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svalakṣaṇasya vācyatvavācakatve hi dūṣite adhyāropitamevāto vācyavācakamiṣyate | Since the notion of specific individuality being either denoted or denotative has [already] been rejected, therefore the relationship of denoted and denotative is considered [to be] merely superimposed. |
anāropitam arthaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyate | And sense-perception apprehends [an] object that is not superimposed. |
svalakṣaṇasya sadbhāve sadbhāvāt tadabhāvataḥ vyavadhānādi bhāve ca tasyāpi vyatirekataḥ | [This is] because [perception] exists when the specific individuality exists, and does not exist when it [the specific individuality] does not exist due to intervention or such [causes]. |
nahi svalakṣaṇe saṅketaḥ, nāpi śabdasvalakṣaṇe, tayor vyavahārakāle 'nanvayāt | There can be no convention regarding the specific individuality, nor regarding the specific individuality of the word, because these two are not present at the time of usage. |
naca svalakṣaṇavyatirekeṇānyacchabdasvarūpam asti | And there is no other form of the word apart from its specific individuality. |
nacāsaṅketito 'rthaḥ śabdena yojyate 'tiprasaṅgāt nāpi śabdayojanam antareṇa vikalpaḥ | Neither can a word be connected with an object for which there is no convention, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence, nor can there be conceptual content without connection with words. |
tasmād adhyāropita eva vācyavācakabhāvo na pāramārthikaḥ | Therefore, the relationship of denoted and denotative is merely superimposed [and] not ultimately real. |
syād etad āropitam evārthaṃ tarhi pratyakṣaṃ pratipadyamānaṃ savikalpakaṃ bhaviṣyatītyāha anāropitam ityādi | [If] this [objection] were raised that "then perception, while apprehending the superimposed object, would become determinate," [the author] states "not superimposed" etc. |
tadabhāvata iti | [This refers to] "due to its absence." |
tasya svalakṣaṇasyābhāvāt tasyāpi pratyakṣasya vyatirekato 'bhāvād iti yāvat | [This means] that due to the absence of that specific individuality, that perception too is absent through differentiation. |
kadā svalakṣaṇasyābhāva ity āha vyavadhānādīti | "When is there absence of the svalakṣaṇa [specific characteristic]?" [He] speaks thus: "Through obstruction and so forth." |
ādiśabdena deśakālaviprakarṣādiḥ | By the word "ādi" [and so forth] is meant [things like] distance of space, time, and similar [factors]. |
aśakyasamaya ityādinā pramāṇāntaram apyāha | By [the words] beginning with "aśakyasamaya" [impossible convention], [he] states another means of valid cognition. |
aśakyasamayo hyātmā nīlādīnām ananyabhāk | The nature of blue and other [colors], being uniquely particular, is indeed incapable of [entering into] convention. |
teṣām ataś ca saṃvittir nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇī | Therefore, the cognition of these [things] is not connected with verbal expression. |
nīlādīnām ātmā svabhāvaḥ, aśakyasamayaḥ aśakyasaṅketaḥ | The nature [which is] the essence of blue and other [colors] is incapable of convention, [meaning] impossible to establish agreement about. |
katham iti praśne kāraṇam āha ananyabhāgiti | To the question "why?", [he] states the reason: "because [it is] uniquely particular." |
ananyabhāk asādhāraṇaḥ | "Uniquely particular" means "not common [to multiple instances]." |
vyavahārārthatvāt samayasyeti nātra śabdasaṅketaḥ | Since convention exists for the sake of practical usage, there can be no verbal convention here. |
kiñca viṣayīkṛte cāyaṃ samayo bhavati nāviṣayīkṛte, na tāvad anutpannaṃ | Moreover, convention occurs with respect to what has been made an object [of cognition], not with respect to what has not been made an object [of cognition], [and] not yet arisen. |
pratyakṣaṃ nīlādyātmānaṃ viṣayīkaroti, utpannaṃ cābhilāpamādāya yojayet | Perception makes the nature of blue and other [colors] its object, and once arisen, it would [supposedly] combine [this] with verbal expression. |
utpattikāle 'bhilāpagrahaṇakāle ca kṣaṇikatvān na viṣayeṇāpi pratyakṣaṃ viṣayīti kena kutra yojanam ityato 'pyaśakyasamayo nīlādīnām ātmā / | At the time of [perception's] arising and at the time of grasping the verbal expression, due to [its] momentariness, the perception cannot grasp the object, so with what [and] where would the connection be? Therefore, the nature of blue and other [things] is such that convention regarding it is impossible. |
teṣām iti nīlādīnām / | "Of these" [means] "of blue and other [things]." |
nābhijalpānuṣaṅgiṇīti / nāviṣṭābhilāpā / | "Cannot be associated with verbal expression" [means] "verbal expression cannot enter into it." |
tatra prayogaḥ yadyatrāgṛhītasamarthaṃ na tat tatra savikalpakaṃ bhavati, tadyathā cakṣur vijñānaṃ gandhe, agṛhītasamayaṃ ca pratyakṣaṃ nīlādyātmanīti vyāpakaviruddhopalambhaḥ // | Here is the application: Whatever has no convention grasped with regard to it cannot have determinate perception of it, just as visual cognition [cannot grasp] odor; and perception of the nature of blue etc. has no convention grasped [regarding it] - [this is] an observation contradicting the pervader. |
nanu nāmādiktaṃ mābhūt tasya grāhyaṃ viśeṣaṇam / | Let it be that name etc. may not be its perceived distinguishing characteristic; |
tathāpyasiddhatā hetor naiva vyāvartate yataḥ // | nevertheless, the unestablished nature of the reason does not go away, because: |
arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi / arthamātragraho vā syād agraho vā ghaṭe yathā // | If there is no grasping [of a thing] in the form distinguished from other things, there would either be grasping of the mere thing or no grasping at all, just as with a pot; |
ghaṭāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi / ghaṭamātragraho vā syād agraho vā ghatasya vai // | If there is no grasping [of a pot] in the form distinguished from other pots, there would either be grasping of the mere pot or no grasping of the pot at all. |
sa hi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenobhayarūpaṃ sarvaṃ vastu varṇayati / sāmānyaṃ ca dvirūpam / viśeṣeṇāvicchinnaṃ yathā gotvādi, anavacchinnaṃ yathā sattāvastutvādi / tatra yadanavacchinnam ekarūpaṃ tadālocanāmātrasya nirvikalpakapratyakṣasya gocaraḥ / | For he describes every entity as having both forms through [its] nature of universal and particular. And the universal is of two forms: [that which is] determined by particulars like cowness etc., and [that which is] undetermined like existence, entityhood etc. Among these, that which is undetermined [and] of one form is the object of mere observation, of non-conceptual perception. |
itaratpunaḥ savikalpakasyetyeṣā tasya prakriyā / | The other [kind of universal], however, belongs to conceptual [perception] - this is his procedure. |
kumārilastu ālocanājñānaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ vyaktisvalakṣaṇaviṣayaṃ varṇayati / | Kumārila, however, describes ālocanājñāna [perceptual cognition] as nirvikalpaka [non-conceptual], having as its object the svalakṣaṇa [unique characteristic] of the particular. |
sāmānyaviṣayaṃ tu savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam / | The savikalpaka [conceptual] perception, on the other hand, has the universal as its object. |
tatra sumatiḥ kumārilādyabhimatālocanāmātrapratyakṣavicāraṇārthamāha / | Here, Sumati, for the purpose of examining mere perceptual cognition as accepted by Kumārila and others, says [the following]. |
tadvādīdaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ / kiṃ tadindriyasya puraḥsthitamarthamātraṃ svena rūpeṇārthāntarāsambhavināviśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyateneti / | The proponent of that view should be asked this: "Is the mere object situated before the sense organ grasped by its own form, which is impossible in other objects?" |
atrocyate arthāntaravyavacchinnarūpeṇāgrahaṇaṃ yadi vivakṣitādarthādyadarthāntaraṃ, tato vyavacchinnam tatrāvidyamānaṃ vivakṣitārthastham rūpaṃsvabhāvaḥ , tena viśiṣṭasya yadi tasyārthasyāgrahaṇam iṣyate, tadā tadarthamātragraho vā syāt yat tadarthamātram arthāntarāsambhavi svabhāvarahitaṃ tasyaiva grahaṇaṃ syāt / | To this it is said: If there is non-apprehension through a form distinguished from other objects—that is, [distinguished] from what is other than the intended object, [and if there is] the form or nature residing in the intended object which is not present in the other—if non-apprehension of that object as qualified by that [form] is maintained, then either there would be apprehension of the mere object, i.e., apprehension of that very [object] devoid of the nature impossible in other objects. |
atha tadapi na gṛhyate, tadā, agraho vā agrahaṇam eva syāt / | But if even that is not grasped, then there would indeed be no apprehension whatsoever. |
ghaṭe yatheti nidarśanam uktaṃ tacchlokāntareṇa vyācaṣṭe ghaṭāntaretyādi / | The example "as in the case of a pot" is stated [and] that is explained by another verse beginning with "ghaṭāntara." |
avadhīkṛtaghaṭāsambhavinā rūpeṇa yadi tasya ghaṭasyāgrahaṇaṃ tadā ghaṭamātragraho vā syāt kenacidrājatatāmrādinā viśeṣeṇāviśiṣṭasya ghaṭamātrasya grahaṇaṃ syāt / | If there is non-apprehension of that pot by the form impossible in the compared pot, then either there would be apprehension of the mere pot—[that is], apprehension of the mere pot unqualified by any particularity such as [being made of] silver, copper, etc. |
ghaṭamātrasyāpi grahaṇaṃ na bhavati tadā kasyacidapyabhimatasyāpi na grahaṇaṃ syād ityagraho vā ghaṭasya vai / | And if there is no apprehension even of the mere pot, then there would be no apprehension even of any intended [pot]—thus there would indeed be no apprehension of the pot. |
evam atrāpi dārṣṭāntike viśeṣāgrahaṇe 'rthamātragrahaṇaṃ na grahaṇaṃ vā syād ityekāntaḥ / | Thus in this analogous case too, when there is non-apprehension of the particular, there would either be apprehension of the mere object or no apprehension [at all]—this is the definite conclusion. |
atha pūrvakaḥ pakṣaḥ atrāha grāhyāntaretyādi / | [Here] the Pūrvapakṣa [proponent] speaks thus, beginning with "grāhyāntara" [etc.] |
grāhyāntaravyavacchinnaṃ bhāvena grāhi cenmatam / savikalpakavijñānaṃ bhaved vṛkṣādibodhavat // | If perception is considered to be that which apprehends [an object] as distinguished from other apprehensible things, then [such] cognition would be determinate, just like the cognition of a tree and other [objects]. |
yadi paratrāsambhavinā svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhīndriyajñānamabhipretaṃ tadā savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, kenacidrūpeṇa viśiṣṭārthagrāhitvāt, vṛkṣoyamityādibodhavat // | If sense-perception is intended to apprehend an object as qualified by a unique characteristic not found elsewhere, then it would become determinate, because it apprehends [the object] as qualified by some characteristic, just like the cognition "This is a tree." |
viśeṣo 'spṛṣṭasāmānyo na ca kaścana vidyate / | No particular exists that is untouched by the universal. |
grahaṇe cet tadaspaṣṭaṃ vibhāvatvān na gṛhyate // | If that [universal] is unclear in the apprehension, then [the particular] cannot be apprehended due to [its] becoming devoid of being. |
atra mātraṃ nāma sāmānyamucyate, yat tat sattetyākhyāyate, tannirapekṣo nakaścid viśeṣo vidyate yo gṛhyeta tatra / | Here, the term "mātra" refers to the universal, which is called "existence," [and] no particular exists that could be apprehended independently of it. |
etat syāt tvanmatyā yadyapi tadasti sāmānyaṃ, grahaṇakāle tu tan na spṛśyata ity āha grahaṇe cet tadaspaṣṭaṃ vibhāvatvān na gṛhyata iti / | According to your view, although such a universal exists, it is not touched at the time of apprehension - thus [the text] states "If that [universal] is unclear in the apprehension, [the particular] cannot be apprehended due to [its] becoming devoid of being." |
grahaṇakāle yadi tat sāmānyaṃ sattākhyaṃ indriyajñānena na spṛśyate, viśeṣamātram eva gṛhyate tadā tadviśeṣamātraṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ bhāvarahitaṃ sattākhyasvabhāvaravikalaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ prāptam iti nendriyajñānagrāhyaṃ syāt, vibhāvatvāt vigatabhāvatvāt / | If at the time of apprehension that universal known as "existence" is not touched by sense-perception, and only the particular is apprehended, then that mere particular being apprehended would become devoid of existence, lacking the essential nature known as "being," [thus] becoming characterless, [and] therefore could not be apprehended by sense-perception due to [its] being devoid of existence. |
viyatpuṣpavad iti // | [It would be] like a sky-flower. |
viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ kalpanā neti sāhasam / | [To claim that] cognition has a qualified object and yet is not conceptual - this is [mere] audacity! |
na viśeṣaṇasambandhād ṛte vaiśiṣṭyasambhavaḥ // | No qualification [of an object] is possible without connection with qualifiers. |
tasmād viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho 'tha ca kalpanā nāstīti sāhasametad bhavatāṃ pramāṇabādhitamabhyupagacchatāmityupasaṃhāraḥ / | Therefore, your assertion that there is cognition of a qualified object yet without conceptual content is reckless, [as it is] contradicted by valid means of knowledge. |
atraivopapattimāha na viśeṣaṇetyādi / nahi daṇḍasambandhamantareṇa tadvān bhavati, tadvad viśiṣṭo 'pi viśeṣasambandhamantareṇa na yukta iti bhāvaḥ / | [The author] states the reason for this starting with "na viśeṣaṇa": Just as one cannot become a stick-bearer without connection with a stick, similarly something cannot be qualified without connection with qualifiers. |
tasmād yadviśeṣaṇasambandhagrahaṇaṃ tat savikalpakam iti / | Therefore, any cognition that grasps the connection with qualifiers is conceptual. |
prayogaḥ vivādasapadībhūtaṃ viśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt, paṭo 'yam ityādijñānavad iti // | The formal argument [is]: The cognition under dispute which has a qualified object as its content is conceptual, because it has a qualified object as its content, like the cognition "This is cloth." |
sajātīyetyādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds [to this] with [the words] beginning with "sajātīya." |
sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttārthagrahān mataḥ / viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodho na viśeṣaṇasaṅgate // | Cognition of a qualified object is considered [to arise] from grasping an object as differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous [things], not from connection with qualifiers. |
yadatra yadi vyatiriktaviśeṣaṇasambandhāt{iti} viśiṣṭaviṣayatvād iti hetvarthaḥ, tadā na siddho hetuḥ, tathā hi na bauddhasya viśeṣaṇaṃ nāma kiñcidasti / | If here the meaning of the reason "because it has a qualified object as its content" refers to connection with distinct qualifiers, then the reason is not established, because for the Buddhist there is nothing called a qualifier. |
kathaṃ tarhi viśiṣtatvam asya vaiśiṣṭyamasyetyādi vyapadeśo vyatirekīvetyāha bheda ityādi / | How then [does one explain] expressions like "this is qualified" or "this has qualification"? [The author] explains this with [the words] beginning with "bheda." |
bhedo vaiśiṣṭyamuktaṃ hi na viśeṣaṇasaṅgatiḥ / | What is called qualification is difference, not connection with qualifiers. |
bhinnam ityapi tadvācā nānuviddhaṃ pratīyate // | [The object] is not cognized through words [even] when [one says] "this is different" |
bhedaḥ sajātīyavijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttiḥ / | Difference means differentiation from homogeneous and heterogeneous [things] |
sā ca nānyā vyāvṛttād bhāvāt bhāva eva hi bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathocyate / | And this [differentiation] is not different from the differentiated thing; for the thing itself is spoken of in that way when one wishes to emphasize only that [differentiation] through exclusion of other differences |
syād etat yadi vijātīyasajātīyebhyo bhinnasya vastuno grahaṇaṃ niyamena | One might object: "If there is invariably an apprehension of the thing as distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous [things]" |
svabhāvāparaniḥśeṣapadārthavyatirekiṇi / | [When something is apprehended as] distinguished from all other things different from its own nature |
kathaṃ tarhi bhinnam ityabhidhīyata ity āha svabhāvāparetyādi / | [Question:] "How then is it spoken of as 'different'?" [Answer: This is explained in the passage] beginning with "svabhāvāpara" |
tasmād asiddha eva hetuḥ // | Therefore the reason is indeed unproven |
viśeṣaṇānavacchinnaṃ paraiḥ sāmānyamiṣyate / | The universal is accepted by others as not delimited by qualifiers |
dvirūpaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṇāvacchinnarūpamanavacchinnarūpaṃ ca / | The universal [sāmānya] is indeed of two forms: [that which is] distinguished by qualifications and [that which is] not distinguished by qualifications. |
tatra yadanavacchinnarūpaṃ tannirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam iṣṭam / | Among these, that which is not distinguished by qualifications is accepted to be apprehensible by non-conceptual cognition. |
tatrāpi sāmānye / | [This applies] also to that universal. |
ata etad vikalpakavijñānagrāhyatvaṃ tulyam // | Hence this property of being apprehensible by conceptual cognition is equal [in both cases]. |
katham ity āha viśeṣāddhītyādi / | [Someone asks] "How?" [The author] responds with "[the verse beginning with] viśeṣāddhi." |
viśeṣāddhi viśiṣṭaṃ tat sāmānyamavagamyate / | For the universal is recognized as distinguished from the particular; |
tadgrāhakamataḥ prāptaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakam // | therefore the cognition that apprehends it must be conceptual. |
yaddhyasmād viśeṣād viśiṣṭam vyāvṛttaṃ, tat sāmānyaṃ pratīyate / | For that which is qualified by [and] distinguished from this particular is understood [to be] the universal. |
anyathā sāmānyam eva na syāt tato yadi na vyāvarteta / | Otherwise, if it were not distinguished from that [particular], there would not be any universal at all. |
tataścāsyāpi sāmānyasya viśeṣād vyāvṛttasya grāhakaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt / | And consequently, the cognition that apprehends this universal as distinguished from the particular must be conceptual, because it has a qualified object. |
na ca bhavati tvanmatena | And yet, according to your view [this cognition] is not [conceptual] |
tasmāt svato 'naikānta iti | Therefore, your reason is itself inconclusive |
atra kila tenaiva sumatinā svayam āśaṅkya sāmānyena hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ parihṛtaṃ | Here indeed, Sumati himself, anticipating [the objection] that [his] reason becomes inconclusive due to the universal, has refuted [it] |
tadevādarśayati nirviśeṣamityādi | This very [refutation] he shows [beginning with the words] "nirviśeṣam" |
nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītaśced bhedaḥ sāmānyamucyate | When differences are apprehended without distinction, that is called "universal" |
tato viśeṣāt sāmānyaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na yujyate | Therefore, it is not logical [to claim] that the universal is distinguished from the particular |
nahi sāmānyaṃ kiñcid asti viśeṣebhyo vyatiriktasvarūpaṃ, yat svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ savikalpakavijñānagocaraḥ syāt | There exists no universal that has a nature separate from particulars, which by virtue of its own distinct nature, when apprehended, would be the object of conceptual cognition |
kintu nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītā bhedā eva sāmānyamityucyante | Rather, only when differences are apprehended without distinction are they called "universal" |
pratiniyatasvarūpanirapekṣāḥ pratīyamānāḥ sāmānyaśabdābhidheyā iti yāvat | That is to say, when they are cognized without reference to their fixed individual natures, they are denoted by the word "universal" |
tataś ca kutas tasmād viśeṣāt sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvam yena tadgrāhakasya savikalpanā bhavet | Therefore, how could there be distinctness of the universal from the particular by which its apprehension would be conceptual? |
vaiṣamyasamabhāvena jñāyamānā ime kila prakalpayanti sāmānyaviśeṣasthitimātmani | When these [particulars] are cognized through similarity and dissimilarity, they establish within themselves the existence of universal and particular |
eta eva hi bhedāḥ samaviṣamatayā samprajñāyamānā yathākramaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣābhidhānābhidheyatām anubhūya sāmānyaviśeṣavyavahārayor viṣayabhedaṃ prakalpayanti | For these very differences, when cognized as similar or dissimilar, experiencing designation and what is designated as universal and particular respectively, establish the distinction between the domains of the usage of universal and particular |
vaiṣamyasamabhāvo 'yam ityādinā pratividhatte / | [He] answers with [the words] "this [matter of] similarity and dissimilarity" and so forth. |
vaiṣamyasamabhāvo 'yaṃ pravibhakto yadīṣyate / sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ tadavasthaṃ viśeṣataḥ // | If this [relation of] similarity and dissimilarity is accepted as differentiated, then the distinctness of the universal from the particulars remains just as before. |
athāvibhakta evāyam asaṅkīrṇā sthitiḥ katham / anyonyāparihāreṇa sthiter gatyantaraṃ naca // | If, on the other hand, this [relation] is accepted as undifferentiated, how can [their] existence be unmixed without mutually excluding each other? And there is no other way [for them] to exist. |
pravibhakta iti amiśraḥ / | "Differentiated" means "unmixed." |
anyadeva sāmānyamanya eva viśeṣa iti yāvat / | That is to say: the universal is one thing and the particular is entirely another thing. |
sāmānyasya viśeṣato viśiṣṭatvamityupalakṣaṇam / | The statement that "the universal is distinct from the particular" is [meant as] an illustration. |
tathā viśeṣasyāpi sāmānyato viśiṣṭatvam eva / | Similarly, the particular too is indeed distinct from the universal. |
dvayor api parasparasvabhāvavivekena pravibhaktatvāt / | Because both are differentiated through the distinction of their mutual natures. |
asaṅkīrṇā sthitir iti / | "Asaṅkīrṇā sthitiḥ" means "unmixed existence." |
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