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yathoktaṃ tenaiva sumatinā ---"sattādisāmānyasvabhāvānuviddha eva viśeṣaḥ sākṣāt kriyate nānyathā, tato viśiṣṭaviṣayatvam eva viśeṣyasya yuktaṃ rūpam, sāmānyaṃ punar aśeṣanirapekṣaṃ sākṣātkartuṃ śakyata ityaviruddhamasyāvikalpaviṣayatvam" iti / | As stated by that same Sumati: "The particular is directly apprehended only as permeated by the nature of universals such as 'being' and not otherwise; therefore it is only proper that what is qualified should have the form of being an object of qualified [cognition]; the universal, however, can be directly apprehended independently of all [particulars], and thus there is no contradiction in its being an object of non-conceptual [cognition]." |
iyam asaṅkīrṇā sthir na syāt / | This clearly demarcated distinction would not remain [stable]. |
na pravibhakto nāpravibhakta iṣyata iti cedāha anyonyetyādi / | [If] it is argued that "[it] is held to be neither distinguished nor undistinguished," [then he] speaks thus beginning with "mutual" etc. |
api ca nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītā bhedā iti parasparavyāhatam iti darśayann āha viśeṣātmātirekeṇetyādi / | Moreover, showing that [the statement] "differences are apprehended without distinction" involves a mutual contradiction, [he] speaks thus beginning with "viśeṣātmātirekeṇa" etc. |
viśeṣātmātirekeṇa nāparaṃ bhedalakṣaṇam / | There is no other characteristic of difference except [their] particular nature; |
tadrūpāsparśane teṣu grahaṇaṃ katham ucyate / | how can there be any apprehension of them without touching [their] particular form? |
tadrūpasparśane cāpi bhedāntaravibhedinaḥ / | And even when [their] form is touched, [they are] distinguished from other differences; |
gṛhītā iti vijñānaṃ prāptameṣu vikalpakam // | therefore the cognition of these [differences] as apprehended must be conceptual. |
bhedebhyo hi nānyo viśeṣaḥ, tasya ca viśeṣasya sāmānyagrāhiṇā jñānenāsaṃsparśe kathaṃ bhedās tena gṛhītā bhaveyuḥ, agṛhītasvabhāvāvyatirekāttepyagṛhītā eveti bhāvaḥ / | For there is no particular apart from differences, and if that particular is not touched by the cognition that grasps the universal, how could differences be apprehended by it? The meaning is that being non-different from [their] unapprehended nature, they too would remain unapprehended. |
atha gṛhītā iti matam, tadā tadrūpasaṃsparśane bhedarūpasaṃsparśane grahaṇegṛhītāvyatirekād gṛhītasvabhāvavad viśeṣo 'pi gṛhīta eveti, eṣu bhedeṣu yat sāmānyaviṣayatvenābhimataṃ jñānaṃ tadvikalpakaṃ prāptam // | If it is held that [differences] are apprehended, then when their form is touched, when the form of difference is touched, due to [their] non-difference from what is apprehended, the particular too must be apprehended just like [their] apprehended nature, and thus the cognition which is accepted as having the universal as its object with regard to these differences must turn out to be conceptual. |
nirupākhyāc ca sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṃ sampratīyate / | And the universal is cognized as distinct from the featureless [entity]; |
ato vikalpakajñānagrāhyaṃ tadapi te bhavet // | therefore that [universal] too must be for you something graspable by conceptual cognition. |
nāsatastadviśiṣṭaṃ cet kimidānīṃ tadātmakam / no cet tathāpi vaiśiṣṭyaṃ tasmād asya na kiṃ matam // | If [you say that the universal] is not distinct from the non-existent, then is it [itself] of the nature of that [non-existent]? If not, then why is it not accepted that it is distinct from it? |
syād etat sāmānyasyābhāvato na viśeṣaḥ nāpi sādṛśyam / | This might be [objected]: there can be neither distinction nor similarity between the universal and non-existence. |
tathā hi yan na kiñcitso 'bhāvaḥ kalpyate, tac ca tādṛśaṃ sāmānyato naiva viśiṣṭaṃ nāpi samaṃ, bhāvatvaprasaṅgāt / | For that which is nothing is conceived as non-existence, and such [a thing] can neither be distinct from nor equal to the universal, because [if it were] it would follow that it would be an existent. |
tathā hi yadi tacchūnyaṃ sāmānyato viśiṣṭaṃ syāt tadapi vastveva syāt / | For if that void were distinct from the universal, then it too would be a real entity. |
nahyavastuno viśeṣākhyasvabhāvaḥ sambhavati, na ca viśeṣākhyaṃ svabhāvamantareṇa viśiṣṭaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum / | For a non-entity cannot possess the essential nature called distinctness, and without an essential nature called distinctness, [something] cannot be said to be distinct. |
nāpi samaṃ vastutvaprasaṅgāt / | Nor [can it be] equal [to the universal], because it would follow that [it would have] entity-ness. |
nahyavastunaḥ kenacit samānaṃ rūpaṃ bhavati naca samānarūpamantareṇa samaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | For a non-entity cannot have a form similar to anything, and without a similar form, [something] cannot reasonably be equal [to anything else], as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
tasmāt sāmānyasya śūnyam avadhiṃ kṛtvā na samatvaṃ viśiṣṭatvaṃ vā yuktam / | Therefore, taking the void as a limit, neither equality nor distinctness is reasonable for the universal. |
tathā hi yo yamavadhiṃ kṛtvā samo viśiṣṭo vā bhavati tena so 'pyavadhiḥ samo viṣamaś ca dṛśyate / | For when something is equal or distinct in relation to something taken as a limit, that limit too is seen as equal or unequal to it. |
yadi hi so 'vadhis tena samo viṣamo vā na dṛśyeta, itaropyavadhimān samo viṣamovā na dṛśyeta // | For if that limit were not seen as equal or unequal to it, the other [thing] which has [that] limit could also not be seen as equal or unequal. |
kiṃ ca nābhāvo nāma kaścid bhāvavyatirikto 'sti bhāva eva tu bhāvāntaraṃ | Further, there exists no such thing as 'non-entity' [that is] separate from entity; rather, an entity [simply] is not another entity. |
na bhavatītyabhāva akhyāyate, tat kuto 'sya vaiśiṣṭyamityetat sarvaṃ sumatinoktam āgūryāha atadātmakamevedam ityādi | [When something] does not exist [as something else], it is called 'non-entity'; thus how could it have distinctness? All this has been stated by Sumati; responding to this, [the Author] proceeds to say "atadātmakam eva idam" etc. |
atadātmakam evedaṃ vaiśiṣṭyaṃ vastuno 'pi hi | Indeed, even in the case of an entity, distinctness consists in [something] not being of that [other thing's] nature. |
nāsadrūpaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ tadviśiṣṭaṃ na te katham | And since the universal is not of the nature of non-entity, why can it not be distinct from that according to you? |
tasmāt svalakṣaṇe jñānaṃ yatkiñcit sampravartate vākpathātītaviṣayaṃ sarvaṃ tannirvikalpakam | Therefore, whatever cognition arises regarding the specific characteristic [of things] has an object beyond the path of words and is entirely non-conceptual. |
vastuno 'pi hi sakāśād yadavastuno viśiṣṭatvaṃ tat khalu nānyat kiñcit | Indeed, even in the case of an entity, its distinctness from a non-entity is truly nothing else [than this]. |
kiṃ tarhitattvaniṣedhaḥ, atadātmatvam eva, lakṣaṇabheda iti yāvat | Rather, [it is] the negation of identity, merely the state of not being that [other thing], that is to say, a difference in characteristics. |
taccāsato 'pi śaśaviṣāṇādeḥ sakāśāt sāmānyasya tulyam eva | And this [distinctness] of the universal from non-entities like a hare's horn is exactly the same. |
tathā hi asacchaśaviṣāṇādi sarvārthakriyāvirahalakṣaṇaṃ, sāmānyaṃ tu na tatheṣṭam iti vispaṣṭam asya tato vaiśiṣṭyam | For non-entities like a hare's horn are characterized by a complete absence of causal efficacy, while the universal is not considered to be like that; thus its distinctness from that [non-entity] is quite clear. |
tataścāsato 'pi sakāśād vaiśiṣṭyaṃ syān na ca vastutvaprasaṅgo 'sata iti yatkiñcid etat | Therefore, there can be distinctness from a non-entity without the unwanted consequence of [that] non-entity becoming an entity - this is nothing significant. |
yaduktam nābhāvo nāmānya evetyādi tatra tena svabhāṣitasyaivārtho na vivecitaḥ / | As regards what was said about the non-entity supposedly being nothing different from entity and so forth, [it is clear that] he has not properly analyzed the meaning of his own statement. |
tathā hi bhāva eva tu bhāvāntaraṃ na bhavatītyukte bhāvāntarāt tasya viśeṣa ukto bhavati, tato vyāvṛttisaṅkīrtanāt / | For when it is said that "an entity does not become another entity," its distinction from that other entity is [thereby] stated, because this [statement] proclaims its exclusion from it. |
tadetadhyānyavijṛmbhitam ityalaṃ prasaṅgena / | All this [argumentation] is merely [a case of] blind fumbling, so enough of this digression. |
tasmād ityādinā pramāṇaphalopasaṃhāraḥ // | With [the words] "therefore" etc., [there follows] the conclusion regarding the result of the means of valid cognition. |
asti hyālocanājñānamādyaṃ cennirvikalpakam / bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam // | There exists indeed an initial perceptual cognition which is non-conceptual, similar to the cognition of infants and mutes, [and] arising purely from the object. |
na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīmanubhūyate / | At that moment, neither the particular nor the universal is experienced. |
tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate // | Rather, only the individual thing, which is the substratum of both these [the particular and universal], is ascertained. |
tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhiryayā / | Subsequently, the object is [apprehended] together with properties such as class-character and so forth by that [cognition]. |
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā // | And that cognition by which [the object] is ascertained is accepted as being perceptual. |
tathā hi sarvaṃ pratyakṣaṃ, pakṣīkṛtaṃ tatra ca sarvatra pratyakṣākhye dharmiṇi savikalpakavyavasthitau nāsti ca viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ nimittam ityasya hetor asiddhiḥ, ālocanājñānavyatirekeṇānyatra pratyakṣe sāmānyādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣṭārthagrahaṇasya vidyamānatvāt / | For all perception is taken as the subject [of discussion], and in all cases where the property-possessor called "perception" is established as determinate, the reason that "there is no basis for the apprehension of an object qualified by qualifiers" is unestablished, because the apprehension of an object qualified by qualifiers such as universals exists in perception other than the initial perceptual cognition. |
athālocanājñānam eva pratyakṣīkṛtya hetur abhidhīyate tadā siddhasādhyateti manyate paraḥ / | If the reason is stated taking only the initial perceptual cognition as [the subject of] perception, then [the argument] proves what is [already] established—this is what the opponent thinks. |
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśam iti / | [The phrase] "similar to the cognition of infants and mutes" [is to be explained as above]. |
bālavijñānasadṛśaṃ mūkādivijñānasadṛśam | [It is] like the cognition of an infant and like the cognition of a mute person and others. |
ādiśabdena saṃmūrchitaparigrahaḥ / abhilāpaviśeṣarahitatvamātreṇa sāmyam | By the word "ādi" [one should understand] the inclusion of [a person in] a swoon. The similarity [in all these cases] lies merely in the absence of specific verbal expression. |
śuddhatvaṃ punar vastunaḥ sāmānyadvayaviviktatvāt | The "purity" of an entity, moreover, [comes] from its being free from both types of universals. |
tadeva dvitīyena ślokena spaṣṭayati na viśeṣa ityādi / viśeṣa iti / avāntarasāmānyaṃ gotvādi | This very [point] is clarified by the second verse [beginning with] "na viśeṣa." By "viśeṣa" [is meant] the intermediate universal such as cowness. |
sāmānyam iti / mahāsāmānyaṃ vastutvādi / tayorādhārabhūteti | By "sāmānya" [is meant] the highest universal such as entityness. By "tayorādhārabhūta" [is meant] the substratum of both of these. |
anena śuddhaṃ vastu darśitam | By this, the pure entity is shown. |
tataḥ paramityādinā tāmeva pakṣaikadeśāsiddhatāṃ hetor abhivyanakti tataḥparam iti | By [the phrase] "tataḥ param" etc., he reveals that very partial inadmissibility of the reason. [The meaning of] "tataḥ param" [is as follows]. |
śuddhavastugrahaṇottarakālaṃ yayā buddhyā vastu vyavasīyate jātyādibhir | At a time subsequent to the grasping of the pure entity, by which cognition the entity is determined along with [its] class-characteristics and other [qualities]. |
viśeṣaṇaiḥ viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ darśayati | [This] shows the grasping of an object qualified by qualifications. |
anena cānadhigatārthādhigantṛtvaṃ hetoś cāsiddhatoktā bhavati | By this, both the apprehension of what was not [previously] apprehended and the inadmissibility of the reason are stated. |
punaḥ punar vikalpe 'pi yāvānadhigamo bhavet | Again and again, when conceptual contents [arise], further apprehensions occur accordingly |
tat sambandhānusāreṇa sarvaṃ pratyakṣamiṣyate | In accordance with that connection [with the sense organ], everything is considered to be perception |
punaḥ punariti | [The phrase] "again and again" [refers to] |
tṛtīyādau kṣaṇe | [what happens] in the third and subsequent moments |
yāvāniti / anadhigatārthādhiganteti śeṣaḥ | [The phrase] "however many" [means] the apprehension of objects not previously apprehended |
tatsambandhānusāreṇeti / tasyākṣasya sambandhānusāreṇa | [The phrase] "in accordance with that connection" [means] in accordance with the connection of that sense organ |
syād etat yadi prathamato 'kṣavyāpārakāle sakalajātyādidharmasamanvitaṃ vastu na bhāsate, tat tarhyuttarakālam api na bhāsetāviśeṣād ity āha na hipraviṣṭamātrāṇām ityādi | This might be objected: if at the first operation of the sense organ the object does not appear as endowed with all its properties such as universals etc., then it should not appear [as such] even later, since there is no difference [between the two situations] - thus [the author] states "for those who have just entered..." etc. |
uṣṇāditi / prabhāsvarāt | [The word] "from heat" [means] from bright [light] |
praviṣṭamātrāṇām iti yojyam / gamyante nendriyair iti / api tu gamyanta eveti kākā darśayati | [This] should be construed as "for those who have just entered from bright [light]" / [As for the phrase] "are not perceived by the senses" - the particular intonation indicates that [objects] are indeed perceived [by the senses] |
evaṃ dṛṣṭāntaṃ prasādhya dārṣṭāntikaṃ upasaṃharann āha yathetyādi | Having thus established the example, [the author], concluding with its application [to the topic at hand], states "just as..." etc. |
yathā svābhāsamātreṇa pūrvaṃ jñātvā svarūpataḥ / paścāt tatra vibuddhyante tathā jātyādidharmataḥ // | Just as one first cognizes [something] through mere appearance in its own form, and subsequently becomes aware of it through [its] class-characteristics and other properties |
yathā garbhagṛhe ābhāsamātraṃ gṛhītvā paścād viśeṣato nīlam ityādinā | Just as in a dark room, having first grasped a mere appearance, one subsequently [cognizes it] specifically as "blue" and so forth |
jānāti, evaṃ svarūpataḥ pūrvaṃ jñātvā paścāj jātyādidharmataḥ pratyakṣavān bhaviṣyatītyadoṣaḥ // | Thus, having first known [something] in its own form and subsequently [knowing it] through class-characteristics and other properties, one will have perceptual cognition – hence there is no fault |
evaṃ tarhi yadyālocanājñānād ūrdhvaṃ punaḥ punar yāvānadhigamas tasya prāṃānyaṃ tadālocanājñānena yadi kaścid ālocya paścāddakṣiṇī nimīlya jātyādidharmato vikalpayati tadāsyāpūrvādhigamo 'stīti tasyāpi pratyakṣatā syād ity āha yadi tvityādi / | If this is so, and if whatever cognition occurs repeatedly after the initial pre-cognitive awareness is valid, then if someone, after having pre-cognized [something] through that pre-cognitive awareness, closes his eyes and conceptualizes [it] through class-characteristics and other properties, since this would be an apprehension of something new, that too would be perception – [responding to this objection], he says "If however..." etc. |
yadi tvālocya saṃmīlya netre kaścid vikalpayet / | If however someone, after having pre-cognized [something] and closing [his] eyes, should conceptualize [it] |
na syāt pratyakṣatā tasya sambandhānanusārataḥ // | That would not be perception, because it does not follow from [sense-organ] contact |
ālocyeti / ālocanājñāne jñātvā / | "Having pre-cognized" means "having known through pre-cognitive awareness" |
netre iti / saṃmīlyeti sambandhaḥ / | "Eyes" is to be construed with "closes" |
sambandhānanusārata iti / akṣasambandhadvāreṇānutpatteḥ / | "Not following from contact" means "because it does not arise through contact with the sense organs" |
yathoktaṃ tenaiva kumārilena ---"evaṃ samāne 'pi vikalpamātre yatrākṣasambandhaphalānusāraḥ / | As stated by Kumārila himself: "Thus even when the conceptual content is the same, where there is accordance with the result of sense-organ contact..." |
pratyakṣatā tasya, tathā ca loke vināpyado lakṣaṇataḥ prasiddham, iti // | Its perceptibility is well-known in the world even without [explicit] definition. |
tadityādinā pratividhatte | [The opponent] responds with [the word] "tat" etc. |
tadayuktaṃ yadi jñānaṃ tat pravṛttaṃ svalakṣaṇe / nāviṣṭābhilāpaṃ taj jātyādigrahaṇe 'pi hi // | If that cognition operates on the svalakṣaṇa [particular], then it should remain free from verbal expression even in the apprehension of universals and other [properties]. |
tathā{cā}vācyamevedaṃ sādhitaṃ prāk svalakṣaṇam / | For it has been proved before that this svalakṣaṇa cannot be expressed in words. |
tasmin vṛttaṃ ca vijñānaṃ niyataṃ nirvikalpakam // | And [therefore] the cognition that operates on it must necessarily be non-conceptual. |
jātyādigrahaṇe 'pītyapiśabdo 'bhyupagame / ekadā tāvajjātyādīnāṃ nirastatvān na santyeva ta iti kutas tadgrahaṇe prāmāṇyam, santu nāma tathāpi tadgrahaṇe ālocanājñānavad uttarakālabhāvināṃ jñānāṃ svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvādavikalpataiva jātyādīnāṃ svalakṣaṇadavyatirekasyābhyupagatatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | The word "api" in "even in the apprehension [of universals]" indicates a concession. In the first place, since universals etc. have been rejected, they do not even exist—so how could there be validity in their apprehension? But even granting that they exist, in their apprehension, the cognitions that arise after [the initial perception], like the initial perceptual awareness, must be non-conceptual because they have the svalakṣaṇa as their object, since universals etc. are accepted to be non-different from the svalakṣaṇa. |
prayogaḥ yat svalakṣaṇagrāhi tadavika[p.387]lpakaṃ, yathālocanājñānam, svalakṣaṇagrāhi cottarapratyakṣatvenābhimataṃjñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The formal argument is: Whatever apprehends the svalakṣaṇa is non-conceptual, like the initial perceptual awareness; and the cognition that is accepted as subsequent perception apprehends the svalakṣaṇa—this is a natural reason. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedaṃ, nacānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, yato 'vācyam evedaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti prāganyāpohe prasādhitam / | This is a prasaṅga argument, and the reason is not inconclusive, because it has been proved before in the Anyāpoha [chapter] that this svalakṣaṇa cannot be expressed in words. |
nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt // | Nor is [the reason] contradictory, since it exists in similar instances. |
jātimātragrahe tu syād ekāntena vibhinnatā / | However, if only the universal were apprehended, there would be absolute difference [between the universal and particular]. |
viśeṣaṇasya naitac ca parair iṣṭaṃ yathoditam // | And this [claim about] the qualifier is not acceptable to the other party, as [he himself] has stated. |
ekāntena vibhinnatā viśeṣaṇasyeti / | [The opponent claims that] "the qualifier has absolute distinctness [from the qualified]." |
viśeṣyād iti śeṣaḥ / naitac ca parair iṣṭam iti / ekāntena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor vibhinnatvam / | [Supply:] "from the qualified." And this is not acceptable to the other party, [namely] this absolute distinction between qualifier and qualified. |
kathaṃ neṣṭam ity āha yathoditam iti / | [If asked:] "How [do we know] it is not acceptable?" [The answer is:] because [he himself] has stated [it] thus. |
kiṃ tadityāha yadītyādi / | [If asked:] "What is that [statement]?" [The answer is given in] "If..." etc. |
yadi hyekāntato bhinnaṃ viśeṣyāt syād viśeṣaṇam / svānurūpāṃ tadā buddhiṃ viśeṣye janayet katham // | "If indeed the qualifier were absolutely distinct from the qualified, then how could it produce in the qualified a cognition conforming to itself?" |
paryāyeṇa bhedasyāpyabhyupagatatvād ekāntata ity āha / | He says "absolutely" because a distinction in an indirect way is indeed accepted. |
tathā hi ---bhinnābhinnasvabhāvā jātyādayas tasyeṣṭā naikāntato bhinnā nāpyabhinnāḥ / | For thus: according to him, universals and so forth have a nature [that is both] different and non-different [from their substrates], neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different. |
buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate / | "Because their cognitions are distinct, oneness cannot apply to color and other [qualities]; |
ekānekatvam iṣṭaṃ vā sattārūpādibhedata" iti / | rather, being-one-and-many is accepted, [as seen] through the distinction between being and color etc." |
punaścoktam "sthitaṃ naiva hi jātyādeḥ paratvaṃ vyaktito hi na" iti | [It has] again been stated: "Indeed, the universal and other [categories] are not different from the particular." |
paratvam iti anyatvam | 'Paratva' means 'difference' [or 'being other']. |
svānurūpām iti viśeṣaṇasvarūpoparaktām | '[In accordance with] its own form' means 'tinged with the nature of the qualifier.' |
yato viśeṣaṇoparaktaṃ viśeṣyaṃ grāhayad viśeṣaṇam ucyate anyathā viśeṣaṇasyānupapannatvād iti bhāvaḥ | Since [something] is called a qualifier [only] when it causes the apprehension of a qualificand that is tinged by [that] qualifier, otherwise the status of being a qualifier would not be possible - this is the meaning. |
yathoktam "svabuddhyā yena rajyeta viśeṣyaṃ tadviśeṣaṇam" | As has been stated: "That by whose cognition the qualificand is colored is [called] its qualifier." |
svasāmānyātmanor yuktaṃ jñānaṃ caikaṃ na vedakam | One and the same cognition cannot properly be the apprehender of both the particular and the universal nature. |
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