |
śabdādibodhavad iti | [It is] just like the cognition of sound and other [sensations]. |
nartakīprekṣāvasthāyāṃ śabdādisaṃvedanavat | [It is] like the perception of sound etc. while watching a dancing girl. |
alāte 'pi sakṛdbhrāntiścakrābhāsā pravartate | In [the case of] a firebrand too, the illusion of simultaneity occurs as the appearance of a circle. |
na dṛśāṃ pratisandhānād vispaṣṭaṃ pratibhāsanāt | [This occurs] not due to the connecting of perceptions, [but] because of clear appearance. |
tathā hi pratisandhānaṃ smṛtyaiva kriyate natu darśanena vyatītasya viṣayasyānavagrahāt | Indeed, such connecting is done only through memory, not through perception, because what is past cannot be grasped [by perception]. |
yaścāsyā viṣayo nāsau vinaṣṭatvāt parisphuṭaḥ | And its object cannot be clear because it has perished. |
tataḥ parisphuṭo nāyaṃ cakrābhāsaḥ prasajyate // | Therefore this appearance of the circle cannot be clear [if it were based on memory]. |
yato neyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ kramavartinī darśanāni ghaṭayantī samupajāyate | This mental illusion does not arise by combining successive perceptions. |
kiṃ tarhi sakṛdekaivendriyajā cakrākārā bhrāntiḥ sāmagrīviśeṣabalād utpadyate, vispaṣṭapratibhāsatvāt / | Rather, this circular illusion arises once through the senses alone due to the force of specific conditions, [as is evident] from its very clear appearance. |
nahi vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭapratibhāsitvaṃ yuktam / | For clear appearance is not possible for that which is connected with conceptual construction. |
tathā hi ghaṭanā kriyamāṇā spṛtyaiva kriyate, nendriyajñānena, tasya vastusannidhānabalabhāvino 'tītārthagrahaṇasāmarthyāt / | For such combination is accomplished only through memory, not through sense-perception, since the latter functions only through the force of the object's presence and cannot grasp past objects. |
yaścāsyāḥ smṛter viṣayo nāsau parisphuṭaḥ, kasmāt---, vinaṣṭatvāt / | And the object of such memory cannot be clear - why? - because it has disappeared. |
tasmād aspaṣṭābhatvaprasaṅgānneyaṃ mānasī bhrāntiḥ / | Therefore, due to the unwanted consequence of unclear appearance, this cannot be a mental illusion. |
kiṃ tarhi---, indriyajā, iti sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ // | What then? [It is] sense-born. Thus the example lacks what is to be proved. |
yadi cāpyasya bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam / na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate budhaiḥ // | Moreover, when there exists no cause for a thing's existence in a certain form, that [thing] in that form is not established as real by the wise. |
avidyamānasāsnādir yathā karko gavātmanā / | For example, a white horse [is not established] as having the nature of a cow, since dewlap etc. are absent [in it]. |
viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthaṃ grahaṇaṃ na ca vidyate // | And there exists no apprehension of an object qualified by qualifiers. |
savikalpakabhāvasya sthiter ākṣe nibandhanam / | [There is] no basis in sense-perception for the existence of determinate cognition. |
vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādiranyathātiprasajyate // | Otherwise, spotted and other [cows] would lead to an unwanted consequence. |
nacāprasiddhatā hetor jātyādeḥ pratiṣedhataḥ / bhedena cāparicchhedān nacāstyevaṃ viśeṣaṇam // | [Our] reason cannot be said to be unproven, since the universal and other [qualifying factors] have [all] been rejected, and since [they] are not cognized as distinct [from particulars], and thus there are no such qualifying properties. |
prayogaḥ yasya yadrūpaṃ vyavasthitau nimittaṃ nāsti na tat tathā prekṣāvadbhir vyavahartṛbhir vyavasthāpyate, tadyathā avidyamānagoprajñaptinimittabhūtakakudādisamudāyaḥ karko gotvena | When something lacks the basis for being established in a certain form, intelligent persons do not accept it as having that form—just as a karka [white horse], which lacks the collection of dewlap and other features that constitute the basis for the designation "cow," [is not accepted] as having cowness. |
nāsti ca pratyakṣasya nīlādyasādhāraṇaviṣayabalenotpadyamānasya savikalpakabhāvavyavasthitau viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ nimittam iti karaṇānupalabdhiḥ | And perception, which arises through the force of specific objects like blue, lacks any basis for being established as determinate in the form of grasping objects along with their qualifiers—this is [our] non-apprehension of the cause. |
vaidharmyeṇa śābaleyabāhuleyādayaḥ | The spotted and black cows [serve as] the dissimilar example. |
sarvathā sarvasya vyavasthānaprasaṅgo vyavasthāpayituścāprekṣāpūrvakāritāprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti saṃkṣepārthaḥ | The absurd consequence that everything could be established as everything, and that the establisher would [act] without discrimination, serves as the defeating proof—such is the summary. |
karkaḥ śuklo 'śvaḥ | "Karka" means a white horse. |
jātyāder iti / viśeṣasyeti śeṣaḥ | "[Of] universal, etc." means "[of] the qualifying factors." |
santu nāma vastubhūtā jātyādayas tathāpi nāsiddhateti darśayann āha | [The text] shows that even if universals and the rest are real entities, [our reason] is still not unproven. |
viśeṣyatvenābhimatād rūpāder ityadhyāhāryam | [The phrase] is to be supplemented with "from color and other [things] that are accepted as qualified." |
yadi nāma bhedenāparicchedo jātas tathāpi viśeṣaṇaṃ kasmān na bhavatītyāha na cāstyevam iti / bhedenāparicchinnam | If there is no cognition [of properties] as distinct [from particulars], why should it not be a qualifier?—To this [the text] says "nor are there any such," meaning "[properties] differentiated [from particulars]." |
tasmād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣitārthagrahaṇaṃ na vidyata ityasya hetor nāsiddhatā | Therefore, there is no apprehension of objects along with their qualifiers, [and] hence this reason [of ours] is not unproven. |
nāmāpi vācakaṃ naiva yacchabdasya svalakṣaṇam | The name, which [would be] the specific individuality (svalakṣaṇa) of the word, can never be denotative. |
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