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yadyapi viprakīrṇāni vacanāni, tathāpi sambaddhānyevaikārthopasaṃhāreṇetina tat sambandhasiddhaye pṛthagnigamanaṃ vācyam | Even though the statements are scattered, they are nevertheless connected and thus lead to a single conclusion; therefore a separate conclusion need not be stated to establish that connection |
dvaividhyamanumānasya kecid eva pracakṣate viśeṣadṛṣṭasāmānyaparidṛṣṭatvabhedataḥ | Some [teachers] declare that inference is of two kinds, distinguished as being based on perception of particulars and perception of universals |
kecid iti kumārilādayaḥ | By "some" [is meant] Kumārila and others |
te hi dvividhamanumānaṃ viśeṣatodṛṣṭaṃ sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ceti varṇayanti | For they describe inference as being of two kinds: [that which is] based on particulars and [that which is] based on universals |
pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandhaṃ yayor eva viśeṣayoḥ gomayendhanataddeśaviśeṣādimatiḥ kṛtā | [In the case of] two particulars whose relation has been perceived directly, such as the cognition of specific cow-dung fuel and that specific location |
taddeśasthena tenaiva gatvā kālāntare 'pi tam yadāgniṃ budhyate tasya pūrvabodhātpunaḥ punaḥ | When [one who] was present at that location, having gone [elsewhere], even at a different time repeatedly cognizes that fire from the previous cognition |
sandihyamānasadbhāvavastubodhāt pramāṇatā | [Its] validity [comes] from bringing about cognition of an object whose existence was in doubt |
viśeṣadṛṣṭam etac ca likhitaṃ vindhyavāsinā | And this [type of] inference based on perceived particulars has been written about by Vindhyavāsin |
agnidhūmāntaratve tu vācye sāmānyatomitau sāmānyadṛṣṭam ekāntād gantetyāditya ucyate | Though in [the case of] inference based on universals one could speak of different instances of fire and smoke, [instead] the inference that "the sun moves" is mentioned, as it is based purely on universals |
ayam arthaḥ pūrvaṃ kaścit kvacit pradeśaviśeṣe vahnidhūmaviśeṣau pratyakṣeṇagṛhītvā kālāntareṇa dūraṃ gato vā yadā punaḥpunas tam eva dhūmaviśeṣaṃ dṛṣṭvā tam eva vahniṃ pūrvaṃ parigṛhītamanumimīte tadviśeṣatodṛṣṭamanumānam, pūrvapratyakṣagṛhītaviśeṣaviṣayatvāt | [This means that] when someone, having first perceived through direct perception a particular fire and a particular smoke in some specific place, and having gone far away at a later time, sees that very same particular smoke again and again and [then] infers that very same particular fire which was previously apprehended - this is inference based on perception of particulars, because it has as its object the particular [previously] apprehended through direct perception. |
naca gṛhītagrāhitvād aprāmaṇam, yataḥ kiṃ vahnirāste parinivṛtto veti sandehavinivṛtter adhikāyā vidyamānatvāt | And this [inference] is not invalid due to [merely] grasping what was [already] grasped, because there exists an additional [element] in the form of removing the doubt as to whether the fire still remains or has ceased. |
iti piṇḍārthaḥ | This is the essence [of what Kumārila means]. |
avayavārthas tūcyate pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandham iti | Now the meaning of the components [of the phrase] "that based on a relationship of perceived particulars" is explained. |
kaḥ sambandhaḥ | What [is this] relationship? |
atrocyate śabarasvāminānumānalakṣaṇam uktam anumānaṃ jñānasambandhasyaikadeśadarśanād ekadeśāntare 'sannikṛṣṭe buddhiḥ | Here it is stated: Śabarasvāmin has given the definition of inference [as follows]: "Inference is the cognition of an unperceived factor from seeing one factor of a known relationship." |
taddvividhaṃ pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandhaṃ sāmānyatodṛṣṭasambandhaṃ ca | This [inference] is of two kinds: [that] based on directly perceived relationship and [that] based on relationship seen through generalization. |
pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandho yathā dhūmākṛtidarśanād agnyākṛter vijñānam | An example of directly perceived relationship is the cognition of fire's form from seeing smoke's form. |
sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ yathā devadattasya gatipūrvikāṃ deśāntaraprāptimupalabhyādityasya gatismaraṇam iti | An example of [inference] based on generalization is when, having observed that Devadatta's reaching another place is preceded by movement, one recalls the movement of the sun. |
pratyakṣe dṛṣṭasambandhamanumānam evaṃ pratyakṣata iti sambandhaḥ | They explain [it] thus: Inference [is that which is] based upon the relationship of [things] seen in perception. |
yataḥ pūrvasminn anantaraśloke evaṃ pracakṣata iti prakṛtam | Because "they explain [it] thus" was mentioned in the immediately preceding verse. |
yayor evāgnidhūmaviśeṣayor viṣayabhūtayor gomayendhanaviśeṣabuddhiḥ kṛtā utpāditā puruṣeṇa gomayendhanaprabhavāvetāvagnidhūmāviti | Regarding those two particular objects, fire and smoke, a person forms the understanding about the specific fuel of cow-dung, [thinking] "these two, fire and smoke, arise from cow-dung fuel." |
tathā parvatādideśaviśeṣamatiḥ kṛtā etat parvatādideśaviśeṣasthāvetāvagnidhūmāv iti | Likewise, [he] forms the understanding about the specific location of the mountain etc., [thinking] "these two, fire and smoke, are located at this specific place, the mountain etc." |
gomayamindhanaṃ yayor agnidhūmayos tau gomayendhanau, sa deśo yayos tau taddeśaugomayendhanau ca tau taddeśau ceti vigrahaḥ | The compound analysis is: "those two whose fuel is cow-dung" [refers to] those fire and smoke, and "those two whose location is that [place]" [refers to] those [fire and smoke]. |
tāv eva viśeṣau tāvādī yeṣāṃ sarjasaralasallakīvanaprabhṛtīnāṃ vahnyādiviśeṣāntarāṇāṃ tāni gomayendhanataddeśaviśeṣādīni | Those two particulars and others belonging to different particulars such as fires [produced from] forests of Sarja, Sarala, Sallakī etc., these are the particulars of cow-dung fuel, that location, etc. |
teṣu matir iti saptamī{ti}yogavibhāgāt samāsaḥ | [This is] a compound [ending] in the locative case through separation of the connection. |
sā evambhūtā pratyakṣā matir yena pramātrā kṛtā utpāditā sa taddeśasthena tenaiva dhūmādinā liṅgena tamevāgniṃ kālāntareṇa yadā budhyate | When that cognizer who has produced such a perceptual cognition understands that same fire at another time through that very mark consisting of smoke present in that location. |
punaḥ punar iti sambandhaḥ | [This happens] again and again - this is the connection. |
tadā tasya bodhasya pūrvabodhāt pratyakṣātmakāt pramāṇatā pramāṇāntaratetyarthaḥ | Then that cognition becomes a separate means of valid knowledge [distinct] from the previous perceptual cognition - this is the meaning. |
athavā pūrvabodhāt kāraṇāttameva vahniṃ budhyata iti sambandhaḥ | Or the connection is: [he] cognizes that very fire from the previous cognition as the cause. |
kimāste vahnirāhosvinnivṛtta ityevaṃ sandihyamānaḥ sadbhāvo yasya vastunas tattathā tac ca tadvastu ceti tattathā tasya bodha iti vigrahaḥ | The compound is to be analyzed as "[that which has] the cognition of that thing whose existence is being doubted [with questions] like 'Is the fire there or has it ceased?'" |
tatredaṃ codyaṃ bhavati nanu cāgnyantare dhūmāntare ca sāmānyadharmasamaśrayeṇa yadānumitiḥ kriyate, tadā sāmānyatodṛṣṭamanumānamagnidhūmayor asty eva | Here arises this objection: "When an inference is made with respect to another fire and another smoke on the basis of common properties, then there certainly exists a sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference regarding fire and smoke." |
kim iti bhāṣyakāreṇāgnidhūmādau buddhau viparivartamānatvena pratyāsannāvutsṛjyāditya eva sāmānyatodṛṣṭāv udāhṛta | "Why did the Bhāṣyakāra, abandoning fire and smoke which were readily present in [his] mind, cite only the [example of the] sun for sāmānyatodṛṣṭa [inference]?" |
sāmānyato 'numitau sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāne udāharaṇatvenāgnidhūmāntaratve vācye yadbhāṣyakāreṇādityodāharaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ tat sarvakālamādityagater apratyakṣatvādekāntena | When another fire and smoke could have been mentioned as examples for sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference, the Bhāṣyakāra gave the example of the sun because the sun's motion is imperceptible at all times without exception. |
atrādityagatau sāmānyatodṛṣṭam evānumānaṃ sambhavati na viśeṣatodṛṣṭam | In [the case of] the sun's motion, only sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is possible, not viśeṣatodṛṣṭa. |
tadatretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha | [The author] states the refutation beginning with "tadatra." |
tadatra kṣaṇabhaṅgasya vyāpinaḥ pratipādanāt prāktanasyaiva tenaiva nānumānasya sambhavaḥ | Since momentariness has been established as all-pervading, there can be no inference of what existed before by means of that [same thing]. |
kalpitaṃ cet tadekatvaṃ prabandhaikyavivakṣayā na tasyāvasthitiḥ kācid vastutvaṃ naca bhāvikam | If it is argued that "unity is assumed based on the continuity of the series," [then we reply that] it has no real existence and what is [merely] assumed cannot be real. |
agnidhūmādisakalapadārthavyāpakasya | [All-pervading means] pervading all entities such as fire, smoke, etc. |
satyapi kṣaṇikatve prabandhaikatvād ekatvam iti cedāha kalpitam iti | If one says that "even though [things are] momentary, there is unity due to the continuity of the series," [the author] responds with "kalpitam" [assumed]. |
tadā kalpitamekatvaṃ na pāramārthikaṃ, paramārthatas tu na kasyacid avasthitiḥ | Then [we reply that] this assumed unity is not ultimately real, and in ultimate reality nothing has continuous existence. |
nāpi kalpitasya vastutvaṃ, tataś ca sandihyamānasadbhāvavastubodhādityasambaddhaṃ syāt | What is [merely] assumed cannot be a real entity, and therefore [the definition involving] "cognition of an entity whose existence is doubted" would be disconnected. |
athāpi syāt kalpanāsamāropitamevaikyam āśritya viśeṣato dṛṣṭamākhyātam, nabhāvikam ity āha nacetyādi | If it should be said that viśeṣatodṛṣṭa [inference] is explained by relying on merely assumed unity, [the author] says "na ca" etc. [to indicate that] it cannot be real. |
na ca nirviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ yuṣmābhir anumanyate / | A cognition without an object is not accepted by you. |
vikalpitārthatāyāṃ ca vyaktaṃ nirviṣayaṃ bhavet // | And if [the cognition] had an imagined object, it would clearly be without [a real] object. |
syād etad yadyapi vyaktir vināśinī jātistvanapāyinī vidyate, tataś ca bhāvikam ekatvaṃ bhaviṣyati, naca nirviṣayatvam ity āha vyaktirūpetyādi / | One might say: "Although the particular is perishable, the universal exists [as] imperishable, and therefore there will be a real unity, and [thus] no objectlessness" - [to this] he responds with [the verse beginning with] "vyaktirūpa-". |
vyaktirūpasya nāśe 'pi tiṣṭhatyevākṛtis tayoḥ / yadi na kṣaṇabhaṅgāpter bhāve tasyā api dhruvam // | Even if the universal would persist after the destruction of the particular form, [this cannot be], because even if it existed, it too would certainly be subject to momentary destruction. |
pratyakṣadṛṣṭaḥ sambandho yayor eva viśeṣayoḥ / ityayaṃ niyamaścokto yuṣmābhiḥ kena hetunā // | For what reason have you stated this restriction that "[inference applies only to] those two particulars whose relation has been perceived by direct perception"? |
dṛṣṭvaikadānumānena tasyaiva hyanumā punaḥ / pramāṇaṃ neṣyate kasmāt ko viśeṣo hi pūrvake // | Having once cognized [something] through inference, why is a subsequent inference of that same [thing] not considered valid? What indeed is special about the earlier one? |
vijñātārthādhigantṛtvān na pramāṇam idaṃ yadi / | If this [latter inference] is not valid because it apprehends an already known object, |
smārtavat prāktano 'pyetat samānaṃ kiṃ na vīkṣyate // | Why is the earlier [inference] not viewed similarly, like memory? |
tasmāt kimasti nāstīti sandehavinivṛttikṛt / sa eveti nirākāṅkṣam etat sāmānyadarśanam // | Therefore this perception of the universal, which removes doubt about whether [something] exists or does not exist, is itself complete [and independent]. |
ākṛtiḥ jātiḥ / | 'Ākṛti' [means] the universal. |
yadītyabhyupagame / | 'Even if' [means] as a concession. |
jātivyaktyoḥ pareṇaikyasyeṣṭatvāt kuto vyaktivināśe jāter avasthānaṃ sambhavati, anyathā bhinnayogakṣematvād ekāntena tayor bhedo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ syāt | Since the opponent accepts the identity of Universal and Individual, how can the Universal persist when the Individual is destroyed? Otherwise, since [they would have] different destinies, their absolute difference would have to be accepted. |
ayam abhyupagamavāda eva | This is merely a concessive statement. |
ekadā tāvajjātir vistareṇa nirastaiveti kutas tasyāḥ sattvam | Since the Universal has already been extensively refuted, how can it [even] exist? |
bhāve 'pi sattve 'pi | Even if it exists, even if it has being... |
vyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanāt | ...because momentary destruction has been proven to be all-pervading. |
api ca yadānumānaparicchinnaṃ punar api tata eva liṅgāt tameva vahniṃ paricchinatti, tadāpi viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ kiṃ na varṇitam, yena pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa iti viśeṣaṇamiṣṭam | Moreover, when something has been cognized through inference and then that same fire is cognized again through that same inferential sign [i.e., smoke], why is that [second inference] not described as being based on particulars, when the qualification "perceived through perception" is desired? |
adhigatārthādhigantṛtvād iti cet | If [you say] it is because [the second inference] apprehends an object that has already been apprehended... |
na | No [that is not correct]. |
pratyakṣadṛṣṭe 'pi tat tulyam | This applies equally to what is based on perceived [particulars]. |
antarālavartisandehanivartanamadhikaṃ pratyakṣadṛṣṭe 'stīti cenna | If [you say] "In what is based on perceived [particulars] there is the additional [factor of] removing doubt that has arisen in the interval" - no [that is not correct]. |
anumānadṛṣṭe 'pi samānam ādhikyam | The same additional [factor] exists even in what is based on inferred [particulars]. |
tasmāt sarvatraiva sāmānyato dṛṣṭam eva kṣaṇakṣayiṣu bhāveṣvanumānaṃ na viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ nāma | Therefore, in all cases where things are momentarily perishing, inference is based only on generalized observation, not on what is called [inference from] perceived particulars. |
na pramāṇam iti prāhur anumānaṃ tu kecana / vivakṣāmarpayanto 'pi vāgbhirābhiḥ kudṛṣṭayaḥ // | Some short-sighted people declare that "inference is not a valid means of cognition," even while they [themselves] express their intention through these very words. |
kecid iti / bārhaspatyādayaḥ / | "Some [people]" [means] the followers of Bṛhaspati and others. |
nānumānaṃ pramāṇam ityevaṃrūpābhiḥ / | [They say this] through words of the form "inference is not a valid means of cognition." |
anena svavacanavirodham āha / | By this [statement] he points out their self-contradiction. |
tathā hi vacanaliṅgād vivakṣā pratīyata iti manyamānena parasmai svābhiprāyanivedanāya vyāharatā darśitamanumānasya prāmāṇyam, naca tat pramāṇamiti bruvatā tadeva pratiṣiddhamitītaretaravyāghātaḥ / | For when someone speaks to convey their intention to another, thinking that "intention is understood from verbal signs," they demonstrate the validity of inference through their speaking, yet deny that very [validity] by saying "that is not a valid means [of cognition]" – [thus creating] mutual contradiction. |
etac ca dūṣaṇaṃ paścād vyaktīkariṣyate // | And this objection will be explained more clearly later. |
trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvāt svārthaṃ mānaṃ na yujyate / iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ mithyājñānaṃ yathā kila // | "Inference for oneself cannot be valid because it depends on a three-featured sign which destroys what is desired, just as false knowledge [does]." |
bhāvād anumāne 'pi na cānumitikāraṇam / dvairūpyam iva liṅgasya trairūpyaṃ nāstyato 'numā // | "Even when [the three features] are present, they cannot be the cause of inference, just as the two features [cannot be]; therefore, since the three features of the sign do not [truly] exist, there is no inference." |
anumānavirodhasya viruddhānāṃ ca sādhane / sarvatra sambhavāt kiñca viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ // | "Moreover, since the contradiction of inference and the establishment of contradictory [conclusions] is possible everywhere, [and since these are] mutually contradictory yet invariable..." |
tatra tāvac cārvākāḥ pramāṇayanti svārthānumānam pramāṇaṃ na bhavati, trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvān mithyājñānavat / | On this point, the Cārvākas first argue [thus]: "Inference for oneself cannot be a valid means of cognition, because it depends on a three-featured sign, just like false knowledge." |
parārthāścakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvācchayanāsanādyaṅgavat | "The eye and other [sense] organs are for the purpose of others, because they are composite things, like the limbs of a couch, seat and other [objects]" |
na ca trairūpyamanumitikāraṇam ananumāne 'pi bhāvād dvairūpyavat | The presence of three characteristics cannot be the cause of inference, because, like [the presence of] two characteristics, they exist even where there is no inference |
api ca sarvatra sādhane 'numānavirodhaḥ sambhavati | Moreover, in every proof, contradiction of inference becomes possible |
tadyathā vivakṣitasādhyadharmo dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ na bhavati etat samudāyaikadeśatvād dharmisvarūpavat | For example, [one could argue that] "the intended probandum cannot be a qualifier of the subject because it is part of the aggregate [of all factors], like the essential nature of the subject itself" |
anena hi sarvamanumānaṃ niranumānīkṛtam | By this [argument], indeed, all inference would be rendered non-inferential |
sarvatra cānumāne kṛte viśeṣaviruddhānāṃ sambhavas tadyathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viśeṣaviruddham udbhāvayet | And when any inference is made, there is the possibility of [raising] specific contradictions, as when [someone] has stated "sound is non-eternal because it is produced, like a pot", someone might raise a specific contradiction |
yathāyaṃ hetur anityatvaṃ sādhayati tathākāśaguṇatvābhāvamapītyevamādi | [They might argue that] "just as this reason proves non-eternality, so too [it proves] the absence of being a quality of ākāśa" and so forth |
sarvatra ca viruddhāvyabhicārī sambhavati | And in every case, an invariable concomitant of the opposite is possible |
tadyathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viruddhāvyabhicāriṇam āha nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvācchabdatvavad iti | For example, when [someone] has stated "sound is non-eternal because it is produced, like a pot", someone might state an invariable concomitant of the opposite: "sound is eternal because it is audible, like soundness [itself]" |
evam ādistattvaṭīkāyām udāharaṇaprapañco draṣṭavyaḥ | Such and other detailed examples are to be seen in the Tattvaṭīkā |
avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu bhāvānam anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā | Due to the difference of condition, place and time in regard to different powers, the establishment of entities through inference is very difficult to achieve |
vijñātaśakter apyasya tāṃ tamarthakriyāṃ prati / viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate // | Even in the case of a thing whose potency is [already] known, that potency becomes restricted with regard to particular effective actions when [the thing] becomes connected with particular substances. |
yatnenānumito 'pyarthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyathaivopapādyate // | Even when a conclusion has been carefully deduced through inference by skilled reasoners, it can be proved otherwise by other, more expert [reasoners]. |
avasthādeśakālabhedena padārthānāṃ śaktayo bhinnāḥ / | The potencies of things differ according to [their] condition, place and time. |
ato na śakyate 'numānāt tadbhāvaniścayaḥ kartum, na hyevaṃ śakyate 'numānāt | Therefore, no definite conclusion about their nature can be reached through inference. |
pratyetum devadatto bhārodvahanasamartho na bhavati, devadattatvād bālāvasthadevadattavad iti / | [For example,] it cannot be inferred that "Devadatta is unable to carry a burden because he is Devadatta, like Devadatta in [his] childhood state." |
tathā deśabhedenāmalakīkharjūrādīnāṃ rasavīryavipākabhedo dṛśyate, tatranaivaṃ śakyate kartum sarvāmalakī kaṣāyaphalā, anubhūyamānāmalakīvaditi / | Similarly, due to difference in place, variations in taste, potency and ripening are seen in āmalakī, kharjūra and other fruits; therefore one cannot argue that "all āmalakī fruits are astringent, like the āmalakī [that is] being experienced [now]." |
tathā kālabhedena kūpodakādīnāṃ śītoṣṇādibhedaḥ sambhavati, tatra sarvāāpaḥ śītā iti na śakyate niścayaḥ kartum / | Similarly, due to difference in time, variations in coldness and other [properties] occur in well-water and other [waters]; therefore one cannot reach the conclusion that "all water is cold." |
avasthādeśakālānām iti bhedād ityetadapekṣya ṣaṣṭhī / | The genitive case in "avasthādeśakālānām" relates to "bhedāt." |
bhāvānām iti prasiddhyapekṣayā / | The [genitive case] in "bhāvānām" relates to "prasiddhi." |
tathā tṛṇādiṣu niścitadahanasāmarthyasyāgner abhrapaṭale tat sāmarthyaṃ pratihanyate, na ca tatraivamanumātuṃ śakyate abhrapaṭalamagninā dahyate pārthivattvāt tṛṇādivad iti / | Similarly, fire's capacity to burn, which is established in [the case of] grass and such things, is blocked in [the case of] a mass of clouds; and one cannot make the inference that "the mass of clouds is burned by fire because it is earthen, like grass and such things." |
tathānyenānyathā pratipādito 'rthaḥ punar abhiyuktatareṇānyenānyathā pratipādyata ityaniṣṭā // | Thus, when something has been proven one way by someone, it can again be proven differently by another who is more expert—which is undesirable. |
parārthamanumānaṃ tu na mānaṃ vaktrapekṣayā | Inference for the sake of others cannot be a means of valid cognition with regard to the speaker, because it is [merely] a restatement. |
anuvādān na tenāsau svayam arthaṃ prapadyate | Because through [such] restatement, he himself does not obtain knowledge of the object through that [inference]. |
śrotṛvyapekṣayāpyetat svārthamevopapadyate | With regard to the hearer too, this [inference] turns out to be for his own sake. |
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