buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 2 508	english stringlengths 2 924 ⌀
tatraiṣāṃ dravyādīnām abhāve daṇḍītyādidhīdhvanī nirviṣayau syātām	In the absence of these substances etc., expressions and cognitions like 'stick-bearer' would be objectless.
ādigrahaṇaṃ pratyekam abhisambadhyate	The term 'ādi' [etc.] connects with each [member of the compound].
tena pratyekaṃ chatrī viṣāṇītyādisamānajātīyadhīdhvanīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ bhavati.	Through this [rule], the inclusion of similar cognitions and expressions such as "umbrella-bearer" [and] "horned [one]" becomes [possible] for each [case].
antyās tu viśeṣā yoginām eva grāhyā iti na teṣām ādiśabdena parigrahaḥ.	The ultimate particulars, however, are cognizable only by yogins, therefore they are not included by the word "ādi" ["and so forth"].
na cānimittāv etau yuktau, sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa sarvadā tayor vṛttiprasaṅgāt. na cāvibhāgena tayoḥ pravṛttir asti.	And these two [cognitions and expressions] cannot be without basis, because [then] they would occur everywhere without distinction at all times. And their occurrence does not happen without differentiation.
tasmāt santi dravyādaya iti paraḥ.	Therefore, says the opponent, substances and the rest do exist.
prayogaḥ ye parasparam asaṅkīrṇapravṛttayaḥ, te sanimittāḥ, yathā śrotrādipratyayāḥ. asaṅkīrṇapravṛttayaś ca daṇḍītyādiśabdapratyayā iti svabhāvahetuḥ.	The formal argument [is this]: Those [cognitions] which have mutually distinct occurrences have a [real] basis, like auditory and other cognitions. And the verbal cognitions and expressions like "stick-bearer" have distinct occurrences - this is a natural reason.
animittatve sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛttiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam.	If [they were] without basis, their indiscriminate occurrence everywhere would be the contradicting valid cognition.
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte	[He] responds with [the words] "it is said" and so forth.
ucyate viṣayo 'mīṣāṃ dhīdhvanīnāṃ na kaścana	It is said: These cognitions and expressions have no [external] object whatsoever.
antarmātrāniviṣṭaṃ tu bījam eṣāṃ nibandhanam	Rather, their foundation is [only] the seed situated in internal consciousness alone.
tatra yadi mukhyato bāhyena viṣayabhūtena sanimittatvam eṣāṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam, tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt.	In this regard, if what is desired to be proved is primarily their having a basis in an external object-entity, then the reason is inconclusive, because there is no contradicting valid cognition for the opposite of what is to be proved.
atha yena kenacin nimittena sanimittatvam iṣyate, tadā siddhasādhyatā.	If [you maintain that] some kind of cause [for cognitions] is accepted, then [this amounts to] proving what is [already] proven.
tathā hi asmābhir iṣyata evaiṣām antarjalpavāsanāprabodho nimittam, na tu viṣayabhūtaṃ, bhrāntatvena pūrvasya śābdapratyayasya nirviṣayatvāt.	For we also accept that their cause is the awakening of the latent impressions of internal speech, but not [any] external object, since the prior verbal cognition, being erroneous, has no [real] object.
antarmātrāniviṣṭam iti vijñānasanniviṣṭaṃ, vāsaneti yāvat.	"Located internally" means "embedded in consciousness," that is to say, [in the form of] latent impressions.
ad TS 869 etad evāgamena saṃspandayann āha yasya yasyetyādi.	[The author] corroborates this very [point] through scripture by stating "yasya yasya" etc.
yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate /	Whatever object is said [to correspond] to whatever word,
sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnāṃ sā hi dharmatā //	that [object] never actually corresponds [to it] - for such is the nature of real things.
yo yo viṣaya iti svalakṣaṇasāmānyādiḥ.	"Whatever object" means the unique particular, the universal, and so forth.
sā hi dharmateti.	"For such is the nature" means:
sā prakṛtiḥ, sarvavākpathātītatvaṃ vastūnāṃ svabhāva iti yāvat.	That nature, that is to say, being beyond the path of all speech, is the essential nature of real things.
yathoktam yena yena hi nāmnā vai yo yo dharmo 'bhilapyate /	As has been stated: "By whatever name whatever property is expressed,
na sa saṃvidyate tatra dharmāṇāṃ sā hi dharmatā	[This] is indeed the essential nature of dharmas; it is not found there.
atha śābdapratyayasya bhrāntatvatvāviṣayatvayoḥ kiṃ pramāṇam iti cet, uktam atra pramāṇam asmābhir yad bhinneṣv abhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ sarvaṃ evāyaṃ śābdapratyayo bhrānta iti	[Question:] "What is the proof that verbal cognition is both erroneous and objectless?" [Answer:] We have already stated the proof here that all verbal cognition is erroneous because it operates by superimposing non-difference upon different [things].
tathā hi yo 'tasmiṃs tad iti pratyayaḥ, sa bhrāntaḥ, yathā marīcikāyāṃ jalapratyayaḥ	For indeed, any cognition [that takes] "this [is] that" [when it is] not that is erroneous, just as [is] the cognition of water in a mirage.
tathā cāyaṃ bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedādhyavasāyī śābdapratyaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ	And thus this verbal cognition, which superimposes non-difference upon different objects, [provides] a natural reason [for its being erroneous].
na ca sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ grāhyam asyāsti, yenāsiddhatā hetor iti syāt, tasya pūrvaṃ vistareṇa nirastatvāt	And there is no real universal entity that could be its object, by which the reason might be [considered] unproven, because that [universal] has already been extensively refuted.
bhavatu vā sāmānyaṃ, tathāpi tasya bhedebhyo 'rthāntaratve bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyo bhrāntir eva	Even if there were a universal, nevertheless, if it is different from the particulars, the superimposition of non-difference upon different [things] would still be erroneous.
na hy anyenānye samānā yuktās tadvanto nāma syuḥ	For indeed, [things] cannot properly be identical with others [just] because they possess that [universal].
anarthāntaratve 'pi sāmānyasya sarvam eva viśvamekam eva vastu paramārthata iti tatra sāmānyasya pratyayo bhrāntireva	And if the universal is not different [from particulars], then the entire universe would really be just one entity, and thus the cognition of a universal there would still be erroneous.
nahyekavastuviṣayaḥ sāmānyapratyayaḥ, bhedagrahaṇapuraḥsaratvāt tasya	For a cognition of a universal does not have a single entity as its object, because it is preceded by the apprehension of difference.
bhrāntatve ca siddhe nirviṣayatvam api siddham	And when [its] erroneousness is established, [its] objectlessness is also established.
svākārārpaṇena janakasya kasyacidarthasyālambanalakṣaṇaprāptasyābhāvāt	Because when [the object] that produces [the cognition] has given up its own form, there is an absence of anything that could obtain the characteristic of being a support [for cognition].
athavā anyathā nirviṣayatvaṃ sādhyate / yatraiva hi kṛtasamayā dhvanayaḥ, sa eva teṣām artho yukto nānyo 'tiprasaṅgāt /	Or, [we can] prove the objectlessness [of verbal cognitions] in another way: Only that can be their proper meaning where words have been fixed by convention; nothing else [can be their meaning], as [accepting anything else] would lead to absurd consequences.
na ca kvacidvastunyeṣāṃ paramārthataḥ samayaḥ samastītyato nirviṣayā dhīdhvanayaḥ /	And there is no real object wherein their conventional application truly exists; therefore verbal cognitions are objectless.
prayogaḥ ye yatra bhāvataḥ kṛtasamayā na bhavanti, na te paramārthatastam abhidadhati, yathā sāsnādimati piṇḍe 'śvaśabdo 'kṛtasamayaḥ, na bhavanti ca bhāvataḥ kṛtasamayāḥ sarvasmin vastuni sarve dhvanaya iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ /	The logical application [is as follows]: Those [words] which have not been fixed by convention from the beginning in relation to something do not truly denote that thing - like the word "horse" which has not been fixed by convention in relation to an entity possessing a dewlap [i.e., a cow]; and all words are not fixed by convention from the beginning in relation to all things - this is [known] from the non-apprehension of the pervader.
kṛtasamayatvenābhidhāyakatvasya vyāptatvāt, tasya cehābhāvaḥ /	Because denotativeness is pervaded by being fixed by convention, and this [being fixed by convention] is absent here.
nacāyam asiddho hetur ityādarśayann āha yata ityādi /	Showing that this reason is not unestablished, [the author] states "yataḥ" etc.
tathā hi gṛhītasamayaṃ vastu śabdārthatvena vyavasthāpyamānaṃ kadācit svalakṣaṇaṃ vā vyavasthāpyate, jātir vā, tadyogo vā, tayā jātyā, yogaḥ sambandhaḥ, yadvā jātimān padārthabuddher vā ākāra iti vikalpāḥ /	For when an object whose convention has been apprehended is being established as the meaning of words, it must be established as either [1] the particular, or [2] the universal, or [3] the relation with that [universal] - where "relation" means "connection" [and] "that" refers to the universal - or [4] [something] possessing the universal, or [5] the form of the cognition of the object - these are the alternatives.
tatra sarveṣveva samayāsambhavān na yuktaṃ śabdārthatvam /	Since convention is impossible in every one of these cases, [none of these] can properly be the meaning of words.
tattvata ityanena sāṃvṛtasya śabdārthasyāpratiṣedhaṃ darśayati /	By [using] the word "tattvataḥ" [truly], he shows [there is] no denial of the conventional meaning of words.
tena svavacanavyāghāto na bhavati /	Therefore there is no self-contradiction [in his statement].
anyathā hi pratijñāyāḥ svavacanavirodhaḥ syāt /	For otherwise there would be a self-contradiction in [his] proposition.
saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyogataḥ /	Because [the specific individuality] lacks any connection with the time of convention and usage.
tathā hyetān svalakṣaṇādīn śabdenāpratipādya na śakyamaśabdārthatvam eṣāṃ pratipādayitum /	Indeed, it would not be possible to assert that "these [things like] specific individuality do not constitute the import of words" without [first] expressing them by means of words.
tat pratipipādayiṣayā ca śabdena svalakṣaṇadīnupadarśayatā śabdārthatvameṣām abhyupetaṃ syāt /	And by showing these [things like] specific individuality through words for the purpose of proving that [proposition], one would [implicitly] admit their capacity to be expressed by words.
punaś ca tadeva pratijñayā pratiṣiddham iti svavacanavyāghātaḥ /	And yet this very [capacity] is denied in the proposition, thus [resulting in] self-contradiction.
etena yaduktamudyotakareṇa "avācakatve śabdānāṃ pratijñāhetvor vyāghāta" iti tadapi pratyuktaṃ bhavati	By this [explanation] what was stated by Uddyotakara that "if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the proposition and the premise" is also answered.
nahi sarvathā śabdārthāpavādo 'smābhiḥ kriyate, tasyāgopālam api pratītatvāt /	For we do not entirely deny words having their import, since this [fact] is known even to the meanest cowherd.
kintu tāttvikatvaṃ dharmo yaḥ parais tatrāropyo tasya niṣedhaḥ kriyate /	However, what we deny is that characteristic of reality which others superimpose upon it [i.e., the import].
na tu dharmiṇaḥ /	[We do] not [deny] the substratum [itself].
tatra svalakṣaṇaṃ tāvan na śabdaiḥ pratipādyate /	Among these, specific individuality cannot be denoted by words.
saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyogataḥ /	Because it lacks connection with the time of convention and usage.
na śabdaiḥ pratipādyata iti /	[The statement] "cannot be denoted by words" [means]
tatra saṅketābhāvāditi bhāvaḥ /	That there can be no convention regarding it - this is the meaning.
kathaṃ saṅketābhāva ity āha saṅketetyādi /	[If one asks] "Why can there be no convention?" [the author] states "Because it lacks connection..." etc.
saṅketavyavahārābhyām āptaḥ prāpto yaḥ kālas tasya vyāptir vyāpanaṃ tayā viyogāt kāraṇāt /	Because of the absence [viyoga] of connection with the time that is related to Convention and Usage
na tatra svalakṣaṇe samaya iti śeṣaḥ /	[Therefore] there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality
etad uktaṃ bhavati samayo hi vyavahārārthaṃ kriyate, na vyasanitayā, tena yasyaiva saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvam asti tatraiva samayo vyavahartṝṇāṃ yukto nānyatra /	This is what is meant: Convention is made for the purpose of usage, not out of mere attachment; therefore users can properly make Conventions only with regard to what is present at the time related to Convention and Usage, [and] not with regard to anything else
na ca svalakṣaṇasya saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvam asti /	And the Specific Individuality does not have presence at the time related to Convention and Usage
tasmān na tatra samaya iti //	Therefore there can be no Convention with regard to it
vyaktyātmano 'nuyantyeti na paraspararūpataḥ / deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedataḥ //	Things of the nature of individuals do not follow [one another] in their mutual forms, due to differences of place, time, action, potency, manifestation and so forth
tasmāt saṅketadṛṣṭo 'rtho vyavahāre na dṛśyate /	Therefore, the object seen at [the time of] Convention is not seen in actual usage
nacāgṛhītasaṅketo bodhyetānya iva dhvaneḥ //	And [that] for which Convention has not been grasped cannot be understood through sound, just like any other [thing]
sāvaleyādayo hi vyaktibhedā deśādibhedena parasparato 'tyantavyāvṛttamūrttayo naite parasparamanvāviśanti /	For the various individuals such as the variegated cow, having forms completely distinct from each other through differences of place etc., do not interpenetrate one another
tatraikatra kṛtasamayasya puṃso 'nyair vyavahāro na syāt /	Therefore when a person has made a Convention regarding one [individual], usage would not be possible with others
pratibhāsādītyādiśabdena varṇasaṃsthānāvasthāviśeṣādiparigrahaḥ.	By the phrase "pratibhāsādi" [manifestation and so forth], [there is] inclusion of color, shape, specific conditions and other peculiarities.
vyavahāro na dṛśyata iti.	[It] is not observed in actual usage.
tena tatra samayābhāvān nāsiddhatā hetor iti bhāvaḥ.	Therefore, due to the absence of convention in this case, the reason [given] is not unestablished - this is the intended meaning.
na cāpy anaikāntikatvam iti darśayann āha na cāgṛhītetyādi.	And showing that [there is] not even inconclusiveness [in the reason], he states "na cāgṛhīta" ["and not that which is ungrasped"] etc.
anya iveti vijātīyārthavat.	"Like something else" means like objects of a different kind.
dhvaner iti śabdāt.	[The term] "dhvaneḥ" [means] through words.
etad uktaṃ bhavati yady agṛhītasaṅketam arthaṃ śabdaḥ pratipādayet, tadā gośabdo 'py aśvaṃ pratipādayet.	This is what is being said: if a word were to convey a meaning for which no convention has been grasped, then the word "cow" would also denote [the meaning] "horse."
saṅketakaraṇānarthakyaṃ ca syāt.	And [in that case] the making of conventions would become purposeless.
tasmād atiprasaṅgāpattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti siddhā vyāptiḥ.	Therefore, the occurrence of this overextension [serves as] the annulling evidence, [and] thus the pervasion is established.
ayam eva cākṛtasamayatvād iti hetur ācāryadignāgena na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka ānantyād ity anena nirdiṣṭaḥ.	And this very reason - "because of not having established convention" - was indicated by Ācārya Dignāga through this [statement]: "A generic term cannot be denotative of particulars, due to [their] endlessness."
tathā hi ānantyād ity anena samayāsambhava eva darśitaḥ.	Thus, by [the statement] "because of endlessness," the impossibility of Convention itself is shown.
tena yad uddyotakareṇoktam yadi śabdān pakṣayasi, tadānantyād ity asya vastudharmatvād vyadhikaraṇo hetuḥ.	Therefore, what Uddyotakara has said: "If you make 'words' the subject [of inference], then, because 'endlessness' is a property of things [denoted by words], it would be a heterologous reason."
atha bhedā eva pakṣīkriyante, tadā nānvayī na vyatirekī dṛṣṭānto 'stīty ahetur ānantyamHH iti, tat pratyuktaṃ bhavati.	"And if the particular things themselves are made the subject [of inference], then there exists neither a positive nor a negative example, hence 'endlessness' is not a [valid] reason" - this [argument] is thus refuted.
punaḥ sa evāha yasya nirviśeṣaṇā bhedāḥ śabdair abhidhīyante, tasyāyaṃ doṣaḥ, asmākaṃ tu sattādiviśeṣaṇāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇy abhidhīyante.	Again, he himself says: "This fault applies to one who [holds that] unqualified particulars are denoted by words; for us, however, substances, qualities and actions qualified by 'being' etc. are what are denoted [by words]."
tathā hi yatra yatra sattādikaṃ sāmānyaṃ paśyati, tatra tatra sadādiśabdaṃ prayuṅkte.	Thus, wherever one perceives the universal 'being' etc., there one uses the word 'existent' etc.
ekam eva ca sattādikaṃ sāmānyam, ataḥ sāmānyopalakṣiteṣu bhedeṣu samayakriyāsambhavād akāraṇam ānantyamII iti.	"And the universal 'being' etc. is indeed one only; therefore, regarding particulars characterized by the universal, Convention is possible, hence 'endlessness' is not a [valid] reason."
tad etad asamyak.	This [argument] is not correct.
na hi sattādikaṃ vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyaṃ tebhyo bhinnam abhinnaṃ vāstīti prasādhitam etat.	For it has been proved that there exists no real universal like 'being' etc. which is either different or non-different from them [i.e., from particulars].
bhavatu vā sāmānyaṃ, tathāpy ekasmin bhede 'nekasāmānyasambhavād asāṅkatyeṇa sadādiśabdaprayojanaṃ na syāt.	Or let there be a universal; even then, because multiple universals can exist in one particular, there could not be an unambiguous use of words like 'existent' etc.
na ca śabdenānupadarśya sattādikaṃ tena sattādinā bhedān param upalakṣayituṃ samayakāraḥ śaknuyāt.	And without first explaining through words what 'being' etc. is, the Convention-maker could not indicate particulars by means of that 'being' etc.
na cākṛtasamayeṣu sattādiśabdapravṛttir asti.	And there is no usage of words like 'being' etc. before Conventions are made.
tataścetaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ syāt.	Thus there would be the fault of mutual interdependence.
athāpi syāt svayam eva pratipattā vyavahāropalambhād anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sadādiśabdaiḥ samayaṃ pratipadyata iti.	[One might argue:] "The cognizer himself, from observing usage and through positive and negative concomitance with words like 'sat' [existence], comes to understand the convention."
tad etad asamyak.	This [argument] is not correct.
na hy anantarabhedaviṣayaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ kaścid vyavahāramupalabhate.	For no one can observe the complete usage pertaining to all subsequent particulars.
ekadā sattādim atsu bhedeṣv asakṛdvyavahāram upalabhyādṛṣṭeṣv api tajjātīyeṣu tācchabdyaṃ pratipadyata iti cet, na, adṛṣṭatvāt.	If [one argues] "Having observed repeated usage in particulars possessing existence etc., one understands the application of that word even to unseen things of the same kind" - no, because they are unseen.
na hy adṛṣṭeṣv atītānāgatabhedabhinneṣu ananteṣu bhedeṣu samayaḥ sambhavati, atiprasaṅgāt.	For convention is not possible regarding unseen particulars which are endless and differentiated by past and future [distinctions], as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence.
vikalpabuddhyā vyāhṛtya teṣu pratipadyata eveti cet, evaṃ tarhi vikalpasamāropitārthaviṣaya eva śabdasanniveśanaṃ na paramārthato bhedeṣv iti prāptam.	If [one argues] "One does comprehend [convention] regarding these [particulars] by speaking through conceptual cognition," then it follows that the application of words pertains only to conceptually superimposed meanings, not to real particulars.
tathā hy atītānāgatayor asattvenāsannihitatvāt tatra vikalpabuddhir bhavantī nirviṣayaiveti tayā vyāhṛtamasadeva.	For since past and future do not exist [and are] not present, any conceptual cognition occurring there would be objectless, and thus what is expressed by it would be non-existent.
tataś ca tatra bhavan samayaḥ kathaṃ paramārthato vastubhūto bhaved ityalaṃ bahunā.	And therefore how could the convention occurring there be ultimately real? [We say] enough of [this] elaboration.
sapakṣe bhāvānnāpi hetor viruddhateti siddhaṃ svalakṣaṇāviṣayatvaṃ śabdānām.	Because [our] reason exists in similar cases, it is not contradictory; thus it is established that words do not have particular individuals as their objects.
syād etad ye himācalādayo bhāvās teṣāṃ sthiraikarūpatvān na deśakālabhedādibhedaḥ sambhavatyataḥ saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvāt teṣu samayaḥ sambhavatītyataḥ pakṣaikadeśāsiddhatā hetor ity ata āha himācalādaya ityādi /	[Someone might object:] "There are certain things, like the Himālaya [mountain] and others, which, due to having a permanent single form, cannot undergo differentiation through place, time and other [factors]; therefore, since they persist through the time of convention and usage, convention regarding them is possible; hence [your] reason would be partially inadmissible."
himācalādayo ye 'pi deśakālādyabhedinaḥ /	[The term] "the Himālaya and others" [refers to entities] which [seemingly] do not differ according to place, time, and other [factors].
ete hyanekāṇupracayasvabhāvāḥ, ato naiṣāmaśeṣāvayavaparigraheṇa samayaḥ samasti /	These indeed have the nature of aggregates of many atoms; therefore there can be no convention encompassing all their parts.

tatraiṣāṃ dravyādīnām abhāve daṇḍītyādidhīdhvanī nirviṣayau syātām

In the absence of these substances etc., expressions and cognitions like 'stick-bearer' would be objectless.

ādigrahaṇaṃ pratyekam abhisambadhyate

The term 'ādi' [etc.] connects with each [member of the compound].

tena pratyekaṃ chatrī viṣāṇītyādisamānajātīyadhīdhvanīnāṃ grahaṇaṃ bhavati.

Through this [rule], the inclusion of similar cognitions and expressions such as "umbrella-bearer" [and] "horned [one]" becomes [possible] for each [case].

antyās tu viśeṣā yoginām eva grāhyā iti na teṣām ādiśabdena parigrahaḥ.

The ultimate particulars, however, are cognizable only by yogins, therefore they are not included by the word "ādi" ["and so forth"].

na cānimittāv etau yuktau, sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa sarvadā tayor vṛttiprasaṅgāt. na cāvibhāgena tayoḥ pravṛttir asti.

And these two [cognitions and expressions] cannot be without basis, because [then] they would occur everywhere without distinction at all times. And their occurrence does not happen without differentiation.

tasmāt santi dravyādaya iti paraḥ.

Therefore, says the opponent, substances and the rest do exist.

prayogaḥ ye parasparam asaṅkīrṇapravṛttayaḥ, te sanimittāḥ, yathā śrotrādipratyayāḥ. asaṅkīrṇapravṛttayaś ca daṇḍītyādiśabdapratyayā iti svabhāvahetuḥ.

The formal argument [is this]: Those [cognitions] which have mutually distinct occurrences have a [real] basis, like auditory and other cognitions. And the verbal cognitions and expressions like "stick-bearer" have distinct occurrences - this is a natural reason.

animittatve sarvatrāviśeṣeṇa pravṛttiprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam.

If [they were] without basis, their indiscriminate occurrence everywhere would be the contradicting valid cognition.

ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte

[He] responds with [the words] "it is said" and so forth.

ucyate viṣayo 'mīṣāṃ dhīdhvanīnāṃ na kaścana

It is said: These cognitions and expressions have no [external] object whatsoever.

antarmātrāniviṣṭaṃ tu bījam eṣāṃ nibandhanam

Rather, their foundation is [only] the seed situated in internal consciousness alone.

tatra yadi mukhyato bāhyena viṣayabhūtena sanimittatvam eṣāṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam, tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt.

In this regard, if what is desired to be proved is primarily their having a basis in an external object-entity, then the reason is inconclusive, because there is no contradicting valid cognition for the opposite of what is to be proved.

atha yena kenacin nimittena sanimittatvam iṣyate, tadā siddhasādhyatā.

If [you maintain that] some kind of cause [for cognitions] is accepted, then [this amounts to] proving what is [already] proven.

tathā hi asmābhir iṣyata evaiṣām antarjalpavāsanāprabodho nimittam, na tu viṣayabhūtaṃ, bhrāntatvena pūrvasya śābdapratyayasya nirviṣayatvāt.

For we also accept that their cause is the awakening of the latent impressions of internal speech, but not [any] external object, since the prior verbal cognition, being erroneous, has no [real] object.

antarmātrāniviṣṭam iti vijñānasanniviṣṭaṃ, vāsaneti yāvat.

"Located internally" means "embedded in consciousness," that is to say, [in the form of] latent impressions.

ad TS 869 etad evāgamena saṃspandayann āha yasya yasyetyādi.

[The author] corroborates this very [point] through scripture by stating "yasya yasya" etc.

yasya yasya hi śabdasya yo yo viṣaya ucyate /

Whatever object is said [to correspond] to whatever word,

sa sa saṃghaṭate naiva vastūnāṃ sā hi dharmatā //

that [object] never actually corresponds [to it] - for such is the nature of real things.

yo yo viṣaya iti svalakṣaṇasāmānyādiḥ.

"Whatever object" means the unique particular, the universal, and so forth.

sā hi dharmateti.

"For such is the nature" means:

sā prakṛtiḥ, sarvavākpathātītatvaṃ vastūnāṃ svabhāva iti yāvat.

That nature, that is to say, being beyond the path of all speech, is the essential nature of real things.

yathoktam yena yena hi nāmnā vai yo yo dharmo 'bhilapyate /

As has been stated: "By whatever name whatever property is expressed,

na sa saṃvidyate tatra dharmāṇāṃ sā hi dharmatā

[This] is indeed the essential nature of dharmas; it is not found there.

atha śābdapratyayasya bhrāntatvatvāviṣayatvayoḥ kiṃ pramāṇam iti cet, uktam atra pramāṇam asmābhir yad bhinneṣv abhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtteḥ sarvaṃ evāyaṃ śābdapratyayo bhrānta iti

[Question:] "What is the proof that verbal cognition is both erroneous and objectless?" [Answer:] We have already stated the proof here that all verbal cognition is erroneous because it operates by superimposing non-difference upon different [things].

tathā hi yo 'tasmiṃs tad iti pratyayaḥ, sa bhrāntaḥ, yathā marīcikāyāṃ jalapratyayaḥ

For indeed, any cognition [that takes] "this [is] that" [when it is] not that is erroneous, just as [is] the cognition of water in a mirage.

tathā cāyaṃ bhinneṣv artheṣv abhedādhyavasāyī śābdapratyaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ

And thus this verbal cognition, which superimposes non-difference upon different objects, [provides] a natural reason [for its being erroneous].

na ca sāmānyaṃ vastubhūtaṃ grāhyam asyāsti, yenāsiddhatā hetor iti syāt, tasya pūrvaṃ vistareṇa nirastatvāt

And there is no real universal entity that could be its object, by which the reason might be [considered] unproven, because that [universal] has already been extensively refuted.

bhavatu vā sāmānyaṃ, tathāpi tasya bhedebhyo 'rthāntaratve bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyo bhrāntir eva

Even if there were a universal, nevertheless, if it is different from the particulars, the superimposition of non-difference upon different [things] would still be erroneous.

na hy anyenānye samānā yuktās tadvanto nāma syuḥ

For indeed, [things] cannot properly be identical with others [just] because they possess that [universal].

anarthāntaratve 'pi sāmānyasya sarvam eva viśvamekam eva vastu paramārthata iti tatra sāmānyasya pratyayo bhrāntireva

And if the universal is not different [from particulars], then the entire universe would really be just one entity, and thus the cognition of a universal there would still be erroneous.

nahyekavastuviṣayaḥ sāmānyapratyayaḥ, bhedagrahaṇapuraḥsaratvāt tasya

For a cognition of a universal does not have a single entity as its object, because it is preceded by the apprehension of difference.

bhrāntatve ca siddhe nirviṣayatvam api siddham

And when [its] erroneousness is established, [its] objectlessness is also established.

svākārārpaṇena janakasya kasyacidarthasyālambanalakṣaṇaprāptasyābhāvāt

Because when [the object] that produces [the cognition] has given up its own form, there is an absence of anything that could obtain the characteristic of being a support [for cognition].

athavā anyathā nirviṣayatvaṃ sādhyate / yatraiva hi kṛtasamayā dhvanayaḥ, sa eva teṣām artho yukto nānyo 'tiprasaṅgāt /

Or, [we can] prove the objectlessness [of verbal cognitions] in another way: Only that can be their proper meaning where words have been fixed by convention; nothing else [can be their meaning], as [accepting anything else] would lead to absurd consequences.

na ca kvacidvastunyeṣāṃ paramārthataḥ samayaḥ samastītyato nirviṣayā dhīdhvanayaḥ /

And there is no real object wherein their conventional application truly exists; therefore verbal cognitions are objectless.

prayogaḥ ye yatra bhāvataḥ kṛtasamayā na bhavanti, na te paramārthatastam abhidadhati, yathā sāsnādimati piṇḍe 'śvaśabdo 'kṛtasamayaḥ, na bhavanti ca bhāvataḥ kṛtasamayāḥ sarvasmin vastuni sarve dhvanaya iti vyāpakānupalabdheḥ /

The logical application [is as follows]: Those [words] which have not been fixed by convention from the beginning in relation to something do not truly denote that thing - like the word "horse" which has not been fixed by convention in relation to an entity possessing a dewlap [i.e., a cow]; and all words are not fixed by convention from the beginning in relation to all things - this is [known] from the non-apprehension of the pervader.

kṛtasamayatvenābhidhāyakatvasya vyāptatvāt, tasya cehābhāvaḥ /

Because denotativeness is pervaded by being fixed by convention, and this [being fixed by convention] is absent here.

nacāyam asiddho hetur ityādarśayann āha yata ityādi /

Showing that this reason is not unestablished, [the author] states "yataḥ" etc.

tathā hi gṛhītasamayaṃ vastu śabdārthatvena vyavasthāpyamānaṃ kadācit svalakṣaṇaṃ vā vyavasthāpyate, jātir vā, tadyogo vā, tayā jātyā, yogaḥ sambandhaḥ, yadvā jātimān padārthabuddher vā ākāra iti vikalpāḥ /

For when an object whose convention has been apprehended is being established as the meaning of words, it must be established as either [1] the particular, or [2] the universal, or [3] the relation with that [universal] - where "relation" means "connection" [and] "that" refers to the universal - or [4] [something] possessing the universal, or [5] the form of the cognition of the object - these are the alternatives.

tatra sarveṣveva samayāsambhavān na yuktaṃ śabdārthatvam /

Since convention is impossible in every one of these cases, [none of these] can properly be the meaning of words.

tattvata ityanena sāṃvṛtasya śabdārthasyāpratiṣedhaṃ darśayati /

By [using] the word "tattvataḥ" [truly], he shows [there is] no denial of the conventional meaning of words.

tena svavacanavyāghāto na bhavati /

Therefore there is no self-contradiction [in his statement].

anyathā hi pratijñāyāḥ svavacanavirodhaḥ syāt /

For otherwise there would be a self-contradiction in [his] proposition.

saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyogataḥ /

Because [the specific individuality] lacks any connection with the time of convention and usage.

tathā hyetān svalakṣaṇādīn śabdenāpratipādya na śakyamaśabdārthatvam eṣāṃ pratipādayitum /

Indeed, it would not be possible to assert that "these [things like] specific individuality do not constitute the import of words" without [first] expressing them by means of words.

tat pratipipādayiṣayā ca śabdena svalakṣaṇadīnupadarśayatā śabdārthatvameṣām abhyupetaṃ syāt /

And by showing these [things like] specific individuality through words for the purpose of proving that [proposition], one would [implicitly] admit their capacity to be expressed by words.

punaś ca tadeva pratijñayā pratiṣiddham iti svavacanavyāghātaḥ /

And yet this very [capacity] is denied in the proposition, thus [resulting in] self-contradiction.

etena yaduktamudyotakareṇa "avācakatve śabdānāṃ pratijñāhetvor vyāghāta" iti tadapi pratyuktaṃ bhavati

By this [explanation] what was stated by Uddyotakara that "if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the proposition and the premise" is also answered.

nahi sarvathā śabdārthāpavādo 'smābhiḥ kriyate, tasyāgopālam api pratītatvāt /

For we do not entirely deny words having their import, since this [fact] is known even to the meanest cowherd.

kintu tāttvikatvaṃ dharmo yaḥ parais tatrāropyo tasya niṣedhaḥ kriyate /

However, what we deny is that characteristic of reality which others superimpose upon it [i.e., the import].

na tu dharmiṇaḥ /

[We do] not [deny] the substratum [itself].

tatra svalakṣaṇaṃ tāvan na śabdaiḥ pratipādyate /

Among these, specific individuality cannot be denoted by words.

saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāptiviyogataḥ /

Because it lacks connection with the time of convention and usage.

na śabdaiḥ pratipādyata iti /

[The statement] "cannot be denoted by words" [means]

tatra saṅketābhāvāditi bhāvaḥ /

That there can be no convention regarding it - this is the meaning.

kathaṃ saṅketābhāva ity āha saṅketetyādi /

[If one asks] "Why can there be no convention?" [the author] states "Because it lacks connection..." etc.

saṅketavyavahārābhyām āptaḥ prāpto yaḥ kālas tasya vyāptir vyāpanaṃ tayā viyogāt kāraṇāt /

Because of the absence [viyoga] of connection with the time that is related to Convention and Usage

na tatra svalakṣaṇe samaya iti śeṣaḥ /

[Therefore] there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality

etad uktaṃ bhavati samayo hi vyavahārārthaṃ kriyate, na vyasanitayā, tena yasyaiva saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvam asti tatraiva samayo vyavahartṝṇāṃ yukto nānyatra /

This is what is meant: Convention is made for the purpose of usage, not out of mere attachment; therefore users can properly make Conventions only with regard to what is present at the time related to Convention and Usage, [and] not with regard to anything else

na ca svalakṣaṇasya saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvam asti /

And the Specific Individuality does not have presence at the time related to Convention and Usage

tasmān na tatra samaya iti //

Therefore there can be no Convention with regard to it

vyaktyātmano 'nuyantyeti na paraspararūpataḥ / deśakālakriyāśaktipratibhāsādibhedataḥ //

Things of the nature of individuals do not follow [one another] in their mutual forms, due to differences of place, time, action, potency, manifestation and so forth

tasmāt saṅketadṛṣṭo 'rtho vyavahāre na dṛśyate /

Therefore, the object seen at [the time of] Convention is not seen in actual usage

nacāgṛhītasaṅketo bodhyetānya iva dhvaneḥ //

And [that] for which Convention has not been grasped cannot be understood through sound, just like any other [thing]

sāvaleyādayo hi vyaktibhedā deśādibhedena parasparato 'tyantavyāvṛttamūrttayo naite parasparamanvāviśanti /

For the various individuals such as the variegated cow, having forms completely distinct from each other through differences of place etc., do not interpenetrate one another

tatraikatra kṛtasamayasya puṃso 'nyair vyavahāro na syāt /

Therefore when a person has made a Convention regarding one [individual], usage would not be possible with others

pratibhāsādītyādiśabdena varṇasaṃsthānāvasthāviśeṣādiparigrahaḥ.

By the phrase "pratibhāsādi" [manifestation and so forth], [there is] inclusion of color, shape, specific conditions and other peculiarities.

vyavahāro na dṛśyata iti.

[It] is not observed in actual usage.

tena tatra samayābhāvān nāsiddhatā hetor iti bhāvaḥ.

Therefore, due to the absence of convention in this case, the reason [given] is not unestablished - this is the intended meaning.

na cāpy anaikāntikatvam iti darśayann āha na cāgṛhītetyādi.

And showing that [there is] not even inconclusiveness [in the reason], he states "na cāgṛhīta" ["and not that which is ungrasped"] etc.

anya iveti vijātīyārthavat.

"Like something else" means like objects of a different kind.

dhvaner iti śabdāt.

[The term] "dhvaneḥ" [means] through words.

etad uktaṃ bhavati yady agṛhītasaṅketam arthaṃ śabdaḥ pratipādayet, tadā gośabdo 'py aśvaṃ pratipādayet.

This is what is being said: if a word were to convey a meaning for which no convention has been grasped, then the word "cow" would also denote [the meaning] "horse."

saṅketakaraṇānarthakyaṃ ca syāt.

And [in that case] the making of conventions would become purposeless.

tasmād atiprasaṅgāpattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti siddhā vyāptiḥ.

Therefore, the occurrence of this overextension [serves as] the annulling evidence, [and] thus the pervasion is established.

ayam eva cākṛtasamayatvād iti hetur ācāryadignāgena na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka ānantyād ity anena nirdiṣṭaḥ.

And this very reason - "because of not having established convention" - was indicated by Ācārya Dignāga through this [statement]: "A generic term cannot be denotative of particulars, due to [their] endlessness."

tathā hi ānantyād ity anena samayāsambhava eva darśitaḥ.

Thus, by [the statement] "because of endlessness," the impossibility of Convention itself is shown.

tena yad uddyotakareṇoktam yadi śabdān pakṣayasi, tadānantyād ity asya vastudharmatvād vyadhikaraṇo hetuḥ.

Therefore, what Uddyotakara has said: "If you make 'words' the subject [of inference], then, because 'endlessness' is a property of things [denoted by words], it would be a heterologous reason."

atha bhedā eva pakṣīkriyante, tadā nānvayī na vyatirekī dṛṣṭānto 'stīty ahetur ānantyamHH iti, tat pratyuktaṃ bhavati.

"And if the particular things themselves are made the subject [of inference], then there exists neither a positive nor a negative example, hence 'endlessness' is not a [valid] reason" - this [argument] is thus refuted.

punaḥ sa evāha yasya nirviśeṣaṇā bhedāḥ śabdair abhidhīyante, tasyāyaṃ doṣaḥ, asmākaṃ tu sattādiviśeṣaṇāni dravyaguṇakarmāṇy abhidhīyante.

Again, he himself says: "This fault applies to one who [holds that] unqualified particulars are denoted by words; for us, however, substances, qualities and actions qualified by 'being' etc. are what are denoted [by words]."

tathā hi yatra yatra sattādikaṃ sāmānyaṃ paśyati, tatra tatra sadādiśabdaṃ prayuṅkte.

Thus, wherever one perceives the universal 'being' etc., there one uses the word 'existent' etc.

ekam eva ca sattādikaṃ sāmānyam, ataḥ sāmānyopalakṣiteṣu bhedeṣu samayakriyāsambhavād akāraṇam ānantyamII iti.

"And the universal 'being' etc. is indeed one only; therefore, regarding particulars characterized by the universal, Convention is possible, hence 'endlessness' is not a [valid] reason."

tad etad asamyak.

This [argument] is not correct.

na hi sattādikaṃ vastubhūtaṃ sāmānyaṃ tebhyo bhinnam abhinnaṃ vāstīti prasādhitam etat.

For it has been proved that there exists no real universal like 'being' etc. which is either different or non-different from them [i.e., from particulars].

bhavatu vā sāmānyaṃ, tathāpy ekasmin bhede 'nekasāmānyasambhavād asāṅkatyeṇa sadādiśabdaprayojanaṃ na syāt.

Or let there be a universal; even then, because multiple universals can exist in one particular, there could not be an unambiguous use of words like 'existent' etc.

na ca śabdenānupadarśya sattādikaṃ tena sattādinā bhedān param upalakṣayituṃ samayakāraḥ śaknuyāt.

And without first explaining through words what 'being' etc. is, the Convention-maker could not indicate particulars by means of that 'being' etc.

na cākṛtasamayeṣu sattādiśabdapravṛttir asti.

And there is no usage of words like 'being' etc. before Conventions are made.

tataścetaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ syāt.

Thus there would be the fault of mutual interdependence.

athāpi syāt svayam eva pratipattā vyavahāropalambhād anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ sadādiśabdaiḥ samayaṃ pratipadyata iti.

[One might argue:] "The cognizer himself, from observing usage and through positive and negative concomitance with words like 'sat' [existence], comes to understand the convention."

tad etad asamyak.

This [argument] is not correct.

na hy anantarabhedaviṣayaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ kaścid vyavahāramupalabhate.

For no one can observe the complete usage pertaining to all subsequent particulars.

ekadā sattādim atsu bhedeṣv asakṛdvyavahāram upalabhyādṛṣṭeṣv api tajjātīyeṣu tācchabdyaṃ pratipadyata iti cet, na, adṛṣṭatvāt.

If [one argues] "Having observed repeated usage in particulars possessing existence etc., one understands the application of that word even to unseen things of the same kind" - no, because they are unseen.

na hy adṛṣṭeṣv atītānāgatabhedabhinneṣu ananteṣu bhedeṣu samayaḥ sambhavati, atiprasaṅgāt.

For convention is not possible regarding unseen particulars which are endless and differentiated by past and future [distinctions], as [this would lead to] an undesirable consequence.

vikalpabuddhyā vyāhṛtya teṣu pratipadyata eveti cet, evaṃ tarhi vikalpasamāropitārthaviṣaya eva śabdasanniveśanaṃ na paramārthato bhedeṣv iti prāptam.

If [one argues] "One does comprehend [convention] regarding these [particulars] by speaking through conceptual cognition," then it follows that the application of words pertains only to conceptually superimposed meanings, not to real particulars.

tathā hy atītānāgatayor asattvenāsannihitatvāt tatra vikalpabuddhir bhavantī nirviṣayaiveti tayā vyāhṛtamasadeva.

For since past and future do not exist [and are] not present, any conceptual cognition occurring there would be objectless, and thus what is expressed by it would be non-existent.

tataś ca tatra bhavan samayaḥ kathaṃ paramārthato vastubhūto bhaved ityalaṃ bahunā.

And therefore how could the convention occurring there be ultimately real? [We say] enough of [this] elaboration.

sapakṣe bhāvānnāpi hetor viruddhateti siddhaṃ svalakṣaṇāviṣayatvaṃ śabdānām.

Because [our] reason exists in similar cases, it is not contradictory; thus it is established that words do not have particular individuals as their objects.

syād etad ye himācalādayo bhāvās teṣāṃ sthiraikarūpatvān na deśakālabhedādibhedaḥ sambhavatyataḥ saṅketavyavahārāptakālavyāpakatvāt teṣu samayaḥ sambhavatītyataḥ pakṣaikadeśāsiddhatā hetor ity ata āha himācalādaya ityādi /

[Someone might object:] "There are certain things, like the Himālaya [mountain] and others, which, due to having a permanent single form, cannot undergo differentiation through place, time and other [factors]; therefore, since they persist through the time of convention and usage, convention regarding them is possible; hence [your] reason would be partially inadmissible."

himācalādayo ye 'pi deśakālādyabhedinaḥ /

[The term] "the Himālaya and others" [refers to entities] which [seemingly] do not differ according to place, time, and other [factors].

ete hyanekāṇupracayasvabhāvāḥ, ato naiṣāmaśeṣāvayavaparigraheṇa samayaḥ samasti /

These indeed have the nature of aggregates of many atoms; therefore there can be no convention encompassing all their parts.