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akṣaṇikapakṣe ca nākramāt kramiṇo bhāva iti śabdārthaviṣayasya kramijñānasyābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ / | And in the case of non-momentariness, since what is successive cannot arise from what is non-successive, there would follow the absence of successive cognition regarding words and their meanings. |
anyatheti akṣaṇikatve / | "Otherwise" means in [the case of] non-momentariness. |
etenaiva vivakṣāpi śabdagamyā nirākṛtā / | By this same [argument], the desire to speak, [supposedly] cognized through words, is also refuted. |
śabdārthāsambhave hītthaṃ kva vivakṣā kva vā śrutiḥ / | For when the meaning of words is thus impossible, how can there be desire to speak? Or even the word itself? |
yadi pāramārthato vivakṣā pāramārthikaśabdārthaviṣayeṣyate, tadasiddham, svalakṣaṇādeḥ, śabdārthasya kasyacid asambhavāt / | If the desire to speak (vivakṣā) is claimed to truly pertain to the real meaning of words, then [that claim] is unproven, because there can be no word-meaning whatsoever in the form of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) and such things. |
ato na kvacid arthe paramārthato vivakṣāsti, anvayino 'rthasyābhāvāt / | Therefore there is no real desire to speak about any object, due to the absence of any connectable meaning. |
nāpi tat pratipādakaḥ śabdo 'sti, tadāha kva vā śrutir iti / | Nor is there any word that can express that [meaning], which is what is stated in [the phrase] "where is the śruti?" |
śrutiḥ śabdaḥ / | Śruti means "word." |
vivakṣāyāṃ ca pratipādyāyāṃ śruteḥ śabdād bahirarthe pravṛttir na prāpnoti / | And if the desire to speak is what is to be expressed by the word, then the word cannot be applied to any external object. |
tasyācoditatvād arthāntaravat / | Because it [the external object] would not be expressed [by the word], like any other thing. |
atha mataṃ yo vivakṣāviparivartī rūpādir artho yaś ca bāhyas tayoḥ sārūpyamastyataḥ sārūpyādacodite bāhye pravṛttir bhaviṣyati yamalakavad ityata āha sārūpyād iti / | Now if it is thought that "there exists similarity between the object like form etc. that accompanies the desire to speak and the external [object], therefore application to the unexpressed external [object] will occur through similarity, as in the case of twins" - to this [the text] says "through similarity..." |
sārūpyā{dyamalakava}nnāmādyetena dūṣitam / | This refutes [the argument about] names etc. [being applicable] through similarity like [in the case of] twins. |
evaṃ sati sarvadā bāhye pravṛttir na prāpnoti kadācid vivakṣāparivartinyapicodite pravṛttir bhavet / | This being the case, application to external [objects] can never occur - [rather] application might sometimes occur even to what is not expressed in the desire to speak. |
yathā yamalakyor iva / | As in the case of twins. |
athavā eteneti / yathāsambhavaṃ svalakṣaṇādidūṣaṇena / | Or "by this" means: by the refutation of unique particulars etc., as applicable. |
tathāhyatrāpyevaṃ vaktavyam | In this case too, the same [argument] must be stated thus. |
aśakyasamayo hyātmā nāmādīnām ananyabhāk | For the nature [of things] that partakes of nothing else cannot coexist with names and other [linguistic elements]. |
tathā mato na vācyatvaṃ kathañcidupapadyate | Similarly, [something] conceived in this way cannot possibly be denoted [by words]. |
iti | Thus [it is said]. |
yaduktaṃ vivakṣāsamārūḍhārthadyotakatve śabdānāṃ bāhye pravṛttir na prāpnoti | As was stated [before], if words express meanings that are contained in the intention to speak, they cannot operate in relation to external [objects]. |
atra parasyottaramāśaṅkayann āha vivakṣetyādi | Here, anticipating the opponent's answer, he states [the verse beginning with] "vivakṣā." |
vivakṣā ca vaktṛsantānavartinī tasyā eva vivakṣāyā anumitiś ca śrotṛsantānagateti vivakṣānumitī tābhyāṃ śliṣṭaḥ --- sambaddhaḥ tat pratibhāsītyarthaḥ | The intention to speak exists in the continuum of the speaker, and the inference of that very intention exists in the continuum of the hearer; [the form] that is connected with these two -- that is, which appears [in them] -- [is what is meant]. |
tamākāraṃ bāhyatayā vyavasyator vaktṛśrotroratra bāhye pravṛttir bhaviṣyati | When both speaker and hearer determine that form as external, then [the word] will operate in relation to that external [object]. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati paramārthataḥ svapratibhāsānubhave 'pi vaktur evamadhyavasāyo bhavati mayāsmai bāhya evārthaḥ pratipādyate | This means that although in reality the speaker experiences only what appears in his own [consciousness], he determines [the situation] thus: "I am conveying an external object to this person." |
śroturapyevaṃ bhavati mamāyaṃ bāhyam eva pratipādayatīti | And the hearer likewise [thinks]: "This person is conveying an external object to me." |
atastaimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavad ayaṃ sarvaḥ śābdo vyavahāra iti / | Hence, just as two men suffering from timira [eye disease] see two moons, so also is all this verbal usage. |
yadyevam asmatpakṣa eva patito 'sīti siddhasādhyatā / | If this is so, then you have fallen into our position [and thus] your proof is proving what is [already] proven. |
pūrvaṃ pratibhādvāreṇāgatatvād ityataḥ punar ity āha tadevamakṛtasamayatvādityasya hetor nāsiddhateti pratipāditam / | Having previously come [to our view] through [accepting] pratibhā, when you say "again," it is thus established that the reason "because no convention can be made" cannot be [considered] unproven. |
anaikāntikatvaviruddhatve tu pūrvam eva niraste / | The [objections of] inconclusiveness and contradictoriness have already been rejected before. |
tasmāt siddhā yathoktāpohakṛtaḥ śabdā iti // | Therefore it is established that words function through exclusion [of others] as stated. |
nanvanyāpohakṛcchabdo yuṣmābhiḥ katham ucyate / | "Why do you say that a word brings about the exclusion of others? |
niṣedhamātraṃ naiveha pratibhāse 'vagamyate // | For mere negation is not apprehended in [verbal] cognition. |
kiṃtu gaurgavayo hastī vṛkṣaścetyādiśabdataḥ / | Rather, from words like 'cow', 'gavaya', 'elephant', 'tree' and so forth, |
vidhirūpāvasāyena matiḥ śābdī pravartate // | verbal cognition proceeds through apprehension of positive forms." |
anyāpohakṛcchabda ityatretiśabdo 'dhyāhāryaḥ / | The word 'iti' should be understood after [the compound] 'anyāpohakṛcchabda'. |
anyāpohakṛcchabda ityevaṃ katham abhidhīyata ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is "Why do you say that what is brought about by words is the exclusion of others?" |
kasmānnābhidheyamityāha niṣedhamātram ityādi / | [The opponent] states why this should not be asserted by [saying] "mere negation" etc. |
niṣedhamātram eva kilānyāpoho 'bhipretaḥ, naceha śābde pratibhāse niṣedhamātraṃ gamyate / | The exclusion of others is supposedly intended to be mere negation, but mere negation is not apprehended in verbal cognition. |
kiṃ tarhi vasturūpādhyavasāyenaiva śābdī dhīḥ pravartamānā samālakṣyate / | Rather, verbal cognition is observed to proceed through determination of the positive form of things. |
naca śābde jñāne yo na pratyavabhāsate sa śabdānāṃ yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | And what does not appear in verbal cognition cannot be [considered] the proper meaning of words, as this would lead to [unwanted] over-extension. |
tasmāt pratītivirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ // | Therefore, [there is] a contradiction between the proposition [of the Apohist] and [actual] experience. |
yadi gaurityādinā ślokatrayeṇa bhāmahasya matena pratītyādibādhāmudbhāvayati / | [The author] presents the contradiction with experience and other [issues] through three verses beginning with "yadi gauḥ," following Bhāmaha's view. |
yadi gau{ritiśabdo 'yaṃ bhaveda}nyanirākṛtau / | If this word "cow" were [merely] the exclusion of others... |
yadi gośabdo 'nyavyavacchedapratipādanaparas tadā tasya tatraiva caritārthatvāt sāsnādimati padārthe gośabdāt pratītir na prāpnoti, tataś ca sāsnādimat padārthaviṣayāyā gobuddher janako 'paro dhvaniranveṣaṇīyaḥ syāt // | If the word "cow" is aimed only at expressing the exclusion of others, then, since it would be fulfilled in that alone, no cognition [of the positive entity] would arise from the word "cow" regarding the thing possessing dewlap etc., and consequently another word would need to be sought that could generate the notion of "cow" regarding the object possessing dewlap etc. |
na tu jñānaphalāḥ śabdā na caikasya phaladva}yam / | Words have cognition as [their] fruit, and one [word] cannot have two fruits. |
apavādavidhi{jñānaṃ phalam ekasya vā katham} // | And how could the cognition of both negation and affirmation be the fruit of a single [word]? |
vidhiviṣayaṃ pratiṣedhaviṣayaṃ ca jñānaṃ phalaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | [Words] which have as their fruit a cognition that has affirmation and negation as [its] objects are described as such. |
tataḥ kimityāha na caikasyetyādi / | [To the question] "what follows from that?" he states "na caikasya" etc. |
na hyekasya vidhikāriṇaḥ pratiṣedhakāriṇo vā śabdasya yugapad vijñānadvayalakṣaṇaṃ phalam / | For a single word, whether it be affirmative or negative, cannot have simultaneously two cognitions as [its] fruit. |
upalabhyata iti śeṣaḥ / | The remainder [of the sentence] is "[this] is [never] observed." |
nacāpi parasparaviruddhamapavādavidhijñānaṃ phalaṃ yuktam // | Nor is it possible for mutually contradictory cognitions of [both] negation and affirmation to be the fruit of a single word. |
prāgityādinopacayahetumāha prāgagauriti vijñānaṃ gośabdaśrāviṇo bhavet / | When one hears the word "go" [cow], first there should be the cognition "a-go" [non-cow] in the hearer. |
yenāgoḥ pratiṣedhāya pravṛtto gauriti dhvaniḥ // | Since the sound "go" [cow] is employed for the negation of "a-go" [non-cow]. |
yadi ca gośabdenāgonivṛttir mukhyataḥ pratipādyate tadā gośabdaśravaṇānantaraṃ prathamataramagaur ity eṣā śrotuḥ pratipattir bhavet / | If it is primarily the negation of non-cow that is expressed by the word "go" [cow], then immediately after hearing the word "go", the hearer's first cognition would be [that of] "non-cow". |
yatraiva hy avyavadhānena śabdāt pratyaya upajāyate sa eva śabdārtho vyavasthāpyate / | For whatever notion arises directly and immediately from a word, that alone is established as the meaning of that word. |
na cāvyavadhānenāgovyavacchede matir upajāyate / ato gobuddhyanutpattiprasaṅgāt prathamataramagopratītiprasaṅgāc ca nāpohaḥ śabdārtha iti // | And the notion of the exclusion of non-cow does not arise immediately [from the word "go"]. Therefore, due to [both] the undesirable consequence of no cognition of cow arising and the undesirable consequence of the first cognition being that of non-cow, apoha cannot be the meaning of words. |
agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ yai{rurarīkṛtam} / {vācyaṃ} vastveva tairukta{metayā hi girā sphuṭam} // | Those who have accepted the universal [in the form of] "negation of non-cow" as what is to be denoted have clearly, by this very statement, [actually] accepted an entity [i.e., universal] as what is to be denoted. |
sa hyevam apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ vācyatvenābhidhīyamānaṃ kadācit paryudāsalakṣaṇaṃ vābhidhīyate prasajyalakṣaṇaṃ vā / | For when this universal characterized by apoha is declared as what is to be denoted, it is either expressed as characterized by paryudāsa [implicative negation] or as characterized by prasajya [simple negation]. |
tatra prathame pakṣe siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣaḥ tathāhyasmābhir gotvākhyaṃ sāmānyaṃ gośabdena vācyamityevam iṣyate bhavatā cāgonivṛttilakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyaṃ gośabdenocyata iti bruvatā tadeva śabdāntareṇābhidhīyata iti kevalaṃ nāmni vivādaḥ // | In the first alternative, there is the fault of proving what is [already] established in the proposition, for we maintain that what is to be denoted by the word "go" is the universal named "cowness", and when you say that what is expressed by the word "go" is the universal characterized by the negation of non-cow, the same thing is being expressed in different words - thus the dispute is merely about names. |
bhāvāntarātmako 'bhāvo yena sarvo vyavasthitaḥ / tatrāśvādinivṛttātmābhāvaḥ sa{ka---} iti kathyatām // | Since all absence has been established as having the nature of some other presence, let it be stated what that absence is which has the nature of negation of horse etc. |
yena yasmāt prāgabhāvādilakṣaṇaścaturvidhaḥ sarva evābhāvo bhāvāntarātmako vyavasthitaḥ / | Since all abhāva [non-existence], which is of four types beginning with prāgabhāva [prior non-existence], has been established to be of the nature of another existence. |
yaccoktam "kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa kathyate / | As it has been said: "When curd and other [products] do not exist in milk, that is called prior non-existence; |
nāstitā payaso dadhni pradhvaṃsābhāvalakṣaṇam // | The non-existence of milk in curd is characterized as destruction-non-existence; |
gavi hyaśvādyabhāvaś ca so 'nyonyābhāva ucyate / | And indeed the absence of horse etc. in a cow is called mutual non-existence; |
śiraso 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyavarjitāḥ // śaśaśṛṅgādirūpeṇa so 'tyantābhāva ucyate / | When the parts of [a hare's] head are flat and devoid of growth and hardness, that is called absolute non-existence, in the form of a hare's horn and such things; |
na cāvastuta ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā" // | And these differences are not non-real, therefore this [abhāva] has reality." |
etena kṣīrādaya eva ca dadhyādirūpeṇāvidyamānāḥ prāgabhāvādivyapadeśabhāja iti darśitaṃ bhavati / | By this it is shown that milk and similar [substances], while not existing in the form of curd etc., become the bearers of the designation of prior non-existence and other [types of non-existence]. |
tatraivamabhāvasya bhāvāntarātmakatve sthite sati ko 'yaṃ bhavadbhiraśvādinivṛttisvabhāvo 'bhāvo 'bhipreta iti kathyatām // | This being established that non-existence is of the nature of another existence, please tell [us] what is this non-existence that is intended by you to be of the nature of negation of horse etc. |
neṣṭo 'sādhāraṇātmā vo viśeṣo nirvikalpanāt / | You do not accept the [category of] viśeṣa [particularity] having a unique nature because [it is] free from conceptual construction; |
tathā ca śābaleyādirasāmānyaprasaṅgataḥ // | And similarly [you do not accept it] because of the undesired consequence regarding śābaleya [spotted cow] etc. lacking commonness. |
tasmāt sarveṣu yadrūpaṃ pratyekaṃ pariniṣṭhitam / gobuddhistannimittā syā..............ṣti tat // | Hence, that form which subsists individually in all [cows] must be the basis for the cognition of 'cow' [and in this there can be no dispute]. |
yo 'sāvasādhāraṇo viśeṣaḥ so 'śvādinivṛttyātmā neṣṭo bhavatāṃ / | That unique (non-common) particularity, which is the essence of the negation of [non-cows like] horses etc., is not accepted by you. |
kasmād ity āha nirvikalpanāt / | Why? Because it is free from conceptual construction. |
tatra sarvavikalpapratyayastamayāt / | Because in it all conceptual cognitions cease. |
vikalpajñānagocaraḥ sāmānyameveṣyate, asādhāraṇastvarthaḥ sarvavikalpānām agocaraḥ / | Only the universal is accepted as the object of conceptual cognition, while the unique (non-common) entity is beyond the scope of all conceptual cognitions. |
yathoktam "svasaṃvedyamanirdeśyaṃ rūpamindriyagocara" iti / | As has been stated: "The form that is perceptible to the senses is self-cognized [and] indefinable." |
viśeṣātmakatve kāraṇamasādhāraṇātmakatā, asādhāraṇātmatayā yo viśeṣa | The cause of [something's] being a particularity is its uniqueness - [that is,] that which is a particularity by virtue of its uniqueness. |
ity arthaḥ / | This is the meaning. |
sāmprataṃ viśeṣeṇainamevārthamāha tathācetyādi / | Now [the text] states this very meaning with specific reference, [beginning with] "tathā ca" etc. |
yathaiva bhavatām asādhāraṇo viśeṣo 'śvādinivṛttyātmā gośabdābhidheyo neṣṭas tathaiva śābaleyādiśabdavācyatayā neṣṭo 'śvādinivṛttyātmā bhāva ityatrāpyanuvartate / | Just as you do not accept that a unique particularity consisting in the negation of [non-cows like] horses etc. is denoted by the word 'cow', similarly [you do not accept] that an entity consisting in the negation of horses etc. is expressed by words like 'śābaleya' [spotted cow] etc. |
kasmād ity āha asāmānyaprasaṅgata iti / | Why? Because it would lead to the consequence of non-universality. |
yadīṣyeta tadā sāmānyaṃ śabdavācyaṃ na syāt tasyānanvayāt / | If it were accepted [thus], then the universal could not be expressed by the word, because it [the universal] would have no connection [with the particular]. |
yata evamaśvādinivṛttyātmā bhāvo 'sādhāraṇo na ghaṭate, tasmāt sarveṣu sajātīyeṣu śābaleyādipiṇḍeṣu yat pratyekaṃ parisamāptaṃ tannibandhanā gobuddhiḥ | Since in this way a unique entity consisting of the negation of horse etc. is not possible, therefore the cognition of 'cow' is based on that [character] which is completely present in each individual member of the same class such as variegated and other cows. |
tac ca gotvākhyam eva sāmānyam / tasyāgo 'pohaśabdenābhidhānāt kevalaṃ nāmāntaram ityataḥ siddhasādhyatā pratijñādoṣaḥ | And this [character] is indeed nothing but the universal called 'cowness'. Since this same [universal] is [merely] expressed by the term 'exclusion of non-cow', it is just another name, and thus [your] thesis has the defect of proving what is [already] established. |
niṣedhamātrarūpaś ca śabdārthau yadi kalpyate / abhāvaśabdavācyā syācchūnyatānyaprakārikā | If the meaning of words is assumed to be of the nature of mere negation, then [that] emptiness would be another kind [of void] expressed by negative words. |
abhāvaśabdavācyeti | [The phrase] "expressed by negative words" [means the following]: |
ago 'pohalakṣaṇo 'bhāvavācakaḥ śabdo 'bhāvaśabdas tadvācyā bahirarthaśusunyatā syāt, vasturūpāpahnavat | The negative word is that word which expresses negation in the form of exclusion of non-cow; and what would be expressed by it would be [nothing but] emptiness [in the form of] absence of external objects, since [it would amount to] denial of the nature of real entities. |
anyaprakāriketi | [The phrase] "another kind" [means the following]: |
pūrvaṃ vijñānamātravādopanyāsakāle bhavadbhirupanyastā, nirastā cāsmābhiḥ, punar apyatra śabdārthacintāprastāve saivāpohavyājenābhihitā pratītisiddhasyārthasyāpavādāt | This [same] void was previously proposed by you [Buddhists] during the discussion of Idealism, and was rejected by us; and now again, on the occasion of examining the nature of word-meaning, the very same [void] is being presented under the guise of apoha, [thus] denying objects established by perception. |
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha | [If one asks:] "What then is the fault in that?" [The answer follows:] |
tasyāṃ cāśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ bhavet | In that [void], there would be grasping of the intrinsic aspect of cognitions of horse etc. |
tatrānyāpohavācyatvaṃ mudhaivābhyupagamyate | In that case, the acceptance of "being expressed through exclusion of others" would be entirely pointless. |
tasyām śūnyatāyāṃ vācyāyāṃ śābdīnām aśvādibuddhīnām ātmāṃśagrahaṇaṃ prāpnoti bāhyavastusvarūpāgrahāt / | If [the] śūnyatā is what is denoted, then for verbal cognitions [like those] of horses etc., only the subjective aspect would be grasped, due to non-apprehension of the form of external objects. |
evaṃ ca sati ko doṣa ity āha tatretyādi / | [Someone asks:] "Even if this is so, what is the fault?" [To which he replies] with "In that case..." etc. |
buddhyākārasyānapekṣitabāhyārthāvalambanasya vidhirūpasyaiva śabdārthatvāpatteḥ / tataścābhyupagamabādhā pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ // | Because the form of cognition—which is positive in nature and independent of any external referent—would become the meaning of words. And thus [there would be] a contradiction of [your] own accepted position by [your] proposition—this is the idea. |
etadeva darśayati sāmānyam ityādi / | He shows this very [point] with "[the] universal" etc. |
sāmānyaṃ vasturūpaṃ hi buddhyākāro bhaviṣyati / śabdārtha.... | The form of cognition will indeed become [your] universal [which is] a positive entity [as the] meaning of words... |
buddhyākāra eva vasturūpaṃ sāmānyaṃ śabdārtho bhaviṣyatīti sambandhaḥ // | The connection [of words in the verse means that] the very form of cognition will become the meaning of words [as] a universal [which is] a positive entity. |
syād etad anālambanāpi sā buddhir vijātīyagavādibuddhibhyo vyāvṛttarūpā pravartate tenāpohakalpanā yuktaivetyata āha vasturūpetyādi / | One might object: "Even without a substrate, that cognition operates in the form of exclusion from heterogeneous cognitions like [those] of cows etc., therefore the postulation of apoha is indeed appropriate"—to this he says "vasturūpa" etc. |
teṣu vastveva kalpyeta vācyaṃ buddhyanapohakam // | In these cases, only a positive entity would be imagined [as] what is to be denoted, not an exclusion through cognition. |
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