sanskrit
stringlengths
2
508
english
stringlengths
2
924
ādiśabdena śabdasaṃsargacittaudārikasūkṣmatāhetū vitarkavicārau tathā grāhyagrāhakakalpenetyavamādi grahītavyam
By the word 'ādi' [here] should be understood [factors] such as vitarka and vicāra which cause gross and subtle [states] of mind through word-association, as well as the conceptualization of grasped and grasper, and so forth
abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdaḥ sa ca sāmānyākāraḥ
'Abhilāpa' is an expressive word, and it takes a generic form
sa vidyate yasyāḥ pratibhāsataḥ sā tathoktā
That [cognition] which appears as associated with that [word] is called thus [i.e., abhilāpinī]
śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpataḥ
[The cognition is] capable of connecting word and meaning in forms such as "tree" etc.
yā vācām aprayoge 'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate
Even when words are not actually being used, it arises as if connected with verbal expression
anena pratyakṣata eva kalpanāyāḥ siddhimādarśayati
This shows the establishment of conceptual construction through direct perception itself
sarvaprāṇabhṛtāmanusiddhatvād vikalpasya
Because conceptual construction is well-established [in the experience] of all living beings
atītabhavanāmārthabhāvanāvāsanānvayāt
Due to the continuation of impressions from the cultivation of name-and-meaning associations in past lives
itikartavyatā loke sarvaśabdavyapāśrayā
All practical activity in the world is dependent on words
yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate
Which even an infant understands due to impressions laid down previously
sā punaḥ sanmūrchitākṣarākāradhvaniviśiṣṭamantarmātrāviparivartinam arthaṃ bahirivādarśayantī teṣāṃ samupajāyate
Moreover, this [conceptual cognition] arises in them [infants] presenting the object—which exists only internally and is associated with indistinct phonetic forms—as if it were external
yayā paścāt saṅketagrahaṇakuśalā bhavanti
Through which [conceptual cognition] they later become skilled in grasping conventions
cintotprekṣādikāle ca vispaṣṭaṃ yā pravedyate / anuviddheva sā śabdair apahnotuṃ na śakyate //
That which is clearly cognized at the time of reflection and imagination, [appearing] as if interpenetrated with words, cannot be denied [or set aside].
tasyāścetyādinā śābdavyavahārākhyakāryaliṅgito 'pi siddhimāha /
[The author] explains the establishment [of conceptual content] also through the inferential mark of verbal usage, beginning with [the words] "of this" [in the following verse].
tasyāścādhyavasāyena bhrāntā śabdārthayoḥ sthitiḥ /
The connection between words and their objects exists [only] due to conceptual determination [and] is illusory.
anyāyogād asattve 'syāḥ sedṛśyapi na sambhavet //
Due to the impossibility of [its] connection with anything else, if this [conceptual content] did not exist, even this apparent [connection] would not be possible.
yatas tāttvikī śabdārthavyavasthā pūrvaniṣiddhā bhrānteti ca vyavasthāpitā /
Since any real connection between words and objects has been negated by [our] predecessors and established as illusory.
yadi cāsyāḥ kalpanāyā asattvaṃ syāt tadā sā śabdārthavyavasthā īdṛśyapi bhrāntāpi na sambhavet tadabhiprāyavaśāt tasyāvyavasthānāt /
If this conceptual content were non-existent, then that word-object connection, even as it appears [and] even though illusory, would not be possible, because it depends on that [conceptual content's] intention [and] because of its non-establishment.
anyeṣāṃ ca svalakṣaṇādīnāṃ bāhyānāṃ vācyatvenāyogasya pratipāditatvāt //
Because it has been established that other external [things] such as particular characteristics cannot be that which is denoted [by words].
nanu cānye 'pi na kevalam abhilāpinī pratītiṃ kalpanāṃ varṇayanti kintu jātiguṇakriyādisambandhayogyām api /
"But don't others describe conceptual cognition not only as 'that which is expressible in words' but also as that which is capable of being connected with universals, qualities, actions, and so forth?"
sā kasmān na gṛhyata ity āha jātyādītyādi /
[To the question] "Why is that [view] not accepted?" [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "universals, etc."
sā jātyāder apāstatvād adṛṣṭeś ca na saṅgatā //
That [view] is not coherent because universals etc. have been rejected and because they are not perceived.
ayaṃ cābhyupagamya jātyādīn parihāra uktaḥ //
This answer has been given [here] having assumed [the existence of] the universals and other [categories] [for the sake of argument].
jātyādīnām adṛṣṭatvāt tadyogāpratibhāsanāt / kṣīrodakādivaccārthe ghaṭanā ghaṭate katham //
Since universals and other [categories] are never perceived, and since their connection [with particulars] is never manifested, how can their association with things be possible, as [in the case of] milk and water, etc.?
kṣīrodakādivacceti /
[The phrase] "like milk and water, etc." [is explained as follows]:
yathā kṣīrodakāder miśrībhūtasya vivekenāpratibhāsanān na ghaṭanā śakyate kartuṃ tadvajjātyādīnāṃ sattve 'pi vivekenāśrayād apratibhāsanān na
Just as when milk and water and other [substances] are mixed, due to their not appearing separately, no connection can be established [between them], similarly, even if universals and other [categories] exist, because they do not appear as distinct from their substrate,
śakyate tadāśrayeṇa sahetyarthaḥ //
they cannot be connected with their substrate—this is the meaning.
heyopādeyaviṣayakathanāya dvayoktitaḥ /
[It has been stated] by means of two statements for the purpose of explaining what is to be rejected and what is to be accepted.
tatra heyā jātyādiyojanā paraprasiddhā kalpanā upādeyā svaprasiddho nāmayojanākalpanā iti darśanāya dviprakārāpi kalpanā nirdiṣṭā
Of these, the connection with universals etc. is the conceptual construction well-known to others [and is] to be rejected, [while] the connection with names well-known to oneself is to be accepted—to show this, both types of conceptual construction are indicated.
dvayoktitaḥ yasmānnāma ca jātyādayaś ca nāmajātyādayas teṣāṃ yojanetyevaṃ vargadvayam uktam, anyathā nāmādiyojanā yadivā jātyādiyojanetyeva
Through two statements, because [the compound] "nāmajātyādi" [means] "names and universals etc."—thus two groups are stated, otherwise it would have been stated either as "connection with names etc." or as "connection with universals etc."
vācyaṃ syāt /
It should be stated [thus].
nacedaṃ parigaṇanam, ādiśabdavaiphalyaprasaṅgāt //
And this is not an exhaustive enumeration, because [if it were] the word "etc." (ādi) would be purposeless.
nāmajātyādīnāṃ ca yā yojanā tadvadbhiḥ sārthagato dharmaḥ na jñānasyatataścāprastutābhidhāyitvaṃ lakṣaṇakārasyeti codyamāśaṅkyāha nāmādiyojanā ceyam iti
The association of name, universal, etc. is a property of things possessing meaning, [it is] not [a property] of cognition; hence the definition-maker's statement appears irrelevant [to the topic at hand].
ākṣipya vartate yena tena nāprastutābhidhā
That by which [something] proceeds after [first] having made an objection, by that [means] there is no irrelevant statement.
anantaram avyavahitaṃ nimittaṃ yat tasyāḥ kāraṇam
[The word] 'anantaram' [means] the immediate, uninterrupted cause, which is its [i.e. the connection's] cause.
tat punar āviṣṭābhilāpā pratītiḥ
That [cause] again is cognition associated with verbal expression.
sā ca vastudvayānusandhānākārotpattitas tathā yojaneti vyapadiśyate naiva tu kaścit kaṃścidyojayati nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām
And it is called 'connection' because it arises in the form of relating two things, but nothing [actually] connects anything with anything [else], because all properties are functionless.
tasyākṣepo dvābhyāṃ prakārābhyām
The indication of this [connection happens] in two ways.
tābhyāṃ yojanā yato bhavati sā tathoktā
The connection arises from these two [ways], [and] thus it has been explained.
gamakatvād vaiyadhikaraṇye 'pi ca bahuvrīhiḥ
Due to [its] indicative power, there is a bahuvrīhi compound even when there is non-agreement [of cases].
kāraṇe kāryopacārād vā upacārasya ca prayojanaṃ tadanyakāraṇebhyo viśiṣṭakāryakāriṇaḥ svabhāvakhyāpanam
Or [it may be explained] through the metaphorical attribution of the effect to the cause, and the purpose of this metaphorical usage is to reveal the nature [of something] as producing a specific effect distinct from [that produced by] other causes.
athavā yojyate 'nayeti yojanā nāmajātyādīnāṃ yojaneti samāsaṃ kṛtvābhilāpinyeva kalpanā nirdiṣṭetyadoṣa iti darśayati nāmajātyādaya ityādi
Alternatively, [the word] 'yojanā' [means] 'that by which [something] is connected', [and] having made the compound 'connection of names, universals, etc.', [it shows that] what is indicated is conceptual cognition itself which is associated with verbal expression, thus there is no fault.
nāmajātyādayaḥ sarve yojyante vānayeti sā / tathoktā kalpanā proktā pratītir abhilāpinī //
And this 'yojanā' [connection] of 'Name, Universal, etc.' would be the same kalpanā [conceptual content], explained as 'pratīti [cognition] associated with verbal expression'.
yadvetyādinā parihārāntaram āha
This is what is explained by [the phrase] beginning with "yadvā".
yadvā svamatasiddhaiva kevalā kalpanoditā
Or, what has been spoken of [in the definition] is the same conceptual content that we ourselves have established.
sarvatra nāmnā yukto 'rtha ucyata iti yojanāt
[This interpretation] is based upon the fact that in all cases things are spoken of as connected with their name.
yadyevaṃ katham ayam ācāryīyo vṛttigrantho nīyate / tadyathā yadṛcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittha iti jātiśabdeṣujātyā gaur iti guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka itidravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viṣāṇīti
"If it is as asserted above, then how do you explain the Teacher's commentary? For instance, he has declared: In the case of proper names like 'Ḍittha', what is denoted is an object qualified by a name; in the case of universal-denoting words like 'cow', [what is denoted is] the object qualified by the universal 'cow'; in the case of quality-words like 'white', by the quality; in the case of action-words like 'cook', by the action; in the case of substance-words like 'staff-bearer' or 'horn-bearer', by the substance."
anena hi granthena jātyādiviśeṣaṇayuktasyāpyarthasyocyamānatvaṃ pṛthakprakāśitam ityata āha sarvatretyādi / sarvatreti jātyādiśabdeṣvapi
For by this text [the Teacher] has separately shown that things qualified by universals etc. are also denoted [by words]. Therefore he says "in all cases" etc. [Where] "in all cases" [means] even in cases of words denoting universals etc.
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā yadṛcchāśabdeṣu prayujyamāneṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate, evaṃ jātyādiśabdeṣu gaurityādiṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ityetat sarvatra granthe yojanīyamiti
What is meant is this: Just as when proper names are used, what is denoted is an object qualified by a name, similarly in the case of words expressing universals etc., like 'cow', what is denoted is the object qualified by that name - this [interpretation] is to be applied throughout the text.
kathaṃ tarhi jātyā guṇena kriyayā dravyeṇa vetyetadaparaṃ tṛtīyāntaṃ yojanīyam
"How then are we to construe these other instrumental endings in [the words] 'by the universal', 'by the quality', 'by the action', or 'by the substance'?"
taistu karaṇavibhaktyā sāphalyamanubhūyate
Through these [universals etc.], the instrumental case ending becomes meaningful.
nāmno jātyādibhiḥ seyam ityartho 'dhyavatiṣṭhate // jātyā karaṇabhūtayā nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate gaur iti, tathā guṇādibhiḥ ityevaṃ tair jātyādibhiḥ karaṇavibhaktyā sambandhātsāphalyamanubhūyate
The meaning is established thus: that [conceptual content] becomes connected with the name through universals etc. When something is spoken of as 'cow', it is [that which is] qualified by the name through the universal serving as instrument; similarly [it is qualified] through qualities etc. Thus through these universals etc., by virtue of [their] connection, the instrumental case ending becomes meaningful.
yadyevaṃ, nāmajātyādiyojanetyatra sūtre kathaṃ sambandhaḥ kārya ity āha nāmno jātyādibhir iti yojaneti śeṣaḥ /
"If that is so, how is the connection to be made in this sūtra [regarding] 'nāmajātyādiyojanā'?" [The answer is:] "The construction is 'nāmnaḥ jātyādibhiḥ yojanā'" - this is what remains [to be supplied].
jātyādibhir yojanā jātyādiyojanā, nāmno jātyādiyojanā seyaṃ nāmajātyādiyojanetyeyaṃ samāsārtho 'dhyavatiṣṭhata iti yāvat //
[The compound] 'jātyādiyojanā' [means] 'connection with universals etc.' (jātyādibhiḥ yojanā); 'nāmajātyādiyojanā' [means] 'connection of the name with universals etc.' (nāmnaḥ jātyādiyojanā) - this is the meaning that stands as the sense of the compound.
yadṛcchāśabdavācyāyā jāteḥ sadbhāvato na ca /
Because there exists a universal that is expressed by proper names...
avyāptir asya mantavyā prasiddhes tu pṛthakśrutiḥ //
...this [explanation] should not be considered incomplete; it has been mentioned separately only due to common usage.
etad uktaṃ bhavati ye 'pyete ḍitthādayaḥ śabdā yadṛcchāśabdatvena pratītāste 'pi janmanaḥ prabhṛtyāmaraṇakṣaṇādanuvartamānāḥ pratikṣaṇabhedabhinnamasādharaṇabhedena vastu gamayitum aśaktāḥ kālaprakarṣamaryādāvacchinnavastusamavetāṃ jātimabhidheyatvenopādadate /
This means: Even these words like 'Ḍittha' which are known as proper names, continuing [to refer to something] from birth until the moment of death, being unable to denote an object marked by momentary differences and particular distinctions, take up as their denotation a universal that inheres in an entity delimited by a span of time.
anyathā hi bālādyavasthābhedaparicchinnavastubhāgaviṣayatayā nirūḍhāḥ kathaṃ vṛdddhādyavasthopahitabhedam api vastu pratipādayeyuḥ /
For otherwise, how could [these names], being established with reference to a part of an entity delimited by states like childhood, denote an entity that has differences imposed by states like old age?
yeṣām api na kṣaṇiko dehaḥ kiṃ tarhikālāntarāvasthāyīti darśanam, teṣām api yathākālapacīyamānāvayavasambandhādavayavāpacayād vānyadanyaddravyamavasthābhedeṣviti siddham /
Even for those who hold the view that the body is not momentary but rather exists for some time, it is established that due to the connection with components that deteriorate over time, or due to the deterioration of components, [there is] a different substance in different states.
pariṇatidarśane 'pi yadavasthābhedasambaddhaṃ vastu tacchabdavācyatayā pratijñātaṃ tataścāvasthāntaraṃ samāśrayeta tadeva vastu tena śabdena nābhidhīyeta, yathā payasi viniścitābhidhānaśaktiḥ kṣīraśabdo na dadhni pravartate, tathā śarīre 'pi nāvasthāntare pravarteteti jātiravaśyābhyupagantavyā /
Even under the view of transformation, when an entity connected with one state is acknowledged as denoted by a word, and then takes on another state, that very entity could not be denoted by that word - just as the word 'milk', whose denotative power is fixed with respect to milk, does not apply to curd, similarly [the word] would not apply to the body in another state - therefore a universal must necessarily be accepted.
athavā mā bhūd vastubhūtā jātis tathāpi nāvyāpinī vyavasthā /
Or even if there might not be any real universal, still the explanation is not incomplete.
tathā hi ta eva bhedā avivakṣitabhedāḥ sāmānyamiti sarvatra jātiśabdair upādīyanta iti yadṛcchāśabdā jātiśabdebhyaḥ pṛthaglakṣaṇakāreṇa nirdiṣṭā ity āha prasiddhestviti /
For those very differences, when their differences are not meant to be expressed, are taken up everywhere by words denoting universals as [being] the universal - thus proper names have been indicated separately from words denoting universals by the author of the definition, which is what is stated by [the words] "due to common usage."
gavādayo hi śabdā loke jātiśabdatayā pratītāḥ, citrāṅgadādayastu saṃjñāśabdatveneti pṛthagvacanam //
For words like 'cow' are known in the world as words denoting universals, while [words] like 'Citrāṅgada' [are known] as proper names - hence the separate mention.
nanvityādinā paraścodayati
The opponent raises [an objection] with [the words] "nanu" etc.
nanvanyāpohavācyatvāj jātiśabdastu kevalaḥ / vivakṣāparatantratvād vivakṣāśabda eva vā //
"Since [all] words denote 'exclusion of others' (anyāpoha), they should all be either common nouns only, or, since they depend on the speaker's intention, they should all be proper names only."
satyamityādinā pratividhatte
[The author] responds with [the words] "satyam" etc.
satyaṃ lokānuvṛttyedam uktaṃ nyāyavidedṛśam
It is true that what this expert in reasoning has stated follows common usage
iyāneva hi śabdo 'smin vyavahārapathaṃ gataḥ
For words proceed in practical usage only according to this [classification]
iyāneva hīti
[The meaning of] "only according to this" [is explained next]
pañcaprakāraḥ saṃjñājātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdabhedena
[Words are] of five types, divided into proper names, universals, qualities, actions and substances
te tu jātyādayo neha lokavadvyatirekiṇaḥ
But these universals etc. are not here [considered as] different from what is known in common usage
ityetat pratipattyartham anye tvityādivarṇitam
This has been explained with [the words] "anye tu" etc. for the sake of understanding this [point]
etad uktaṃ bhavati na sāvaleyādivyaktivyatiriktā jātyādayaḥ pāramārthikāḥ santi sāṃvṛtās ta ityasyārthasya pratipādanārtham uktam idaṃ lakṣaṇakāreṇa, natu pṛthagaparāṃ kalpanāṃ darśayitum iti
The meaning is this: universals etc. have no ultimate reality separate from particulars like spotted cows; they are merely conventional - it is to establish this meaning that the author of the definition stated this, not to show a different kind of conceptual construction
anya iti bauddhāḥ
By "others" [he means] the Buddhists
arthaśūnyair iti / jātyādinirapekṣair apohamātragocaraiḥ śabdaiḥ /
"[Words that are] devoid of referents," i.e., words that have as their scope mere exclusion (apoha), independent of universals and other [categories].
ityācāryagranthasyārthaḥ //
This is the meaning of the teacher's text.
jātyādiyojanāṃ ye 'pi kalpanāṃ samupāśritāḥ / tairabhyupeyā niyataṃ pratītir abhilāpinī //
Even those who rely on the notion that conceptual construction consists in connection with universals and other [categories] must necessarily accept that [all] cognition is connected with verbal expression.
anyathā yojanābhāvād yuktayoriva bhāvayoḥ / svātantryeṇa paricchedāt kalpanā naiva kalpyate //
Otherwise, due to the absence of connection—just as with two connected entities—since [things would be] cognized independently [of each other], conceptual construction would not be constructed at all.
evaṃ vā vyavahāryaṃ syāt sarvaṃ viśvam idaṃ tataḥ /
And consequently this entire world would [have to] be dealt with in this way.
jātyādirūpasaṃsṛṣṭaṃ vyavahāryamidaṃ matam //
[But rather,] this [world of] practical activity is considered to be combined with the form of universals and other [categories].
jātyādiyojanā śabdayojanāvyabhicāriṇī /
Connection with universals and other [categories] is invariably concomitant with connection with words.
evaṃ cocyata ityetat phalavaj jāyate vacaḥ //
And thus this expression "is spoken of" becomes meaningful.
jātiguṇakriyādravyayojanāyām api kalpanāyāṃ parair abhyupagatāyāṃ nāmayojanaiva kalpanā /
Even when conceptual construction is accepted by others as connection with universals, qualities, actions and substances, [in reality] conceptual construction is just connection with names.
tathā hi tatra jātyādivyavacchinnaṃ vastu nāmnaiva viśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyate, anyathā hi svātantryeṇānekapadārthagrahaṇavadyojanābhāvāt kathaṃ kalpanā bhavet, tataś ca mūkam eva jagat syāt /
For in this case, an object distinguished by universals and other [categories] is grasped as qualified only through a name, since otherwise—as with the independent grasping of multiple entities—how could there be conceptual construction in the absence of connection? And consequently the world would be entirely mute.
ata eva ca daṇḍayuktaṃ puruṣaṃ paśyannapi na tāvad daṇḍīti yojayati yāvan na nāmabhedaṃ smarati /
Indeed for this very reason, even when seeing a person together with a stick, one does not connect [the concepts] as "stick-bearer" until one recalls the distinct name.
yata eva śabdayojanayā sarvā yojanāvyāptā, ---ata eva cācāryīyaṃ "jātyā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate gaur ityādiṣu yaducyate" iti vacanaṃ tat saphalaṃ bhavet /
Precisely because all connection is pervaded by connection with words, the teacher's statement that "what is spoken of in [words] like 'cow' etc. is an object qualified by a universal" becomes meaningful.
anyathā vinā nāmnā katham ucyata iti syāt / abhidhānakriyāyāḥ śabdadharmatvāt //
Otherwise, without a name, how could [something] be spoken of, since the action of expressing belongs to words?
tasmāt samastasiddhāntasaṃsthitānāṃ pravādinām / avivādādayatnena sādhyeyaṃ kalpanā mayā //
Therefore, this conceptual content can be easily established by me without effort, as there is no dispute about it among teachers who are established in all [valid] doctrines.
lakṣaṇakārasya kalpanāṃ siddhirūpāṃ nirdiśato 'bhiprāyam āha etad āgūryeti /
[The author] states the intention of the definition-maker who indicates the established nature of conceptual content [by saying] "having considered this."
etadāgūrya sakalaṃ nāmajātyādivarṇanam /
Having considered all this, [he made] the exposition of name, universal, and so forth.
matayoḥ svānyayor ittham upādānamihākarot // tebhyo 'smākam iyāneva bheda ityevam abruvan / anye tvityādikaṃ vākyam anantaramado jagau //
Thus he made mention here of both his own and others' views; without explicitly stating "this much is our difference from them," he subsequently uttered the statement beginning with "but others."
heyopādeyaviṣayakathanaṃ jātyādiyojanāṃ vinā nāmayojanāṃ vinā bhāvinītyādi pūrvopavarṇitam /
It was explained earlier that the discussion of what is to be accepted and rejected cannot occur without the application of universals and without the application of names.
nāmajātyādivarṇanam iti / akarod iti sambandhaḥ /
"The exposition of name, universal, etc." - this is to be connected with "[he] made."
svānyayos tu matayorupādānaṃ heyopādeyaviṣayakanāya //
The mention of both his own and others' views was for the purpose of showing what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected.
nyāyamukhagranthas tarhi kathaṃneya ity āha evam ityādi /
[If asked] "How then should the Nyāyamukha text be interpreted?" [the author] says "thus" etc.
evaṃ nyāyamukhagrantho vyākhyātavyo diśānayā / jñānam ityabhisambandhāt pratītis tatra coditā //
In this way the Nyāyamukha text should be explained: through its connection with [the word] "cognition," what is spoken of there is the [conceptual] understanding.
tatrāyaṃ nyāyamukhagranthaḥ ---"yat jñānamartharūpādau viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpaka tadakṣamakṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam"
Here is the passage from the Nyāyamukha: "That cognition which [appears] in connection with the form of objects etc., [and which is] non-determinate through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative [elements], [and which] operates in relation to each sense organ—that is perception."
viśeṣaṇaṃ jātyādi, abhidhāyakaṃ nāma, tayor abhedopacāro jātyādimadbhiḥ saṃjñinā ca
The qualifier is the universal etc., the denotative [element] is the name, [and there is] the imposed identity of these two with things possessing universals etc. and with the named thing.
abhedopacāragrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam yatrāpi bhedena grahaṇam asti gotvam asyedaṃ nāmeti, tatrāpi kalpaneṣyata eva
The mention of "imposed identity" is indicative [of the fact that] even where there is apprehension with distinction, [as in] "this has cowness" [or] "this has such-and-such name," there too conceptual construction is indeed accepted.
nanu cānupratītiḥ kalpaneti noktaṃ, tat kathaṃ yathoktakalpanā labhyata ity āha jñānamityabhisambandhād iti
[Objection:] "It has not been stated that subsequent cognition is conceptual construction, so how is the aforementioned conceptual construction obtained?" [Response:] "[It is obtained] from the connection with the word 'cognition.'"