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nirbhāsijñānapakṣe hi grāhyād bhede 'pi cetasaḥ / pratibimbasya tādrūpyād bhāktaṃ syād api vedanam // | For in the doctrine of cognition as [mere] appearance, even though consciousness differs from the apprehended [object], due to the similarity of the reflection, the cognition would be [only] metaphorical. |
yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānam arthasārūpyabhājanam / tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane // | But for one who does not accept that cognition is a receptacle of the similarity with objects, even this method of cognizing external objects does not exist. |
sa iti / | [The text continues with] "sa" etc. |
sārūpyasambhava ākāro vā | [It stands for] the possibility of similarity of form, or the form [itself]. |
nirbhāso viṣayasārūpyaṃ, tadyasyāsti tannirbhāsi | nirbhāsa [means] similarity of form with the object, and that which possesses this [similarity of form] is [called] nirbhāsi. |
grāhyād iti / bāhyādarthāt | [It arises] from the grasped object, i.e., from the external object. |
pratibimbasyeti / jñānākārasya | [It] belongs to the reflection, i.e., to the form of cognition. |
tādrūpyād iti / viṣayasārūpyāt / bhāktam iti | [It arises] from similarity of form, i.e., from similarity with the object. [It is] figurative. |
vedanam iti / arthasyeti śeṣaḥ | "Cognition," i.e., [cognition] of the object [is to be supplied]. |
bhājanam āśrayaḥ | A receptacle [means] a substratum. |
viṣayavipratipattis tu sāmānyasya vastubhūtasya nirākaraṇād vastuviṣayatveneṣṭasya pratyakṣasya nānyaḥ svalakṣaṇād viṣayo 'stīti sāmarthyād upadarśitatvān na pṛthaṅnirākṛtā | The divergence of opinion regarding the object [of cognition] has not been separately refuted, because the universal as a real entity has been [already] rejected, [and] because it has been implicitly shown that perception, which is accepted as having a real entity as its object, has no other object than the particular. |
ye tvāhurayuktam evedaṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam, lakṣaṇaṃ hi pramāṇasya praṇīyate | Some say that this definition of perception is improper, for a definition of a means of valid cognition is given [with a purpose] |
api nāma tena rūpeṇopalakṣya pramāṇaṃ tataḥ pareṣāṃ pravṛttiḥ, syād iti, na tu vyasanitayā, na ca kalpanāpoḍhatvādinopalakṣitasyāpi pravartakatvaṃ nivartakatvaṃ vā samasti loka iti | [namely] that others may recognize the means of valid cognition by that characteristic and then engage in activity, and not merely out of [scholarly] obsession; and [they say] that in the ordinary world, [something] characterized by "freedom from conceptual content" etc. has neither prompting nor restraining power. |
tadasamyak | That [statement] is incorrect. |
nahi svecchayā vastūnāṃ svabhāvavyavasthānaṃ kartuṃ labhyaṃ yenānyathā | For indeed the essential nature of things cannot be established according to one's mere wish, by which [one could frame] otherwise |
praṇīyeta lakṣaṇam, api tu yathāvasthitam eva vastusvarūpamanūdya prasiddhasvabhāvaviśeṣapratipipādayiṣayā lakṣaṇaṃ praṇayanti tadvidaḥ | [one could] frame a definition, but rather the experts frame a definition by following exactly the true nature of the thing as it exists [and] with the desire to establish its well-known particular characteristic |
yathā pṛthivyāḥ khaṣkhaṭatvaṃ | Just as [one defines] roughness as [the characteristic] of Earth |
anyathā hyasambhavitādoṣeṇa duṣṭaṃ syāt | For otherwise, it would be defective due to the fault of impossibility |
naca pratyakṣasya kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntatvābhyāmanyallakṣaṇamupalakṣakam asti | And there is no other defining characteristic of perception besides [its being] free from conceptual construction and [its being] non-erroneous |
tathā hi tadavaśyabhrāntamaṅgīkartavyaṃ pramāṇatvāt | For thus it must necessarily be accepted as non-erroneous because of [its] being a valid means of knowledge |
kalpanāpoḍhaṃ ca sākṣāt svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt | And [it is] free from conceptual construction because [it] directly has the particular as its object |
svalakṣaṇasya cāśakyasamayatvena tat saṃvitter anabhijalpatvasya prasādhitatvāt | And because it has been established that due to the particular's being impossible to conventionalize, its cognition must be free from verbal association |
ato nyāyānuyātameva lakṣaṇam eva tadācakṣate kuśalāḥ | Therefore the skilled ones declare this definition to be precisely in accordance with reason |
na cāpyato lakṣaṇāt prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛttinivṛttī na bhavataḥ | And it is not [true] that from this definition there does not arise both activity and cessation [of activity] for discriminating persons |
tathā hi ghaṭotkṣepaṇasāmānyasaṅkhyādijñānasya pratyabhijñāpratyayasyaca tathā pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya paraiḥ pratyakṣatvenopakalpitasya yathāyogaṃ savikalpakatvena bhrāntatvena vā pratyakṣatvamavadhārya tadviṣayatvenopakalpitasya saṅkhyāder vastutvābhiniveśānnivartante | For thus having ascertained that cognitions such as [those] of a pot, throwing upward, universals, numbers etc., and recognition-cognitions, as well as cognitions such as [that] of a yellow conch-shell (which others consider to be perception) are either conceptual or erroneous respectively, [people] desist from the insistence on the reality of numbers etc. that were considered to be objects of that [perception] |
yac ca nirdeśyaṃ nīlādi svalakṣaṇaṃ tadeva vastvityavasāya tatra pravartante / | And they conclude that only that which is the inexpressible specific characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of [things] like blue is [truly] an entity, and hence they engage in activity towards that. |
yathā ca nirvikalpasyāpi pratyakṣasya pravartakatvaṃ tathā prāguktam eva / | And how even non-conceptual perception can lead to activity has already been explained before. |
yadyevaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvam evaikaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ kartuṃ yuktaṃ natvabhrāntam iti / | If this is so, then it would be proper to make only "being free from conceptual construction" the [single] characteristic [of perception], but not [to include] "being non-erroneous." |
tathā hi pravṛtteḥ prāgyadeva siddhaṃ rūpaṃ tadeva pravṛttikāmānāṃ lakṣaṇatvena praṇetuṃ yuktaṃ nāprasiddham asattulyatvāt tasya / | For only that form which is established prior to activity should be presented as a characteristic for those who desire to engage in activity, not [something] unknown, since that [unknown] is equivalent to non-existent. |
nacābhrāntatvaniścayo 'rthakriyāsaṃvādāt prāgasti / | And there is no determination of non-erroneousness prior to the correspondence with purposeful action. |
na hyarvāgdarśanāsztatkāryādhigamamantareṇa yathārthatāṃ jñānasya jñātumīśate teṣāṃ nityaṃ | For those of limited vision are not able to know the truth-conformity of cognition without understanding its effects. |
padārthaśakteḥ kāryānumeyatvāt / | Because the power of objects is [only] inferable from [their] effects. |
yathopadarśitārthaprāpaṇasāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāc ca yathārthatāyāḥ / | And because truth-conformity consists in the capacity to lead to the attainment of objects, as has been shown. |
na cottarakālaṃ yathārthatāvadhāraṇe 'pi sāphalyam asti tataḥ punar apravṛtteḥ / | And there would be no use in determining truth-conformity at a later time, since there is no further activity after that. |
tadetad acodyam / | This is not a [valid] objection. |
tathā hi keśoṇḍrakādibuddhīnām api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgān mābhūd ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣa ityato 'vaśyakaraṇīyamabhrāntagrahaṇam ityuktam / | For it has been explained that the inclusion of "non-erroneous" is necessary to prevent the definitional fault of over-extension, since [otherwise] even cognitions of [illusory things] like hair-tufts [in the sky] would [absurdly] be valid cognitions. |
yaścāpi pravṛtteḥ prāganiścayaheturarvāgdarśitvam ucyate, so 'pyanaikānta eva / | And what is said about limited vision being the reason for uncertainty prior to activity is also inconclusive. |
ko hyatra pratibandho yadarvāg darśibhir na kvacit sāmarthyaṃ niścitavyam iti / | For what restriction is there that those of limited vision cannot ascertain capacity in any case? |
evaṃ hi na kiñcittairniśceyam iti prāptam / | For [if that were so], it would follow that they could not ascertain anything at all. |
tataścācetanatvam eva teṣām āyātam / | From this it would follow that they [animals, infants] are unconscious beings. |
yāvatā paśuśiśavo 'pyabhyāsabalād udbhūtabhūtajñānavāsanāvṛttayaḥ sukhasya sādhanametad etad asukhasyeti pravṛtteḥ prāgapi niścitya prapātādi pariharantaḥ stanādi copādadānāḥ saṃdṛśyanta eva / | Because even animals and infants, through the power of repeated experience [abhyāsa], having their impressions of past cognitions awakened, are observed to determine even before [their present] activity that "this is a means of pleasure" [and] "this [is a means] of pain," avoiding precipices and seeking mother's breasts. |
tathāhyabhūtam api bhāvayatāṃ kāmaśokabhayādyupaplutacetasāmanapekṣitasādharmyādismṛter abhyāsasya sphuṭapratibhāsasya jñānotpādanasāmarthyam upalabhyata eva / | Indeed, even in the case of those whose minds are disturbed by desire, grief, fear and so forth, who are contemplating something non-existent, without recourse to memory of similarity etc., the mere repetition of vivid appearance is observed to have the capacity to produce cognition. |
yatra tu punar nābhyāsas tatra teṣāṃ kāryānumeyaiva śaktir na tu sarvatra / | However, where there is no repetition, in that case alone their potency is only to be inferred from effects, [but] not everywhere. |
etena dhūmādiliṅganiścayo 'pi vyākhyātaḥ / | By this [same principle] the certainty regarding inferential marks like smoke is also explained. |
yatas tatrāpi tadatatkāryasya dhūmādeḥ prakṛtyā parasparamatyantaviviktasvabhāvatvāt, tadvivekaniścayasya cābhyāsādihetutvāl liṅganiścayasambhavād ato nānumānapratikṣepaḥ / | Because there too, since the effect such as smoke is by nature entirely distinct from [its cause], and since the certainty of this distinction is due to repeated observation and so forth, the certainty regarding the inferential mark becomes possible; therefore there is no rejection of inference. |
natvādyāyāṃ pravṛttau satyām abhyāsaḥ sidhyati, yāvatā saiva kathaṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam / | But [the objection is that] repetition cannot be established when the first activity occurs, so it must be explained how that [first activity] itself comes about. |
ucyate saṃśayāt / | It is said: [it comes about] from doubt. |
saṃśayahetoḥ pratyakṣasya kathaṃ tatra prāmāṇyam iti cet / | [Objection:] "How can there be validity in that perception which causes doubt?" |
niścayahetor api kathaṃ prāmāṇyam / | [Response:] How can there be validity even in [perception] which causes certainty? |
avasāyotpādanād arthinas tatra pravartanād iti cet / | [Objection:] "Because it produces determination and [because] one who desires [the object] acts upon it." |
tadetat saṃśayahetor api tulyam / | This [argument] applies equally to [perception] which is the cause of doubt. |
yadyapi tatra pratīyamānārthitārthakāraviparīto vyavasāyaḥ, tathāpi na tenākāreṇa tasya pratyakṣasya pravartakatvam, tathāvasitasyānarthitatvāt / | Although in this case the determination [of the object] is contrary to the form of the desired object being cognized, nevertheless that perception does not lead to activity in that form, because what is thus determined is not what is desired. |
nāpi nivartakatvaṃ, pratīyamānaprārthitārthādhyavasāyahetutvenārthinaḥ | Nor does [this perception] lead to desisting [from activity], because the person desiring [the object acts] only due to determination of the desired object being cognized. |
anyathā hi saṃśayahetoḥ pratyakṣād arthī na pravarteta nāpi nivarteteti praptaṃ, na caivaṃ bhavati, api tv arthinām asambhāvitānarthodayānām arthitayāpravṛtter eva balīyastvam / | For otherwise it would follow that from perception causing doubt, one desiring [an object] would neither act nor desist [from acting], but this is not the case; rather, the activity becomes even stronger for those desiring [objects] who do not anticipate any disadvantageous consequences. |
anena cāṃśena niścayahetoḥ pratyakṣād asya na kaścid viśeṣaḥ / | And in this respect there is no difference between this [perception causing doubt] and perception causing certainty. |
yatra tvekāntena pratīyamānārthaviparītākārāvasāyahetutvameva, avasāyānutpādakatvaṃ vā, tatra tasya sarvārthārthino 'pravartanād aprāmāṇyameveti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ nānyatra | However, where [perception] either causes determination of a form entirely contrary to the object being cognized, or causes no determination at all - there, because it does not lead to activity for someone seeking any object, it is reasonable to say that only there is [perception] invalid, not elsewhere. |
iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā // | Thus [ends] the examination of the characteristics of perception. |
svaparārthavibhāgena tvanumānaṃ dvidheṣyate / | Inference is considered to be of two kinds through the division into [inference] for oneself and [inference] for others. |
svārthaṃ trirūpato liṅgād anumeyārthadarśanam // | Inference for oneself is the cognition of the object to be inferred from a probans possessing three characteristics. |
trirūpaliṅgavacanaṃ parārthaṃ punar ucyate / | [The] inference for the benefit of others [parārtha] is declared [to be] the statement of the three-featured probans. |
ekaikadvidvirūpo 'rtho liṅgābhāsas tato mataḥ // | A probans having only one [or] two features [out of the three] is therefore considered [to be] a pseudo-probans [liṅgābhāsa]. |
anumānaṃ svārthaparārthabhedena dvividham / | Inference is of two kinds, distinguished as [being either] for oneself [svārtha] or for others [parārtha]. |
tatra svārthaṃ yat trirūpāl liṅgāt pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vikaṣāc ca sarvato vyāvṛttir ityevaṃlakṣaṇād anumeyārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tadātmakaṃ boddhavyam / | Of these, [inference] for oneself should be understood as that cognition which has an inferrable object as its content [and] which [arises] from a three-featured probans characterized by: presence in the subject [pakṣadharmatva], presence in similar cases [sapakṣe sattva], and complete absence from dissimilar cases [vipakṣāt sarvato vyāvṛtti]. |
parārthaṃ tu yathoktatrirūpaliṅgaprakāśakavacanātmakaṃ draṣṭavyam / | [Inference] for others, however, should be understood as consisting in verbal expression that reveals the aforementioned three-featured probans. |
nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvān mūrtatvād aprameyatvādityekaikarūpo yathākramaṃ pakṣadharmatvasapakṣasattvavipakṣavyāvṛttimātrasya vidyamānatvāt / | [In the inference] "Sound is eternal because it is produced, because it is corporeal, because it is non-cognizable," [each reason] has only one feature respectively, as only presence in the subject, presence in similar cases, or absence from dissimilar cases exists [in each case]. |
tatra dvidvirūpo yathā dhvaniranityaścākṣuṣatvāc chrāvaṇatvād amūrtatvād iti yathākramaṃ pakṣasattvasapakṣasattvavipakṣavyāvṛttimātrābhāvāt / | In this [regard, a probans] having [only] two features [is exemplified] as "Sound is non-eternal because it is visible, because it is audible, because it is incorporeal," as [each reason] respectively lacks either presence in the subject, presence in similar cases, or absence from dissimilar cases. |
taduktam | This has been stated [as follows]: |
"kṛtaktavād dhvanir nityo mūttatvād aprameyataḥ / | "Sound is eternal because it is produced, because it is corporeal, [and] because it is non-cognizable; |
amūttaśrāvaṇatvābhyam anityaścākṣuṣatvataḥ" // | and [sound is] non-eternal because of [its] being incorporeal, because of [its] being audible, [and] because of [its] being visible." |
iti // | Thus [ends the quotation]. |
anyathānupapannatve nanu dṛṣṭā suhetutā / | Indeed, when there is no other possible explanation, [this] is seen [to be] good reasoning. |
nāsati tryaṃśakasyāpi tasmān klībāstrilakṣaṇāḥ // | Therefore even with the three aspects [being present], the three-featured [probans] are impotent. |
sa hy āha anyathānupapannatva eva hetur na tu punas trilakṣaṇaḥ. | For he [Pātrasvāmin] says: "The probans is [valid] only when it is otherwise impossible, not merely when it has three features." |
tathā hy asatyanyathānupapannatve tryaṃśakasyāpi tat putratvāder na dṛṣṭā suhetutā / tasmāt klībāḥ asaktāḥ, trilakṣaṇā hetava iti / | For thus, when there is no [property of being] otherwise impossible, even with three aspects [present], as in [the case of] being someone's son and so forth, no valid probative force is observed. Therefore the three-featured probans are impotent [and] ineffective. |
anyatheti / sādhyena vinānupapannatvaṃ, hetoḥ sādhya eva sattvam ity arthaḥ // | The term "otherwise" [means] impossibility without the probandum—that is, the existence of the probans only in the probandum. |
anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsau hetur iṣyate / | That which has [the property of being] otherwise impossible is accepted as a probans. |
ekalakṣaṇakaḥ so 'rthaś catur lakṣaṇako na vā // | This thing [i.e. probans] may be one-featured or may not be four-featured. |
ekaṃ lakṣaṇam anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsti sa ekalakṣaṇaḥ. | That which has only one characteristic—[namely] being otherwise impossible—is one-featured. |
sa eva laukikaiḥ parīkṣakair vā hetur iṣyate, nānyaḥ. | That alone, and no other, is accepted as a probans by both ordinary people and investigators. |
arthāpattyā tu pakṣadharmatvādi trayam anenaivākṣipyata iti caturlakṣaṇako 'pi vā bhavatu / | However, through presumption, this very [characteristic] implies the three [features] beginning with "being a property of the subject," and thus it may also be four-featured. |
na vā caturlakṣaṇo yasmāt kvacid ekalakṣaṇo dvilakṣaṇastrilakṣaṇo 'pi vā nyāyyaḥ, yasmād anyathānupapattir ekaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tenaikalakṣaṇa iti vyapadiśyate | Or it may not be four-featured, since in some cases [a probans] with one, two, or three features is [also] valid, [and] since being otherwise impossible is [its] one characteristic, therefore it is called one-featured. |
anyathānupapattisahitāṃ sajātīyasiddhatāṃ vijātīyavyāvṛttiṃ cābhisamīkṣya dvilakṣaṇaḥ, anyathānupapannatvaṃ sajātīyavṛttiḥ sādhyavipakṣāc ca vyāvṛttir iti trilakṣaṇaḥ / | When [a probans] possesses 'being otherwise impossible' along with existence in similar cases and non-existence in dissimilar cases, it is 'two-featured'; and when it possesses 'being otherwise impossible' along with existence in similar cases and absence where the probandum is absent, it is 'three-featured'. |
na tu pakṣadharmatvādilakṣaṇadharmatrayayogāt trilakṣaṇahetur iṣyate / | But it is not considered a 'three-featured' probans merely due to possessing the three characteristics beginning with 'being a property of the subject' [as defined by Buddhists]. |
tasya samyagjñānaṃ prati hetutvānupapatteḥ // | Because such [a probans] cannot produce valid cognition. |
athavā prādhānyād anyathānupapattināmadheyenaivaikalakṣaṇavyapadeśo na tupakṣadharmatvādibhis teṣām aprādhānyād akiñcikaratvād vetyetad darśayann āha yathetyādi / | Or rather, [the probans] is designated as 'one-featured' due to the primary characteristic of 'being otherwise impossible', and not by [the characteristics] beginning with 'being a property of the subject', due to their being secondary or ineffective - this is what [the author] shows by saying "Just as..." and so forth. |
yathā loke triputraḥ sannekaputraka ucyate / tasyaikasya suputratvāt tathehapi ca dṛśyatām // | "Just as in the world, a man having three sons is called 'having [only] one son' because one [of them] is a good son, so should it be understood here as well." |
nanu cāvinābhāvasambandhāt trirūpasyaiva sahetutā yuktetyāha avinetyādi / | [An objector] says: "Due to the relation of invariable concomitance, the character of being a probans should properly belong only to the 'three-featured' [reason]." |
avinābhāvasambandhas trirūpeṣu na jātucit / | The relation of invariable concomitance is never [found] in three-featured [reasons]. |
anyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetuṣvevopalabhyate // anyathāsambhava ekamaṅgaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktās te ca te hetavaścetyanyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetavaḥ // | It is found only in those reasons which have the single characteristic of 'being otherwise impossible'. [The compound] anyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetuṣu means "those reasons which have 'being otherwise impossible' as their single characteristic." |
anyathetyādi yathoktamevārthaṃ nigamayati / | [The author] concludes the aforementioned meaning with [the words] beginning with anyathā. |
anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasyaiva hetutā / | "That alone which has the characteristic of 'being otherwise impossible' has the nature of being a probans." |
dṛṣṭāntau dvāvapi stāṃ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam // | The two corroborative instances may be present or not, for they are not [actually] the means [of proof]. |
nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim // | Where there is no 'being otherwise impossible', what [use] is there for the three [features]? And where there is 'being otherwise impossible', what [use] is there for the three [features]? |
sādharmyavaidharmyalakṣaṇau / | [They are] characterized by similarity and dissimilarity. |
na kāraṇam iti / sādhyapratipatteḥ / | [They are] not the means – [i.e.,] of establishing what is to be proved. |
pāṭhaḥ kartavyaḥ // | The reading should be done [in this way]. |
sa śyāmas tasya putratvād dṛṣṭā śyāmā yathetare / iti trilakṣaṇo hetur na niścityai pravartate // | "He is dark because he is his son, just as others [his sons] are seen to be dark" – [though] this probans has three characteristics, [it] does not lead to certainty. |
tatraikalakṣaṇo hetur dṛṣṭāntadvayavarjitaḥ / kathañcidupalabhyatvād bhāvābhāvau sadātmakau // | Here, a one-characteristic probans without the two examples [is as follows]: "Positive and negative entities are essentially existent because they are somehow apprehensible." |
bhāvābhāvau kathañcitsadātmakau kathañcid upalabhyatvāt / | Positive and negative entities are somehow existent because they are somehow apprehensible. |
atra na sādharmyavaidharmyadṛṣṭāntau bahirbhūtau prayogātmakāvarthātmakau vā vidyete / | In this [case], there are no external corroborative instances, either of similarity or dissimilarity, whether in the form of statements or actual things. |
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