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savikalpānyathābhāve prāktanāparavinna hi | For in [its] being either determinate or otherwise [i.e., indeterminate], it cannot apprehend the former and the latter. |
svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇayor naika jñānaṃ vedakaṃ yuktam | One cognition cannot properly be the apprehender of both the particular characteristic and the universal characteristic. |
tathā hi tadekaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ vā syād avikalpakaṃ vā tatra savikalpakabhāve savikalpakatve sati prāktanasya pūrvoktasya svalakṣaṇasya vit vedanaṃ na prāpnoti | For that one cognition would be either determinate or indeterminate; in the case of [its] being determinate, when it is determinate, there can be no apprehension, no knowing, of the former, the previously mentioned particular characteristic. |
anyathābhāva iti nirvikalpakapakṣe aparasyeti sāmānyātmanaḥ vit vittir na syāt | 'In [its] being otherwise' means in the case of [its being] indeterminate; '[of] the latter' means of the universal nature; [in this case] there can be no apprehension, no knowing [of it]. |
evaṃ tāvat svalakṣaṇaviṣayatva itareṣāṃ jñānānām avikalpatā prāpnotīti sādhitam | Thus far it has been proved that if subsequent cognitions [have] the specific individual as their object, they must be non-conceptual. |
idānīṃ bhavatu nāma savikalpakatvaṃ tathāpi gṛhītagrāhitvān na teṣāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam iti pratipādayann āha ekāntenetyādi | Now [the author], showing that even if conceptuality be granted, their validity is not justified due to [their] grasping what is [already] grasped, states [beginning with] "ekāntena." |
ekāntenānyatābhāvāj jātyādyādyena cedgatam | Since universals etc. are not absolutely different [from particulars], and since [they] are apprehended by the first [cognition]... |
vijñātārthādhigantṛtvāt smārttajñānasamaṃ param | ...because [it] apprehends what is [already] known, [the subsequent cognition] is equal to memory. |
tathā hi jātyāder vyaktito naivānyatvam ekānteneṣṭam | For the universal etc. is indeed not accepted as absolutely different from the particular. |
sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na | Indeed, the separateness of the universal etc. from the particular is not established. |
tataścādyenaivālocanājñānena jātyādi gṛhītam iti smārttajñānavad adhigatārthādhigantṛtvāt paraṃ jātyādidharmaniścayajñānamapramāṇam eva yuktam iti | Therefore, since the universal etc. is grasped by the very first perceptual cognition, the subsequent determinate cognition of the universal etc. is justified to be non-valid, like memory, because it apprehends what is [already] apprehended. |
tadatra yadi samāropaviṣayavyavacchedena gṛhītam iti hetvarthas tadā hetor asiddhatā | In this case, if the meaning of the reason is that "[they] are grasped as differentiated from superimposed objects," then the reason is unestablished. |
atha yathākathañcid gṛhītatvād iti hetvarthas tadānumānenānekānta | And if the meaning of the reason is that "[they] are somehow grasped," then it is inconclusive due to inference. |
saṃmugdhānekasāmānyarūpeṇādhigame sati | When there is apprehension in the form of multiple confused universals... |
tathā hi prathamaṃ saṃmugdharūpeṇālocanājñānenādhigataṃ, nahi niścitarūpeṇa, uttarottaras tu niścayaḥ pramāṇaṃ, samāropavyavacchedaviṣayatvād anumānavat | For initially [the object] is apprehended by perceptual cognition in a confused form, not in a determinate form, but the subsequent determination is valid because it has as its object the exclusion of superimposition, like inference. |
yathā pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte śabdādau dharmiṇi kṛtakatvādinānityatvaniścayo bhavan pramāṇaṃ bhavati, tathā samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścayo bhaviṣyati | Just as when sound etc. as the subject is grasped by perception, the determination of impermanence arising through [its] being produced etc. is valid, so too will the determination that has the exclusion of superimposition as its object be [valid]. |
tathā hi bhavatāmātrāvivādaḥ samāropavyavacchedaviṣayo niścaya iti / | Thus according to you [too], a determinate cognition has as its object the differentiation from impositions. |
yathoktam "niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ / | As has been said: "Between determinate cognition and imposed cognition there exists the relation of annulled and annuller; |
samāropaviveke 'sya pravṛttir iti gamyate" // | and it is understood that this [determinate cognition] operates when [the object is] differentiated from impositions." |
iti // netyādinā pratividhatte / | [To this] he replies with "no" etc. |
na samāropavicchedaviṣayatvena mānatā / anumāyāḥ pramāṇatvaprasaṅgena smṛter api // | The validity of inference does not lie in its having as its object the differentiation from impositions; [if it did], then memory too would [absurdly] have to be considered valid. |
pratyakṣānantarodbhūtasamāropaṇavāraṇāt / iṣṭaṃ tu laiṅgikaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na tadasti te // | Rather, inferential cognition is considered valid because it prevents impositions that arise after perception. But this [prevention] is not possible for you. |
gauḥśuklaścalatītyādau pratyakṣānantaraṃ na hi / samāropo 'tra vijñāne vedyate yanniṣidhyate // | For in cases like [the cognition] "the white cow is moving," no imposition that could be negated is found to appear after the perception. |
pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedenānumānasya prāmāṇyaṃ, na tu punaḥ samāropaviṣayavyavacchedamātreṇa, smṛter api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt, naca tat pratyakṣasamanantarabhāvino gauḥ śuklaścalatītyāder vikalpasya pravṛttasamāropanivāraṇam | The validity of inference lies in its precluding an imposition that has [actually] occurred, not merely in precluding the object of [some possible] imposition, since [in that case] memory too would [absurdly] be valid. And in the case of the conceptual cognition "the white cow is moving" which follows immediately after perception, there is no preclusion of an actually occurred imposition. |
katham anutpannatvam iti cedāha gaur ityādi / | If one asks "How [do you know] that it has not occurred?", he responds with "the cow" etc. |
nahi vikalpo 'saṃviditi utpadyata ityupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdhyā siddhamanutpannatvaṃ samāropasya // | [It is established that] an imposition [samāropa] has not arisen, due to the non-perception of what should be perceptible [if it existed], since a conceptual cognition cannot arise without being cognized. |
evaṃ tāvad etat sarvaṃ jātyādikamabhyugamyoktam, idānīṃ jātyādayaḥ paramārthato na santyeva kutas tadviṣayatayā pratyakṣasya savikalpatā bhaviṣyatīti darśayann āha tattvetyādi / | Thus far everything has been stated by provisionally accepting [the existence of] universals and so forth. Now [the author] shows that universals etc. do not truly exist at all, [asking] how perception could be conceptual with regard to them, saying "tattva" etc. |
tattvānyatvobhayātmānaḥ santi jātyādayo na ca / | Universals and the rest do not exist either as [identical with particulars], as different [from them], or as both. |
anvayāsatvato bhedād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt / | [They cannot be identical] because of the absence of pervasion, [and they cannot be different] because they do not appear as different. |
anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiteścānyatva tattvayoḥ // | [And they cannot be both] because difference and identity remain mutually exclusive. |
vyaktibhyo hi jātyādayaḥ kadācid avytiriktā vyatiriktā vā vyatiriktāvyatiriktatvenobhayātmāno vā / | For universals etc. must either be non-different from particulars, or different [from them], or both different and non-different. |
na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ anvayāsatvataḥ anvayābhāvāt / | The first alternative is not [possible] due to the absence of pervasion, i.e., due to the absence of continuity [across particulars]. |
anekavastvanugataṃ hi rūpaṃ sāmānyamucyate, na caivaṃ vyaktayaḥ parasparamanvāviśanti, yena tā eva sāmānyaṃ bhaveyuḥ / | For a universal is said to be a form that pervades multiple things, but particulars do not pervade one another in this way, by which they themselves could become the universal. |
anvāveśe vā viśvam ekam eva rūpaṃ jātam iti sāmānyasyaivābhāvaprasaṅgaḥanekādhāratvāt tasya / | And if there were such pervasion, the entire world would become one form, resulting in the absurd consequence that there would be no universal at all, since it [i.e., a universal] must have multiple substrates. |
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ bhedād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt bhedād iti / | Nor [is] the second alternative [possible], because they do not appear as different from particulars. |
vyakteḥ / | [The term] "bhedāt" [means] "from particulars." |
nacāpratibhāsamānaṃ pratyakṣībhavati / | And what does not appear cannot be perceived. |
yathoktam "vyaktayo nānuyantyanyadanuyāyi na bhāsate / jñānādavyatiriktaṃ ca katham arthāntaraṃ vrajet" iti | As has been stated: "Individual manifestations do not pervade one another [and] no pervader appears [separately]; how then could anything be different from consciousness?" |
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiter anyatvatattvayoḥ pakṣayoḥ | Nor [is] the third alternative possible, since the two positions of difference and identity exist in mutual exclusion. |
yau hi parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇau tayor ya ekaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ so 'paravidhināntarīyakaḥ | For when two things have characteristics that exist in mutual exclusion, the negation of one necessarily implies the affirmation of the other. |
parasparaparihāreṇa vānyatvatattve vyavasthite, anyatarasvabhāvavyavacchedenānyatarasya paricchedāt | And difference and identity are established in mutual exclusion, because the determination of one [occurs] through the exclusion of the nature of the other. |
tasmānnāsti tṛtīyarāśisambandhaḥ | Therefore there can be no connection with a third category. |
nanu ca yadyavikalpaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kathaṃ tena vyavahāraḥ, tathā hi idaṃ sukhasādhanam idaṃ duḥkhasyeti yadi niścinoti tadā tayoḥ prāptiparihārāya pravartate | [The opponent:] "If perception is non-conceptual, how can there be practical activity based on it? For [only] when one determines 'this is a means to pleasure' [and] 'this [leads] to pain', does one then engage in obtaining or avoiding these respectively." |
kiṃ ca anumānānumeyavyavahārābhāvaś ca prāpnoti | Moreover, there would result an absence of the practical operation of inference and inferrable objects. |
tathā hi anumānakāle 'vaśyaṃ dharmī dharmo vā pramāṇāntareṇa niścito gṛhītavyaḥ | For at the time of inference, either the subject or the property must necessarily be apprehended as determined through another means of valid cognition. |
sa ca na pratyakṣeṇāniścayātmakena niścito gṛhītuṃ śakyate | And that cannot be grasped as determined by perception, which [according to you] is of an indeterminate nature. |
nāpyanumānena, anavasthādoṣāt | Nor [can it be grasped] by inference, due to the fault of infinite regress. |
nacānyatpramāṇāntaramastīti sarvavyavahārocchedaḥ prāpnoti | And since there is no other means of valid cognition [besides these two], the destruction of all practical activity would result. |
tasmād anumānādivyavahārapravṛttito liṅgādanumānabādhiteyam avikalpakapratijñeti yaścodayettaṃ pratyāha avikalpam apītyādi / | From all this, and on the basis of the fact that activities proceed based on inference etc., [one might object that] "this claim about [perception being] non-conceptual is refuted by inference through inferential marks" – to such an objector, [the author] responds with "Even though non-conceptual..." |
avikalpam api jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiśaktimat / niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavatyataḥ // | Even though non-conceptual, cognition has the power to produce conceptual [cognition]; through that [conceptual cognition], it becomes a factor in all activities without exception. |
vikalpadvāreṇāvikalpakam api niścayahetutvena sakalavyavahārāṅgaṃ bhavati. | Through conceptual [cognition], even non-conceptual [cognition] becomes a factor in all activities by being the cause of determinate [cognition]. |
tathā hi pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham api sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttam analādikam arthaṃ tadākāranirbhāsotpattitaḥ paricchindad utpadyate. | For instance, even though perception is free from conceptual content, it arises as determining an object like fire as distinguished from similar and dissimilar things, through the arising of the appearance of its form. |
tac ca niyatarūpavyavasthitavastugrāhitvād vijātīyavyāvṛttavastvākārānugatatvān na tatraiva vastuni vidhipratiṣedhāvāvirbhāvayati analo 'yaṃ nāsau kusumastabakādiḥ iti. | And since it grasps an object established with a fixed form and follows the form of an object distinguished from dissimilar things, it makes manifest in that very object both positive and negative [aspects] such as "this is fire" [and] "this is not a bunch of flowers." |
tayoś ca vikalpayoḥ pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād asaṃvāditve 'pi na prāmāṇyam iṣṭam, dṛśyavikalpayor ekatvādhyavasāyena pravṛtter anadhigatavasturūpādhigamābhāvāt. | And even though these two conceptual [cognitions] are non-discordant due to their indirect connection with the object, they are not considered valid because, due to proceeding through the determination of unity between what is seen and what is conceived, there is no apprehension of a previously unapprehended object-form. |
ata eva vikalpadvayahetutvāt tṛtīyaprakārābhāvasūcanāyāpi nimittatāṃ pratipadyate. | For this very reason, being the cause of these two conceptual [cognitions], [perception] also becomes the cause for indicating the absence of a third kind. |
tathā hi yad yatra kvacit pravṛttaṃ tatpratibhāsitvāt tat paricchinatti, tadanyasya tatrānupalambhāt tatas tad vyavacchinatti. | For instance, whatever [cognition] occurs regarding something determines it because it bears its appearance, and because anything other than that is not apprehended there, it distinguishes that [thing] from [everything else]. |
sarvabhāvānāṃ ca dṛśyatadanyatvena dvairāśye vyavasthāpanāt prakārāntarābhāvaṃ ca sūcayati. | And because all entities are established in a dichotomy as either perceived or other than that, it indicates the absence of another alternative. |
yady evaṃ pratyekṣeṇaiva śabdādau dharmiṇi gṛhītatvād anityatvādeḥ tatrānumānavikalpaḥ pravartamānaḥ pramāṇaṃ na prāpnoti. | If this is so, then since the subject (such as sound) is already grasped by perception itself along with [properties] like impermanence, the inferential conception occurring there would not achieve the status of a valid means of knowledge. |
naiṣa doṣaḥ. | This is not a fault. |
pratyakṣam utpannam api yatrāṃśe 'vasāyaṃ janayati sa evāṃśo vyavahārayogyo gṛhīta ity abhidhīyate, yatra nu bhrāntinimittavaśāt samāropapravṛtter na vyavasāyaṃ janayitum īśam, sa vyavahārāyogyatvād gṛhīto 'py agṛhītaprakhya iti tatrānumānasya pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedāya pravartamānasya prāmāṇyaṃ bhavati, na punaḥ pratyakṣānantarabhāvivikalpasya, tasya pravṛttasamāropavyavacchedābhāvāt. | Even though perception has arisen, that aspect alone in which it produces ascertainment is called "grasped" as being fit for practical activity, but where due to the power of the cause of error it is not able to produce ascertainment due to the operation of superimposition, that [aspect], though grasped, appears as if ungrasped due to being unfit for practical activity – therefore inference operating there to eliminate the active superimposition becomes valid, but not the conceptual [cognition] that follows immediately after perception, because in that case there is no elimination of active superimposition. |
kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ sarvato bhinne vasturūpe anubhavotpattāvapi tathaiva na smārto niścayo bhavati | "What is the reason that, even when an apprehension arises with regard to the form of a thing which is distinct from all [other things], the resultant memorial determination does not arise in the same way?" |
ucyate kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt | [Answer:] "Because it depends on other causes." |
na hy anubhūta ity eva niścayo bhavati, tasyābhyāsārthitvapāṭavādikāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt | "For a determination does not arise merely from [something] having been experienced, because that [determination] depends on other causes such as practice, desire [to learn], and proficiency." |
yathā janakādhyāpakāviśeṣe 'pi pitaram āyāntaṃ dṛṣṭvā pitā me āgacchati, nopādhyāya iti niścinoti | "Just as when someone sees the same person who is [both] father and teacher coming, he determines '[my] father is coming', [and] not 'the teacher is coming'." |
nāvikalpaṃ vikalpe cecchaktaṃ viṣayabhedataḥ | "The non-conceptual is not capable [of bringing about] the conceptual because their objects are different." |
akalpatvāc ca rūpādijñānavaccakṣurādivat | "And because of [its] being non-conceptual, like the cognition of color etc., [and] like the eye etc." |
nendriyavijñānaṃ savikalpakamanovijñānakāraṇaṃ bhinnaviṣayatvād rūpasparśādijñānavat nirvikalpakatvāc ca, cakṣurādivat | "Sense-cognition cannot be the cause of conceptual mental cognition, because they have different objects, like the cognitions of color, touch etc., and because it is non-conceptual, like the eye etc." |
viṣayabhedata ityatra hetau dṛṣṭāntau rūpādijñānavad iti, akalpatvād ityatra tu cakṣurādivad iti | "For the reason 'because their objects are different', the example given is 'like the cognitions of color etc.', and for [the reason] 'because of being non-conceptual', [the example] is 'like the eye etc.'" |
tadatra na virodho 'sti vikalpena sahānayoḥ | "Here there is no incompatibility between these [reasons] and the conceptual [content]." |
nacāpi viṣayo bhinnas tadarthādhyavasāyataḥ | "Nor is the object different, due to the determination of that object [being the same]." |
ubhayor api hetvor anaikāntikatā, sādhyaviparyayeṇa saha hetor virodhānupadarśanāt | "Both reasons are inconclusive, because no incompatibility has been shown between the reason[s] and the opposite of what is to be proved." |
anayor iti hetvoḥ | "'Of these two' means 'of the two reasons'." |
nacāpi viṣayo bhinna ityanena satyapi saviṣayatve vikalpasya viṣayabhedata ityasya hetor asiddhatāmāha | "By [the statement] 'nor is the object different', he states the inadmissibility of the reason 'because their objects are different', even though the conceptual [content] has an object." |
vastutastu nirālambo vikalpaḥ sampravartate / | In reality, conceptual cognition proceeds without any [objective] support. |
tasyāsti viṣayo naiva yo vibhidyeta kaścana // | It has no object whatsoever which could differ from anything else. |
rūpaśabdādītyādinā rūpādijñānavad ityasya dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām āha | [The author] states the deficiency of the probandum in this example "like cognitions of form, sound, etc." |
rūpaśabdādibuddhīnām astyevānyonyahetutā / | Among cognitions of form, sound, etc., there certainly exists mutual causation. |
tato 'prasiddhasādhyo 'yaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ samudīritaḥ // | Therefore, this example is cited [as one] in which the probandum is not established. |
rūpaśabdādijñānāṃ parasparasamanantarapratyayabhāvena kāraṇatvasya vidyamānatvāt // | Because among cognitions of form, sound, etc., causality exists in the form of their being immediate successive conditions for one another. |
agnidhūmādibuddhīnāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ / vyabhicāro 'pi vispaṣṭametasminnupalabhyate // | Due to the causal relationship between cognitions of fire, smoke, etc., deviation is also clearly observed in this [case]. |
etasminniti / | [The word] "in this" [means the following]: |
viṣayabhedata ityata hetau / yathāgnyādiliṅgibuddher dhūmādiliṅgabuddhir viṣayabhede 'pi kāraṇaṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyatīti hetor anaikāntikatvam // | [It refers] to this reason "because of difference of objects." Just as the cognition of the inferential mark 'smoke' etc. is the cause of the cognition of what is marked 'fire' etc. even though their objects are different, so it might be in this case too—thus [showing] the inconclusiveness of the reason. |
evaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvaṃ pratyakṣasya prasādhyābhrāntagrahaṇe prayojanam āha keśoṇḍraketyādi / | Having thus established the non-conceptual nature of perception, [the author] states the purpose of including the term "non-erroneous" with reference to [illusions like] the hair-tuft, etc. |
abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ taddhi bhrāntatvānneṣyate pramā // | This [cognition] is not accepted as valid means of knowledge (pramā) due to [its] being erroneous. |
abhrāntamatrāvisaṃvāditvena draṣṭavyam, natu yathāvasthitālambanākāratayā / | The term "non-erroneous" (abhrānta) here should be understood as "non-contradictory" (avisaṃvāditva), not as "having an object-basis exactly as it exists [in reality]." |
anyathā hi yogācāramatenālambanāsiddher ubhayanayasamāśrayeṇeṣṭasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasyāvyāpitā syāt / | For otherwise, since according to the Yogācāra view there is no [real] basis [for cognition], the definition of perception accepted by both systems [Sautrāntika and Yogācāra] would be too narrow. |
avisaṃvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprāpaṇaśaktikatvam, natu prāpaṇam eva pratibandhādisambhavāt / | And "non-contradictoriness" means "having the capacity to lead to an object capable of performing the desired function," not the actual leading [to it], because obstacles may arise. |
yadyevam abhrāntagrahaṇamevāstu, kiṃ kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇeneti cet / | [If someone asks:] "If that is so, let there be only the qualification 'non-erroneous' - what is the need for [including] 'free from conceptual construction'?" |
na / | [We reply:] No. |
anumānavikalpasyāpi pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt // | Because [if we did that,] inferential conceptualization would also [absurdly] become perception. |
mānasaṃ tadapītyeka iti / | Some say that this [illusion] too is mental. |
mānasaṃ tadapītyeke naitad indriyabhāvataḥ / bhāvāt tadvikṛtāvasya vikṛteścopalambhataḥ // sarpādibhrāntivaccedam anaṣṭe 'pyakṣaviplave / | Some say it is mental, [but] this is not [correct] because [the illusion] exists when the sense organ is present and [because] it is perceived when [the sense organ] is disturbed. If it were like the snake-illusion [which is purely mental], it would cease even when the disturbance of the sense organ has not ceased. |
nivarteta manobhrānteḥ spaṣṭaṃ ca pratibhāsanāt // | [The illusion] would cease because of mental error and because of [its] clear appearance. |
na tadarthamabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktaṃ kartum iti teṣām abhiprāyaḥ / | [According to] their opinion, it is not appropriate to include the term "abhrānta" [non-erroneous] for that purpose. |
nanu ca bhavatu nāma mānasam tathāpyabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam eva, nahyanenendriyajñānasyaiva pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṃ kartumārabdham, kiṃ tarhi/ | But indeed, even if [perception] is mental, the term "abhrānta" must still be included, because what was intended to be defined here was not only sense-organ perception, but rather... |
mānasasyāpi yogijñānādeḥ, tatra ca svapnāntikasyāpi nirvikalpakatvam ast spaṣṭapratibhāsitvāt, natvabhrāntatvam iti tannivṛttyarthamabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktam eva / | ...also mental [perception] such as yogic cognition, and in that case dream-cognition too is non-conceptual due to its distinct appearance, but not non-erroneous; therefore the inclusion of "abhrānta" is indeed appropriate for excluding that [dream-cognition]. |
satyam etat / | This is true. |
kiṃtvindriyabhrāntir api sambhavatyato 'yam ayukta eṣāṃ pakṣa itīndriyajatvapratipādanāyāha naitad ityādi / | However, since illusions through sense-organs are also possible, therefore their position is not appropriate; [the author] states "naitad" etc. to establish [their] sense-organ origin. |
indriyabhāve sati bhāvādindriyajeyaṃ keśoṇḍrakādibuddhiḥ / | When the sense-organ is present, this cognition of hair-tuft etc. is sense-born, just like [cognition] of [real] entities. |
kiṃ ca yadi manobhrāntiḥ syāt tato manobhrānter eva kāraṇānnivartetānivṛtte 'pyakṣaviplave / | Moreover, if it were a mental illusion, then due to mental delusion being its only cause, it would cease even when the sense-organ disorder has not ceased. |
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