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tatraiṣāṃ dravyādīnām abhāve daṇḍītyādidhīdhvanī nirviṣayau syātām | In the absence of these substances etc., expressions and cognitions like 'stick-bearer' would be objectless. |
ādigrahaṇaṃ pratyekam abhisambadhyate | The term 'ādi' [etc.] connects with each [member of the compound]. |
tena pratyekaṃ chatrī viṣāṇītyādisamānajātīyadhīdhvanīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ bhavati. | Through this [rule], the inclusion of similar cognitions and expressions such as "umbrella-bearer" [and] "horned [one]" becomes [possible] for each [case]. |
antyās tu viśeṣā yoginām eva grāhyā iti na teṣām ādiśabdena parigrahaḥ. | The ultimate particulars, however, are cognizable only by yogins, therefore they are not included by the word "ādi" ["and so forth"]. |
na cānimittāv etau yuktau, sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa sarvadā tayor vṛttiprasaṅgāt. na cāvibhāgena tayoḥ pravṛttir asti. | And these two [cognitions and expressions] cannot be without basis, because [then] they would occur everywhere without distinction at all times. And their occurrence does not happen without differentiation. |
tasmāt santi dravyādaya iti paraḥ. | Therefore, says the opponent, substances and the rest do exist. |
prayogaḥ ye parasparam asaṅkīrṇapravṛttayaḥ, te sanimittāḥ, yathā śrotrādipratyayāḥ. asaṅkīrṇapravṛttayaś ca daṇḍītyādiśabdapratyayā iti svabhāvahetuḥ. | The formal argument [is this]: Those [cognitions] which have mutually distinct occurrences have a [real] basis, like auditory and other cognitions. And the verbal cognitions and expressions like "stick-bearer" have distinct occurrences - this is a natural reason. |
animittatve sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛttiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam. | If [they were] without basis, their indiscriminate occurrence everywhere would be the contradicting valid cognition. |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte | [He] responds with [the words] "it is said" and so forth. |
ucyate viṣayo 'mīṣāṃ dhīdhvanīnāṃ na kaścana | It is said: These cognitions and expressions have no [external] object whatsoever. |
antarmātrāniviṣṭaṃ tu bījam eṣāṃ nibandhanam | Rather, their foundation is [only] the seed situated in internal consciousness alone. |
tatra yadi mukhyato bāhyena viṣayabhūtena sanimittatvam eṣāṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam, tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt. | In this regard, if what is desired to be proved is primarily their having a basis in an external object-entity, then the reason is inconclusive, because there is no contradicting valid cognition for the opposite of what is to be proved. |
atha yena kenacin nimittena sanimittatvam iṣyate, tadā siddhasādhyatā. | If [you maintain that] some kind of cause [for cognitions] is accepted, then [this amounts to] proving what is [already] proven. |
tathā hi asmābhir iṣyata evaiṣām antarjalpavāsanāprabodho nimittam, na tu viṣayabhūtaṃ, bhrāntatvena pūrvasya śābdapratyayasya nirviṣayatvāt. | For we also accept that their cause is the awakening of the latent impressions of internal speech, but not [any] external object, since the prior verbal cognition, being erroneous, has no [real] object. |
antarmātrāniviṣṭam iti vijñānasanniviṣṭaṃ, vāsaneti yāvat. | "Located internally" means "embedded in consciousness," that is to say, [in the form of] latent impressions. |
ad TS 869 etad evāgamena saṃspandayann āha yasya yasyetyādi. | [The author] corroborates this very [point] through scripture by stating "yasya yasya" etc. |
yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate / | Whatever object is said [to correspond] to whatever word, |
sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnāṃ sā hi dharmatā // | that [object] never actually corresponds [to it] - for such is the nature of real things. |
yo yo viṣaya iti svalakṣaṇasāmānyādiḥ. | "Whatever object" means the unique particular, the universal, and so forth. |
sā hi dharmateti. | "For such is the nature" means: |
sā prakṛtiḥ, sarvavākpathātītatvaṃ vastūnāṃ svabhāva iti yāvat. | That nature, that is to say, being beyond the path of all speech, is the essential nature of real things. |
yathoktam yena yena hi nāmnā vai yo yo dharmo 'bhilapyate / | As has been stated: "By whatever name whatever property is expressed, |
na sa saṃvidyate tatra dharmāṇāṃ sā hi dharmatā | [This] is indeed the essential nature of dharmas; it is not found there. |
atha śābdapratyayasya bhrāntatvatvāviṣayatvayoḥ kiṃ pramāṇam iti cet, uktam atra pramāṇam asmābhir yad bhinneṣv abhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ sarvaṃ evāyaṃ śābdapratyayo bhrānta iti | [Question:] "What is the proof that verbal cognition is both erroneous and objectless?" [Answer:] We have already stated the proof here that all verbal cognition is erroneous because it operates by superimposing non-difference upon different [things]. |
tathā hi yo 'tasmiṃs tad iti pratyayaḥ, sa bhrāntaḥ, yathā marīcikāyāṃ jalapratyayaḥ | For indeed, any cognition [that takes] "this [is] that" [when it is] not that is erroneous, just as [is] the cognition of water in a mirage. |
tathā cāyaṃ bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedādhyavasāyī śābdapratyaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ | And thus this verbal cognition, which superimposes non-difference upon different objects, [provides] a natural reason [for its being erroneous]. |
na ca sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ grāhyam asyāsti, yenāsiddhatā hetor iti syāt, tasya pūrvaṃ vistareṇa nirastatvāt | And there is no real universal entity that could be its object, by which the reason might be [considered] unproven, because that [universal] has already been extensively refuted. |
bhavatu vā sāmānyaṃ, tathāpi tasya bhedebhyo 'rthāntaratve bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyo bhrāntir eva | Even if there were a universal, nevertheless, if it is different from the particulars, the superimposition of non-difference upon different [things] would still be erroneous. |
na hy anyenānye samānā yuktās tadvanto nāma syuḥ | For indeed, [things] cannot properly be identical with others [just] because they possess that [universal]. |
anarthāntaratve 'pi sāmānyasya sarvam eva viśvamekam eva vastu paramārthata iti tatra sāmānyasya pratyayo bhrāntireva | And if the universal is not different [from particulars], then the entire universe would really be just one entity, and thus the cognition of a universal there would still be erroneous. |
nahyekavastuviṣayaḥ sāmānyapratyayaḥ, bhedagrahaṇapuraḥsaratvāt tasya | For a cognition of a universal does not have a single entity as its object, because it is preceded by the apprehension of difference. |
bhrāntatve ca siddhe nirviṣayatvam api siddham | And when [its] erroneousness is established, [its] objectlessness is also established. |
svākārārpaṇena janakasya kasyacidarthasyālambanalakṣaṇaprāptasyābhāvāt | Because when [the object] that produces [the cognition] has given up its own form, there is an absence of anything that could obtain the characteristic of being a support [for cognition]. |
athavā anyathā nirviṣayatvaṃ sādhyate / yatraiva hi kṛtasamayā dhvanayaḥ, sa eva teṣām artho yukto nānyo 'tiprasaṅgāt / | Or, [we can] prove the objectlessness [of verbal cognitions] in another way: Only that can be their proper meaning where words have been fixed by convention; nothing else [can be their meaning], as [accepting anything else] would lead to absurd consequences. |
na ca kvacidvastunyeṣāṃ paramārthataḥ samayaḥ samastītyato nirviṣayā dhīdhvanayaḥ / | And there is no real object wherein their conventional application truly exists; therefore verbal cognitions are objectless. |
prayogaḥ ye yatra bhāvataḥ kṛtasamayā na bhavanti, na te paramārthatastam abhidadhati, yathā sāsnādimati piṇḍe 'śvaśabdo 'kṛtasamayaḥ, na bhavanti ca bhāvataḥ kṛtasamayāḥ sarvasmin vastuni sarve dhvanaya iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ / | The logical application [is as follows]: Those [words] which have not been fixed by convention from the beginning in relation to something do not truly denote that thing - like the word "horse" which has not been fixed by convention in relation to an entity possessing a dewlap [i.e., a cow]; and all words are not fixed by convention from the beginning in relation to all things - this is [known] from the non-apprehension of the pervader. |
kṛtasamayatvenābhidhāyakatvasya vyāptatvāt, tasya cehābhāvaḥ / | Because denotativeness is pervaded by being fixed by convention, and this [being fixed by convention] is absent here. |
nacāyam asiddho hetur ityādarśayann āha yata ityādi / | Showing that this reason is not unestablished, [the author] states "yataḥ" etc. |
tathā hi gṛhītasamayaṃ vastu śabdārthatvena vyavasthāpyamānaṃ kadācit svalakṣaṇaṃ vā vyavasthāpyate, jātir vā, tadyogo vā, tayā jātyā, yogaḥ sambandhaḥ, yadvā jātimān padārthabuddher vā ākāra iti vikalpāḥ / | For when an object whose convention has been apprehended is being established as the meaning of words, it must be established as either [1] the particular, or [2] the universal, or [3] the relation with that [universal] - where "relation" means "connection" [and] "that" refers to the universal - or [4] [something] possessing the universal, or [5] the form of the cognition of the object - these are the alternatives. |
tatra sarveṣveva samayāsambhavān na yuktaṃ śabdārthatvam / | Since convention is impossible in every one of these cases, [none of these] can properly be the meaning of words. |
tattvata ityanena sāṃvṛtasya śabdārthasyāpratiṣedhaṃ darśayati / | By [using] the word "tattvataḥ" [truly], he shows [there is] no denial of the conventional meaning of words. |
tena svavacanavyāghāto na bhavati / | Therefore there is no self-contradiction [in his statement]. |
anyathā hi pratijñāyāḥ svavacanavirodhaḥ syāt / | For otherwise there would be a self-contradiction in [his] proposition. |
saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyogataḥ / | Because [the specific individuality] lacks any connection with the time of convention and usage. |
tathā hyetān svalakṣaṇādīn śabdenāpratipādya na śakyamaśabdārthatvam eṣāṃ pratipādayitum / | Indeed, it would not be possible to assert that "these [things like] specific individuality do not constitute the import of words" without [first] expressing them by means of words. |
tat pratipipādayiṣayā ca śabdena svalakṣaṇadīnupadarśayatā śabdārthatvameṣām abhyupetaṃ syāt / | And by showing these [things like] specific individuality through words for the purpose of proving that [proposition], one would [implicitly] admit their capacity to be expressed by words. |
punaś ca tadeva pratijñayā pratiṣiddham iti svavacanavyāghātaḥ / | And yet this very [capacity] is denied in the proposition, thus [resulting in] self-contradiction. |
etena yaduktamudyotakareṇa "avācakatve śabdānāṃ pratijñāhetvor vyāghāta" iti tadapi pratyuktaṃ bhavati | By this [explanation] what was stated by Uddyotakara that "if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the proposition and the premise" is also answered. |
nahi sarvathā śabdārthāpavādo 'smābhiḥ kriyate, tasyāgopālam api pratītatvāt / | For we do not entirely deny words having their import, since this [fact] is known even to the meanest cowherd. |
kintu tāttvikatvaṃ dharmo yaḥ parais tatrāropyo tasya niṣedhaḥ kriyate / | However, what we deny is that characteristic of reality which others superimpose upon it [i.e., the import]. |
na tu dharmiṇaḥ / | [We do] not [deny] the substratum [itself]. |
tatra svalakṣaṇaṃ tāvan na śabdaiḥ pratipādyate / | Among these, specific individuality cannot be denoted by words. |
saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyogataḥ / | Because it lacks connection with the time of convention and usage. |
na śabdaiḥ pratipādyata iti / | [The statement] "cannot be denoted by words" [means] |
tatra saṅketābhāvāditi bhāvaḥ / | That there can be no convention regarding it - this is the meaning. |
kathaṃ saṅketābhāva ity āha saṅketetyādi / | [If one asks] "Why can there be no convention?" [the author] states "Because it lacks connection..." etc. |
saṅketavyavahārābhyām āptaḥ prāpto yaḥ kālas tasya vyāptir vyāpanaṃ tayā viyogāt kāraṇāt / | Because of the absence [viyoga] of connection with the time that is related to Convention and Usage |
na tatra svalakṣaṇe samaya iti śeṣaḥ / | [Therefore] there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality |
etad uktaṃ bhavati samayo hi vyavahārārthaṃ kriyate, na vyasanitayā, tena yasyaiva saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvam asti tatraiva samayo vyavahartṝṇāṃ yukto nānyatra / | This is what is meant: Convention is made for the purpose of usage, not out of mere attachment; therefore users can properly make Conventions only with regard to what is present at the time related to Convention and Usage, [and] not with regard to anything else |
na ca svalakṣaṇasya saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvam asti / | And the Specific Individuality does not have presence at the time related to Convention and Usage |
tasmān na tatra samaya iti // | Therefore there can be no Convention with regard to it |
vyaktyātmano 'nuyantyeti na paraspararūpataḥ / deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedataḥ // | Things of the nature of individuals do not follow [one another] in their mutual forms, due to differences of place, time, action, potency, manifestation and so forth |
tasmāt saṅketadṛṣṭo 'rtho vyavahāre na dṛśyate / | Therefore, the object seen at [the time of] Convention is not seen in actual usage |
nacāgṛhītasaṅketo bodhyetānya iva dhvaneḥ // | And [that] for which Convention has not been grasped cannot be understood through sound, just like any other [thing] |
sāvaleyādayo hi vyaktibhedā deśādibhedena parasparato 'tyantavyāvṛttamūrttayo naite parasparamanvāviśanti / | For the various individuals such as the variegated cow, having forms completely distinct from each other through differences of place etc., do not interpenetrate one another |
tatraikatra kṛtasamayasya puṃso 'nyair vyavahāro na syāt / | Therefore when a person has made a Convention regarding one [individual], usage would not be possible with others |
pratibhāsādītyādiśabdena varṇasaṃsthānāvasthāviśeṣādiparigrahaḥ. | By the phrase "pratibhāsādi" [manifestation and so forth], [there is] inclusion of color, shape, specific conditions and other peculiarities. |
vyavahāro na dṛśyata iti. | [It] is not observed in actual usage. |
tena tatra samayābhāvān nāsiddhatā hetor iti bhāvaḥ. | Therefore, due to the absence of convention in this case, the reason [given] is not unestablished - this is the intended meaning. |
na cāpy anaikāntikatvam iti darśayann āha na cāgṛhītetyādi. | And showing that [there is] not even inconclusiveness [in the reason], he states "na cāgṛhīta" ["and not that which is ungrasped"] etc. |
anya iveti vijātīyārthavat. | "Like something else" means like objects of a different kind. |
dhvaner iti śabdāt. | [The term] "dhvaneḥ" [means] through words. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yady agṛhītasaṅketam arthaṃ śabdaḥ pratipādayet, tadā gośabdo 'py aśvaṃ pratipādayet. | This is what is being said: if a word were to convey a meaning for which no convention has been grasped, then the word "cow" would also denote [the meaning] "horse." |
saṅketakaraṇānarthakyaṃ ca syāt. | And [in that case] the making of conventions would become purposeless. |
tasmād atiprasaṅgāpattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti siddhā vyāptiḥ. | Therefore, the occurrence of this overextension [serves as] the annulling evidence, [and] thus the pervasion is established. |
ayam eva cākṛtasamayatvād iti hetur ācāryadignāgena na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka ānantyād ity anena nirdiṣṭaḥ. | And this very reason - "because of not having established convention" - was indicated by Ācārya Dignāga through this [statement]: "A generic term cannot be denotative of particulars, due to [their] endlessness." |
tathā hi ānantyād ity anena samayāsambhava eva darśitaḥ. | Thus, by [the statement] "because of endlessness," the impossibility of Convention itself is shown. |
tena yad uddyotakareṇoktam yadi śabdān pakṣayasi, tadānantyād ity asya vastudharmatvād vyadhikaraṇo hetuḥ. | Therefore, what Uddyotakara has said: "If you make 'words' the subject [of inference], then, because 'endlessness' is a property of things [denoted by words], it would be a heterologous reason." |
atha bhedā eva pakṣīkriyante, tadā nānvayī na vyatirekī dṛṣṭānto 'stīty ahetur ānantyamHH iti, tat pratyuktaṃ bhavati. | "And if the particular things themselves are made the subject [of inference], then there exists neither a positive nor a negative example, hence 'endlessness' is not a [valid] reason" - this [argument] is thus refuted. |
punaḥ sa evāha yasya nirviśeṣaṇā bhedāḥ śabdair abhidhīyante, tasyāyaṃ doṣaḥ, asmākaṃ tu sattādiviśeṣaṇāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇy abhidhīyante. | Again, he himself says: "This fault applies to one who [holds that] unqualified particulars are denoted by words; for us, however, substances, qualities and actions qualified by 'being' etc. are what are denoted [by words]." |
tathā hi yatra yatra sattādikaṃ sāmānyaṃ paśyati, tatra tatra sadādiśabdaṃ prayuṅkte. | Thus, wherever one perceives the universal 'being' etc., there one uses the word 'existent' etc. |
ekam eva ca sattādikaṃ sāmānyam, ataḥ sāmānyopalakṣiteṣu bhedeṣu samayakriyāsambhavād akāraṇam ānantyamII iti. | "And the universal 'being' etc. is indeed one only; therefore, regarding particulars characterized by the universal, Convention is possible, hence 'endlessness' is not a [valid] reason." |
tad etad asamyak. | This [argument] is not correct. |
na hi sattādikaṃ vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyaṃ tebhyo bhinnam abhinnaṃ vāstīti prasādhitam etat. | For it has been proved that there exists no real universal like 'being' etc. which is either different or non-different from them [i.e., from particulars]. |
bhavatu vā sāmānyaṃ, tathāpy ekasmin bhede 'nekasāmānyasambhavād asāṅkatyeṇa sadādiśabdaprayojanaṃ na syāt. | Or let there be a universal; even then, because multiple universals can exist in one particular, there could not be an unambiguous use of words like 'existent' etc. |
na ca śabdenānupadarśya sattādikaṃ tena sattādinā bhedān param upalakṣayituṃ samayakāraḥ śaknuyāt. | And without first explaining through words what 'being' etc. is, the Convention-maker could not indicate particulars by means of that 'being' etc. |
na cākṛtasamayeṣu sattādiśabdapravṛttir asti. | And there is no usage of words like 'being' etc. before Conventions are made. |
tataścetaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ syāt. | Thus there would be the fault of mutual interdependence. |
athāpi syāt svayam eva pratipattā vyavahāropalambhād anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sadādiśabdaiḥ samayaṃ pratipadyata iti. | [One might argue:] "The cognizer himself, from observing usage and through positive and negative concomitance with words like 'sat' [existence], comes to understand the convention." |
tad etad asamyak. | This [argument] is not correct. |
na hy anantarabhedaviṣayaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ kaścid vyavahāramupalabhate. | For no one can observe the complete usage pertaining to all subsequent particulars. |
ekadā sattādim atsu bhedeṣv asakṛdvyavahāram upalabhyādṛṣṭeṣv api tajjātīyeṣu tācchabdyaṃ pratipadyata iti cet, na, adṛṣṭatvāt. | If [one argues] "Having observed repeated usage in particulars possessing existence etc., one understands the application of that word even to unseen things of the same kind" - no, because they are unseen. |
na hy adṛṣṭeṣv atītānāgatabhedabhinneṣu ananteṣu bhedeṣu samayaḥ sambhavati, atiprasaṅgāt. | For convention is not possible regarding unseen particulars which are endless and differentiated by past and future [distinctions], as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence. |
vikalpabuddhyā vyāhṛtya teṣu pratipadyata eveti cet, evaṃ tarhi vikalpasamāropitārthaviṣaya eva śabdasanniveśanaṃ na paramārthato bhedeṣv iti prāptam. | If [one argues] "One does comprehend [convention] regarding these [particulars] by speaking through conceptual cognition," then it follows that the application of words pertains only to conceptually superimposed meanings, not to real particulars. |
tathā hy atītānāgatayor asattvenāsannihitatvāt tatra vikalpabuddhir bhavantī nirviṣayaiveti tayā vyāhṛtamasadeva. | For since past and future do not exist [and are] not present, any conceptual cognition occurring there would be objectless, and thus what is expressed by it would be non-existent. |
tataś ca tatra bhavan samayaḥ kathaṃ paramārthato vastubhūto bhaved ityalaṃ bahunā. | And therefore how could the convention occurring there be ultimately real? [We say] enough of [this] elaboration. |
sapakṣe bhāvānnāpi hetor viruddhateti siddhaṃ svalakṣaṇāviṣayatvaṃ śabdānām. | Because [our] reason exists in similar cases, it is not contradictory; thus it is established that words do not have particular individuals as their objects. |
syād etad ye himācalādayo bhāvās teṣāṃ sthiraikarūpatvān na deśakālabhedādibhedaḥ sambhavatyataḥ saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvāt teṣu samayaḥ sambhavatītyataḥ pakṣaikadeśāsiddhatā hetor ity ata āha himācalādaya ityādi / | [Someone might object:] "There are certain things, like the Himālaya [mountain] and others, which, due to having a permanent single form, cannot undergo differentiation through place, time and other [factors]; therefore, since they persist through the time of convention and usage, convention regarding them is possible; hence [your] reason would be partially inadmissible." |
himācalādayo ye 'pi deśakālādyabhedinaḥ / | [The term] "the Himālaya and others" [refers to entities] which [seemingly] do not differ according to place, time, and other [factors]. |
ete hyanekāṇupracayasvabhāvāḥ, ato naiṣāmaśeṣāvayavaparigraheṇa samayaḥ samasti / | These indeed have the nature of aggregates of many atoms; therefore there can be no convention encompassing all their parts. |
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