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vyatiriktānāṃ tvasiddhatvād bhrāntyasiddheḥ / | Because [their existence as] separate [entities] is not established, [their being] an error is not established. |
śātetyanukūlā, tadviparītā tvaśātā, ādiśabdenopekṣā gṛhyate / | 'Pleasant' means favorable, and its opposite is 'unpleasant', [and] by the word 'ādi' [in 'sukhādi'] indifference is included. |
yadi ca svasantānotpattilakṣaṇaiva sukhādīnāṃ sattā sa eva teṣām anubhava iti nābhyupagamyate / kiṃtu tadviṣayajñānotpattis tadā yogināṃ parakīyaṃ sukhādi gṛhṇatāṃ tadanubhavināmiva tulyāturāvasthā syāt / bhinnasantānavartitvān na tulyāvastheti na vaktavyam / | If [one holds that] the existence of pleasure etc. consists only in [their] arising in their own series, and if it is not accepted that this same [arising] constitutes their experience, but rather [that it is] the arising of cognition regarding them, then when yogins apprehend the pleasure etc. of others, they should be in the same state of distress as those experiencing it, and one cannot say "it is not the same state because [they] belong to different series." |
nahi svasantānavartitvaṃ teṣām anugamo 'bhyupagataḥ / | For [you] do not accept that their continuance consists in [their] occurring in their own series. |
kiṃ tarhitadviṣayajñānotpattiḥ / | Rather, [you accept only] the arising of cognition regarding them. |
sā ca parasantānagrāhiṇām apyastīti samānaḥ prasaṅgaḥ / | And since that [cognition] exists also for those who apprehend others' series, the same consequence follows. |
athobhayamanubhave sukhādīnāṃ kāraṇamaṅgīkriyate tadā svasantānavartitvenānubhave siddhaṃ sukhādīnām ātmasaṃvedanam / | If both are accepted as causes in the experience of pleasure etc., then, due to [their] occurring in their own series in experience, the self-cognition of pleasure etc. is established. |
evaṃ hi svasantānavartitvaṃ nimittaṃ parasantānavartibhyaś ca viśeṣakaṃ bhavati / | For in this way, occurring in one's own series serves as both cause and distinguishing factor from [those things] occurring in others' series. |
yadi svasaṃvid rūpā bhavanti yeṣāṃ tarhi na yoginaḥ siddhā mīmāṃsakādīnāṃ teṣāṃ kathaṃ taiḥ prasaṅga ity āha paretyādi / | [Question:] "If [pleasure etc.] are of the nature of self-cognition, then how can this consequence be urged against those Mīmāṃsakas etc. who do not accept [the existence of] yogins?" |
nahi bauddhānām iva pareṣāṃ nirviṣayaṃ paramārthato 'numānam / | For unlike the Buddhists, other [philosophers] do not [accept] inference as ultimately objectless. |
tataś ca paraduḥkhānumāne tulyo 'nubhave 'numātur api syāt // | And therefore in inferring others' pain, the same experience would occur even for the one making the inference. |
sukhādītyeva gamyante sukhaduḥkhādayo na tu / | Pleasure and pain etc. are apprehended only as "pleasure etc." |
jñānamityeva gamyante tan na jñānaṃ ghaṭādivat // | They are not apprehended as "jñāna" [cognition]; consequently, like a jar and other [objects], they cannot be cognition. |
śaṅkarasvāmyāha na jñānasvabhāvāḥ sukhādayaḥ, jñānamityavyapadeśyatvāt, ghaṭādivad iti // | Śaṅkarasvāmin says: "Pleasure and other [mental states] cannot be of the nature of cognition, because they are never designated as 'cognition,' just like a jar and other [objects]." |
yadyevamityādinā dūṣaṇam āha | [He] states the objection to this with [the words] beginning with "if this is so." |
yadyevaṃ samayānyatve jñānamityapi no gatiḥ / cetasyasti tataḥ prāptā tatrāpyajñānatā tadā // | If difference is to be accepted on the basis of convention, then even cognition might not be designated as "cognition" with respect to consciousness, and consequently non-cognition would result even there. |
yadi saṅketānyatvena svabhāvānyatvaṃ syāt, evaṃ sati yadā jñāne 'pi kaścidajñānam iti samayaṃ kuryāt tadā jñānam ityapi cetasi vyapadeśo nāstīti prāptā jñāne 'pyajñānatā bhāvataḥ // | If difference in nature were based on linguistic convention, then if someone were to establish the convention that cognition [should be called] "non-cognition," then there would be no designation of "cognition" for consciousness, and thus cognition would effectively become non-cognition. |
vyaktaṃ prakāśarūpatvānno cedevaṃ prasajyate / sukhaduḥkhādike tulyaṃ tac ca sarvamidaṃ na kim // | If [you say] that "being manifestly of the nature of light, this [consequence] does not follow," then is not all this equally [applicable] in the case of pleasure, pain, and other [mental states]? |
bhutārthabhāvanodbhūtaṃ kalpanābhrāntivarjitam / vakṣyāmo yogivijñānaṃ sādhanaīr vimalair alam // | We shall explain the yogin's cognition, which arises from the contemplation of real objects and is free from conceptual construction and error, [supported] by flawless arguments. |
atha prakāśātmakaṃ jñānaṃ spaṣṭamanubhūyata iti nājñānatā syād evaṃ sati sukhādiṣvapi sarvametat samānam / | If [you argue] that "cognition, being of the nature of light, is clearly experienced [and] thus cannot be non-cognition," then all this applies equally to pleasure and other [mental states] as well. |
hetuścānenaiva vyabhicārī{ti} na kiñcid etat / | And this reason is inconclusive, so this [argument] amounts to nothing. |
vakṣyāma iti / sarvajñasiddhau // | [As indicated by] "we shall explain" [this will be discussed] in the section on establishing [the existence of] the omniscient one. |
pramāṇaphalavipratipattinirākaraṇāyāha viṣayetyādi / viṣayādhigatiścātra pramāṇaphalamiṣyate / | [Now the author] speaks about the refutation of misconceptions regarding the means and result of cognition, starting with "viṣaya." The cognition of an object is considered here to be the result of the means of cognition. |
svavittir vā pramāṇaṃ tu sārūpyaṃ yogyatāpi vā // | Either self-awareness is [the result], while the means [consists in either] conformity [to the object] or capability. |
bāhye 'the prameye viṣayādhigamaḥ pramāṇaphalaṃ, sārūpyaṃ tu pramāṇam / | When the object of cognition is external, the cognition of [that] object is the result, while conformity [to the object] is the means. |
svasaṃvittāvapi satyāṃ yathākāram asya prathanāt / | Since even in [the case of] self-awareness, it manifests according to the form of that [object]. |
jñānātmani tu prameye svasaṃvittiḥ phalam, yogyatā pramāṇam / | However, when the object of cognition is of the nature of cognition [itself], self-awareness is the result, [and] capability is the means. |
savyāpārapratītatām upādāya jñānasyaiva sā tādṛśī yogyatā / | Such capability belongs to cognition alone, considering its cognizability along with its operation. |
yena tadevātmānaṃ vedayate na ghaṭādaya iti yogyatayā karaṇabhūtayaivātmaprakāśakaṃ lakṣyate jñānamiti yogyatāyāḥ svasaṃvedane prāmāṇyam / | By virtue of which cognition alone apprehends itself, not jars and such [objects]; thus through capability serving as an instrument, cognition is observed to be self-manifesting; therefore capability [serves as] the means in self-awareness. |
tatrāpyanubhayātmatvāt te yogyāḥ svātmasaṃvidaḥ / | "Since they are neither [subject nor object], these [cognitions] are capable of self-awareness. |
sā yogyatā mānamātmā meyaḥ phalaṃ svavit // | That capability is the means, [cognition] itself is the object to be known, and self-awareness is the result." |
chedana ityādinā kaumārilacodyamāśaṅkate chedane khadiraprāpte palāśe na chidā yathā / tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā naikateti cet // | [The opponent] raises a Kumārila-style objection beginning with "cutting": "Just as when cutting occurs in a khadira tree, the cut does not appear in a palāśa tree, similarly in the world an axe is never identical with the cut [it produces]." |
bhinnapramāṇaphalavādinaṃ prati bauddhenoktam yadi pramāṇaphalayor bhedo 'bhyupagamyate tadā bhinnaviṣayatvaṃ syāt pramāṇaphalayoḥ / | The Bauddha has [thus] addressed [an argument] to the proponent of difference between pramāṇa and [its] fruit: "If a difference between the means of cognition and [its] fruit is accepted, then there would be a difference in objects between the means of cognition and [its] fruit." |
na caitad yuktam / | And this is not reasonable. |
nahi paraścādike chedane svadiraprāpte sati palāśe chedo bhavati / | For when an axe [as] the cutting instrument strikes a khadira tree, the cut does not occur in a palāśa tree. |
tasmāt pramāṇaphalayor ekaviṣayatvād abheda iti / | Therefore, due to means of cognition and [its] fruit having the same object, [there is] non-difference. |
atroktaṃ kumārilena "viṣayaikatvam icchaṃs tu yaḥ pramāṇaṃ phalaṃ vadet / sādhyasādhanayor bhedo laukikās tena bādhitaḥ // | To this Kumārila has said: "One who, desiring [there to be] identity of object, would declare the means of cognition [to be] the fruit - the commonly accepted difference between what is to be established and what establishes would be contradicted by him. |
chedane khadiraprāpte na palāśe chidā yathā / tathaiva paraśor loke chidayā saha naikatā" // | Just as when the cutting [instrument] strikes the khadira [tree], there is no cut in the palāśa [tree], exactly so in the world there is no identity of the axe with the cut." |
iti / chedyate 'neneti chedanam // | Thus. [The word] 'chedana' [means] "that by which [something] is cut." |
na vyavasthāśrayatvena sādhyasādhanasaṃsthitiḥ / | The establishment of what is to be established and what establishes [is] not by way of being the substrate of the distinction. |
nirākāre tu vijñāne sā saṃsthā na hi yujyate // | But in formless consciousness that establishment indeed is not possible. |
nīlāspadaṃ saṃvedanaṃ na pītasyeti viṣayāvagativyavasthāyā arthasārūpyameva nibandhanaṃ nānyad iti vyavasthāpakatvabhāvena sādhyasādhanavyavasthā notpadyotpādakabhāvena, yasmān na pāramārthikaḥ kartṛkaraṇādibhāvo 'sti, | The awareness that has blue as its basis is not [the awareness] of yellow - [regarding] this distinction in the apprehension of objects, conformity with the object alone is the foundation, nothing else; thus the distinction between what is to be established and what establishes [exists] through [their] being distinguisher and distinguished, not through [their] being producer and produced, because the relation of agent, instrument etc. is not ultimately real. |
kṣaṇikatvena nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām | Because all dharmas, being momentary, are [by nature] without activity |
jñānaṃ hi viṣayākāramutpadyamānaṃ viṣayaṃ paricchindadiva savyāpāramivābhāti | When cognition arises in the form of [its] object, it appears as if it were characterizing the object and as if it were active |
ayamevārthaprāpaṇavyāpāro jñānasya na tvavinābhāvitvamātram | This indeed is the activity of cognition in presenting the object, [and] not mere invariable concomitance |
na hi bījādyavinābhāvino 'ṅkurādayo na bhavanti | For indeed, sprouts etc., which are invariably concomitant with seeds etc., do not [thereby] cease to exist |
ye{na} jñānam eva pramāṇaṃ syāt | Therefore cognition alone cannot be the means of valid cognition |
tasmāt sākāram eva jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na nirākāram iti vyavasthayā pramāṇyena pradarśyate | Therefore it is demonstrated through this distinction that [only] cognition with form is the means of valid cognition, not formless cognition |
vyavasthā ca tat pṛṣṭhalabdhena vikalpena veditavyā | And this distinction should be understood through the conceptual cognition obtained subsequent to that [perception] |
ata utprekṣito bhedo vidyate dhanurādivat | Therefore, the distinction [between means and result of cognition] exists [only] as imagined, like in the case of a bow etc. |
utpādyotpādakatvena vyavastheyaṃ tu neṣyate | But this distinction cannot be established on the basis of [the relation between] producer and produced |
dhanurādivad iti / dhanur vidyati dhanuṣā vidhyati dhanuṣo niḥsṛtya śaro vidyatīti yaccaikasya dhanuṣaḥ kartṛtvādayaḥ kalpitā na virudhyante tathehāpīti | Just as with the bow: [when we say] "the bow pierces," "he pierces with the bow," "[and] the arrow, having emerged from the bow, pierces," these conceived notions of agency etc. of one [and the same] bow are not contradictory, so too in this case |
viśliṣyamāṇasandhau ca dārvādau paraśucchidā / praviśannucyate tena tatraikatvamavasthitam // | When the joint [of fibers] in wood and similar [materials] is being split by the cut of an axe, [the axe] entering [into it] is therefore called [the cut itself], [thus] identity is established there. |
paraśunā ca vṛkṣādeśchidā nirūpyamāṇā chedyadravyānupraveśalakṣaṇaivāvatiṣṭhate sa cānupraveśaḥ paraśorātmagata eva dharma iti paramārthataśchidayāsahaikatvam iti nāsti virodhaḥ // | When the cutting of trees and such with an axe is examined, it is found to consist only in [the axe's] entering into the substance to be cut, and this entering is indeed an inherent property of the axe itself; thus in reality there is identity with the cut, [and] therefore there is no contradiction. |
vyavasthāyām ityādinaitaddarśayati | By [the words] beginning with "vyavasthāyām" this is shown. |
vyavasthāyāṃ tu jātāyāṃ kalpyatāmanyathāpi hi / | Indeed, when a distinction has been established, it may also be conceived differently; |
utpādyotpādakatvena saṃsthānavidhirucyate // | the form of arrangement is spoken of in terms of producer and produced. |
yathā kumārilena paricchedaphalatvetyādinā granthenotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇaphalavyavasthākṛtā tathāsmākam apyavirodhinyeva / | Just as Kumārila has established the distinction between means [of knowledge] and result through the relation of producer and produced in his text beginning with "paricchedaphalatvā", similarly our [position] too is entirely free from contradiction. |
yathoktamācāryeṇa ---"tatrāpi hi pratyakṣatvopacāro 'viruddhaścakṣurādiṣu tat kāraṇeṣv"iti / | As stated by the Teacher: "Even in that case, the metaphorical application of perceptuality to the eyes and other causes is not contradictory." |
etāvat tu brūmaḥ avaśyamādau vyavasthādvāreṇaiva sādhyasādhanasaṃsthā kartavyā, na hy avyavasthāpya saṃvidbhedaṃ viṣayabhedena niyamena pravṛttir yuktā saṃvidbhedavyavasthāyāś ca sārūpyam eva nibandhanam iti sāmarthyāevāyātaṃ sārūpyasya sādhakatamatvaṃ sārūpyād eva ca jñānasya pravartakatvam / | But this much we say: necessarily at first, the arrangement of means and ends must be made only through distinction; for without establishing the difference between cognitions, activity cannot properly proceed according to the difference of objects; and similarity [of form] alone is the basis for establishing the difference between cognitions; thus by implication follows the supreme efficacy of similarity [of form], and from similarity alone comes the motivating power of cognition. |
pravartakasya ca pramāṇatvaṃ pravṛttikāmena nirūpyate na vyasanitayā / | And the status of being a valid means of knowledge of that which motivates is determined by one who desires to act, not out of [mere] addiction. |
yathoktam ---"arthakriyārthaṃ hi sarvaḥ pramāṇamapramāṇaṃ cānveṣate prekṣāvān"iti / | As has been said: "For every discerning person investigates what is and is not a valid means of knowledge for the sake of purposeful action." |
yato yenaivāṃśena pravartakatvaṃ jñānasya bhavati sa eva darśanīyaḥ, na cotpādyotpādakabhāvena pramāṇaphalavyavasthāyāṃ pravartakāṃśaḥ sārūpyaṃ gamyate, tataś ca niṣphalamevotpādadvāreṇa pramāṇavyavasthānaṃ syāt / | Since that aspect alone by which cognition becomes prompting should be considered, and [since] in establishing the distinction between pramāṇa and result through the producer-produced relation no prompting aspect [namely] conformity [to the object] is found, therefore the establishment of pramāṇa through [the aspect of] production would be fruitless. |
ata evācāryeṇaitaddvāreṇa pramāṇavyavasthānaṃ na pravṛttyaṅgam iti matvaivopacāra āśritaḥ / | For this very reason, the Teacher resorted to a figurative interpretation, having considered that the establishment of pramāṇa through this means cannot be a factor in prompting [activity]. |
tasmājjātāyāṃ tu vyavasthāyāṃ sānyathāpyutpādyotpādakabhāvena kalpyatām / | Therefore, once the distinction has been established, it may then also be explained differently through the producer-produced relation. |
paricchedaphalatvena vṛttasyānantarasya hi / kāraṇatvaṃ mataṃ jñāne pramāṇe tu phalaṃ param // | For when [something] that occurs immediately before is considered to be the cause in [relation to] cognition which has apprehension as its result, then if [that cognition] is held to be the pramāṇa, the result must be something different. |
svasaṃvittiphalatvaṃ cenniṣedhānnaiva yujyate / māne ca viṣayākāre bhinnārthatvaṃ prasajyate // | And if self-awareness is [considered] the result, [this] is not appropriate because of [its future] refutation, and if the form of the object [is considered] the pramāṇa, a difference of objects would follow. |
vṛttasya | [The word] "vṛttasya" [means "of what occurs"]. |
pravṛttasya cakṣurāder ity arthaḥ / | [This] means "of the active sense organs like the eye, etc." |
phalaṃ param iti hānopādānāpekṣābuddhilakṣaṇam . | "The result must be something different" means [it must be] characterized by the cognition concerned with rejection, acceptance or indifference [towards the object]. |
idam aparamuktaṃ kumārilenaiva svasaṃvedanasya niṣedhāt tasya pramāṇaphalatvamayuktam / | This other [point] was stated by Kumārila himself: since self-awareness is refuted, it cannot be considered the result of pramāṇa. |
viṣayākārasya ca prāmāṇye sati pramāṇaphalayor bhinnaviṣayatvaṃ prasajyate / | And if the form of the object is accepted as the pramāṇa, then it would follow that the pramāṇa and [its] result would have different objects. |
tathā hi viṣayākāro bāhyaviṣayaḥ svasaṃvedanaṃ tu jñānasvarūpaviṣayam | For instance, the form of the object would be [something] external, while self-recognition [would have] cognition itself as [its] object (which is purely subjective). |
iti // [p.401] sarvetyādinā pratividhatte | This [objection] is answered by [the words] beginning with "sarva" [in the following verse] |
sarvāvittaprasaṅgena sā niṣeddhuṃ na śakyate / | Self-recognition cannot be denied, as that would lead to the unwanted consequence of there being no cognition at all. |
bhinnārthatvam na cehāsti svavidapyarthavinmatā // | Nor is there different objectivity here, since self-recognition too is considered to be [a form of] object-cognition. |
"apratyakṣopalambhāya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati" iti sarvārthāpratyakṣatvaprasaṅgān na śakyate svasaṃvittir niṣeddhum / | According to the maxim "Without the apprehension of perception, no perception of objects can be established," self-recognition cannot be denied, as [that denial] would lead to the unwanted consequence of nothing being perceptible. |
nāpi bhinnaviṣayatvaprasaṅgo yuktaḥ, yataḥ svasaṃvittirapyarthasaṃvittir iṣṭātat, kāryatvāt / | Nor is it logical to claim [they have] different objects, since self-recognition too is accepted as object-cognition, due to being its effect. |
natu tanmayatvena / | [But] not because it consists of that [object]. |
svātiriktakriyākāri pramāṇaṃ kārakatvataḥ / | The means of cognition produces an action different from itself, because it is an active agent. |
kāsyādivaccedvaiphalyamanyaddhyapi phalaṃ matam // | If [it were] like an axe and such [tools], [there would be] futility, since another result is accepted. |
uktanyāyena vāsyāder anyad asti phalaṃ na ca / kārakatvaṃ ca no siddhaṃ janakatvavivakṣayā // | And according to the previously stated reasoning, there is no different result from an axe and such [tools]; and [its] status as an active agent is not established for us when productive capacity is meant. |
sthāpakatvavivakṣāyāṃ na virodho 'sti kaścana / | When regulatory capacity is meant, there exists no contradiction whatsoever. |
tenānaikāntiko hetur virodhāpratipādanāt // | [In] that case the reason becomes inconclusive, because it does not establish any incongruity. |
ātmavyatiriktakriyākāri pramāṇaṃ kārakatvād vāsyādivad iti / | "The means of cognition must be that which brings about an action different from itself, because it is an active agent, like a hatchet and so forth." |
vaiphalyam ityādinā kathitam / | [This has been] explained through [the discussion of] fruitlessness and so forth. |
hiśabdo hetau / | The word "hi" [is used] in [the sense of] reason. |
vāsyādivad iti ca sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaśchidayā sahaikatvasya pratipāditatvāt / | And the example "like a hatchet" is devoid of the probandum, because the identity [of the hatchet] with the cutting has already been established. |
kārakatvād iti ca janyajanakatvavivakṣāyām asiddho hetuḥ, sthāpakatvenaiveṣṭatvāt / | And the reason "because it is an active agent" is inadmissible if what is meant is the relationship between producer and produced, because [the means of cognition] is accepted only as that which determines [cognition]. |
sādhanasya sthāpakatvavivakṣāyām apyanaikāntiko virodhābhāvāt / sāmānyavivakṣāyām anaikāntika eva, virodhasyānupadarśitatvāt // | Even if what is meant is the determining nature of the instrument, [the reason] is inconclusive due to absence of incongruity. If what is meant is activity in general, it is likewise inconclusive, because no incongruity has been shown. |
nanu ca yadi viṣayākāraṃ jñānaṃ syāt tadā bhaved viṣayasārūpyasya prāmāṇyam, yāvatā grāhyaviṣayasamānākāraṃ samānasvabhāvaṃ jñānam upapadyate, naiva tathā, grāhyāj jātyantaratvād rūparasayor ivetyāha grāhyetyādi / | "If cognition were to have the form of [its] object, then the validity [would lie] in its similarity to the object; however, cognition having the same form and nature as the object to be grasped is not possible, because it belongs to a different category than what is to be grasped, just like [in the case of] color and taste" - thus [the opponent] speaks about what is to be grasped and so forth. |
idam anyac ca vispaṣṭaṃ grāhyagrāhavivecane // | This and other [points] have been clearly [explained] in the analysis of the grasped and the grasper. |
vijñānavādanyāyānusāribhir asmābhir etad iṣṭam eveti na kiñcit kṣīyate / | We who follow the reasoning of Vijñānavāda accept exactly this, so nothing is diminished [from our position]. |
tathā hi yatkiñcid idam aspaṣṭaṃ bhavatā grāhyadūṣaṇam abhihitam / idaṃ tu spaṣṭaṃ gāhyavivecanāya sādhanamabhidhīyate 'smābhiḥ / | Indeed, whatever objection you have raised against the apprehended object has [only] been stated indistinctly, while this proof that we are presenting for the examination of the apprehended [object] is [quite] clear. |
kiṃ tvaspaṣṭaṃ sādhanam ity āha sarvetyādi / | [Someone] asks: "What is this clear proof?" [The answer comes with the words] "sarvā" etc. |
sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatāṃ vrajet / sāmyaṃ kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam // | If there were complete identity of form, cognition would become non-cognition; [and] if there were identity [only] in some aspect, everything would cognize everything. |
yāvadbhyo vijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttāvadbhya eva jñānapītīdaṃ sarvātmanā sārūpyam / katipayapadārthavyāvṛttitastvaṃśena sārūpyam // | Complete identity of form means that cognition is excluded from exactly those heterogeneous things from which [the object is excluded]; partial identity [means] exclusion from only some entities. |
kathaṃ tarhyarthasārūpyasya prāmāṇyamuktam ity āha kintvityādi / | [Someone] asks: "Then why has the validity [of cognition] been said to consist in its having the same form as the object?" [The answer begins with] "kintu" etc. |
kintu bāhyārthasadbhāvavāde sārūpyasambhavaḥ / | However, under the doctrine of the existence of external objects, the possibility of identity of form [must be accepted]. |
dhruvamabhyupagantavya ityarthaṃ sa prakāśitaḥ // | It has been explained for this reason that [such identity] must certainly be accepted. |
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