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anyathā evam aniṣyamāṇe kathañcit upalabhyamānatvāt iti ayaṃ hetuḥ api na sidhyati | If it is not accepted in this way, even this reason "because [it] is somehow apprehended" cannot be established |
pūrvaṃ siddhasādhyatā hetudoṣaḥ uktaḥ | Previously, the logical fallacy of proving what is [already] proved was pointed out |
idānīṃ tu asiddhatā uktā | But now, [its] non-establishment is being pointed out |
atha vyavahāraḥ sādhyate tadā yatra pūrvaṃ vyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ tat prasiddhaṃ nidarśanaṃ sambhavati iti trirūpaḥ eva syāt | If [mundane] usage is what is to be proved, then where usage has been previously established, that [becomes] a valid corroborative example, thus [the inference] would indeed have three characteristics |
anyathā nidarśanābhāve saḥ api vyavahāraḥ na siddhyet | Otherwise, in the absence of a corroborative example, even that usage could not be established |
candratvenāpadiṣṭatvaṃ sapakṣe 'pyanuvartate / kvacin māṇavake yadvā karpūrarajatādike // | [The property of] being spoken of as the moon also occurs in [things where] the probandum [is known to be present], sometimes in a young man or in camphor, silver and such [things]. |
māṇavaka iti / puruṣe // | "Māṇavaka" [means] "in [reference to] a man." |
candratvasādhane hetāvasādhāraṇatā bhavet / | In proving moon-ness, the probans would have [the fault of] non-exclusiveness. |
prasiddhivyatireke ca vasturūpasamāśraye // | And in [cases] devoid of well-known [facts], [the proof] would depend on the nature of the thing itself. |
vasturūpasamāśraya iti / | "[Depending on] the nature of the thing itself" means [what follows]: |
vastusadasattānurodhini sādhane / atrāsādhāraṇatoktā natu prasiddhilakṣaṇe hetau / | In a proof conforming to the existence or non-existence of things, here uniqueness has been stated, [but] not in a probans characterized by [being] well-known. |
tasyecchānurodhitvād astyevānvayaḥ / | Because that [well-known probans] conforms to [the speaker's] wish, positive concomitance definitely exists. |
yasmād asau vipratipannaḥ sarvapratītyapalāpī na śakyate prasiddhilakṣaṇena candratvaṃ pratipādayitum / na cānyalliṅgam asti vastubalapravṛttaṃ, yena candratvaṃ śaśini pratipādyeta candrādivyapadeśasyecchāmātrānurodhitvenāvastudharmatvād iti taṃ pratyadṛṣṭāntakamanumānam uktam / | Since that opponent, denying all cognition, cannot be made to understand moon-ness through [something] characterized as well-known, and since there exists no other inferential mark proceeding from the force of [real] things by which moon-ness could be established in the hare-bearer—because the designation "moon" etc. conforms to mere wish [and] is not a property of the thing—therefore an inference without example has been stated with respect to him. |
candratāṃ śaśino 'nicchan kāṃ pratītiṃ sa vāñchati | "One who does not wish to attribute moon-ness to the śaśin [hare-bearer], what [kind of] cognition could he desire?" |
tatraivam iti sambandhaḥ | This is how the connection [is to be understood]. |
pūrvapakṣavādinā ya ukto 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād iti hetus tasminnacandrasādhanhetau pūrvapakṣavādinā prokte sati candratvasādhanāya taṃ prati pravṛttasyottarapakṣavādino 'sādhāraṇatānumānābhāve kāraṇamācāryeṇoditaṃ "yatrāpyasādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāva" ityādinā prasiddhivyatiriktaṃ vastubalapravṛttaṃ liṅgamāśrityeti | When the proponent of the prima facie view has stated the reason "the śaśin is not the moon because it exists," when this reason for proving non-moon-ness has been stated by the prima facie proponent, then for proving moon-ness, the Teacher has explained the reason for the absence of a unique inference for the respondent who proceeds against him, [namely] that "where there is no inference due to uniqueness" etc., referring to an inferential mark operating by force of the object apart from [mere] common recognition. |
tṛtīye 'pi hetāvāha patadityādi | Regarding the third reason also, he states [the verse beginning with] "patat" etc. |
patatkīṭakṛtatvasya na viśeṣaḥ samīkṣyate | No distinction is perceived between [the property of] being caused by a falling insect |
patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayasya ca | And [the property of] having its occurrence obtained through contact with a falling insect. |
na viśeṣaḥ samīkṣyata iti hetupratijñayoḥ | "No distinction is perceived" [means no distinction] between the reason and the proposition. |
pratijñārthaikadeśo hetur iti yāvat | [This means] that the reason is [merely] a part of what is to be proved. |
tathā hi atra viśiṣṭakīṭahetutvaṃ vedanāyāḥ sādhyatveneṣṭam, tadeva ca śabdāntareṇa hetunoktam iti na viśeṣo hetupratijñayoḥ | For here, the being caused by a qualified insect is desired as what is to be proved for the sensation, and that very [thing] is stated by the reason through different words, hence [there is] no distinction between reason and proposition. |
patato 'syeti kāryaṃ hi dhruvaṃ hetor viśeṣaṇam | For "of this falling [insect]" must certainly be a qualification of the reason. |
anyathā vyabhicāritvaṃ durnivāraṃ prasajyate // | Otherwise [if this is not accepted], the [logical] deviation would be impossible to prevent. |
atha kāryakāraṇavyavahāro vismṛtaṃ prati sādhyate, tathāsati trirūpo hetuḥ syād agnidhūmādeḥ prasiddhakāryakāraṇasya dṛṣṭāntatvena vidyamānatvsāt // | If [it is argued that] the cause-effect relationship is being proved for [the benefit of] one who has forgotten it, then in that case the probans would [indeed] be three-featured, since well-known cause-effect [relationships] like [that of] fire and smoke are present as examples. |
cakṣūrūpetyādāvāha cakṣuṣa ityādi / | [The text] states "cakṣuṣa" etc. regarding [the example of] eye and form, etc. |
tasyāś ca sādhanaṃ yuktaṃ nāsiddhyādiprasaṅgataḥ // | And the proving of this [existence] cannot be valid, due to the consequence of inadmissibility and other [defects]. |
tasyāś ca sādhanaṃ yuktaṃ neti chedaḥ / | [There is] a break [in the text] after "na" [in the compound] "yuktaṃ na". |
asiddhyādītyādiśabdena vyabhicāravirodhayor grahaṇam / | By the word "ādi" in "asiddhyādi", [both] deviation and contradiction are included. |
sattāyāṃ sādhyāyāṃ sarvo hetur doṣatrayaṃ nātivartate / | When existence is being proved, no probans can escape the three defects. |
tathā hi bhāve dharme hetāvasiddhatā, ubhayadharme 'naikāntikatā, abhāvadharme viruddhatā / | For thus: with a positive property [as] probans [there is] inadmissibility, with both [types of] properties [there is] inconclusiveness, with a negative property [there is] contradiction. |
nāsiddher bhāvadharmo 'sti vyabhicāryubhayāśrayaḥ / | "The positive property is not established [due to inadmissibility], [and when] based on both [properties it is] deviating. |
dharmo viruddho bhāvaś ca sā sattā sādhyate katham // | And [since] a positive property is contradictory, how can that existence be proved?" |
cakṣuṣi dharmiṇi cakṣurvijñānotpādanaśaktiḥ sādhyate tadāpi śaktiḥ sattetyādeḥ paryāyatvāt tatsādhane sattāsādhanaprasaṅgaḥ | If what is sought to be proved is the potency in the eye [as] the subject to bring about visual perception, even then, since 'potency', 'existence', etc. are synonymous terms, the proving of [this] potency would involve the proving of existence. |
vyatireke 'pi tasyā atīndriyatvenāsiddhatvād āśrayāsiddho hetuḥ syāt | In the negative aspect also, since that [potency] is unestablished due to being beyond the senses, the reason would be fallacious due to having an unestablished substratum. |
evaṃ rūpagrahaṇād ityayam apyapakṣadharmatvād asiddho draṣṭavyaḥ | Similarly, the reason "because of the perception of color" should also be understood as inadmissible due to not being a property of the subject [pakṣa]. |
kathaṃ tarhi bhavatām api cakṣurādīndriyasiddhir | "How then do you [yourselves] establish the existence of the eyes and other sense organs?" |
kintu rūpādibhāve 'pi cakṣurjñānaṃ na jāyate | But even when color and other [objects] are present, visual cognition does not arise [sometimes]; |
kadācit tena tanmātraṃ na hetur iti gamyate | Therefore it is understood that that alone [i.e., color etc.] cannot be the reason. |
kadācid iti nimīlitalocanāvasthāyām | "Sometimes" [means] in the state when the eyes are closed. |
na hy asmābhir āhatya cakṣurādīdantayā sādhyate, api tu jñānaṃ keṣucid rūpādiṣu satsv anvayavyatirekāv anubhavad dṛśyate | For we do not prove the existence of the eye directly as "this is the eye"; rather, cognition is seen to experience positive and negative concomitance when certain colors etc. are present. |
tasya kāraṇāntarāpekṣitā tanmātrāsambhavitā ca sādhyata iti tad eva jñānaṃ dharmīti nāsiddhyādidoṣaḥ | [Thus] its dependence on another cause and impossibility [of arising] from those [colors] alone is proved, so that very cognition is the subject [dharmin] - hence there is no fallacy of non-establishment etc. |
yat tat kāraṇāntaraṃ tac cakṣur iti vyavahriyate | What that other cause is, that is called "eye." |
siddhāntāśrayas tu bhedavyavahāraḥ | The basis of [our] conclusion is the practical usage of difference. |
syād etat bhavatu yathoktayā nītyā vijñānasya dharmitvam, tathāpi dvirūpa eva hetur | One might object: "Let it be that cognition is the subject according to the method described, still the reason remains only two-featured." |
svahetuniyatā hetupratibaddhā udbhūtir yasyāsau sa tathoktaḥ | That which has its arising inseparably connected with [and] bound to its cause is called thus. |
evambhūtāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmāno 'ṅkurādayaḥ kādācitkā dṛṣṭāntatvena sambhavantīti yāvat/ | Such things like sprouts, which have their birth dependent on their [respective] causes and hence come into existence only occasionally, serve as corroborative instances [in this argument]. |
ye yat sannidhāne kādācitkās te na tanmātrasambhavinaḥ, kāraṇāntarasavyapekṣakāś ca tadyathā satsvapi kṣityādiṣu bījasannidhānāsannidhānābhyām anvayavyatirekiṇo 'ṅkurādayaḥ, satsvapi rūpādiṣu kādācitkaṃ cakṣur jñānaṃ nimīlitānimīlitāvasthāyām iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe/ | Those things which appear only occasionally in the presence of something cannot arise from that alone but depend on other causes—just as sprouts appear or do not appear depending on the presence or absence of seeds even when soil etc. are present, and just as visual cognition occurs only occasionally even when colors etc. are present, depending on whether the eyes are closed or open—thus [this constitutes] the recognition of contradiction with the pervader in case of denial [of the eye]. |
vidhau tu svabhāvahetuḥ// | In case of assertion [of the eye], however, [this constitutes] a natural reason. |
kathañcid ityādāvāha kathañciditi/ kathañcid asadātmatvasādhane ca ghaṭādiṣu/ | Regarding [the word] "somehow" etc., [the text] states "somehow." And [this applies] in proving the somehow-non-existence of jars and other [things]. |
pūrvavaddhetuvaiphalyam asiddhiś ca dṛśyate// | As in the previous case, the futility of the reason and its inadmissibility are observed. |
atrāpi siddhasādhyatā kenacitprakāreṇa ghaṭādīnām asattvasya siddhatvāt/ | Here too there is the proving of what is [already] proven, because the non-existence of jars etc. in some way is [already] established. |
atha na siddham, anupalabhyamānatvād ityayaṃ hetur api na sidhyatītyasiddho hetur itipūrvavad vācyaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ yathā sadātmatvasādhane hetāvuktam// | If it is not established, then this reason "because it is not apprehended" also is not established—thus the reason is inadmissible, and the refutation should be stated as before, just as it was stated regarding the reason for proving existence. |
asti cātrāpi vispaṣṭaṃ vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam/ | Here too there is a clear example by dissimilarity. |
tadeva teṣāṃ svaṃ rūpaṃ prayāti hi vipakṣatām// | For their very own form becomes the counter-instance. |
kathañcana sadātmatvasādhanepi nirātmasu/ | Even in proving the somehow-existence in non-entities. |
iṣṭasiddhir asiddhiś ca vaidharmāptis tathaiva ca// | [There would be] proving what is desired, inadmissibility, and obtaining of the contrary characteristic in just that way. |
yena rūpeṇopalabhyante ghaṭādayas tena rūpeṇa sadātmatvaṃ teṣām iṣṭam eva | That form in which jars and other [objects] are apprehended - if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then that same character would serve as the Instance per dissimilarity. |
tasmin svabhāve 'nupalabhyamānatvasya hetor nivṛttatvāt / | Because in that character, the probans of "being unapprehended" will have ceased to exist. |
evaṃ kathañcanetyatrāpi prayoge tulyā iṣṭasiddhādayaḥ / | Similarly, in the case of the argument regarding [things] being "somehow existent," the defects like [that of] "futility" would be present. |
nirātmasviti / abhāveṣu / | [The term] "nirātmasu" [means] "in non-entities." |
vaidharmyāptir iti vaidharmyasya sādhyanivṛttilakṣaṇasya sādhanābhāvenāptir vyāptiḥ / | "Concomitance of the contrary character" means that the contrary character, characterized by the cessation of the probandum, is pervaded by the absence of the probans. |
tathaiveti svabhāvasya vaidharmyasambhavena // | [The phrase] "in that way" [means] through the possibility of an Instance per dissimilarity of [its] nature. |
pitṛśabdaśruteryāpi veśmanaḥ pratipādyate / pitṛsambandhitā tatra vyakto hetustrilakṣaṇaḥ // | When the presence of the father in the house is sought to be proved by the hearing of the father's voice, the probans in this case is clearly three-featured. |
kvacid vipratisambaddhaḥ svaraḥ prāgupalakṣitaḥ / | The voice [as] connected [with the father] has surely been observed somewhere previously. |
tasyānanubhave pūrvaṃ durdharā hetvasiddhatā // tasyeti pitṛsambaddhasyānyatra kvacit pradeśe 'nanubhave satyasiddho hetuḥ syāt // | If there had been no prior experience of that [voice] - meaning the [voice] connected with the father - in some other place, the probans would be inadmissible. |
yasmin nityādinā tad eva trairūpyam ādarśayati | [In the verse] beginning with "yasmin," [the author] shows that very three-featured character [of the probans]. |
yasmin prāgupalabdhaś ca nopalabdhaś ca yatra saḥ / anvayo vyatireko vā vispaṣṭaṃ tatra dṛśyate // | In [that place] where he was previously perceived and where he was not perceived, there positive and negative concomitance is clearly seen. |
śabdas tu jñāpayatyarthaṃ naiva bāhyaṃ kathañcana / | The word does not make known any external object whatsoever. |
anyathāsambhavābhāvād vilakṣāgamakastvasau // | Because of the absence of impossibility otherwise, that [word] is a different kind of indicator. |
vivakṣāsaṃmukhībhāve na hi śabdaḥ prayujyate // | For when there is no presence of desire to speak, the word is not employed. |
dīpastu jñāpako naiva nīlāder liṅgabhāvataḥ / | The lamp is not a revealer [of objects] like blue etc. through being an inferential sign. |
jñānotpādanayogyasya jananāt tu tathocyate // | [It] is called thus because of [its] producing that which is capable of generating knowledge. |
jñāpake liṅgarūpe ca pakṣadharmādi cintyate / | And if [the word] were an inferential indicator, the property of the subject and other [conditions] would need to be considered. |
anyathā cakṣurādīnāṃ kasmād etan na codyate // | Otherwise, why is this not questioned regarding the eyes and other [sense organs]? |
anyathānupapattyāpi cākṣuṣatvaṃ na sādhakam / pakṣadharmaviyogena klībās tenaikalakṣaṇaḥ // | Even through impossibility otherwise, visibility is not proving [anything] without the property of the subject; therefore single-featured [probans] are impotent. |
ekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyaṃ copalakṣitam / dvirūpatvena coktānāṃ trairūpyaṃ pakṣadharmataḥ // | In those [probans] declared as single-featured, two features are observed, and in those declared as two-featured, three features [are observed] through the property of the subject. |
anyathānupapattyaiva cākṣepāditi cen na tat / | If [one says] that "[the other features] are implied through impossibility otherwise alone," that is not [correct]. |
śabdādāvanyathāpīṣṭe cākṣuṣatve 'tha nāstyasau // | Even though visibility may be otherwise desired in sound and other [things], it is not present in them. |
śabdasya bāhyārthāpekṣayānyathānupapannatvam asiddham iti taṃ pratyaliṅgatvam icchāmātravṛttitvāt tasya | The word's impossibility otherwise with respect to external objects is unproven; therefore it is not an inferential sign for them, as it depends solely on will. |
atha buddhiparivartinām artham apekṣya, tadā trailakṣaṇyam asty eva dhūmasyeva | But with respect to the object that revolves in cognition, then indeed the three characteristics are present, just as [in the case] of smoke. |
yato vivakṣāyā asammukhībhāve śabdasyāprayogāt tatkāryatvād bhūmavajjātavedase gamaka iṣṭa eva, natu vācakarūpeṇa | Because when there is no presence of desire to speak, the word is not used, [and] being its effect, it is indeed accepted as an indicator of fire-born [i.e., fire] like smoke, but not in the form of a signifier. |
pradīpastu liṅgadvāreṇa dhūmavan na jñāpaka iṣṭaḥ / | The lamp is not accepted as an indicator through inference like smoke [is]. |
kiṃ tarhivijñānajananayogyaghaṭādyutpādanena jñāpako rūḍho natu liṅgatveneti tasya liṅgabhūtasya pakṣadharmatvādicintā na yuktaiva / anyathā cakṣurādīnām api pakṣadharmatvādi codanīyaṃ syāt / | Rather, [the lamp] is established as an indicator through producing cognition-generating objects like pots, but not through being an inferential mark. Therefore, consideration of [the lamp] as having the property of being present in the subject (pakṣadharmatva) etc. is not appropriate. Otherwise, one would have to claim that the eyes and other [sense organs] also have the property of being present in the subject etc. |
anyathetyādi prakṛtārthopasaṃhāraḥ / | The phrase "otherwise etc." concludes the matter under discussion. |
yataś cākṣuṣatvam anityatvāvinābhāvyapi śabde tadanityatvaṃ na sādhayati, yataścāvaśyaṃ sarvatra pakṣadharmatvamāśrayaṇīyam, ataḥ pakṣadharmatvāśrayaṇādekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyamāvaśyakaṃ dvirūpatayā coktānāṃ, trairūpyaṃ tata eva pakṣadharmata ityekalakṣaṇā eva klībā hetavaḥ / | Since visibility, even though invariably concomitant with non-eternality, does not prove non-eternality in sound, and since the property of being present in the subject must necessarily be accepted in all cases, therefore due to accepting the property of being present in the subject, what were stated as having one characteristic must necessarily have two characteristics, and what were stated as having two characteristics [must have] three characteristics, precisely because of [requiring] the property of being present in the subject. Thus only the one-characteristic reasons are [truly] impotent. |
na caitad vaktavyam anyathānupapattyaiva pakṣadharmatvam antareṇāpyanyathānupapannatvam astīti svayam evoktam ---"anyathānupapattyaiva śabdādivastuṣv apakṣadharmabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭā jñāpakatāpi ce"ti / | And this cannot be claimed that "through being otherwise impossible alone, even without the property of being present in the subject, there is the character of being otherwise impossible," because [the opponent] himself has stated: "Through being otherwise impossible alone, indicativeness is observed in things like words even without being present in the subject." |
cākṣuṣatve cānityatvānyathānupapanne 'pyasau pakṣadharmo nāstītyanekānta / | And in the case of visibility, even though non-eternality is otherwise impossible, that [visibility] is not present in the subject, hence [there is] no invariable [concomitance]. |
yad uktaṃ sa śyāmas tatputratvād ity eṣa trilakṣaṇe 'pi na niścityai pravartata ity atrāha tat putretyādi / | Regarding what was said - that "he is dark because he is that person's son" does not lead to certainty even with three characteristics - [the author] states "that person's son" etc. |
na trailakṣaṇyasadbhāvo vijātīyāvirodhataḥ // | The three characteristics are not present because [there is] no incompatibility with what is heterogeneous. |
tatputraś ca bhaviṣyati na ca śyāma iti nātra kaścid virodha iti saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvān nāyaṃ trilakṣaṇa ityasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ // | Since there is no contradiction in [someone] being that person's son but not being dark, due to having doubtful exclusion from the counter-example, this [reason] does not have three characteristics - thus the example is not established. |
syād etat astyeva virodhaḥ / | One might think: "There is indeed an incompatibility." |
kāraṇābhede sati yadi kāryaṃ bhidyeta nirhetukaṃ syād ity āha karmetyādi / | If an effect were to differ [from its cause] when there is no difference in the cause, it would be without cause - thus [the text] states [starting with] "karma." |
karmāhārādihetūnāṃ sarvathāpi viśeṣataḥ / sambhāvyate 'nyathābhāvas tatputratve 'pi tasya hi // | Even when [someone] is the son of that [person], a difference [in appearance] is always possible due to the specific [influences] of causes such as karma, food, and so forth. |
nāyaṃ svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā dṛśyasyādṛṣṭir eva vā / | This [reason] is neither a natural property, nor an effect, nor a non-perception of what is perceptible. |
naca tadvyatiriktasya bhavatyavyabhicāritā // | And apart from these [three types of valid reason], nothing else can have infallibility. |
śubhādikarmaviśeṣād uṣṇaśītādyāhārāvasthābhedāc cānyathābhāvo gaurāditvaṃ sambhāvyata iti kuto virodhaḥ, kāraṇabhedasya siddhatvāt / | Since differences such as fairness are possible due to specific [past] good deeds and variations in circumstances such as [consuming] hot and cold food, how can there be any contradiction, given that the difference in causes is established? |
api ca tat putratvād iti nāyaṃ svabhāvahetur yathā kṛtakatvaṃ, nahi kṛtakatvasyānyat tattvam asti muktvānityatvam nanvevaṃ tatputratvasyānyaḥ svabhāvonāsti yataḥ pañcopādānaskaṃdhātmakasya kañcid apekṣya tatputra iti vyapadeśonatu śyāmatvasya / | Moreover, "because [he] is his son" is not a natural reason like "being produced" is [for proving impermanence], for "being produced" has no other essence apart from impermanence, but it is not the case that "being his son" has no other nature, because the designation "his son" depends on the aggregate of five constitutive elements, not on [being] dark. |
nāpi kāryahetuḥ / | Nor is it a reason based on effect. |
nāpyanupalabdhir vidhiviṣayatvāt / | Nor is it [a reason based on] non-perception, since it has a positive subject. |
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