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śrotradarśanamūlāyāḥ ko viśeṣo hi saṃvidaḥ | For what difference is there between cognition based on hearing and [cognition based on] seeing? |
na parārthānumānatvaṃ vacasaḥ śrotrapekṣayā | With regard to the hearer, the verbal statement cannot [be considered] an inference for the sake of others, |
śrotṛsantānavijñānahetutvajñāpakatvataḥ | Because it is a cause in the series of the hearer's cognitions and because it is [merely] informative. |
yathendriyasya sākṣāc ca nānumeyaprakāśanam | And just as a sense organ [does not directly reveal] the inferrable object, |
tasmād asyāvinābhāvasambandhajñānavan na tat | Therefore, like the knowledge of invariable concomitance, it [inference for others] is not that [i.e., not a means of valid cognition]. |
athocyate parārthatvaṃ paravyāvṛttyapekṣayā | If it is said that [its] being for the sake of others depends on [causing] the activity of others, |
tadapyayuktaṃ svārthepi parārthatvaprasaṅgataḥ | That too is incorrect, because [then] inference for oneself would also become [inference] for the sake of others. |
anyaḥ punar āha parārtham anumānaṃ vaktrapekṣayānuvādatvān na pramāṇam | Another [scholar] further says that inference for the sake of others is not a means of valid cognition with regard to the speaker because it is [merely] a restatement. |
śrotrapekṣayā tu svārtham eva ko hi viśeṣaḥ śrotradvāreṇa tamarthaṃ pratipadyate darśanadvāreṇa ceti | With regard to hearing, however, it is only for one's own sake, for what difference is there between understanding that object through the faculty of hearing and through the faculty of seeing? |
yathā darśanendriyasya vyāpāre sati parārthavyapadeśo na bhavati evaṃ śrotrendriyavyāpāre 'pi mābhūd iti | Just as when the visual organ is functioning, there is no designation of [its cognition being] for the sake of others, similarly let it not be [designated as such] in the case of the functioning of the auditory organ. |
darśanam cakṣurindriyaṃ dṛśyate 'neneti kṛtvā | 'Darśana' [means] the visual organ, being derived as "that by which [something] is seen." |
saṃvida iti / jñānasya / | "Saṃvit" [means] cognition. |
tathā na śrotrapekṣayā vacanasya parārthānumānatvam, śrotṛsantānavartijñānahetutvāt, jñāpakatvād vā, indriyavad iti / | Similarly, with respect to the hearer, verbal expression cannot be [considered] an inference-for-others, because it [merely] causes cognition in the mental continuum of the hearer, or because it is a means of cognition, like a sense organ. |
śrotṛsantānavijñānahetutvaṃ ca jñāpakatvaṃ ceti dvandvena hetudvayanirdeśaḥ / | The compound "śrotṛsantāna[vartijñāna]hetutvāt" and "jñāpakatvāt" indicates two reasons through a dvandva [compound]. |
yathendriyasyeti dṛṣṭāntanirdeśaḥ / | "Yathendriyasya" presents the example. |
ayamaparaḥ prayogaḥ na parārthānumānatvaṃ vacanasya śrotrapekṣayāsākṣādanumeyāprakāśakatvāt, avinābhāvasambandhajñānavat / | Here is another argument: with respect to the hearer, verbal expression cannot be [considered] an inference-for-others because it does not directly reveal the object to be inferred, like the cognition of invariable concomitance. |
tasmād iti / sākṣādanumeyāprakāśakatvāt / | "Tasmāt" [refers to] because it does not directly reveal the object to be inferred. |
yasmāt sākṣādanumeyāprakāśakatvaṃ tasmān na śrotrapekṣayā vacasaḥ prāmāṇyamavinābhāvasambandhajñānavad iti vākyārthaḥ / avinābhāvaḥ sādhyena sādhanasya, sa eva sambandhaḥ sādhyena yasya liṅgasyatasya jñānam iti vigrahaḥ / | The meaning is: because it does not directly reveal the object to be inferred, therefore verbal expression cannot be considered a valid means of cognition with respect to the hearer, like the cognition of invariable concomitance. [Here] "invariable concomitance" [means] of the probans with the probandum, and [refers to] the cognition of that mark which has such a relation with the probandum. |
atha paravyāpārāpekṣayā taducyate parārtha iti / | If [one says] it is called "for others" because it depends on the activity of another person... |
tathā 'pyayuktaṃ svārthe 'pi parārthatvaprasaṅgāt, āpekṣikatvāt paratvasya, pārācāravat / | ...even then it would be incorrect, because [this would lead to] the undesired consequence that inference-for-oneself would also be for others, since "otherness" is relative, like [the concept of] "the other shore." |
trirūpaliṅgetyādinā pratividhatte / trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṃ nanu saṃvādilakṣaṇam / | [The text] responds with "trirūpaliṅga" etc. The being preceded by a three-featured mark is indeed the characteristic of [that which is] compatible [with reality]. |
tallakṣaṇaṃ ca mānatvaṃ tat kiṃ tasmānniṣidhyate // | And this same [compatibility] characterizes valid cognition; why then is it denied? |
tatra prathame prayoge trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvād ityasya hetor viruddhatām āha saṃvādilakṣaṇam iti / | Regarding the first argument [in Text 1457], [the author] points out the contradictory nature of the reason "because it is brought about by the three-featured indicative" by [saying] that [it has] the characteristic of compatibility. |
saṃvāditvam anena lakṣyata iti kṛtvā / | [This is said] because compatibility is what is indicated by this. |
yatastrirūpaliṅgajaṃ yajjñānaṃ tat pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibaddhamato 'visaṃvādakaṃ pratyakṣavat / | Because any cognition that arises from a three-featured indicative is indirectly connected to the object, therefore it is non-contradictory, just like perception. |
yathāha "liṅgaliṅgidhiyorevaṃ pāramparyeṇa vastuni / pratibandhāt tadābhāsaśūnyayor apyavañcanam" // | As has been stated: "Since the cognitions of the sign and the signified are indirectly connected to the object, and [since they are] free from false appearances, there is no deception." |
iti / | Thus. |
avisaṃvādalakṣaṇam / | [It has] the characteristic of non-contradiction. |
yathāha ---"pramāṇamavisaṃvādijñānam" iti / | As has been stated: "Valid knowledge is non-contradictory cognition." |
nahi pratyakṣe 'pi tat pramāṇavādinānyat pramāṇavyavasthānibandhanaṃ śakyamādarśayitum anyatrāvisaṃvādāt / | Even for one who maintains the validity of perception, nothing other than non-contradiction can be shown as the basis for establishing [something as] valid knowledge. |
sa ca trirūpaliṅgajanye 'stīti kimiti tasmāttrirūpaliṅgapūrvatvād avisaṃvāditvahetoḥ prāmāṇyaṃ niṣidhyate / | And since this [non-contradiction] exists in [cognition] produced by a three-featured indicative, why then is validity denied on the grounds of being produced by a three-featured indicative, which is the reason for non-contradiction? |
etena sādhyasādhanayor arthato virodha uktaḥ / | By this, the actual contradiction between the probandum and the probans is stated. |
tathā hi yatra trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṃ tatrāvisaṃvāditvaṃ yatrāvisaṃvāditvaṃ tatra prāmāṇyaṃ, prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyayoś ca parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo virodha iti sāmarthyād viruddho hetur nirdiṣṭaḥ // | For where there is the property of being produced by a three-featured indicative, there is non-contradiction; where there is non-contradiction, there is validity; and since validity and invalidity have the characteristic of mutual exclusion, the reason is shown by implication to be contradictory. |
mithyājñānam ityādinā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām āha | By [the phrase] beginning with "false cognition," [the author] states that the example lacks the probandum. |
mithyājñānaṃ samānaṃ ca pūrvapakṣavyapekṣayā / iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ jñānamuktaṃ na vastutaḥ // | When [something] is spoken of as a "wrong cognition" [that is] "similar" [and] "subversive of what is desirable," the similarity [meant] must be only with reference to the view of the first party, not [in terms of] actual reality. |
vastusthityā hi tajjñānam avisaṃvādi niścitam / | For with regard to the actual state of things, that cognition has been definitively established to be non-contradictory. |
vādīṣṭaviparītasya pramāṇamata eva tat // ato viruddhatā hetor dṛṣṭānte cāpyasādhyatā / | Therefore it is indeed a valid means of knowledge for [establishing] the opposite of what the disputant desires. Hence there is contradictoriness in the reason and non-establishment in the example. |
etenaiva prakāreṇa dvitīye hetvasiddhatā // | In this very same way, in the second [argument], there is non-establishment of the reason. |
yato vādīṣṭaviparītasādhanāt tadapi pramāṇam eva, anyathā hi sādhyāntaramapekṣya sarvadaiva sarvasya yadyaprāmāṇyaṃ vyavasthāpyeta, pratyakṣe 'pi prasaṅgaḥ syāt / | Since it proves the opposite of what the disputant desires, that [cognition] too is indeed a valid means of knowledge; for otherwise, if invalidity were to be established for everything at all times with respect to another probandum, then [such invalidity] would apply to perception as well. |
pūrvapakṣāpekṣayā tu tanmithyājñānam uktam na vastusthityā / | However, it has been called a "wrong cognition" only with reference to the prima facie view, not according to the actual state of things. |
pūrvasya prathamavādinaḥ pakṣaḥ, pūrvapakṣaḥ tasya vyāpekṣeti vigrahaḥ/ | [The compound] pūrvapakṣa means "the position (pakṣa) of the prior (pūrva), i.e., the first speaker" – this is its analysis. |
yo hyanādheyātiśayaikaparārthatvaṃ cakṣurādīnām icchati tadabhiprāyāpekṣayā mithyājñānamucyate / anityānekavijñānādihetutvena cakṣurādīnāṃ siddhatvāt / | It is called a "wrong cognition" only with reference to the view of one who maintains that the eyes and other [sense organs] serve only objects that are essentially incapable of having additional qualities imposed upon them, because the eyes and other [sense organs] are established as causes of multiple impermanent cognitions and so forth. |
viruddhateti / | [It is] "contradictory" thus: |
trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvasyāpramāṇe kvacid apyabhāvāt / pramāṇe tu tatraiveṣṭavighātakṛtā janye jñāne bhāvāt / | Because the property of "being preceded by a three-featured mark" is not found in any invalid means of knowledge whatsoever, while in a valid means of knowledge it is present in that very cognition which is produced as subversive of what is desired [by the opponent]. |
nanu ca lokāyataṃ prati viruddhasādhane kartavye dṛṣṭānto na siddha eva / | [Says the opponent:] "When putting forward a contradictory argument against the Lokāyata [materialist], the corroborative instance is indeed not established. |
nahīṣṭavighātakṛjjanyaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam icchati paraḥ, nacānyatarāsiddho dṛṣṭānto bhavati / | For the opponent does not accept as valid the cognition that destroys what is desired, and an instance that is not established for either party cannot [serve as a corroborative instance]. |
ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanadūṣaṇam iti nyāyaḥ ucyate / | It is indeed stated as a rule that only that which expresses what is ascertained by both parties can [serve to] refute an argument." |
yadyapipareṇātra prāmāṇyaṃ neṣṭaṃ vācā, tathāpyasaṃvāditvaṃ tvaśakyāpahnavatvādiṣṭam eva, tadicchatāṃ sāmarthyāt prāmāṇyam api tena vastusthityābhyupagantavyam iti vastubalaprakṛtyā viruddha udbhāvyate na parābhyupagamānurodhena / | Although the opponent has not verbally accepted the validity here, nevertheless the non-contradictoriness must be accepted [by him] since it cannot be denied; and for those who accept that, the validity must also be tacitly accepted by them according to the real state of things; thus the contradiction is pointed out based on the force of reality, not in accordance with the opponent's acceptance. |
athavā viruddhahetusaṃsūcanād viruddhaḥ / | Or, [it may be considered] contradictory because it indicates a contradictory reason. |
tatra viruddho hetuḥ yadavisaṃvādi tat pramāṇaṃ yathā pratyakṣaṃ, saṃvādi ca trirūpaliṅgajanyaṃ jñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | In this case, the contradictory reason is [as follows]: "What is non-contradictory is valid, as for instance direct perception, and the cognition produced by a three-featured mark is non-contradictory" - this is a reason based on essential nature. |
nacāsiddho niḥsvabhāvatvānihetutvaprasaṅgāt, pratyakṣāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgānnaikāntikaḥ / | And [this reason] is not inadmissible, because [if it were] there would follow [both] lack of essential nature and lack of reason, and it is not inconclusive because [if it were] there would follow invalidity of perception. |
asādhyateti / | [The term] "asādhyatā" [means] |
sādhyavikalateti yāvat / | [it means] as much as "lacking the probandum" |
dvitīya iti / | [The phrase] "in the second" [refers to the second argument]. |
na ca trairūpya ityādau hetvasiddhateti | "Nor [is there] in [the case of] three features etc." [means] "because the reason is not established" |
ananumāne kvacid apyabhāvāt | Because [the reason] is not absent anywhere in [cases of] non-inference |
etenaiveti trirūpaliṅgetyādinā nyāyena | "By this very [means]" [refers to] by the reasoning based on the three-featured mark etc. |
yattādātmyatadutpattyā sambandhaṃ pariniścitam tadeva sādhanaṃ prāhuḥ siddhaye nyāyavādinaḥ | The exponents of logic declare that only that [reason] which has its relation determined through identity or causation serves as a [valid] proof |
anumānavirodhādirīdṛśe 'sti na sādhane | In such a proof there is no contradiction with inference etc. |
naiva taddhyātmahetubhyāṃ vinā sambhavati kvacit | For that [inference] is never possible without [the relations of] identity or causation |
parasparaviruddhau ca dharmau naikatra vastuni yujyete sambhavo nāto viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ | And mutually contradictory properties cannot exist in one thing; therefore there cannot be [any] invariable concomitance with contradictories |
īdṛśa iti | "Such" [means the following] |
tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhe | [That which is] connected through identity or causation |
ātmahetubhyām iti | "Through identity or cause" [means] |
svabhāvena kāraṇena ca vinā yathākramaṃ talliṅgaṃ na bhavati niḥsvabhāvatvanirhetutvaprasaṅgāt | Without inherent nature and cause respectively, that mark cannot exist, because [if it did] it would follow that [it would be] without nature and without cause |
yaduktam vivakṣitaḥ sādhyadharmo na dharmiviśeṣaṇam iti, tatra yadi sādhyadharmo na dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ tadā samudāya eva nāstīti tataścaitat samudāyaikadeśatvādityasiddhau hetuḥ syāt / | [As to] what has been stated that "the intended probandum is not a qualification of the subject," if the probandum is not a qualification of the subject, then the aggregate [of the three characteristics] itself does not exist, and consequently the reason would be inadmissible due to being [only] a part of [that] aggregate. |
yaccoktam sarvatrānumāne viśeṣaviruddhānāṃ sambhava iti tadayuktam / | What has been stated that "in all inference there is the possibility of contradictory particulars" - that is incorrect. |
yataḥ sādhyaviparyayasādhanād viruddha iṣyate naca viśeṣaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ / vastubalapravṛttānumāne viṣaye na viruddhāvyabhicārī ca sambhavati / | Because [something] is considered contradictory [only] when it proves the opposite of what is to be proved, and no particular [case] is intended to be proved [here]. In the case of an inference proceeding by force of [real] things, neither contradiction nor deviation is possible. |
ekasmin dharmiṇi parasparaviruddhadharmadvayaprasaṅgāt // | Because two mutually contradictory properties cannot occur in one and the same subject. |
taduktamavasthādeśakālānām ityādi tatrāha abhyastetyādi / | [With regard to] what was said about "conditions, places and times" etc., [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "abhyasta" etc. |
anumāvṛttiranyā tu nānumetyabhidhīyate // avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā // | The process of inference is one thing, [but] what is not inference is called something else. Though powers differ according to differences of condition, place and time, the establishment of things through inference is not thereby impossible. |
yatnenānumito 'pyarthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / nānyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatarair api // | A matter that has been carefully inferred by skilled inferrers cannot be proved otherwise even by those who are more skilled. |
supariniścitaṃ liṅgaṃ gamakam iṣyate na saṃdigdham, nahi dhūmo bāṣpādirūpeṇasandihyamāno vahner niścāyako bhavati / | A well-ascertained reason is considered indicative, not a doubtful one; for smoke, when doubtful due to [possible confusion with] vapor etc., does not lead to certainty about fire. |
liṅganiścaya eva katham iti cet / | [If one asks:] "How indeed [does] the ascertainment of the reason [come about]?" |
yathā maṇirūpādiṣu tadvidām / | [It is] as [happens] for those who know about gems and forms etc. |
tathā hi vivecayanty eva bāṣpādibhyo dhūmādīnabhyas tatatsvalakṣaṇāḥ / a{tha}vivecya pravṛttāścaite prāpnuvantyeva vahnim / | Indeed, [those who know] discriminate the specific characteristics of smoke and similar [things] from vapor and the like, and when they act after having discriminated, they certainly find fire. |
tasmādyataḥ suvivecitaṃ liṅgaṃ na vyabhicarati, tenāvasthādibhedabhinnānāṃsiddhir na durlabhā / | Therefore, since a well-discriminated probans never deviates, the establishment of things that differ according to variations of condition [time and place] is not difficult through it. |
nāpi suvivecitālliṅgāt pariniścito 'rtho 'nyathā śakyate kartum / | Nor can an object that has been ascertained through a well-discriminated probans be made otherwise. |
nahi dhūmāt supariniścitād anumitasya vahner anyathābhāvaḥ śakyate kartum, ekasya viruddhasvabhāvadvayāyogāt / | For fire that has been inferred from well-ascertained smoke cannot be made otherwise [i.e., non-existent], because one [thing] cannot possess two contradictory natures. |
yaccoktam na devadatto bhārodvahanasamartha ityādi, yaccābhrapaṭalaṃ vahninā dahyata iti, talliṅgameva na bhavati, trairūpyābhāvāt / | As for what was said about "Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden" and "the cloud-mass burns with fire," these are not [valid] probans at all, due to the absence of the three characteristics. |
nahyadarśanamātreṇa vipakṣāddhetor vyāvṛttiḥ śakyate kartum / | For the exclusion of the reason from the counter-instance cannot be established through mere non-perception. |
yadāha ---"nacādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣād vyatirekitā" iti / kiṃ tarhi tādātmyatadutpattisambandhaniyamād avinābhāvaniyamaḥ / | As it has been said: "Exclusion from the counter-instance cannot [be established] through mere non-perception." Rather, the necessity of invariable concomitance [follows] from the necessity of the relation of identity or causation. |
"kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt" // | "The necessity of invariable concomitance [follows] either from the relation of cause and effect or from the restrictive nature [of things], [and] not from non-perception but from perception." |
nacātra tādātmyatadutpattisambandho 'sti // | And here [in the examples cited] there is neither a relation of identity nor of causation. |
na hi svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā svabhāvāt kāraṇādṛte / | For there can be neither a nature nor an effect without [respectively] a nature or a cause. |
bhedānimittatāprāptes te vināsti na cānumā // | "How is it known that the well-ascertained probans never fails? There is no reason why this should be so." |
dvividham eva hi liṅgaṃ yaduta svabhāvaḥ kāryam iti / | There are indeed only two kinds of probans: [namely] svabhāva (nature) and kārya (effect). |
anupalabdhes tu svabhāve 'ntarbhāvaḥ / naca svabhāvakāraṇākhyena liṅginā vinā tayor liṅgayoḥ sambhavo 'sti, yena | The non-apprehension [type of probans] is included under svabhāva. And these two probans are not possible without a probandum called 'nature' and 'cause', through which [there could be fallibility]. |
kasmān na sambhava ity āha bhedānimittatāprāpteḥ bhedaścānimittatā ca tayoḥ prāptiḥ / | [If one asks:] "Why is it not possible?" [The answer is:] "Because of the obtaining of difference and causelessness." There is a dvandva compound between bheda and animittatā. |
svabhāvahetor bhedo 'svabhāvatā prāpnoti, kāryahetor animittatvaṃ nirhetukatvaṃ prāpnoti, naca svabhāvakāryavyatirekeṇānyaliṅgamiṣṭamanyatrāpratibandhād avinābhāvāyogāt / | [For] the svabhāvahetu would obtain difference [and thus] non-svabhāva-ness, and the kāryahetu would obtain causelessness [and thus] absence of cause, and no other probans apart from svabhāva and kārya is admitted, because there would be no connection and no invariable concomitance elsewhere. |
te vineti / svabhāvakārye / | [The expression] "without these" [refers to] svabhāva and kārya. |
dvivacanāntam etat // | This [word] has a dual ending. |
yaduktaṃ parārtham anumānaṃ tu mānam iti tatrāha trirūpaliṅgetyādi / trirūpaliṅgavacasaḥ saktasaṃsūcakatvataḥ / yatparārthānumānatvam uktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā // | Regarding what was said about "inference for others being a means of knowledge," [the text] states "the three-featured probans" etc. Because the statement of the three-featured probans indicates what is possible, what is called "inference for others" [is so called] with reference to the hearer. |
saktasaṃsūcakatvena tena nātiprasajyate // | Therefore, due to [its] being indicative of what is possible, there is no overextension. |
nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava / | If inference is not a means of valid cognition, then your statement is futile. |
na kaścid api vādo hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate // | Indeed, no disputant whatsoever comprehends [your] intention to speak. |
vacanasya yat parārthānumānatvamuktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā tena vaktrapekṣābhāvī doṣo na bhavati / | The statement that has been declared to be "inference for another" [is so called] with reference to the hearer; therefore, the defect of lacking reference to the speaker does not arise. |
śrotrapekṣayāpi trirūpaliṅgasūcanād upacāreṇānumānakāraṇatvāt samayād vānumānatvam uktam / | Even with reference to the hearer, it has been called "inference" either because it indicates the three-featured probans and thus metaphorically causes inference, or because of convention. |
saktasaṃsūcaka evānumānasaṃjñāniveśāt / | [This is] because the designation "inference" applies only to that which indicates what is possible. |
tenendriyasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhajñānasya ca parārthānumānatvaprasaṅgād atiprasaṅgo na bhavati tayoḥ, saktasaṃsūcakatvābhāvāt / | Therefore, there is no overextension in [claiming that] the sense organ and the cognition of invariable concomitance would [absurdly] become inference for another, because these two lack the property of indicating what is possible. |
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