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upakārakatve cāṅgīkriyamāṇe kāryakāle kāraṇasyānavasthānādayugapatkālabhāvinor na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo yuktaḥ | And if helping is accepted, then due to the cause not existing at the time of the effect, there cannot properly be a qualifier-qualified relation between things not existing simultaneously. |
yugapatkālabhāvitvetu [incomplete sentence] | But when [things] exist simultaneously... [sentence incomplete in source] |
tat tasmāt sarvabhāvānāṃ svasvabhāvasthitatvenāyaḥśalākākalpatvāt kevalaṃ kalpanāyāmīṣāṃ miśrīkaraṇam | Therefore, since all entities remain established in their own nature like iron rods, there is merely an [imaginary] mixing of these [entities] in conceptual thought. |
tena paramārthato yadyapi vyāvṛttobhedas tathāpi kalpanāracitaṃ bhedamāśritya viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāvo bhaviṣyati | Thus, although in ultimate reality there is no difference between the exclusion and [that from which something is] excluded, yet based on an imagined difference, there will be a relation of qualificand and qualifier. |
pratibhāsaśca śabdārtha ityāhus tattvacintakāḥ | The investigators of truth declare that the meaning of words is [merely] an appearance. |
dṛśyakalpāvibhāgajño loko bāhyaṃ tu manyate | People who do not know the distinction between the perceived and the conceived imagine it to be external. |
tasyāto 'dhyavasāyena vyaktīnām eva vācyatā | Therefore, due to [this] determination, only the particulars are what is denoted. |
tattvataś ca na śabdānāṃ vācyamastīti sādhitam | And in reality there is nothing that is denoted by words, as has been proven. |
vyaktīnām avācyatvādityasiddham | [The reason] "because particulars are not denoted" is unestablished. |
tathā hi yadvyaktīnām avācyatvamasmābhir varṇitaṃ tatparamārthacintāyāmna punaḥ saṃvṛttyāpi, saṃvṛtyā tu vyaktīnām eva vācyatvaṃ avicāraramaṇīyatayā prasiddham ityasiddho hetuḥ | For the non-denotability of particulars that we have described pertains to ultimate reality analysis, not to the conventional level. But conventionally, the denotability of particulars alone is well-known, being agreeable [only] when unexamined. Therefore the reason is unestablished. |
dṛśyaḥ bāhyaḥ svalakṣaṇātmā, kalpyo vikalpajñānaparivartī pratibhāsaḥ | The perceived is external, having the nature of the particular characteristic; the conceived is the appearance that occurs in conceptual cognition. |
atha pāramārthikamavācyatvaṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadāpohyatvam api vyaktīnāṃ paramārthato neṣṭam ityataḥ siddhasādhyateti darśayati tattvataścetyādi | If real non-denotability is taken as the reason, then we also do not accept the real excludability of particulars, and therefore [this would constitute] proving what is [already] established - this is what is shown by [the words] "in reality" etc. |
itthaṃ ca śabdavācyatvād vyaktīnām astyapohyatā | And thus, because particulars are denoted by words, they are excludable. |
sāmānyasya tu nāpoho na cāpohe 'pi vastutā // | As regards the universal, [there can be] no exclusion, and even if there were exclusion, [it would] not have the character of an entity. |
yaccoktam ---"tadāpohyo na sāmānyaṃ tasyāpohāc ca vastutā/" iti, tatrāpyapohyatvādityasya hetor asiddhatvam anaikāntikatvaṃ ceti darśayati sāmānyasyetyādinā / | What has been stated -- "The universal cannot be excluded and from its exclusion comes entity-hood" -- regarding that, [the author] shows through [the words] beginning with "as regards the universal" that this reason of "being excludable" is both unestablished and inconclusive. |
vyaktīnām evāpohasya pratipāditatvāt / | Because it has been established that exclusion applies only to particulars. |
na cāpohe 'pi vastuteti / sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ // | And [the phrase] "even if [there were] exclusion, [it would not have] entity-hood" [means] that there is no opposing evidence when the reason is applied to the contrary of what is to be proved. |
yaccoktam ---"nāpohyatvamabhāvānā"mityādi, tatrāha nābhāva ityādi / nābhāvo 'pohyate hyevaṃ nābhāvo 'bhāva ityayam / | Regarding what was said -- "negations cannot be excluded" etc. -- he states "nābhāva" etc. [meaning] negation is not excluded in [the statement] "negation is not negation." |
abhāvo nābhāva ityevam abhāvo nāpohyate yenābhāvarūpatāyāstyāgaḥ syāt / | In [the statement] "negation is not negation," negation is not excluded in such a way that would result in abandonment of its negative nature. |
kiṃ tarhibhāvo yaḥ sa vidhirūpatvād abhāvarūpavivekenāvasthita iti sāmarthyād apohyatvaṃ tasyābhāvasyeṣṭam // | Rather, that which is an entity, being of positive nature, remains distinct from the negative nature; thus by implication, excludability of that negation is accepted. |
etad eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha yo nāmetyādi / | Clarifying this very point, he states [the verse beginning with] "yo nāma." |
yo nāma na yadātmā hi sa tasyāpoha ucyate / na bhāvo 'bhāvarūpaś ca tadapohe na vastutā // | Whatever is not of the nature of something, that is called its exclusion [apoha], and an entity is not of the nature of negation, yet in that exclusion there is no entity-hood. |
tasyābhāvasyaivamapohe sati na vastutā prāpnoti // | Thus when there is exclusion of that negation, it does not obtain entity-hood. |
agoto vinivṛttiś ca gaur vilakṣaṇa iṣyate / | The cow, which is the negation of [what is] non-cow, is accepted as being distinct [from it]. |
tathā hi prakṛtīśvarakālādikṛtaṃ bhāvānāṃ bhavadbhir mīmāṃsakair api neṣyata eva / | Indeed, you Mīmāṃsakas also do not accept that entities are created by Prakṛti, Īśvara, Time, and other [such causes]. |
tasya ca pratiṣedhe satyapi yathā na vastutvamāpadyate tathāpohyatve 'pyabhāvasya vastutvāpattir na bhaviṣyati | Even though there is negation of this [creation by Prakṛti etc.], just as [that negation] does not attain the status of a real entity, similarly even when negation is negated, negation will not attain the status of a real entity. |
nāto 'sato 'pi bhāvatvam iti kleśo na kaścana / | Therefore there is no difficulty whatsoever [in the form of] non-existence becoming existence. |
tasya siddhau ca sattāsti sā cāsattā prasidhyati // | And when that [negation] is established, existence exists, and that non-existence becomes established. |
atrobhayapakṣaprasiddhodāharaṇopadarśanenānaikāntikatām eva sphuṭayann āha prakṛtīśādijanyatvam ityādi / | [The author] shows the inconclusiveness [of the opponent's reasoning] by presenting an example accepted by both sides, stating [the matter of] being produced by Prakṛti and others. |
tasyābhāvasya yathoktena prakāreṇa siddhau satyām api bhāvasya sattā siddhyatyeva tasya svasvabhāvavyavasthitatvāt / | Even when that negation is established in the aforementioned way, the existence of the positive entity is indeed established, because it is established in its own nature. |
bhāva eva tato nāyaṃ gaurgor me prasajyate // | Therefore, for me, this [negation of non-cow] does not entail that the non-cow becomes the cow. |
yādṛśo 'rthāntarāpoho vācyo 'yaṃ pratipāditaḥ / śabdāntaravyapoho 'pi tādṛgevāvagamyatām // | Just as [we have explained] the exclusion of other things [to be] what is denoted [by words], exactly in the same manner should the exclusion of other words also be understood. |
bhāva eva sa cedityetannāniṣṭatvāpādamiṣṭatvāt | [The statement] "if it is a positive entity" does not lead to any undesirable conclusion, because [this] is actually what is desired. |
tathā hi agorūpādeśvāder gorbhāvaviśeṣarūpa eva vilakṣaṇa iṣyate, nābhātmā, tena bhāva eva bhavet | For instance, from [things like] horses which have the form of non-cow, [the cow] is accepted as being distinct [precisely] in its specific positive nature, not in its negative nature; therefore it would indeed be a positive entity. |
agotaś ca gor vailakṣaṇyeṣṭatvād agor na gotvaprasaṅgaḥ | And since the distinctness of the cow from the non-cow is what is accepted, there is no undesired consequence of the non-cow becoming the cow. |
avastuviṣaye 'pyasti cetomātravinirmitā / vicitrakalpanābhedaraciteṣviva vāsanā | Even regarding non-entities, there exist impressions created by mind alone, just as in [the case of] things constructed through various kinds of imagination. |
tataś ca vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi ca / prakalpyate hyapohānāṃ kalpanāraciteṣviva | And thus, based on the difference of impressions, both difference and positive nature of apohas are assumed, just as in [the case of] things constructed through imagination. |
avastuviṣayaṃ ceto nāstītyetad asiddham | The [claim] that consciousness does not have non-entities as its object is unproven. |
tathā hi utpādyakatvaviṣayasamudbhūtavasvākārasamāropeṇa pravartataeva cetaḥ | For consciousness indeed operates through the superimposition of the form of things that arise as objects to be produced. |
tacānāgatasajātīyavikalpotpattaye 'nantaracetasi vāsanāmādhatta eva | And it [consciousness] indeed deposits impressions in the subsequent consciousness for the production of future similar conceptual cognitions. |
yataḥ punar api santānaparipākavaśāt prabodhakaṃ pratyayamāsādya tathāvidham eva cetaḥ samupajāyate | Because again, due to the maturation of the series [of cognitions], upon encountering an awakening cognition, consciousness of exactly that kind arises. |
tadvadapohānām api parasparato bhedaḥ sadrūpatā ca kalpanāvaśād bhaviṣyati | Similarly for apohas also, mutual difference and positive nature will exist due to the power of conceptual construction. |
yādṛśa iti pratibibātmā | The word "yādṛśa" [means] "of the nature of reflection." |
tasya ca pratibimbāntarād bhedaḥ sphuṭataram eva saṃvedyata iti | The difference between this [reflection] and other reflections is indeed very clearly perceived. |
ato vistareṇa yaduktaṃ tat sarvamasaṅgatam iti bhāvaḥ | Hence, whatever has been stated [by the opponent] in detail is entirely irrelevant—this is the meaning [of the text]. |
vastvityadhyavasāyatvān nāvastutvamapohayoḥ | Since the two apohas are apprehended as "things," they cannot be [considered] non-entities. |
prasiddhaṃ sāṃvṛte mārge tāttvike tviṣṭasādhanam | This is well-established in regard to the conventional level [of truth], while at the ultimate level it proves what is [already] accepted. |
yadyavastutvād iti sāmānyenopādīyate tadā heturasiddhaḥ, yataḥ pratibimbātmanorvācyavācakāpohayor bāhyavastutvena bhrāntair adhyavasitatvāt sāṃvṛtaṃ vastutvamastyeva | If [the reason] "because they are non-entities" is taken as a general statement, then [that] reason is unestablished, because the two apohas—which are in the nature of reflections [and consist of] the denoted and denoter—are apprehended by deluded [persons] as external entities, and thus do possess conventional entity-hood. |
atha pāramārthikamavastutvam āśritya hetur abhidhīyate tadā siddhasādhyatā | If, on the other hand, the reason is stated with reference to ultimate non-entity-hood, then [there is the fallacy of] proving what is [already] established. |
nahi paramārthato 'smābhiḥ kiñcid vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ceṣyate | For we do not accept anything as denoted or denoter from the ultimate perspective. |
etad eva darśayati na vācyam ityādi | This very [point] is shown [in the verse beginning with] "na vācyam." |
na vācyaṃ vācakaṃ vāpi paramārthena kiñcana / kṣaṇabhaṅgiṣu bhāveṣu vyāpakatvaviyogataḥ | Nothing whatsoever can be either denoted or denoter from the ultimate perspective, because among momentarily perishing entities there can be no [relation of] pervasion. |
vyāpakatvaviyogata iti | [This means] "because of the absence of pervasion." |
kṣaṇikatvena saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvābhāvāt svalakṣaṇasyetyarthaḥ | Due to [its] momentariness, the svalakṣaṇa cannot be concomitant with the time of convention and usage – this is the meaning. |
syād etannāsmābhis tāttviko vācyavācakabhāvo niṣidhyate | One might say: "We are not denying the real relation between denoted and denoter." |
kiṃ tarhi---tāttvikīmapohayor avastutām āśritya sāṃvṛtam eva gamyagamakatvaṃ niṣidhyate, na bhāvikam, tena na hetor asiddhatā nāpi siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣo bhaviṣyati | Rather, we are denying only the conventional relation between signified and signifier based on the real non-existence of the two apohas, not the real [relation]. Therefore neither will the reason be unestablished nor will there be the fault of proving what is [already] established. |
dvayor api sāṃvṛtatve tāttvikatve cāśrīyamāṇe syād etad doṣadvayam ityata āha | [The text] states this because if both [relations] are considered to be both conventional and real, these two faults would arise. |
tadgamyagamakatvaṃ cet sāṃvṛtaṃ pratiṣidhyate | If the relation between signified and signifier is denied to be conventional, |
vikalpaparacitair arthaiḥ śabdais tadvācakair api evaṃ sati hetor anaikāntikatā, kalpanāraciteṣu mahāśvetādiṣvartheṣu tadvācakeṣu ca śabdeṣu paramārthato vastutvābhāve 'pi sāṃvṛtasya vācyavācakabhāvasya darśanāt | [then] the reason becomes inconclusive, because even in conceptually constructed objects like Mahāśvetā and their denoting words, although they lack real existence, a conventional relation between denoted and denoter is observed. |
syād etat tatrāpi mahāśvetādiṣu sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca paramārthato 'styeva | One might say: "Even in cases like Mahāśvetā, there really exists a universal as the denoted and [a word] as the denoter." |
tato na tair vyabhicāra ityāśaṅkyāha | Anticipating [the objection] "therefore there is no deviation through these [examples]," [the text] states: |
sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ sāmānyasya vistareṇa nirastatvān na teṣu sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ vācakaṃ cāstītyanaikāntikatā hetoḥ | Since the universal has been extensively refuted in the examination of universals, there is no universal as denoted or denoter in these [cases] – thus the reason is inconclusive. |
tasyeti sāmānyasya | 'Tasya' [means] 'of the universal'. |
vācakam ityatrāpi sāmānyamiti prakṛtena sambadhyate | Here also in [the compound ending in] 'vācakam', [the word] 'universal' is to be connected with the context. |
syād etadyadyapi tatra vastubhūtaṃ nāsti vācyaṃ, vācakaṃ tu mahāśvetādiśabdasvalakṣaṇamastyevety | [One] might argue that "although there is no real entity [to be] denoted in this case, the denotative [capacity] certainly exists in the form of the specific individuality of words like 'Mahāśvetā'" |
sarvapadārthavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya pratipāditatvān na śabdasvalakṣaṇasya vācakatvaṃ, kṣaṇabhaṅgitvena tasya saṅketāsambhavāt | Since it has been established that momentary destruction pervades all entities, the specific individuality of words cannot have denotative capacity, because being momentary it cannot be the subject of conventional agreement |
vyavahārakālānanvayācceti pratipāditam | And [this has been] explained [before] because it cannot be concomitant with the time of usage |
tasmād ityādinopasaṃharati | [The text] concludes with "therefore" and what follows |
tasmāt taddvayameṣṭavyaṃ pratibimbādi sāṃvṛtam | Therefore these two should be accepted as conventional [reality] like reflections and so forth |
teṣu tadvyabhicāritvaṃ durnivāram avasthitam | In view of these, their falsity remains insurmountable |
dvayam iti / vācyaṃ vācakaṃ ca | "Two" means the denoted [object] and the denoting [word] |
pratibimbādītyādiśabdena nirākārajñānābhyupagame 'pi svagatamanyatkiñcit pratiniyatamanarthe 'rthādhyavasāyirūpasya vijñānasyāvaśyamaṅgīkartavyam iti darśayati | By the word "etc." after "reflection," [the text] shows that even accepting cognitions as formless, one must necessarily accept that within [cognition] itself there exists some other specific [form] of consciousness that determines objects where there is no [real] object |
teṣviti | "In view of these" [refers to things created by imagination] |
taditi tasmāt | "Tat" means "therefore" |
tasya vā hetor vyabhicāritvam | Or [it means] "of that," i.e., the falsity of that reason remains [unshaken] |
vidhirūpaś ca śabdārtho yena nābhyupagamyate / tadābhaṃ jāyate cetaḥ śabdād arthāvasāyi hi // | [For one] by whom the denotation of words is not accepted as having positive form, consciousness arises as a reflection [of the thing] from the word, [and this consciousness] indeed determines the object. |
svārthābhidhāne śabdānām arthād anyanivartanam / | When words express their own meaning, [there is] the exclusion of other things from [that] meaning. |
tadyogo vyatireko 'pi mama tat pūrvako hyasau // | Through its presence, negation also [occurs] for me, as that [negation] is indeed preceded by that [positive meaning]. |
na hyasmābhiḥ sarvathāvidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho nābhyupagamyate, yenaitad bhavatāniṣṭaprasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyate / | For we do not completely deny that word-meanings have positive form, on account of which you are raising this undesirable consequence against us. |
yāvatā śabdād arthādhyavasāyinaścetasaḥ samutpādāt sāṃvṛto vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhīṣyata eva / | Rather, since the word produces a consciousness that determines the object, a conventional positive form of word-meaning is indeed accepted [by us]. |
tattvatas tu na kiñcid vācyam asti śabdānām iti vidhirūpas tāttviko niṣidhyate / | However, in reality there is nothing that is denoted by words; thus [only] the ultimately real positive form is denied. |
tena sāṃvṛtasya vidhirūpasya śabdārthasyeṣṭatvāt svārthābhidhāne vidhirūpe satyanyavyatirekasya sāmarthyād adhigater vidhipūrvako vyatireko yujyata eva // | Therefore, since the conventional positive form of word-meaning is accepted [by us], when there is a positive form in expressing its own meaning, the exclusion [of others] preceded by the positive [meaning] is indeed appropriate, due to the comprehension of the exclusion of others through implication. |
syād etad yadi vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhyupagamyate, kathaṃ tarhi hetumukhe lakṣaṇakāreṇāsambhavo vidher ityuktamityata āha asambhava ityādi / asambhavo vidher uktaḥ sāmānyāderasambhavāt / | This might be [objected]: "If positive word-meaning is accepted, then why did the Lakṣaṇakāra speak of the 'impossibility of the positive' in the Hetumukha?" To this [we] say: The impossibility of the positive was stated due to the impossibility of universals and such. |
sāmānyalakṣaṇāder vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato 'sambhavācchabdānāṃvikalpānāṃ ca vastutaḥ paramārthato viṣayāsambhavāt paramārthamāśritya vidher asambhava ukta ācāryeṇetyavirodhaḥ // | Since there is no ultimate reality of the denoted and denoter in the form of universals and such, and since there is no ultimately real object for words and conceptual cognitions, the teacher stated the impossibility of the positive with reference to ultimate reality - thus there is no contradiction. |
nīlotpalādiśabdebhya eka evāvasīyate / anīlānutpalādibhyo vyāvṛttaṃ pratibimbakam // | From words like "blue lotus" only one thing is ascertained: a reflection differentiated from non-blue and non-lotus. |
ekamevānīlānutpalavyāvṛttam arthākāramaubhayārūpaṃ pratibimbakaṃ nīlotpalaśabdo vadati nābhāvamātram | The term "blue-lotus" expresses a single reflection of the object [which is] excluded from "non-blue" and "non-lotus", partaking of both natures, not mere negation. |
ataḥ sabalārthābhidhāyitvamadhyavasāyavaśānnīlotpalādiśabdānām astyeva | Therefore, based on [actual] cognition, words like "blue-lotus" certainly possess the capacity to denote mixed entities. |
tadanurodhāt sāmānādhikaraṇyamupapadyata eva | On account of this, co-reference becomes entirely possible. |
natvānyāpohavad vastu vācyamasmābhir iṣyate | We do not maintain that what is to be denoted is an entity possessing the exclusion of others. |
vyāvṛttād anyato 'bhāvān nānyād vyāvṛttirasti naḥ | For us, exclusion is nothing other than the entity [itself] excluded from others. |
tat pāratantryadoṣoyaṃ jātāviva na saṃgataḥ avadātam iti prokte śabdasyārthe 'pṛthaktvataḥ | This defect of dependency does not apply to the meaning of words as clearly explained, unlike [in the case of] universals, due to [their] non-separateness. |
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ | [This is true] of both qualification-qualified relation and co-reference. |
tasmād apohe śabdārthe vyavasthā na virudhyate | Therefore, the theory that Apoha is what is denoted by words is not contradictory. |
yadi hi vyāvṛttād vyāvṛttir nāmānyā bhavet tadā syāt tadvat pakṣoditadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ | If exclusion were something different from what is excluded, then the same defect would arise as mentioned regarding that position. |
yāvatānyato vyāvṛttād bhāvānnāsmākam anyā vyāvṛttirasti api tu vyāvṛtta eva bhāvo bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyāṃ tathābhidhīyate | However, for us, exclusion is not different from the entity excluded from others; rather, the excluded entity itself is termed thus when there is inquiry only about the negation of other differences. |
tena yathājātau prādhānyena vācyāyāṃ pāratantryeṇa tadvato 'bhidhānāt tadgatabhedānākṣepāt tena saha sāmānādhikaraṇyāder abhāvaprasaṅga uktaḥ tadvad apohapakṣe nāvatarati vyatiriktānyāpohavato 'nābhidhānāt | Therefore, just as in the case of universals being primarily denoted, the defect was stated that due to the dependent denotation of what possesses it and non-indication of its varieties, there would be no possibility of co-reference etc., similarly [this defect] does not arise in the Apoha theory since there is no denotation of anything separate possessing exclusion of others. |
taddarśayati tat pāratantryadoṣoyam ityādi | This is what is shown by [the words] beginning with "this defect of dependency." |
taditi tasmāt | "tat" [means] "tasmāt" [therefore] |
viśuddhādhiyācāryādiṅnāgena prokte 'pohalakṣaṇe śabdārthe | [This refers] to the meaning of words characterized by exclusion [apoha], as expounded by Ācārya Dignāga with pure intellect |
atra kāraṇamāha apṛthaktvata iti | Here [he] states the reason [beginning with] "apṛthaktvataḥ" [because of non-difference] |
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