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virodhābhāvāc ca na śyāmetaravarṇābhāvasiddhiḥ / nacaitad vyatiriktaṃ liṅgam astyanyatra pratibandhābhāvāt / naca pratibandhamantareṇa gamakatvam atiprasaṅgāt tasmān nāyaṃ hetur nāpi | And due to absence of contradiction, there is no establishing the absence of colors other than dark. And apart from these, there is no other valid inferential sign due to absence of invariable connection. And without invariable connection there can be no indicative power due to [unwanted] over-application. Therefore this is neither a [valid] reason nor [complete]. |
trilakṣaṇa iti kuto 'vyabhicāraḥ / dṛśyasyādṛṣṭirupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalabdhiḥ // | How can there be infallibility when it is not three-featured? The non-perception of the perceptible is the non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility. |
nanu cetyādināvyāpitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣam āha | With [the phrase] starting "nanu ca", [the text] states the definitional fault of non-pervasion. |
nanu cāvyabhicāritvam anyeṣām api dṛśyate / kumudānāṃ vikāsasya vṛddhiś ca jaladher yathā // | Indeed, infallibility is seen in other cases as well, such as [in the case of] the blooming of water lilies and the swelling of the ocean. |
liṅgaṃ candrodayo dṛṣṭa ātapasya ca bhāvataḥ / | The rise of the moon is seen as the indicator, and [likewise] from the presence of sunlight. |
tamasyulmukadṛṣṭau ca dhūma ārāt pratīyate / | And when a firebrand is seen in darkness, smoke is inferred from afar. |
kṛttikodayaścāpi rohiṇyāsattikalpanā // | And from the rising of [the constellation] Kṛttikā, the proximity of [the constellation] Rohiṇī is inferred. |
yathā candrodayāt kumudavikāsasamudravṛddhyoranumānam / | Just as from the rising of the moon [follows] the inference of the blooming of water lilies and the swelling of the ocean. |
ādigrahaṇāt sūryodayāt padmavikāśasya, atapasadbhāvāt parvatādiṣu parabhāge cchāyānumitiḥ evaṃ dūrāt tamasyulmukamarddhadagdhakāṣṭhakhaṇḍakaṃ dṛṣṭvā dhūmapratītiḥ, tathā kṛttikānakṣatrodayādrohiṇīnakṣatrasyāsa nnatvaṃ pratīyate yato 'śvinīmārabhya yathāpāṭhaṃ krameṇaiva nakṣatrāṇām | From [the word] "ādi", [we understand] the blooming of the lotus [is inferred] from the rising of the sun; from the presence of sunlight, the inference of shadow on the other side of mountains and such; likewise, seeing from afar in darkness a half-burnt piece of wood, [there is] the inference of smoke; similarly, from the rising of the constellation Kṛttikā, the proximity of the constellation Rohiṇī is inferred, since the constellations [appear] in sequence according to their enumeration, beginning with Aśvinī. |
na cāsya sarvasya hetutrayāntarbhāvo 'stīti tat kumucyate na tadvyatiriktasyabhavatyavyabhicāriteti // | And since all these are not included within the three types of reasons, why is it said that there can be no infallibility in anything other than those [three types]? |
atrottaram āha tadatretyādi / | To this [objection], [the author] gives the following answer. |
tadatra hetudharmasya tādṛśo 'numitair matāḥ / jātās tadekakālās te sarve bodhādayo 'pare // | Here, such characteristics of the reason are considered to arise simultaneously with the inference, [and] all other cognitions likewise. |
sambandhānupapattau ca sarvasyāpi gatir bhavet // | And in the absence of [such] a relationship, everything would [have to] be accepted [as valid inference]. |
tasmād atrāpi pratibandho vācyaḥ / | Hence in this case also, a relationship must be stated. |
sa ca yathoktakāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇa eva bhavati // | And this [relationship] is indeed characterized only by the cause-effect relation as explained above. |
rohiṇyāsattyā tarhi kṛtakodayasya kaḥ pratibandha ity āha prabhañjanetyādi / | "What then is the relationship between the proximity of Rohiṇī and the rise of Kṛttikā?" - thus [someone] asks [and the answer begins with] "prabhañjana." |
prabhañjano vāyuḥ / | Prabhañjana means [the] wind. |
atrāpyekasāmagryadhīnatvāddhetudharmānumānam iti / | Here too there is an inference from a causal property due to [their] dependence on the same totality [of conditions]. |
yathoktam | As it has been said: |
"ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ svarūpādessato gatiḥ / hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat" // iti // | "Dependence on one and the same totality [of conditions] leads from [its] own nature to understanding through inference from a causal property, as in the case of smoke [which is] a transformation of fuel." |
atha pratibimbād bimbasya yā gatis tasyā na kvacid antarbhāvo 'styavastutvātpratibimbasya / tasmād avyāpi lakṣaṇam ityāśaṅkyāha liṅgāccetyādi / | [Someone might] object: "The inference of an object from its reflection cannot be included anywhere [in your classification] because a reflection is not a real entity; therefore your definition is too narrow" - thinking thus, [the author] says [the verse beginning with] "liṅgāc ca." |
liṅgāc ca pratibimbākhyād anumānaṃ pravartate / | And inference proceeds from the inferential sign known as reflection. |
sahaikatra dvayāsattvān na vastupratibimbakam | Because two [things] cannot exist together in one place, the reflection cannot be a real entity |
yatraiva pradeśe ādarśarūpaṃ dṛśyate pratibimbakaṃ ca tatraiva, na caikatra pradeśe rūpādvayāsti sahabhāvaḥ, sapratighatvāt, ataḥ sahaikatra dvayo rūpayoḥ sattvaṃ na prāpnoti | In the very place where the mirror's surface is seen and [where] the reflection [is seen], two forms cannot coexist in one place due to [their] mutual resistance, therefore the existence of two forms together in one place is not possible |
tasmād bhrāntiriyam | Therefore this [perception] is an illusion |
athavā sahaikatra dvayāsattvād iti | Or [alternatively], because two [things] cannot exist together in one place |
katam asya dvayasya/ ādarśatalasya candrapratibimbakaṃ dṛśyate kūpa ivodakam | Which two things? The surface of the mirror and the reflection of the moon is seen [there], like water in a well |
anyatra deśe ādarśatalaṃ bavati, anyatraivāntargathaṃ candrapratibimbakaṃ druśate kūpa ivodakaṃ | The mirror's surface exists in one place, while the reflection of the moon appears inside [it] in another place, like water in a well |
anyatra cotpadyamānaṃ kimityanyatropalabhyate / ato nāstyeva kiñcid vastubhūtaṃ pratibimbakaṃ nāma | When [something] is produced in one place, why is it perceived in another? Therefore there exists no real entity called a reflection |
acintyā hi dharmāṇāṃ śaktiprabhedā iti | For the diverse powers of phenomena are indeed inconceivable |
mūrtetyādinā pariharati | [The opponent] responds with [the verse beginning with] "mūrte" |
jñānamevātra tathābhūtaṃ, kāryaṃ liṅgamabhipretaṃ natu bāhyaṃ pratibimbākhyaṃ vastu | Here only the cognition appearing in that form is intended as the effect [and] inferential mark, not an external thing called a reflection |
katham uktaṃ trirūpaliṅgavacanaṃ parārthaṃ punar ucyata iti, yāvatā pakṣanigamopanayavacanamapyanyaiḥ parārthamanumānaṃ kīrtitam / | "How is it claimed that 'Inference for others consists in stating the three-featured probans', when others have declared that inference for others [also] consists in statements of the thesis (pakṣa), conclusion (nigama), and application (upanaya)?" |
etad eva darśayann āha pratijñetyādi / | [The author], showing this very [point], speaks beginning with "pratijñā" etc. |
pratijñādivaco 'pyanyaiḥ parārtham iti varṇyate / | "The statement of thesis etc. is described by others as [being] for the sake of others." |
asādhanāṅgabhūtatvāt pratijñānupayoginī // | "Because it is not an integral part of the proof, the thesis is of no use." |
asādhanetyādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds with [the words] beginning with "asādhana." |
tasmād asādhanāṅgabhūtatvād anupayoginī na prayoktavyetyarthaḥ / | Therefore, because it is not an integral part of the proof, being of no use, [the thesis] need not be stated - this is the meaning. |
anupayiginī akāraṇabhūtetivyākhyāne pratijñārthaikadeśaḥ syāt // | If "of no use" is explained as "not being a cause," then this would be part of the thesis's meaning. |
katham asādhanāṅgam ity āha asambandhādityādi / | [To the question] "How is it not an integral part of the proof?" [the author] speaks [the words] beginning with "because of lack of connection" etc. |
abhyanujñādivākyena nanvatra vyabhicāritā / | "Indeed there is deviation here through statements of agreement etc." |
etad uktaṃ bhavati śabdānām arthena saha sambandhābhāvān na tāvat sākṣād upayujyate, nāpi hetuvacanavat pāramparyeṇa, saktāsaṃsūcakatvād iti / | This means: Because words have no connection with objects, [the thesis] is neither directly useful, nor indirectly useful like the statement of the reason (hetu), because it does not indicate what is possible. |
yathoktam "tat pakṣavacanaṃ cakrur abhiprāyanivedane" | As [it has been] declared: "They made that assertion of the pakṣa [Minor Term] for intimating [their] intention" |
prāpaṇaṃ saṃśayotpattes tataḥ sākṣān na sādhanam | [It serves only for] bringing about doubt; hence it is not directly [useful] for proving |
sādhyasyaivābhidhānena pāramparyeṇa nāpyalam | And since it merely states the sādhya [Probandum], it is not even indirectly sufficient |
kecin manyante sādhyasādhanadharmayor viṣayopadarśanārtham anavayavabhūtāpi satī dṛṣṭāntapadavat pratijñā prayoktavyeti | Some hold [the view] that the pratijñā [Proposition] must be stated, just like the corroborative instance, because even though it does not constitute a component [of inference], it serves to indicate the domain of the sādhya [Probandum] and sādhana [Probans] |
"yato rūpadvayaṃ śeṣaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tena pradarśyate" iti vacanāt | As [it is] stated in the words: "Because the remaining two characteristics are shown by that [Instance]" |
dṛṣṭāntapadaṃ pṛthaganavayavabhūtam api pakṣadharmavyatiriktarūpadvayapradarśanārtham eva prayujyata iti | [That is to say,] the statement of the corroborative instance, even though not constituting a separate component, is employed precisely for showing the two characteristics other than the pakṣadharma [property of the Minor Term] |
tān pratyāha dṛṣṭāntetyādi | To them [he] replies with [the words] beginning with "dṛṣṭānta" |
abhyanujñāvākyam evaṃ kuru śabdam anityaṃ sādhayeti | [There are] sentences of permission [such as] "Do this" [and] "Prove that sound is non-eternal" |
ādiśabdenājñābhyarthanāvākyaṃ gṛhyate | By the word "ādi" [and so forth], sentences of command and request are included |
evambhūtasyāpi vākyasya prayoganirdeśārthaṃ nirdeśaḥ syāt, nahyebhir api vinākāṇḍa eva sādhanasya pravṛttiḥ sambhavatīti | For such statements too, there would have to be an instruction for [their] use, since without these also, the sudden operation of an inference is not possible |
niṣphalam iti | [It is therefore] useless |
vināpi tena sādhyapratīteḥ / | Because the probandum would become cognized even without it. |
tathā hi yat kṛtakaṃ tat sarvam anityaṃ kṛtakaś ca śabda ityetāvanmātre prokte 'nityaḥ śabda iti pratītir bhavatyantareṇāpi pratijñāvacanam // | For instance, when just this much is stated: "Whatever is produced is non-eternal, and sound is produced," the cognition "sound is non-eternal" arises even without the statement of the proposition. |
sapakṣādivyavasthā cet kathaṃ pakṣāprayogaḥ / | [Question:] "How then can there be any distinction [made] regarding the sapakṣa and so forth without stating the pakṣa?" |
tadabhāvaḥ prasādhitaścāsapakṣa iti / | [This refers to] the establishment of its absence and [the concept of] asapakṣa. |
netyādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds with "na" etc. |
na sādhanābhidhānesti sapakṣādivikalpanā / | There is no distinction of sapakṣa etc. in the statement of the proof. |
tathāhyavyutpannasapakṣādivyavahāro bhaṭādir api yatra dhūmas tatra vahnir dhūmaścātretyetāvanmātram ukto 'vadhāritānvayavyatirekaḥ sapakṣādivyavahāramantareṇaiva vahnimpratipadyata eva, tasmān na sādhanakāle sapakṣādivyavasthāsti / | For instance, even an uneducated person like a Bhaṭa, who does not know the usage of sapakṣa etc., when told just this much: "where there is smoke, there is fire, and there is smoke here," grasps the positive and negative concomitance and understands [the presence of] fire without [knowledge of] the usage of sapakṣa etc. Therefore, there is no distinction of sapakṣa etc. at the time of proving. |
kutra tarhi sapakṣādivyavahāra ity āha śāstre tviti // | [Question:] "Where then is this usage of sapakṣa etc.?" [Answer:] "[It occurs] in scientific treatises." |
yadi vā sādhanābhidhānakāle 'pi tadvyavasthā kriyamāṇā na virodhinīti pratipādayati prakṛtetyādi / | Or [the author] explains that even if this distinction is made at the time of stating the proof, it is not contradictory. |
yadyapi sādhanābhidhānakāle pratijñāprayogo nāsti tathāpi, prakṛtam arthaṃ sādhyadharmiṇaṃ samāśritya sā vyavasthā kriyamāṇā na virudhyata eva / nacaitad vaktavyaṃ sādhanakāle prakṛta evārtho nāstīti, yato na, akāṇḍa eva aprastāva eva, parasyāpi pratijñāprayogavādinaḥ, vādī sādhanam āha // | Although there is no statement of the proposition at the time of stating the proof, nevertheless when this distinction is made with reference to the subject matter under discussion [i.e.] the subject to be proved, it is not contradictory. And it cannot be said that "at the time of proof there is no subject matter under discussion," because even for the opponent who advocates the statement of the proposition, the disputant does not state the proof suddenly [or] out of context. |
bhavatu nāma jijñāsitaviśeṣo dharmī prakṛtaḥ, tathāpi sā kriyamāṇā vyavasthā prakṛtaṃ dharmiṇam āśritya kathaṃ kartavyetyāha jijñāsiteti | Let it be that the subject [dharmin] whose particular nature is to be known is under discussion; still, how is that distinction to be made with reference to that subject under discussion? |
jijñāsitaviśeṣe hi vartanāt pakṣadharmatā | [The answer is that] the [required] property of the subject exists because of its presence in that which is to be investigated. |
subodham | This is easily understood. |
udāharaṇāpekṣas tathetyupasaṃhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanaya ityupanayalakṣaṇam | The upanaya [application] is defined as the restatement of the probandum [which says] either "thus [it is]" or "thus [it is] not," depending on the example. |
tatropanayavacanaṃ na sādhanam, uktahetvarthaprakāśakatvāt, dvitīyahetuvacanavadityācāryadignāgapādaiḥ pramāṇite bhāviviktādayo hetvasiddhyartham āhuḥ na khalu pakṣadharmatvaṃ pratijñānantarabhāvinā hetuvacanena prakāśyate kāraṇamātrābhidhānāt | On this [point], Ācārya Dignāga authoritatively stated that "the statement of application is not the proof, since it only illuminates the meaning of the stated reason, like a second statement of the reason." But Bhāvivikta and others, to establish the [necessity of] reason, said: "The property of the subject is certainly not made clear by the statement of reason that follows the proposition, since it merely states the cause." |
anityaḥ śabdo bhavati kṛtakatvāt, tatpunaḥ kṛtakatvaṃ kiṃ śabde 'sti nāstīti ceti, tasyāstitvamupanayat pratīyate | "Sound is non-eternal because it is produced" - but whether this being-produced exists in sound or not, its existence is understood through the application. |
athavā pratibimbanārtham upanayanaṃ, pūrvaṃ hi hetuvacanena nirviśeṣaṃ kṛtakatvaṃ śabde nirdiṣṭaṃ, tena dṛṣṭānte pradarśitasādhyāvinābhāvitvān na kṛtakatvasyopanayena pratibimbanamuṣanasā darśyate tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabda iti / tasmād viśeṣadyotanān na punar uktateti | Or rather, the application is for reflection [of the reason]: first, by the statement of reason, the being-produced is indicated in sound in an unqualified way; then, in the example, its inseparable connection with the probandum is shown; thus through the application the reflection of being-produced is shown, [concluding] "thus sound is produced." Therefore, since it indicates a specific [connection], it is not mere repetition. |
atrāha pratijñetyādi | Here [the author] speaks beginning with "proposition" etc. |
pratijñānabhidhāne ca kāraṇānabhidhānataḥ / kartavyopanayasyoktir na sadbhāvaprasiddhaye | When there is no statement of the proposition, there can be no statement of the reason; therefore the statement of application need not be made to establish existence [of the reason in the subject]. |
prāgukte bhāvamātre ca paścād vyāpteḥ prakāśanāt / vivakṣitārthasaṃsiddher viphalaṃ pratibimbakam | When mere existence [of the reason] has been stated first, and the pervasion is shown afterwards, all that is intended is accomplished; [therefore] the reflection [through application] is futile. |
sadbhāvaprasiddhaya iti | [The Statement would serve merely] for intimating the [Probans'] existence |
hetor dharmiṇīti śeṣaḥ | [This means] the existence of the Probans in the Subject [dharmin] |
ayamatrārthaḥ pratijñāprayogasya yathoktayā nītyā niṣiddhatvāt tatsamanantarabhāvikṛtakatvādikāraṇābhidhānaṃ nāstyeva | The meaning here is this: Since the use of the Proposition has been negated in the manner explained above, there can be no statement of the cause like "being produced" etc. that would immediately follow it |
tataś ca kāraṇābhidhānapūrvasyopanayasyoktir na kartavyaiva | And consequently, there should be no statement of the Re-affirmation, which must be preceded by the statement of the Reason |
athopanayasyoktiḥ pakṣadharmatvaprasādhanāya kriyate, tadā kāraṇābhidhānasya phalamanyadvaktavyam | If the Re-affirmation is made to establish the fact that [the Probans] is a property of the Subject [pakṣa], then some other purpose must be stated for the Statement of the Reason |
tatraitat syāt kāraṇatvapratipādanam eva phalam iti | In this regard, one might say: "The purpose [of the Statement of the Reason] is simply to establish its being the cause" |
tan na | That is not [acceptable] |
tenaiva tāvat pratipādanaṃ ko 'rtho yato 'nyathāpi sādhyasiddhir bhavatyevetidarśitam eva | What would be the purpose of establishing that very [fact], since it has already been shown that the Probandum can be established in another way? |
tasmāt pakṣadharmatvapratipādanaṃ muktvā nānyatphalaṃ śakyate hetuvacanasya vaktum | Therefore, apart from establishing that [the Probans] is a property of the Subject, no other purpose can be stated for the Statement of the Reason |
tadā prathamatas tenaiva hetuvacanena pakṣadharmatve pratipādite tat pratipādanāyopanayanamupādīyamānaṃ sphuṭataram eva punar uktatāṃ prakāśayatīti kuto 'siddhatā hetoḥ | Then, when this property-of-the-Subject has first been established by that very Statement of the Reason, the Re-affirmation undertaken to establish that same [fact] clearly reveals itself as mere repetition; so how could there be any inadmissibility of the Reason? |
pratibimbanam api vyartham eva, yatas tasmin pakṣadharmamātre hetuvacanena prāgukte sati sādhyadharmeṇa ca tasya vyāptau kathitāyāṃ vivakṣitārthasaṃsiddher ucyamānaṃ sphuṭataram eva punaruktāmāvahatīti kuto 'trāpyasiddhatā hetoḥ | The Representment too is entirely useless, because when the mere property-of-the-Subject has been previously stated through the Statement of Reason, and its pervasion by the property-to-be-proved has [also] been stated, the intended meaning is accomplished; thus what is [subsequently] stated clearly amounts to mere repetition, so how could there be any inadmissibility of the Reason here either? |
tatra hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punar vacanaṃ nigamanam iti nigamanalakṣaṇam | Here, the definition of Conclusion [nigamana] is that it is the restatement of the Proposition based on the indication of the Reason |
tasmād anitya ityādau tasmād ityanena hetoḥ sāmarthyam udāharaṇapratisiddhamapadiśya yat pratijñārthaṃ punar vacanaṃ kriyate tannigamanam | In [statements] like "therefore [it is] non-eternal," the word "therefore" indicates the efficacy of the Reason as established in the Example, and what is then restated as the content of the Proposition - that is the Conclusion |
nigamyante 'nena pratijñāhetūdaharaṇopanayā ekārthatayā samarthyante sambadhyanta iti nigamanam / | By this [final conclusion] the proposition, reason, example, and application are connected and synthesized as serving one purpose - this is nigamana. |
tatra pratijñāprayoga eva tāvannāsti, kutas tadanuvādātmakasya nigamanasyetyato nigamanaṃ na sādhanāvayavaḥ / | When the very statement of the proposition itself is not present, how can there be its restatement in the form of a final conclusion? Therefore, the final conclusion cannot be a part of the proof. |
tatrācāryādiṅnāgapādair uktam nigamanaṃ punar uktatvād eva na sādhanam iti / | On this matter, the venerable Ācārya Diṅnāga has stated that "since the final conclusion is mere repetition, it cannot be a means of proof." |
atrodyotakarādayaḥ prāhuḥ na paunaruktyamatra, yasmāt sādhyanirdeśaḥ, pratijñā nigamanaṃ tu siddhanirdeśaḥ / | To this, Uddyotakara and others have replied: "There is no repetition here, because the proposition indicates what is to be proved, while the final conclusion indicates what has been proved." |
na ca nigamanena vinā sidhir asti / | And there can be no proof without the final conclusion. |
tathā hi tena vinā tadanyāvayavoktāvapi śaṅkā na nivartate kimanityaḥ śabda iti atas tadāśaṅkanivṛttyarthaṃ vācyaṃ nigamanaṃ pṛthag iti / | For without it, even when the other parts [of inference] are stated, the doubt does not cease [as to] whether sound is non-eternal; therefore, for removing this doubt, the final conclusion must be stated separately. |
tadatrāha trirūpetyādi / | To this [objection], he states [the verse beginning with] "trirūpa" etc. |
trirūpyahetunirdeśasāmarthyād eva siddhitaḥ / na viparyayaśaṅkāsti vyarthaṃ nigamanaṃ tataḥ // | From the very power of stating a reason with three characteristics, when the proof is established, there can be no doubt about its opposite; therefore the final conclusion is superfluous. |
anityatvena pradarśitāvinābhāvi kṛtakatvaṃ yadā śabde dharmiṇi niścitaṃ, kutas tatra viparyayasya nityatvasya śaṅkā, nahi jvalajjvalanajvālākalāpaparigate pariniścitātmani bhūtatve śaityāśaṅkā kartuṃ yuktā svasthacetasaḥ / | When it has been ascertained that in sound, the subject, there exists the property of being produced, which has been shown to be invariably concomitant with non-eternality, how can there be any doubt about its opposite, eternality? Indeed, when it has been definitely ascertained that something is surrounded by masses of blazing flames, no person of sound mind can reasonably suspect the presence of coldness in it. |
nāpi nigamanād vacanamātrānniryuktikāt tu sā vinivartate // | Nor can that [doubt] be removed by mere statement of the final conclusion without reasoning. |
aviddhakarṇastvāha "viprakīrṇaiś ca vacanairnekārthaḥ pratipādyate / | But Aviddhakarṇa says: "A single meaning cannot be conveyed by scattered statements. |
tena sambandhasiddhyarthaṃ vācyaṃ nigamanaṃ pṛthak" / | Therefore, for establishing the connection [between statements], the final conclusion must be stated separately." |
iti atrāha sambaddhair iti | In this regard, [he] speaks [about the word] "sambaddhaiḥ" [as follows] |
hetoḥ sādhyena tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇe sambandhe pratipādite 'rthadvāreṇa sambaddhaireva pakṣadharmānvayavyatirekavacanair eko 'rthaḥ sāmarthyād yathāsamīhitaḥ pratipādyata iti | When the relation between the reason and what is to be proved, characterized by identity or causation, has been established, then through connected statements about the presence [of the reason] in the subject and [its] positive and negative concomitance, the single intended meaning is established through their capability |
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