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sarpādibhrāntivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | The illusion of a snake etc. is [given as] an example. |
spaṣṭapratibhāsā ca na prāpnotītyayam aparaḥ prasaṅgaḥ / nahi vikalpānuviddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā, sāmānyollekhenaiva tasya pravṛtteḥ // | And [another] undesirable consequence is that [the illusion] would not achieve distinct appearance. For what is mixed with conceptual content cannot have clear appearance of objects, since it operates only through the presentation of universals. |
tadbhāvetyādinā parakīyaṃ dūṣaṇam āśaṅkate | With [the words] beginning "tadbhāve," [the author] anticipates an objection from the opponent. |
tadbhāvābhāvitā sākṣād asiddhā vyabhicāriṇī / | [The argument that illusion exists] directly due to the existence [of the sense organ] is inadmissible and inconclusive. |
pāramparyeṇa sā tasyāṃ smṛtibuddhau samanvayāt // | In its indirect [sense], it [is inconclusive] due to its presence in remembrance [as well]. |
tadvikāravikāritvaṃ pāramparyodbhaveṣyapi / kāryeṣu dṛśyate loke vyaktaṃ vegasarādiṣu // | The modification caused by their disorder is clearly seen even in indirectly produced effects in the world, [as] in [the case of] mules and such [creatures]. |
mānasyo bhrāntayaḥ sarvā nivartante vicārataḥ / ityasmin vyabhicāritvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ // | [The claim that] "all mental illusions cease upon reflection" is inconclusive in view of [our] cognitions of existence and universals. |
vastusvalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravartante svabhāvataḥ / evaṃ tadvinivṛttiścet tulyaṃ candradvayādiṣu // | If [you say] that these [cognitions] do not naturally occur in the specific characteristics of things and thus cease, [then we reply that] the same [applies] to [illusions] like the double moon. |
na sattāvinivṛttiścet samaṃ sāmānyabuddhiṣu / | If [you say] there is no cessation of [their] existence, [then we reply that] the same [applies] to cognitions of universals. |
naceśvarādibhrāntīnāṃ tanmatābhiniveśinām / yuktikoṭiśrave 'pyasti nivṛttiḥ pratyuta svayam / | And for those fixated on such beliefs, the illusions about God and such things do not cease even upon hearing millions of arguments; rather, on their own, |
naitā yuktaya ityevaṃ te vadanti jaḍāḥ punaḥ // | these dull-witted ones declare "these are not [valid] arguments." |
atra yadi sākṣāt tadbhāvabhāvitvaṃ hetus tadānyatarāsiddhatā hetoḥ, nahiparasya sākṣād indriyād utpattirbhrānteḥ siddhā, tasyā eva sādhyatvāt / | If here the reason is that [illusion] is directly caused by the existence [of sense organs], then the reason is inadmissible to one or the other party, because the direct production of illusion from sense organs is not established for the opponent, as that is itself what is to be proved. |
atha sāmānyena tadbhāvabhāvitvaṃ hetus tadānaikāntikatā, smṛtibuddhau vipakṣabhūtāyām api tadbhāvabhāvitvasya samanvayā{pāramparya}dvidyamānatvāt / | If, on the other hand, the reason is that [illusion] is generally caused by their existence, then it is inconclusive, because such existence-causation is found even in memory-cognition, which is a counter-example, through indirect [causation]. |
yacca tadvikāravikāritvaṃ tadapi sākṣād asiddham, pāramparyeṇāpyupādīyamānamanaikāntikameva / | And as for the modification caused by their disorder, that too is inadmissible in the direct sense, and even when taken in the indirect sense, it is indeed inconclusive. |
yato 'ścāyāṃ gardabhena jātasya vegasarasya kalalādyavasthāvyavadhāne 'pi gardabharūpānukāreṇa tadvikāritvasya paścād darśanādato nāsmāt sākṣād utpattiḥ sidhyati / | As in the case of a mule which is born from a mare [impregnated] by an ass - even though embryonic and other stages intervene - [its] resemblance to the ass-form is only seen afterwards, therefore direct production from it [i.e. the ass] is not established. |
mānasī ca bhrāntir vicārān nivartata ityatrāpyanaikāntikatvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ / | And regarding the [claim] that "mental illusion ceases upon reflection" - this too is inconclusive due to [our continued] cognitions of existence and universals. |
nahi bhavatāṃ yuktyā sāmānyābhāvamavagacchatām api bhāveṣu ghaṭādiṣu bhāva iti vā sāmānyam iti vā sāmānyākāro vikalpo nivartate / | For even though you [Buddhists], through reasoning, understand the non-existence of universals, [your] conceptual cognition of the universal-form regarding things like pots as either "existing" or as "universal" does not cease. |
atha manyase nivartanta eva yuktyā vicārayataḥ sāmānyabuddhayaḥ svalakṣaṇenaitāḥ pravartanta ityanenākāreṇeti / | If you think that "when one reflects through reasoning, these cognitions of universals do indeed cease through the notion that 'these operate [only] with reference to the particular characteristic'..." |
candradvayādibuddhayo 'pi yuktyā vicārayataḥ svalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravartanta ityanenākāreṇa nivartanta eva / | [Then we reply:] The cognitions of two moons and so forth also cease through reflection by reasoning, through the notion that "these do not operate with reference to the particular characteristic." |
na ca tāvatā mānasyo bhavanti / | And they do not thereby become mental [illusions]. |
sattā tāsāṃ na nivartata iti cet tattulyaṃ sāmānyabuddhibhiḥ / | If [you say] that "their existence does not cease" - [we reply that] the same applies to cognitions of universals. |
nahi tāsām api svabhāvo nivartate / | For their essential nature also does not cease. |
tadbhāvabhāvitetyādinā pratividhatte tadbhāvabhāvitā sākṣān na siddhābhrāntacetasā / vyavadhānaṃ na siddhaṃ hi na hi tadvedyate 'ntarā // | [When it is said that] "it is conditioned by that existence," etc. - this conditioning cannot be directly established by an undeluded mind, for the intervention is not established, since no such [intervention] is perceived in between. |
apyarthāsaktacitto 'pi dvicandrādi samīkṣate / | Even one whose mind is not engaged with [other] objects perceives two moons and such things. |
avicchinnamato nāsti pāramparyasamudbhavaḥ // bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnāṃ pratisaṃhārasambhave / nivṛttiḥ sambhavatyeva svecchayeśamater api // | Therefore, since [the perception is] uninterrupted, there is no indirect arising. When there is possibility of withdrawal of cognitions of existence and universals, cessation is indeed possible, even for one of sovereign intellect, if [one] wishes. |
nāsiddhā api tu siddhaiva, kasmāt/ abhrāntenaikacandracetasā vyavadhānāsiddheḥ / tasyopalabhyasyāntarāle 'nupalabhyamanatvāt / | [It is] not inadmissible but rather admissible. Why? Because there is no intervention by the unmistaken cognition of the single moon, [and] because while that [intervention] would be perceivable if present, [it is] not perceived in between. |
etad evānyārthetyādinā spaṣṭīkurute / | This very [point] is clarified by [the phrase] beginning with "anyārtha" ["for another object"]. |
avicchinnaṃ dvicandrādīti sambandhanīyam / | "Uninterrupted" is to be connected with "[the perception] of the double moon and so forth." |
ata eva tadvikāravikāritvasyāpyavyabhicāraḥ / nahi tadapi vyavahitaṃ, yena vegasarādibhir vyabhicāraḥ syāt / | For this very reason, there is also no deviation in [the case of] the transformation being caused by its [sense organ's] transformation. For that too is not interrupted, whereby there could be deviation through [cases like that of] the mule and so forth. |
bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnām api yadecchayā saṃhāraṃ kurute tadā nivṛttir astyeva / | When one withdraws at will even the cognitions of existence and universals, then there indeed is cessation [of them]. |
natu keśoṇḍrakādibuddhīnām icchayā saṃhāraḥ sambhavatīti nānaikāntikatā/ | But for cognitions of [illusions] like the hair-tuft etc., withdrawal at will is not possible, hence there is no inconclusiveness. |
indriyajñānasyāpi cakṣuṣīcchayā nimīlite nivṛttir icchāvaśāt sambhavatīti cet / | If [someone objects] that "even for sense perception, cessation at will is possible when the eyes are closed by volition"... |
nahi samanantaramicchānivṛttau nivartate cakṣur vijñānam / | Visual cognition does not cease immediately upon the arising of the wish [to cease it]. |
cakṣur nimīlanaṃ tāvadicchāvaśād bhavati tato nivṛtte cakṣuṣi tajjñānaṃ nivartate mānasī tu bhrāntiḥ sākṣādicchāvaśān nivartata iti na samānam / | The closing of the eyes occurs first through volition, then when the eyes have ceased [functioning], that cognition ceases; but mental illusion ceases directly through volition - thus [the cases are] not similar. |
itthaṃ caitad avaseyam yataḥ praṇihite cakṣuṣi draṣṭumaniṣyamāṇo 'pyartho dṛśyata evāto necchāyāścakṣurādijñāne sākṣāt sāmarthyam // | And this should be understood thus: because when the eyes are directed [at something], even an object one does not wish to see is indeed seen; therefore volition has no direct power over visual and other [sense] cognitions. |
pītaśaṅkhādibuddhīnāṃ vibhrame 'pi pramāṇatām / arthakriyāvisaṃvādādapare sampracakṣate // | Some [philosophers] declare that cognitions such as [that of] the yellow conch-shell, even though illusory, are valid means of knowledge due to their non-contradiction with purposeful action. |
kecit tu svayūthyā evābhrāntagrahaṇaṃ necchanti / | Some [thinkers] belonging to our own school [of Buddhism] do not accept the inclusion of the qualification "non-erroneous" [in the definition of perception]. |
bhrāntasyāpi pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya pratyakṣatvāt / | [This is] because even the erroneous cognition of [things] like the yellow conch-shell is [a form of] perception. |
tathā hi na tadanumānamaliṅgajatvāt / pramāṇaṃ cāvisaṃvāditvāt / | For it cannot be inference, since it does not arise from a logical mark, and [it must be] a valid means of knowledge because it is non-contradictory. |
ata evācāryadiṅnāgena lakṣaṇe na kṛtamabhrāntagrahaṇam / | For this very reason, Ācārya Diṅnāga did not include the qualification "non-erroneous" in [his] definition. |
bhrāntiḥ saṃvṛttiḥ sājñānamanumānetyādinā pratyakṣābhāsanirdeśādisaṃvādikalpanāpoḍhamityevaṃvidhamiṣṭamācāryasya lakṣaṇam / sataimiram iti tu timiraśabdo 'yam ajñānaparyāyaḥ / timiraghnaṃ ca mandānām iti yathā / | By mentioning error, convention, ignorance, and inference as mere semblances of perception, [it is clear that] the teacher intended a definition [of perception] as being free from conceptual construction and non-contradictory. The word "timira" [when used] in [the compound] "sataimiram" is synonymous with ignorance, as in [the expression] "timiraghnaṃ ca mandānām." |
timire bhavaṃ taimiraṃ visaṃvādakam ity arthaḥ // | That which arises from timira [darkness/ignorance] is "taimira," meaning "contradictory." |
tannetyādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds to this with [the words] beginning with "That is not [correct]." |
tannādhyavasitākārapratirūpā na vidyate / tatrāpyarthakriyāvāptiranyathātiprasajyate // | This is not correct, [because] the effective action does not correspond to the form that is determined [in the cognition]; otherwise, undesirable consequences would follow. |
keśādipratibhāse ca jñāne saṃvādibhāvataḥ / | And in the cognition where there appears [floating] hair and such things, there is compatibility [only with certain aspects, such as light]. |
ālokāder atas tasya durnivārā pramāṇatā // | Hence the validity of this [cognition] from light etc. would be irresistible [under the opponent's view]. |
prāmāṇyaṃ hi bhaddvābhyām ākārābhyāṃ bhavati, yathāpratibhāsamavisaṃvādādyathādhyavasāyāṃ vā / | The validity of a cognition indeed occurs in two forms: [either] through non-contradiction of what appears, or through [non-contradiction of] what is ascertained. |
tatreha na yathāpratibhāsamavisaṃvādaḥ, pītasya pratibhāsanāt tasya yathābhūtasyāprāpteḥ / | In this case, there is no non-contradiction according to appearance, because while yellow appears [in cognition], it is not obtained as such in reality. |
nāpi yathādhyavasāyamavisaṃvādaḥ, pītasyaiva viśiṣṭārthakriyākāritvenādhyavasāyāt, na ca tadrūpārthakriyāprāptir asti / | Nor is there non-contradiction according to ascertainment, because while the yellow [object] itself is ascertained as having the capacity for a specific purposeful action, no purposeful action of that form is actually obtained. |
na cānadhyavasitārthāvisaṃvādenāpi prāmāṇyam atiprasaṅgāt / | And validity cannot [arise] even through non-contradiction of what is not ascertained, because [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
keśādijñāne 'pi hyanadhyavasitālokādiprāpteḥ // | Because even in the cognition of hair-nets etc., [only] the unascertained light etc. is obtained. |
na varṇavyatiriktaṃ ca saṃsthānamupapadyate / | And shape cannot be established as separate from color. |
subodham // | This is easily understood. |
yadyākāramanādṛtya prāmāṇyaṃ ca prakalpyate / arthakriyāvisaṃvādāt tadrūpo hyarthaniścayaḥ // ityādigaditaṃ sarvaṃ kathaṃ na vyāhataṃ bhavet / vāsanāpākahetūtthastasmāt saṃvādasambhavaḥ // | If validity were to be assumed without regard to form, [merely] from non-contradiction of purposeful action, then how would all that has been stated [by you] not be contradicted, [namely] that "the ascertainment of an object indeed has its form"? Therefore, the possibility of correspondence [in such cases] arises only from the maturation of latent impressions. |
naiva hyarthakriyāvisaṃvāditvamātreṇākāramanapekṣya prāmāṇyaṃ, kalpanīyam viṣayākārasyāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt / | Indeed, validity should not be assumed merely through non-contradiction of purposeful action while disregarding form, because [this would lead to] the unwanted consequence of invalidity of the object's form [itself]. |
Here are the sentence pairs with precise translations: | null |
tadrūpa iti / jñānasthābhāsarūpaḥ / | "In the form of that" means [the object appears] in the form manifested in cognition. |
ādiśabdena yathā yathā hyarthasyākāraḥ śubhrāditvena sanniviśate tadrūpaḥsa viṣayaḥ pramīyata ityādikam ācāryīyaṃ vacanaṃ virudhyata iti darśayati / | By the word "ādi" it is shown that [this view] contradicts the Teacher's statement that "in whatever form the object appears, such as whiteness etc., in that very form the object is correctly cognized." |
arthakriyāsaṃvādas tu pūrvārthānubhavavāsanāparipākād eva pramāṇāntarād bhavatīty avaseyam / | The correspondence with practical efficacy should be understood as arising from the maturation of impressions from previous experiences of objects through other means of valid cognition. |
pītaśaṅkhajñānasya vāsanāparipākahetuḥ śukla eva śaṅkhas tadādhipatyenatat paripākāt / | The cause of the maturation of impressions of the cognition of [the] yellow conch-shell is indeed the white conch-shell, due to its predominance in that maturation. |
vāsanāparipākahetutaḥ samutthānaṃ yasyāvisaṃvādasya sa tathoktaḥ // | That non-contradiction which arises from the cause of the maturation of impressions is described as such. |
sukhādīnāṃ kathaṃ saṃvedanapratyakṣatetyāha mānasetyādi / | [The author] explains how pleasure and other [sensations] have the nature of perceptual awareness by saying "through mental [perception]" etc. |
mānasendriyavijñānanirvikalpatvasādhane / yo nyāyaḥ sa sukhādīnām avikalpatvasādhakaḥ // | Whatever reasoning [is used] in establishing the non-conceptual nature of mental sense-organ cognition, that [same reasoning] establishes the non-conceptual nature of pleasure etc. |
yo nyāya iti / aśakyasamayatvādiḥ / | "Whatever reasoning" means the impossibility of convention etc. |
mānasasya yady api nokto nyāyastathāpi ya indriyajñāne nyāyo 'śakyasamayatvaṃ sa tasyāpi tulya eva / | Although this reasoning has not been stated for mental [cognition], nevertheless the reasoning of impossibility of convention which [applies] to sense cognition applies equally to that [mental cognition] as well. |
yadvā yogijñānam iha mānasaṃ, tac ca vakṣyamāṇam / | Or the mental [cognition] here refers to yogic cognition, which will be explained later. |
siddhāntaprasiddhatvān mānasasyātra na lakṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ / | The definition of mental [cognition] is not given here because it is well-established in [Buddhist] doctrine. |
pramāṇenābādhitatvam ācāryeṇaiva pratipāditam iti na pratipādyata iti bhāvaḥ // | The meaning is that since the Teacher himself has established that [this view] is not contradicted by any valid means of knowledge, it is not [further] established [here]. |
avedakatā ityādinā vaiśeṣikamatamāśaṅkate / | With [the words] beginning with "non-apprehension," [the author] raises an objection from the Vaiśeṣika view. |
avedakāḥ parasyāpi svavidbhājaḥ kathaṃ nu te / ekārthāśritavijñānavedyāstvete bhavanti cet // | "If they are non-apprehensive even of other [things], how can they share in self-awareness? Rather, these become cognizable [only] through the cognition that inheres in the same object." |
na kevalaṃ svasaṃvedanā na bhavanti, bāhyasyāpyarthasyāvedakāḥ / | [They say that these sensations] not only lack self-awareness, but are also non-apprehensive of external objects. |
na jñānasvabhāvā iti yāvat / ekasminnātmani samavetena tu jñānena vedyanta iti teṣāṃ siddhāntaḥ // | [It means] that [pleasure etc.] are not of the nature of cognition; rather their position is that [these] are cognized by cognition which inheres in the same Soul [as themselves]. |
nairantaryetyādinā pratividhatte / | [This] is answered by [the words] beginning with "nairantarya" [in the following verses]. |
sukhādi vedyate kasmāt tasmin kāle nirantaram // mānasenaiva yadvedyamiṣyate cetasā na ca / tat kāle tasya sadbhāvaḥ kramajanmopavarṇanāt // | Why is pleasure etc. cognized continuously at that [same] time? What is accepted as being cognized by mental [perception] cannot [be cognized] by consciousness [then], because at that time its existence [is impossible] due to the description of sequential origination. |
janmaiva yaugapadyena neṣyate na punaḥ sthitiḥ / iti cen na sthitis tasya kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt // | If [you say] that "only simultaneous origination is denied, not simultaneous existence," [we reply that] there can be no [such] existence, because momentariness has been established. |
āśuvṛtteḥ sakṛdbhranatir iti cet sāpyapākṛtā / | If [you say] that "there is an illusion of simultaneity due to quick succession," that too has been refuted. |
vispaṣṭapratibhāso hi na syāt smaraṇagocare // | For there could not be clear appearance in what is in the domain of memory. |
śātāśātādirūpā ca sā bhrāntir yadi kalpyate / tadā prāptā sukhādīnāṃ sattā tanmātralakṣaṇā // | If that illusion is assumed to be in the form of [being] pleasant and unpleasant, then the existence of pleasure etc. would turn out to be characterized by just that [i.e., self-cognition]. |
yadā ca yogino 'nyeṣām adhyakṣeṇa sukhādikam / vidanti tulyānubhavāt tadūtte 'pi syurāturāḥ // | And when yogins perceive directly the pleasure etc. of others, then due to similar experience, they too would become distressed [at others' pain]. |
svasminnapi hi duḥkhasya sattaivānubhavo na te / | For according to you, even in one's own case, the experience [of pain] is not the mere existence of pain. |
kiṃ tu tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ taccāsti parasantatau // | Rather, [it is] the cognition which has that [pain] as its object, and that [cognition] exists in another series. |
paraduḥkhānumāne ca tulyametat tathā hi tat / {anumānaṃ sa}viṣayaṃ varṇyate na tvagocaram // | The same [principle] applies to the inference of another's pain, for inference has been described [by others] as having an object, not as being without a domain. |
anena pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣaviruddhatām āha yadā bāhyavastvavalambanajñānasamakālaṃ sukhādayo 'nubhūyante, tadā katamenaikārthāśrayiṇā jñānenavedyeran | This shows the contradiction between [their] proposition and perceptible facts. When pleasures and other [feelings] are experienced simultaneously with the cognition of the external object on which they depend, by which single cognition residing in the same substratum could they be apprehended? |
na tāvat tenaiva bāhyā[p.397]lambane na cakṣurādijñānena, tasya bāhyālambanatvāt | [They could] certainly not [be apprehended] by that same visual or other sensory cognition of the external object, since that [cognition] has an external object as its basis. |
antaḥsaṃvedyamānatvācca sukhādīnāṃ mānasenaiva cetasā vedyatveneṣṭatvāt | And since pleasures and other [feelings] are internally experienced, they are accepted as being cognizable only by mental consciousness. |
naca tasminkāle mānasasya cetasaḥ sambhavaḥ, krameṇaiva jñānātyutpadyante | And at that time mental consciousness is not possible, since cognitions arise only in succession. |
athāpi syājjanmaiva jñānānāṃ krameṇābhyupagataṃ na sthitir iti | One might object: "Only the birth of cognitions is accepted as successive, not their duration." |
etaccāsamyak | This is not correct. |
sarvajanmināṃ kṣaṇikatvasya prasādhitatvāt | Because it has been established that everything that is born has only momentary existence. |
āśu vṛttyā sakṛdbhrāntir api yā sāpāstaiva pūrvam | The [explanation] that "there is merely an illusion [of simultaneity] due to rapid succession" has already been refuted. |
kiñca āhlādaparitāpirūpeṇa spaṣṭaḥ pratibhāso na prāpnoti, vikalpaviṣayatve sati sukhādīnāṃ mānasenaiva cetasā vedyatvenābhyupagamāt | Moreover, [on this view] clear appearance in the form of joy and distress would not be possible, since pleasures and other [feelings] are accepted as being cognizable only by mental consciousness when they have conceptual content. |
tasya ca savikalpakatvāt | And because that [mental consciousness] is conceptual in nature. |
na ca vikalpānubaddhasya sparṣṭārthapratibhāsitā / | And what is bound up with conceptual thought cannot [make] the appearance of tangible objects clear. |
asmābhistu svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena janitasyaiva pratyakṣatvenābhyupetatvāt / | According to our view, what is accepted as perception is only that which is produced by sense-cognition assisted by [its] own object [and] the immediately subsequent object. |
api ca grāhyatve sati sukhādīnāṃ vicchinnapratibhāsitā syānnīlādivat / | Moreover, if pleasure and so forth were actually graspable [objects], their manifestation would be as something distinct [from cognition], like blue and other [colors]. |
na ca jñānādvicchinnasya śātādirūpasyopalabdhiḥ / | And there is no apprehension of the pleasant and so forth as separate from cognition. |
jñānābhedena śatādirūpasya grahaṇaṃ bhrāntir iti cet / | If [someone says] that "the grasping of the pleasant and so forth as non-different from cognition is an error," |
evaṃ tarhi siddhā sukhādīnāṃ sattā svasaṃvidrūpā / | then in that case the existence of pleasure and so forth is established as identical with self-awareness. |
śātādirūpamātralakṣaṇatvāt sukhādīnām / | Because pleasure and so forth are characterized solely by their pleasant nature and so forth. |
tadrūpatā cej jñānasya siddhā, siddhā jñānasvabhāvāḥ sukhādayaḥ / | And if that nature is established for cognition, then pleasure and so forth are established as having the nature of cognition. |
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