sanskrit
stringlengths
2
508
english
stringlengths
2
924
bhāvābhāvātmkasya sarvapādārtharāśeḥ pakṣīkṛtatvāt /
Because all collections of entities have been included under the subject [which consists of both] positive and negative [entities].
tadvyatiriktasya cānyasyābhāvāt
And there is nothing else apart from these [properties].
pakṣadharmasyānyathānupapannatvād avyatirekāccaikalakṣaṇa evāyam
This [probans] has one characteristic only, because its being present in the pakṣa is otherwise impossible and [because] it is not different [from that].
jñeyatvādinā kenacit paryāyeṇetyarthaḥ
[This means] by some synonym such as "knowability" or the like.
sadātmakatvād iti / atrāpi kathañcid iti sambandhanīyam
[In the statement] "because they are essentially existent," here also "somehow" is to be connected.
tenāyam artho bhavati kathañcidupalabhyatvāt kathañcit sadātmakāv iti
Hence this meaning becomes: "Because they are somehow apprehensible, they are somehow essentially existent."
candratvenāpadiṣṭatvān nācandraḥ śaśalāñchanaḥ
The hare-marked [moon] is not non-moon, because it is designated as [being] the moon.
iti dvilakṣaṇo hetur ayaṃ cāpara ucyate
This is called a probans with two characteristics, and another [example] is stated.
patatkīṭakṛteyaṃ me vedanetyavasīyate patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayatvataḥ
"This pain of mine is caused by a falling insect" - this is ascertained because its occurrence was experienced upon contact with the falling insect.
cakṣū rūpagrahe kārye sadātiśayaśaktimat tasmin vyāpāryamāṇatvād yadi vā tasya darśanāt
The eye possesses a unique capacity in producing the effect of color-perception, because it is employed for that [purpose], or because of the actual seeing of that [color through it].
kathañcana sadātmānaḥ śaśaśṛṅgādayo 'pi ca kathañcidupalabhyatvād yathaivātmaghaṭādayaḥ
The hare's horns and such things are also somehow existent, because they are somehow apprehensible, just like the soul, jar, and such things.
tvadīyo vāpi tatrāsti veśmanītyavagamyate
It is understood that your father is in this house [because his voice is heard in the house].
bhāvatkapitṛśabdasya śravaṇādiha sadmani // anyathānupapattyaiva śabdadīpādivastuṣu / apakṣadharmabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭā jñāpakatāpi ca //
In the case of words, lamps and such things, it is found that they are indicative [of things] through the character of 'being otherwise impossible' [anyathānupapatti], even though they do not reside in the subject [pakṣa].
tenaikalakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ /
Therefore, for us, let the 'one-featured' probans be [considered] the indicative [probans], due to its being primary.
pakṣadharmādibhis tvanyaiḥ kiṃ vyarthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ //
What [purpose is served] by [these] other useless assumed [characteristics] such as 'residing in the subject' and so forth?
nācandraḥ śaśī candraḥ śaśīti vā pakṣaḥ, loke sampradāyaprasiddhacandravyapadeśāc candratvenāpadiṣṭatvād iti vā hetuḥ, vaidharmyeṇa loṣṭādi /
The proposition [may be stated] either [in the form] "The hare-marked [moon] is not non-moon" or "The hare-marked is moon"; and the probans is "because it is designated by the traditionally well-known term 'moon' among people" or "because it is designated as moon"; the counter-example by dissimilarity being clods of earth and such things.
ayaṃ cāparo dvilakṣaṇa ucyate patatkīṭakakṛteyaṃ mama vedanā patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayatvāt /
And this other two-featured [probans] is stated [thus]: "This pain of mine has been produced by the falling insect, because its arising was experienced upon contact with the falling insect."
patataḥ kīṭakasya pataṅgasya sparśena pratilabdha udaya utpādo yayetyarthaḥ /
The meaning is: of which the arising [udaya], [i.e.] production, was experienced [pratilabdha] through contact with the falling insect [or] moth.
sāmānyavivakṣā cātrānyapadārthe draṣṭavyā tena ṭāb na bhavati /
And here the intention of [expressing] commonness is to be seen in the other component [of the compound], therefore the feminine suffix 'ṭāp' is not applied.
vidyamānarūpagrahaṇasādhakatamaśaktikaṃ cakṣuḥ, anupahatatve sati rūpādidṛkṣāyāṃ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇā karaṇatvena vyāpāryamāṇatvāt, rūpaparicchedanadarśanād vā /
The eye possesses the most effective instrumental power for grasping presently existing color, because while being undamaged, it is employed as an instrument by one who acts deliberately when desiring to see color, or because it is observed to determine color.
vaidharmyeṇa śrotrādi /
The counter-example by dissimilarity being the ear and so forth.
tasyeti rūpasya /
'Tasya' [means] 'of color'.
atra triṣvapi hetuṣvasatyāṣu sādharmyadṛṣṭāntābhāvād dvirūpatvam
Due to the absence of a similar example in [the case where] all three reasons are untrue, [there is] two-featuredness.
ātmaghaṭādayaḥ kathañcidasadātmānaḥ kathañcid anupalabhyamānatvāt kharaviṣāṇavat
The self, pot, etc. are somehow non-existent because [they are] somehow unperceivable, like a rabbit's horn.
sādhanavyavacchedo nirdiśyeta
The exclusion of the means of proof should be indicated.
kharaviṣāṇādayo vā kathañcitsadātmakāḥ kathañcidupalabhyamānatvād ātmaghaṭādivat
Or the rabbit's horn etc. are somehow existent because [they are] somehow perceivable, like the self, pot, etc.
tadityādinā pratividhatte
[The text] responds with "tad" etc.
tad idaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetoḥ kiṃ sāmānyena gamyate / jijñāsitaviśeṣe vā dharmiṇy atha nidarśane
Is this definition of the reason understood generally, or with reference to a particular subject under investigation, or with reference to the example?
sāmānyena gate tasminnevaṃ cetsādhyadharmiṇi
If this [definition] is understood generally, then [it applies] to the subject possessing the probandum.
hetoḥ sattvaṃ prakāśyeta na vivakṣitasiddhibhāk
The existence of the reason would be revealed [but] it would not achieve the intended proof.
na hy avinābhāvitvamātreṇaiva vinā pakṣadharmatvaṃ śabde dharmiṇi cākṣuṣatvam anityatvasya gamakaṃ dṛṣṭam ityayuktaḥ prathamaḥ pakṣaḥ
For mere inseparability alone, without being a property of the subject, is not seen to prove non-eternality of sound through visibility - thus the first alternative is incorrect.
na vivakṣitasiddhibhāgiti / sādhyadharmiṇi na vivakṣitāṃ siddhiṃ bhajed ity arthaḥ
"Not achieving the intended proof" means it would not achieve the intended proof regarding the subject possessing the probandum.
katham ity āha tadyatheti
[Someone] asks "how?" and [the text] states "for example."
tad yathā cākṣuṣatvasya nāśenāvyabhicāritā
For example, visibility has inseparability from destruction.
sāmānyena gatā tac ca dhvanau tasya na sādhanam
[Though] understood generally, that [visibility] is not a proof of that [destruction] in sound.
tasya dharmiṇi sadbhāvaḥ khyāpyate cet tathā sati / saiva trirūpatāyātā bhavatām api darśane //
If it is claimed that its presence in the dharmin [subject] is being indicated, then, in that case, under your view also, the [probans] becomes three-featured just as [in our view].
tacceti cākṣuṣatvam /
'Tat' [refers to] visibility.
tasyeti nāśasya /
'Tasya' [refers to that] of destruction.
sādhanam gamakam / atha mābhūdyathoktadoṣa iti tasya hetoḥ sādhyadharmiṇi sadbhāva āśrīyate /
The probans is that which proves. Thus, [one might say] "let not the aforementioned fault arise," and therefore resort to [claiming] the presence of that probans in the subject to be proven.
evaṃ sati tadeva trirūpatvaṃ hetulakṣaṇamasmadīyaṃ bhavaddarśane 'pi jātam //
If this is so, then under your view also arises that very same three-featured characteristic of the probans [which exists] in our [view].
katham ity āha anyathetyādi /
[Someone] asks "How?" [The answer] begins with "anyathā" [in the next verse].
anyathānupapattya di{hi} vyatirekānvayau gatau /
Through [the principle of] "being otherwise impossible" both negative and positive concomitance are established.
tasya dharmiṇi sadbhāvāt pakṣadharmatvasaṃśayaḥ //
Due to its presence in the dharmin [subject], [its] being a property of the pakṣa becomes established.
anvayaḥ sapakṣe sattvaṃ, vyatirekaḥ vipakṣāsattvam, saṃśrayaṇaṃ saṃśrayaḥ, parigraha iti yāvat //
Positive concomitance is presence in similar cases; negative concomitance is absence in dissimilar cases; saṃśraya means acceptance, that is to say, inclusion.
ācāryair api nirdiṣṭamīdṛksaṃkṣepalakṣaṇam / grāhyadharmas tadaṃśena vyāpto hetur itīdṛśam //
A similar abbreviated definition has also been indicated by [our] teachers, stating that "the probans is a property of the cognizable [subject] and is pervaded by a part of it."
grāhyasya sādhyadharmiṇo dharmaḥ pakṣadharma iti yāvat //
[A property] of the cognizable subject of inference (sādhyadharmin) [is called] pakṣadharma ["property of the minor term"]
atheti dvitīyaṃ pakṣamāha
Now [the author] states the second position with [the word] "atha"
athedaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ hetor dharmiṇyevāvagamyate / yataḥ pramāṇān nāsiddhiḥ sādhyasyāpi tato na tu // sādhyasyāpratipattau hi hetor api na niścayaḥ /
If this definition of the probans (hetu) is known only in the subject (dharmin), then from the same means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) by which [the probans is known], the probandum (sādhya) would also not be unestablished; for when there is no cognition of the probandum, there can also be no ascertainment of the probans.
ato nirarthako hetur anyataḥ sādhyasiddhitaḥ //
Therefore the probans would be purposeless, since the probandum would be established through other [means].
anyonyāśrayadoṣaśca hetoḥ sādhyasya niścaye /
And there would be the fault of mutual dependence in the ascertainment of the probans and probandum.
dvayor anyatarāsiddhāvanyasyāviniścaye //
When one of the two is unestablished, [it results] in the non-ascertainment of the other.
atha sādhyadharmiṇyeva sādhyāvinābhāvitvaṃ hetor yat tadeva hetulakṣaṇaṃ yathāha vināsādhyād adṛṣṭasya dṛṣṭānte hetuteṣyate /
Now, that which is the inseparability from the probandum in the subject of inference alone - that itself is the definition of the probans, as [others] say: "The nature of being a probans is accepted for that which is seen in the example (dṛṣṭānta) and not seen without the probandum."
parair mayā punar dharmiṇyasambhūṣnor vināmutā //
"By others [this is accepted], but according to me, [the probans] is that which cannot exist in the subject without [the probandum]."
arthāpatteś ca śābaryā bhaikṣavāścānumānataḥ /
The followers of Śabara [derive this] through presumption (arthāpatti), and the followers of Bhikṣu through inference (anumāna).
anyadevānumānaṃ no narasiṃhavadiṣyate //
For us, inference is something entirely different, like Narasiṃha [who has both human and lion aspects].
dharmiṇīti sādhyadharmiṇi.
[The word] 'dharmiṇi' [refers to] in the sādhyadharmin [i.e., the minor term].
amunā sādhyadharmeṇa vinā sādhyadharmiṇyasambhavanaśīlasyetyarthaḥ /
[This means] that which is incapable of existing in the minor term without this probandum.
evaṃ tarhi yata eva pramāṇāddhetuḥ sādhyāvinābhūtaḥ sādhyadharmiṇi siddhas tata eva sādhyam api siddham iti vyartho hetuḥ /
If [it is] thus, then from whichever means of cognition the hetu is established as inseparable from the sādhya [and] as present in the minor term, from that very [means] the sādhya too would be established; hence the hetu would be useless.
atha sādhyaṃ na siddhaṃ tadā hetur api na siddha eva, yasmāt sādhyadharmiṇi
And if the sādhya is not established, then the hetu too is certainly not established, because in the minor term
sādhyāvinābhāvitā hetulakṣaṇam, taccāvinābhāvitvaṃ sādhyāsiddhau na siddhamityasiddho hetuḥ, ubhayasiddhināntarīyakatvād avinābhāvitvasya /
inseparability from the sādhya is the definition of hetu, and this inseparability cannot be established when the sādhya is not established; thus the hetu is unestablished, because inseparability necessarily depends on the establishment of both.
anyataḥ pramāṇāt sādhyasiddhau hetuḥ siddha iti cet, kiṃ tadānīṃ hetunā, sādhyasya siddhatvāt /
If [one says] that "the hetu is established when the sādhya is established through another means of cognition," then what is the use of the hetu, since the sādhya is [already] established?
hetoḥ sakāśāt sādhyasya niścaye kartavye 'nyonyanyāśrayadoṣaś ca syāt /
And if the ascertainment of the sādhya is to be accomplished through the hetu, there would be the fault of mutual dependence.
katham ity āha dvayor ityādi /
[If one asks] "How?", [the author] states "[In the case] of both" etc.
hetusiddhipūrvikā sādhyasiddhiḥ, tadarthatvāddhetoḥ, hetoś ca sādhyavinābhāvalakṣaṇasya sādhyasiddhipūrvikā siddhir iti vyaktam itaretarāśrayatvam //
The establishment of the sādhya would depend on the prior establishment of the hetu (because that is the purpose of the hetu), and the establishment of the hetu, which is characterized by inseparability from the sādhya, would depend on the prior establishment of the sādhya - thus [there would be] clear mutual dependence.
tṛtīyapakṣam āha nidarśane 'pīti /
[The author] states the third alternative [beginning with the words] "In the example too."
nidarśane 'pi tatsiddhau na syād dharmiṇi sādhyadhīḥ /
Even if the probans were [known as] existent in the corroborative instance, that would not bring about the cognition of the probandum in the minor term.
na hi sarvopasaṃhārāt tasya vyāptir viniścitā //
Because its pervasion [i.e., invariable concomitance] has not been definitively cognized through complete enumeration.
nidarśane sādhyadharmivyatirikte dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇītyarthaḥ /
"In the corroborative instance" means in the subject of the example, which is different from the subject where the probandum is to be proved.
tat siddhāviti / hetusiddhau /
"If it were known" means if the probans were established.
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi sādhyadharmivyatirekeṇānyatraiva dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi hetor avinābhāvitvam iṣyate, natu sarvopasaṃhāreṇa saha sādhyadharmiṇā, tat kathaṃ sādhyadharmiṇi hetoḥ sakāśāt sādhyapratipattiḥ syāt /
The meaning is this: if the inseparability of the probans is accepted only in the subject of the example which is different from the minor term, and not everywhere together with the minor term, then how could the cognition of the probandum arise from the probans in the minor term?
kathañca na syād ity āha nahītyādi //
[The text] explains why it could not arise by saying "because... etc."
yo 'pītyādinā sāmpratam udāharaṇāni dūṣayate / yo 'pyayaṃ hetur atroktaṃ kathañcidupalambhataḥ /
[The text] now refutes the examples beginning with "yo 'pi": "As for this probans that has been stated here [in the form of] 'because it is somehow apprehended'"
iti nāstyeva viṣayaḥ sandigdho 'syeti niṣphalaḥ //
"There is indeed no doubtful object for this [probans], therefore it is futile."
yo 'yaṃ kathañcidupalambhata iti hetur uktaḥ, asau niṣphalaḥ, sandigdhasya viṣayasyābhāvāt /
This probans that has been stated [in the form] "because it is somehow apprehended" is futile, because there is no object that is doubtful.
siddhasādhyatvād iti yāvat /
That is to say, because it proves what is [already] established.
na hi siddho viṣayo hetor iṣyate /
What is already established cannot be the objective of the probans.
tathā hi saṃdigdhe hetuvacanāt /
For [it is accepted that] a reason is stated [only] with reference to what is doubtful.
vyastavat siddho 'pi hetor anāśraya eva, siddhatvāt sādhyasyeti
Even what is established [only] in isolation cannot be the substratum of the probans, because the probandum would [then] be already established.
bhāvasya hi tadātmatvaṃ sarvaireva viniścitam /
For the essential existence of a positive entity is ascertained by everyone.
kathañcit tasya sādhyatvaṃ kimittham abhidhīyate //
Why is it then stated that its being provable is [only] "in some way"?
kathañcitsadātmakatvaṃ bhāvasya sarvair yadā niścitam eva tadā bhavatā kimitthamabhidhīyate kathañcit sadātmako bhāva iti /
When everyone has already ascertained that a positive entity has existence in some way, why do you state [the proposition] "A positive entity has existence in some way"?
tadātmatvam iti / sadātmatvam /
"Tadātmatvam" means "having the nature of existence."
bhāvasyetyupalakṣaṇabhāvasyāpi /
The mention of "positive entity" is illustrative [and applies] also to negative entities.
kathañcit prameyādirūpeṇa sadātmatvaṃ niścitam eveti vyartho hetuḥ //
Since existence is already established as certain "in some way," namely in the form of being cognizable etc., the probans is futile.
atha sāṅkhyādīnām asiddhamataḥ sādhyata ity āha sarvetyādi /
Now [one might object that] it needs to be proved because it is not established for Sāṅkhyas and others, [to which] he says "sarva" etc.
sarvabhāvaikyavāde 'pi vikārātmādibhedataḥ / kenacid viśadātmatvamātmanā samprakāśyate //
Even in the doctrine of the unity of all entities, [something] is manifested through some specific nature due to the differences in the forms of modifications and other [factors].
sarvabhāvagataṃ ye 'pi niḥsvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ /
Even those who maintain the featurelessness of all entities,
te 'pi tattvata ityādi viśeṣaṇamupāśritāḥ //
they too rely on qualifying terms such as "truly" and so forth.
sarvabhāvānāmaikyavādaḥ sāṅkhyīyo yasmin vāde sthitastair eva sāṅkhyaiḥ kenacid ātmanā svabhāvena tadātmatvaṃ samprakāśyata eva /
The doctrine of unity of all entities is [that which is] held by the Sāṅkhyas; by those very Sāṅkhyas who adhere to this doctrine, [something] is indeed manifested through some specific nature.
katham ity āha vikārātmādibhedata iti /
[If one] asks "how?", [the answer is]: "due to the differences in the forms of modifications and so forth."
vikārātmā vikārasvabhāvaḥ /
The form of modification means the nature of modification.
ādiśabdena prakṛtir asaṅkīrṇā sukhaduḥkhādisvabhāvā puruṣāś ca parasparataḥ prakṛteś ca bhinnā gṛhyante /
By the word "ādi" [are] included the unmixed prakṛti which has the nature of pleasure, pain and so forth, and the puruṣas who are distinct from each other and from prakṛti.
ye 'pīti mādhyamikāḥ /
"Even those" [refers to] the Mādhyamikas.
te 'pi tattvata iti saviśeṣaṇaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ nissvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ, natu sarvathā /
They too maintain the featurelessness of all entities [only] with qualifications such as "truly," not absolutely.
darśanasamutpādādīnām abhyupagamāc ca /
Because [they] accept [things] such as the arising of perceptions and so forth.
tattvataḥ iti nyāyataḥ
"Tattvaḥ" means "according to strict logic"
ādiśabdāt paramārthataḥ ityādeḥ grahaṇam
The term "ādi" [here] includes [words] such as "paramārthataḥ" [in reality] and similar [expressions]
avaśyaṃ ca etad abhyupagantavyaṃ sarvaiḥ eva bhāvasya kathañcit sadātmatvaṃ niścitam iti
And this must necessarily be admitted by all [people] that the existence of a thing is somehow definitely established
kathañcit upalabhyam anyathā na hi sidhyati
For otherwise, [the fact] that [something] is somehow apprehended cannot be established
vyavahārasya sādhyatve prasiddhaṃ syāt nidarśanam
When [mundane] usage is to be proved, the corroborative example should be [something] well-known