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yat tu sāṃvṛtaṃ tatkalpanāśilpinirmitātmarūpatayāntarmātrārūḍham eva nabāhyaṃ dṛśyavikalpayos tu vivekenānabhijñatayā jano bāhyam iva tamākāraṃ manyamāno bāhyam eva vastvabhidhāvatīti nāto bāhyarūpatāsiddhir aṅkuśādīnām / | However, that which is conventional is, due to having a nature fabricated by the artisan of imagination, based merely on internal [content] and not external; but people, being unable to distinguish between the perceived and the conceptualized, consider that form as if external and rush toward [it] as an external object - hence the external nature of goad etc. is not established. |
aṅkuśādikamityavalambyetyanena pūrvakeṇa sambandhanīyam / | The term "avalambya" should be construed with "aṅkuśādikam" [from the previous verse]. |
antarmātrāsamārūḍhaṃ bahīrūpatayādhyavasitaṃ sāṃvṛtamaṅkuśādikamālambya bāhye pravartanta ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that [these notions] proceed toward external [objects] while depending upon goad etc., which are conventional, based on mere internal [content], and determined as having external form. |
antarmātrā buddhiḥ // | "Antarmātrā" means cognition. |
yac ca gavādiviṣayatve satīti viśeṣaṇaṃ tadapyayuktam eva, vyavacchedyābhāvād iti darśayann āha kriyetyādi / | And showing that the qualification "while pertaining to cow etc." is also improper, since there is nothing to be excluded, [the author] states "kriyā" etc. |
kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo hetuś ca varṇyate / abhāvapratyayasyeti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam // | The absence of action, quality and designation is also described as the cause of the cognition of non-existence; therefore the qualification is purposeless. |
tadapyayuktaṃ hetutve vastutā śaktito 'pi ca / | That too is improper, because if [something] is a cause, [it must have] reality due to having causal power. |
abhāvapratyayasyāpi kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāva eva hetutvena bhavadbhir varṇyate / | The absence of action, quality and designation is described by you as being the cause even of the cognition of non-existence. |
tadapyayuktam iti / | That too is incorrect. |
kriyādyabhāvasya hetutvopavarṇanam / | [It is incorrect] because the absence of action etc. has been described as being the cause. |
yadi cābhāvo 'pi tathāvidhasāmarthyādhyāsito bhavet tadā katham iva vastutvaṃ nāsādayet etāvanmātranibandhanatvād vastunaḥ / | And if absence too were to have such potency attributed to it, how could it not attain the nature of a positive entity, since a positive entity is established by this [potency] alone? |
tataścābhāvarūpatām eva vijahyāt / | And consequently it would abandon its very nature as an absence. |
vastusvabhāvapracyutirūpatvād abhāvasya / | Because absence consists in the departure from the nature of a positive entity. |
apica yadi kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo 'bhāvapratyayahetuḥ syāt tadā sattādiṣvapyabhāvapratyayaḥ prāptastatrāpi śaśaviṣāṇādivat kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvāviśeṣāt / | Moreover, if the absence of action, quality, and designation were the cause of the cognition of absence, then the cognition of absence would also apply to [universals like] "existence" etc., since in those too there is equally an absence of action, quality, and designation, just as in [fictitious things like] "hare's horns." |
hetuścāsiddha iti darśayann āha vailakṣaṇyam iti / | Showing that the reason is unestablished, he states [the verse beginning with] "vailakṣaṇyam." |
vailakṣaṇyam asiddhaṃ ca piṇḍākṛtyādibuddhitaḥ / | The difference from the cognitions of the body, shape, etc. is unestablished; |
tajjñānānām asiddho 'pi hetureṣa bhavatyataḥ / | therefore this reason regarding those cognitions becomes unestablished as well. |
nahi gavādipratyayānāṃ piṇḍādivyatiriktam arthāntaramadhyavaseyam asti yena tat pratyayānyavatmeṣāṃ bhavet / | For indeed there is no separate object to be determined for the cognitions of "cow" etc. distinct from body etc., by which these [cognitions] could be different from those [cognitions of body etc.]. |
pratijñāyāścānumānabādheti darśayann āha anvayītyādi | [The author] shows that the conclusion is also annulled by inference, saying "anvayī" etc. |
anvayī pratyayo yasmācchabdavyaktyavabhāsavān | Since the comprehensive cognition contains manifestations of verbal expressions and individuals |
varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyā jātistu varṇyate | But the universal is described as being devoid of color, shape, and letter-forms |
etaduktaṃ bhavati anugāmipratyayānāṃ piṇḍādivyatiriktaṃ nimittamālambanabhūtameva bhavadbhiḥ sisādhayiṣitam, taccāyuktam, tasyāpratibhāsanāt;tadvilakṣaṇavarṇākṛtyādipratibhāsanāc ca | The meaning is this: What you wish to prove is that the basis of comprehensive cognitions must be something different from individuals like [physical] bodies; but this is incorrect, because [such a basis] does not appear [in cognition], and because what does appear is something different, namely color, shape, etc. |
tathā hi bhavadbhir varṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśūnyameva varṇyate gotvādisāmānyam vijñānaṃ ca varṇādipratibhāsānugatamanubhūyate tat katham asya varṇādiśūnyamālambanaṃ bhavet na hyanyākārasya vijñānasyānyadālambanaṃ yuktamatiprasaṅgāt | For you describe the universal 'cowness' etc. as entirely devoid of color, shape and letter-forms, yet the cognition is experienced as being accompanied by manifestations of color etc. - so how could its basis be something devoid of color etc.? For it is not reasonable for a cognition of one form to have something of a completely different form as its basis, as [this would lead to] unwanted consequences. |
prayogaḥ yo yadvilakṣaṇārthapratibhāsaḥ pratyayaḥ sa tadgrāhako na bhavati tadyathā śabdajñānaṃ na rūpagrāhakaṃ jātivilakṣaṇādipratibhāsaścānvayīpratyaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdheḥ | The formal argument is: Any cognition that manifests an object distinct from something cannot apprehend that thing - just as cognition of sound cannot apprehend color; and the comprehensive cognition manifests color etc. which are distinct from the universal - [this is proven] by the perception of something contradicting the pervader. |
śabdavyaktyavabhāsavān iti | [The text says] "containing manifestations of word and individuals" |
śabdo gaurityādivyapadeśaḥ, vyaktiḥ varṇasaṃsthānātmikā, tayor avabhāsaḥ so 'syāstīti tadvān | 'Word' means verbal designation like 'cow' etc.; 'individual' means that which consists of color and shape; 'having manifestation' means it possesses their appearance |
akṣarāṇi gakāraukāravisarjanīyādīni | 'Letters' refers to [components] like ga, au, and visarga [that make up gauḥ] |
sāmānyasyāpi nīlādirūpatve guṇato 'sya kaḥ / bhedo nānugataścaiko nīlādirupalakṣyate | If the universal also had the form of blue etc., what would be its difference from a quality? Moreover, no single 'blue' etc. that pervades [all instances] is perceived. |
bhāsamāno 'pi cedeṣa na vivekena lakṣyate / | Even though this [universal] is manifesting itself, it is not perceived in a differentiated form. |
tat kathaṃ dhīdhvanī vyaktau vartete tadbalena tau // | How then could these two [namely] thought and word apply to the particular by force of that [universal]? |
niścayātmaka evāyaṃ sāmānyapratyayaḥ paraiḥ / | This notion of the universal is held by others [i.e. Naiyāyikas] to be definite in nature. |
iṣṭaścāgrahaṇaṃ prāpte yuktaṃ nānupalakṣaṇam // | And if [the universal] is accepted [to exist], its non-apprehension would not be logical, as that would mean it is not cognizable. |
syānmataṃ guṇo hi nīlādiranugato na bhavati / | One might think that qualities like blue etc. are not comprehensive. |
sāmānyaṃ tu bhinnadeśakālavyaktyanugāmītyata ākārabhedo 'stītyāha nānugataścaika ityādi / | But since the universal follows particulars [existing in] different places and times, there is a difference in form - thus he states "not comprehensive and one" etc. |
nahi nīlādiguṇavyatiriktamaparaṃ nīlatvādi nīlādyākārānugatamanugāmi pratibhāsānamālakṣyate / | For no other blueness etc., distinct from the quality blue etc., is observed following [all instances with] the form of blue etc. |
adhyakṣata ekasyaiva nīlāder asādhāraṇasya pratibhāsanāt / | Because in direct perception, only one non-generic blue etc. appears. |
nāpi vikalpacetasi nīlatvādi dvitīyaṃ pratibhāsate, yathādṛṣṭasyaiva tenādhyavasāyāt / | Nor does blueness etc. appear as a second [entity] in conceptual cognition, since that [cognition] determines only what has been seen. |
syād etadyathā bhavatāṃ kṣaṇikatvaṃ bhāsamānam api nopalakṣyate vivekena mandais tathedam api sāmānyam iti tadapyayuktam / | One might argue that "just as according to you [Buddhists], momentariness, though apparent, is not apprehended in its differentiated form by dull-minded people, so too [it is] with this universal" - but that too is incorrect. |
evaṃ hi taddarśanabalād bhinnāsvapi vyaktiṣvabhinnau dhīdhvanī bhavata iti | Thus [according to you], on the strength of the perception of that [universal], identical cognition and sound [would] arise even in different individuals. |
yadetad varṇitaṃ tannopapadyate, nahi viśeṣaṇānupalakṣaṇe viśeṣye dhīrupajāyate yathā daṇḍānupalakṣaṇe daṇḍīti pratyayo na bhavati tadvadatrāpi syāt / | What has been described here is not possible, because when a qualifier is not apprehended, no cognition of the qualified can arise - just as when a stick is not apprehended, there can be no notion of "stick-bearer" - the same would apply here. |
tathā hi svataḥśabdapratyayagocarātivṛttā bhedā bhavadbhir upavarṇyante / | For according to you, the differences [i.e. individuals] are by themselves described as being beyond the scope of word and cognition. |
tāṃś ca bhedān svato buddhiśabdaviṣayavyativṛttaśarīrān sāmānyadarśanabalena pratiyanpratipattā kathaṃ tasmaivānupalakṣako nāma / | And [when] the cognizer cognizes these differences, which are by their nature beyond the scope of cognition and verbal expression, through the power of perceiving the universal, how could he not apprehend that very [universal]? |
apica yasyāvikalpakameva pratyakṣaṃ tasyaitadyuktaṃ vaktuṃ pratibhāsamānam api nopalakṣyata iti niścayapratyayavyāpāratvād upalakṣaṇasya yasya tu bhavataḥ sarvam eva savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam iti pakṣas tasyāyuktamanupalakṣaṇamagrahaṇaprasaṅgāt / | Moreover, for one who [holds that] perception is only indeterminate, it might be reasonable to say that "even while appearing, it is not apprehended," since apprehension involves the operation of determinate cognition; but for you who maintain that all perception is determinate, non-apprehension would be unreasonable, as it would lead to [the conclusion of] non-cognition. |
iyam eva hi niścayānāṃ svārthapratipattir yattānniścayanaṃ taccenna niścinvanti na gṛhṇantītyeva prāptam // | For this indeed is the cognition of objects by determinate [cognitions] - their determination [of objects]; if they do not determine [objects], it follows that they do not apprehend [them] at all. |
abhyupetyāpi nīlādivyatiriktārthāntarasiddhiṃ neṣṭasiddhir bhavatām abhimatasādhyārthasyānumānabādhitatvāt tena vyāptyasiddher iti darśayann āha ---siddhe 'pītyādi / | Even accepting the establishment of something different from blue etc., what you wish to prove is not established, because your intended conclusion is contradicted by inference and therefore the pervasion [vyāpti] is not established - thus showing [this], he says "even when established" etc. |
siddhe 'pyanyanimittatve na sāmānyaṃ prasiddhyati / | Even when the existence of a different cause is established, the universal is not established. |
adhrauvyaviviktam iti / anityatvaviviktaṃ, nityam iti yāvat / | "Free from impermanence" means free from non-eternality, that is to say, eternal. |
kasmān na siddhyatītikramodayāt / | "Why is it not established?" - Because [the cognitions] arise in sequence. |
gavādyabhidhānapratyayānām iti śeṣaḥ / | [This refers to] the cognitions of terms like "cow" and others. |
yadā hi tathāvidhasāmānyadharmahetukatvameṣāmabhaviṣyat tadā krameṇāmī nodapatsyanta, avikalakāraṇatvādyugapadevotpadyeran, yugapad utpadyamānānekapadārthavat / | If these [cognitions] were caused by such a common property [i.e., a universal], then they would not arise in succession, [but rather], since their cause would be complete, they would arise simultaneously, just like multiple entities that arise simultaneously. |
nahi pauranupakāryasya kācid apekṣāsti // | For indeed, that which cannot be assisted by anything prior has no need [for anything else]. |
samprati hetoḥ siddhimabhyupagamya vyabhicāramāha padārthaśabda iti / | Now, even while accepting the establishment of the reason, he explains its fallibility through [the example of] the word "padārtha." |
padārthaśabdaḥ kaṃ hetumaparaṃ ṣaṭsvapekṣate / astīti pratyayo yaś ca sattādiṣvanuvartate // | What other cause does the word "padārtha" depend on [when applied] to the six [categories], and [what causes] the cognition "it exists" which persists in [concepts like] existence and others? |
nahi padārthatvaṃ nāma ṣaṭsu padārtheṣvaparam asti yena padārthaḥ padārtha ityanugāmī pratyayo bhavet / | There is no such [universal] called "padārthatva" present in the six categories by which there could be a pervading cognition [of the form] "this is a padārtha, this is a padārtha." |
tathā sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyeṣu na sattāsti yenāstīti teṣu pratyayaḥ syāt dravyaguṇakarmasveva sattāyāḥ sthitatvāt / | Similarly, existence does not reside in universals, particularities and inherence, by which there could be the cognition "it exists" regarding them, since existence resides only in substance, quality and action. |
syād etat tatrāpi sattādisadupalambhakapramāṇaviṣayatvaṃ dharmo 'sti tenānyanimitto 'yamatrāpi vyapadeśa ityavyabhicāra evetyāha anyadharmetyādi / | One might think: "Even there exists the property of being the object of valid cognition that apprehends existence etc., therefore this designation has a different cause here too" - thus [claiming] there is no fallibility; [to this] he says [the verse beginning with] "anyadharma." |
anyadharmanimittaścet tatrāpyastyastitāmatiḥ / tadanyadharmahetutve 'niṣṭhāsakteradharmitā // | If [you say] it is caused by some other property, then regarding that too there is the notion of existence; if that [notion] is caused by yet another property, [we face] the impossibility of reaching an end [and] the absence of a property-bearer. |
vyabhicārī tato heturamībhirayamiṣyate / | Therefore, due to these [reasons], this reason is considered to be fallible. |
naca sarvopasaṃhārādvyāptirasya prasādhitā // | And moreover, the pervasive concomitance [of the reason] has not [yet] been established through complete enumeration. |
anyadharmanimittatve 'pyabhyupagamyamāne vyabhicāradoṣas tadavastha eva yasmāttatrāpyasmin dharme 'tyevāstitāmatiḥ asti saddharma iti / | Even if it is admitted that [these notions] are caused by some other property, the fault of deviation remains exactly as before, since even with regard to that [other property], there exists the cognition of existence [expressed as] "this existent property exists." |
tatrāpyanyadharmābhyupagame 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ syāt / | And if one were to accept another property there too, an infinite regress would result. |
anyeṣām api dharmāntarāśrayatvād dharmitvaprasaṅgaś ca / | And [there would be] the undesired consequence that other [things] too would be substrates of different properties and thus [become] property-bearers. |
tataś ca ṣaḍeva padārthā dharmiṇa iti ṣaṭsaṅkhyāniyamo na syāt / | And consequently, there would not be the numerical restriction that "there are only six categories [that can be] property-bearers." |
athānavasthābhayāddharmāntaraṃ nāśrīyate tadāmībhiḥ padārtheṣu sattādau dharme vā pravṛttaiḥ pratyayair vyabhicāritā hetoḥ / | If, out of fear of infinite regress, another property is not accepted, then the reason would be fallible due to these cognitions occurring with respect to [both] the categories and the property of existence. |
mābhūdvāsya sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā saṃdigdhavyatirekitā tu kena parihriyata ityetad āha naca sarvopasaṃhārād ityādi / | Even if its non-conclusiveness may not be due to over-extension, how could its doubtful absence [in the dissimilar cases] be avoided? This is what [the text] states with "And moreover" etc. |
sarvasmin dharmiṇi hetoḥ sādhyena vyāptipradarśanaṃ sarvopasaṃhāraḥ / | Complete enumeration means showing the pervasion of the reason by the probandum in all property-bearers. |
syād etadvyāptiratra yuktaiveti nimittāntarābhāve hi tadvastupratyayavailakṣaṇyaṃ katham upapadyeta nahyekaviṣayāṇāṃ bahūnām api pratyayānāṃ vailakṣaṇyam asti yadi syāt tadā rūparasādipratyayānām api nānāviṣayo na siddhyet / | One might think: "The pervasion here is indeed justified, because in the absence of another cause, how could the difference between that cognition and the cognition of the thing [itself] be possible? For there is no difference even among many cognitions that have the same object. If there were [such a difference], then even the diversity of objects like color and taste would not be established for [their respective] cognitions." |
pratyayabhedakṛtatvād viṣayabhedavyavasthānasyeti / | Because the determination of the difference between objects is caused by the difference between [their] cognitions. |
tadapyayuktam | That too [is] not correct. |
nahi sāmānyapratyayo vastusvalakṣaṇaviṣayaḥ paramārthato yuktaḥ | Indeed, a cognition of the universal with reference to the unique particular of a thing is not possible in ultimate reality. |
āviṣṭābhilāpena pratyayena svalakṣaṇasyāviṣayīkāraṇāt | Because the unique particular cannot be made the object of a cognition that is associated with verbal expression. |
kintu yato yatas tasyaikasyāpi vastuno vyāvṛttis tannibandhanās tatra yathāsaṅketābhyāsaṃ tadvastvanubhavadvārā yato vikalpā vācakāś ca viśvakalpā yadi pravarterannasatyapi sāmānye tadā ko virodha ityato vyāptyabhāva ucyate | But if [it is held that] from wherever there is exclusion of that single thing, based on that [exclusion] there arise conceptual constructions and verbal expressions of an all-encompassing nature according to convention and practice through the experience of that thing, even in the absence of a universal, then what contradiction [would there be]? Therefore, [we] speak of the absence of pervasion. |
yaccoktaṃ gavādiṣvanuvṛttaṃ cetyādi tatrāha tadanantaram ityādi | As for what was said about "that which pervades cows and other [things]" and so forth, [the author] speaks about that next. |
tadanantaram uddiṣṭam anenaiva nirākṛtam | What was stated immediately after that has been refuted by this very [argument]. |
tatrāpi tulyadoṣatvāt | Because even in that case the same faults apply. |
tathāhīṣṭasiddhyādayo 'trāpi samānāḥ | For thus, [the faults of] proving what is already established and so forth are the same here too. |
ādiśabdena sādhyaśūnyatā dṛṣṭāntasya hetor asiddhir vyabhicāraścetyādi parigṛhyate | By the word "ādi" [above], [we] include [the faults of] the example being devoid of the probandum, the non-establishment of the reason, its being inconclusive, and so forth. |
pācakādiṣu ca jñānaṃ viśiṣṭamupajāyate | And a specific cognition arises with respect to cooks and other [things]. |
abhāve 'bhāvabuddhiś ca vinaikenānugāminā | And [there arises] a cognition of absence in [cases of] absence, without any single pervading [universal]. |
icchāracitarūpeṣu naṣṭājāteṣu vā tataḥ | [The same applies] then to forms created by desire and to [things] destroyed or unborn. |
anaikāntikatā hetoḥ sarvair ebhir yathoditaiḥ // | Due to all these [considerations] as stated, the logical reason becomes fallible [i.e. inconclusive]. |
nahi tatraikamanugāmi nimittaṃ pācakatvapāṭhakatvādikam asti yena pācakaḥ pāṭhaka ityanuvṛttipratyayo bhavet / | Indeed, there is no single pervading basis such as "cookness" or "teacherness" etc. by which there could be a comprehensive cognition [of concepts] like "cook" or "teacher." |
tathā prāgabhāvādiṣu caturṣvabhāvo 'bhāva iti katham anuvṛttapratyayo bhavet nahyatrāpi sāmānyam asti tasya vastvāśritatvāt / | Similarly, regarding the four types of absence like prior absence etc., how could there be a comprehensive cognition [of the type] "absence"? Indeed there cannot be any universal here, since that [universal] must reside in positive entities. |
icchāracitarūpeṣu candrāpīḍādiṣu nabhastalopakalpitadhavanagṛhādiṣu naṣṭājāteṣu ca mahāsammataśaṅkhaprabhṛtiṣu buddhirvinaikenānugāminā kathaṃ bhavet / | How could there be cognition without a single pervading [basis] regarding imagined forms like Candrāpīḍa etc., regarding white mansions etc. imagined in the sky, and regarding those dead and unborn like Mahāsammata, Śaṅkha, and others? |
nahi tatrāpi sāmānyam asti vyaktyāśritatvāt tasya // | Indeed there is no universal even in these cases, since that [universal] must reside in particulars. |
na pācakādibuddhīnām asti kiñcinnibandhanam / | There is no single basis for cognitions of "cook" etc. |
karmāsti cet prativyakti nanu tadbhidyate tathā // | If [you say] "the action exists [as basis]," [we reply that] does it not differ for each individual? |
bhinneṣvanvayino 'satve na yuktānvayinī matiḥ / ityekamiṣṭaṃ sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanuvṛttimat // | [You say] "without something pervading among different [things], a pervading cognition is not possible" - thus a single universal pervading all particulars is accepted [by you]. |
karmanvayadaridraṃ ca yadi hetuḥ prakalpyate / tadā vyaktaya evāsyāḥ kimitīṣṭā na hetavaḥ // | If an action lacking pervasion is imagined as the cause [of the cognition], then why are the particulars themselves not accepted as causes? |
pācakādimatir na syāt tatra coparatakriye / na sadāsannidhānaṃ hi karmeṣṭaṃ jātivat paraiḥ // | And there would be no cognition of "cook" etc. in one who has ceased the action, for indeed the opponent does not accept that action is always present like a universal. |
atītānāgataṃ karma nimittīkṛtya teṣu cet / pācakādiṣu dhīśabdau, tan na heturasattvataḥ // | If [you say] the cognition and word "cook" etc. are based on past and future action, [we reply] that cannot be the cause due to [its] non-existence [at present]. |
nahi pācakādiṣu karmanibandhanā buddhir iti yuktaṃ vaktum | It cannot be right to say that the notion regarding cooks and similar [agents] is based on [their] action |
tasyāpi karmaṇaḥ prativyaktivadbhedābhyupagamāt, bhinneṣu hi vinaikenānugāminānvayī pratyayo nopapadyata iti kṛtvā sāmānyaṃ sarvavyaktyanugataṃ parikalpyate bhavadbhiḥ | Because this action too is accepted to be different for each individual, just like [their] individuality; [and] since there cannot be a comprehensive notion regarding diverse things without some unifying [element], you [opponents] postulate a universal that pervades all individuals |
yadi cānvayaśūnyam api karmābhinnābhidhānapratyayahetuḥ syāt tadā ko vyaktiṣu pradveṣo yena tāḥ parihṛtya sāmānyaṃ taddhetutvena kalpyate | And if action, even without having this comprehensive nature, were the basis for unified designation and cognition, then why [this] aversion to individuals, due to which you abandon them and postulate a universal as the basis for that [cognition]? |
kiṃ ca yadi karmanibandhanaḥ pācakādiṣu pratyayaḥ syāt tadā parataḥ kriye pākamakurvati pācaka iti pratyayo na syāt | Moreover, if the notion regarding cooks and similar [agents] were based on action, then after [that person] has ceased the action and is not performing cooking, the notion "cook" would not arise |
nahi jātivadbhavadbhiḥ sadā sannihitaṃ karmābhīṣṭaṃ, yenoparatakriye 'pi pratyayaḥ syāt | For you [opponents] do not accept action to be eternally present like a universal, by virtue of which the notion could persist even when the action has ceased |
nahi yo yannibandhanaḥ sa tadabhāve bhavitum arhati, atiprasaṅgāt, evaṃ hi sarvaḥ sarvanibandhanaṃ syāt | For that which depends on something cannot exist in the absence of that [thing], as [this would lead to] an absurd consequence - everything would [then] depend on everything |
nacāpyatītānāgataṃ karma tat pratyayanibandhanaṃ yuktaṃ, tasyātītāder asattvāt, asataś ca hetubhāvānupapatteḥ | Nor can past and future action be properly considered as the basis of that notion, because what is past etc. does not exist, and what does not exist cannot serve as a cause |
śaṅkarasvāmī prāha pācakādyanuvṛttipratyayas tat karmajātisambaddhayā kriyayā yogas tasmād bhavati, tenoparatakriye 'pi kriyayā dhruvanimittasyopalakṣaṇāt pācakādipratyaya ityavaseyam iti | Śaṅkarasvāmin says: "[The] comprehensive notion of cook etc. arises from connection with an action that is related to the universal of action, and therefore even when the [particular] action has ceased, the notion of cook etc. [persists] because the permanent cause is indicated by that action" |
tadetad darśayati kriyetyādi | This is shown by [the words] beginning with "kriyā" [in the following verse] |
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