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na cāpi sthitiṃ prati hetutvaṃ yuktam / | [The Soul] cannot be regarded as the cause with respect to subsistence. |
nityasya kvacid api sāmarthyānupapatter ityuktam / | Because an eternal thing cannot have causal potency in any [case], as has been explained before. |
kiñcāsau sthāpyamāno bhāvaḥ svayam astirasvabhāvo vā bhavet, sthirasvabhāvo vā / | Moreover, would this entity that is being established be of unstable nature or of stable nature? |
yadyasthirarūpas tatkathaṃ pareṇa sthāpayituṃ śakyena / | If it is of unstable form, how can it be established by something else? |
atha sthirasvabhāvastathāpi sthāpako 'kiñcitkara eva svayam eva tat svabhāvatayā tasya sthitisiddheḥ / | If, on the other hand, it is of stable nature, then the establisher would be entirely ineffective, since [the entity's] subsistence would be established by its very nature itself. |
kiṃ ca ye tāvan mūrtā bhāvās teṣām adhogamanapratibandhakatvena bhavennāmāśrayakalpanā / | Moreover, for those entities that are corporeal, one might indeed assume a substratum that prevents [their] falling downward. |
ye punar amī sukhādayas teṣām amūrtatayā nādhogamanam astīti kiṃkurvāṇas teṣām āśrayo bhavet / | But for these [entities] like pleasure and so forth, since they are incorporeal, there is no falling downward - so what would their substratum do? |
sadasatoś ca nirāśaṃsatayānupākhyatvena cāśrayaṇānupapattir iti / | And for what cannot be spoken of as either existent or non-existent, there can be no subsisting due to [its] indescribability and lack of expectation. |
evaṃ sukhādīnām anyeṣāṃ ca yathāyogamāśritatvāsiddher na guṇo nāmāstīti bhāvaḥ / | Thus, since pleasure and other [qualities] cannot be proven to be dependent [on a substance] as appropriate, there is no such thing as "quality" - this is the meaning. |
kiṃ ca buddhirjñānasvabhāvāṅgīkṛtā paraiḥ / | Moreover, buddhi has been accepted by others as having the nature of cognition (jñāna). |
yathoktam ---"buddhirupalabdhir jñānam ityanarthāntaram" iti / | As it has been stated: "Buddhi, apprehension, and cognition are synonymous." |
tasyāścaivaṃrūpāyā api na svasaṃviditarūpam iṣṭaṃ paraiḥ / | And even though it is of such nature, [its] self-apprehended form is not accepted by others. |
kintu buddhyantaragamyatvam eva / | Rather, [they maintain that] it is indeed knowable only through another buddhi. |
tathābhūtāyāś ca rūpādivat svato 'siddher buddhitvam evāyuktam iti pratipādayiṣyati // | Thus, [consciousness], not having a self-sufficient existence like color and other [qualities], cannot rightly be regarded even as buddhi - this will be explained [later]. |
sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnānām apyajñānarūpatvam iṣṭam / | Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort have been accepted as being of the nature of non-cognition. |
tad api pramāṇalakṣaṇaparīkṣāyāṃ niṣetsyate / | This too will be refuted during the examination of the characteristics of valid means of knowledge. |
gurutvadravatvasnehānāṃ tu rūpādivat pratiṣedhau vidheya ityevam ālocyaiṣāṃ pratiṣedham akṛtvā saṃskārapratiṣedham āha vegākhya ityādi / | As for gravity, fluidity and viscidity, considering that these should be refuted like color and other [qualities], [the author], without refuting these, proceeds to refute saṃskāra [by saying] "vegākhya" etc. |
vegākhyo bhāvanāsaṃjñaḥ sthitasthāpakalakṣaṇaḥ / saṃskāras trividhaḥ prokto nāsau saṃgacchate 'khilaḥ // | Saṃskāra has been described as being of three kinds - named vega [velocity], bhāvanā [impression], and characterized as sthitasthāpaka [elasticity] - [but] none of this is compatible [with reality]. |
kṣaṇikatvāt padārthānāṃ na kācid vidyate kriyā / yat prabandhasya hetuḥ syāt saṃskāro vegasaṃjñakaḥ // | Because things are momentary, there can be no action [in them] of which the saṃskāra named vega could be the cause of [its] continuity. |
trividhaṃ saṃskāro vego bhāvanā sthitasthāpakaśceti / | Saṃskāra is of three kinds: vega [velocity], bhāvanā [impression], and sthitasthāpaka [elasticity]. |
tatra vegākhyaḥ pṛthivyaptejoḥvāyumanassu pañcasu mūrtimatsu dravyeṣu prayatnābhighātaviśeṣāpekṣātkarmaṇo jāyate / | Among these, [the saṃskāra] called vega arises in the five corporeal substances - earth, water, fire, air and mind - from motion dependent on specific effort and impact. |
sa ca niyatadikkriyāprabandhahetuḥ, sparśavaddravyasaṃyogavirodhī / | And it is the cause of continuous motion in a fixed direction and prevents contact with tangible substances. |
tathā hi śarādiṣu prayatnaviśeṣajanitakarmaviśeṣahetuka eva / | Thus indeed, in arrows and such things, it is caused specifically by motion generated by particular effort. |
yadvaśād antarālaśirasyāpatanaṃ bhavatya evāsau niyatādikriyākārayonnīyamānasadbhāvatayā siddhaḥ / | By virtue of which [vega] it falls on the target at a distance, and thus its existence is established as being inferred from [such] specific effects. |
śākhādau tu loṣṭābhighātajanitakarmajaḥ / | [The quality of momentum] in such [things] as the branch [of a tree] is produced by the movement generated by the impact of a clod [of earth]. |
bhāvanāsaṃjñastvātmaguṇaḥ / | The [quality] termed "bhāvanā" (mental impression) is a quality of the ātman (soul). |
yo 'sau jñānajo jñānahetuścocyate, sa ca dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūteṣu smṛtipratyabhijñānakāryonnītasattvatayā siddhaḥ / | This [quality] which is said to be both produced by cognition and the cause of cognition is established as having its existence proven through [its] effects such as memory and recognition in relation to things [previously] seen, heard, and experienced. |
sthitasthāpakas tu mūrtimaddravyaguṇaḥ, yo hi ghaṇāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭaṃ kālāntarāvasthāyinaṃ svamāśrayaṃ prayatnenānyathākṛtaṃ pūrvavad yathāvasthitaṃ sthāpayati / | The quality of elasticity (sthitasthāpaka) is a quality of corporeal substances, which indeed restores its own substrate—characterized by a solid arrangement of parts and enduring for some time—to its original position after it has been altered by [external] force. |
yathā cirakālasaṃveṣṭitasya tālapatrādeḥ prasāryāvamuktasya punas tathaivāvasthānam / | For instance, when a palm leaf that has been rolled up for a long time is spread out and [then] released, [it] returns to that same [rolled] position. |
dhanuḥśākhāśṛṅgadantādiṣu vastrādiṣu ca bugnāvartiteṣu tasya kāryaṃ lakṣyata eva / | Its effect is indeed observed in such things as bows, branches, horns, teeth, and also in cloth and the like when [they are] bent and turned. |
akhila iti / trividho 'pi / | "All this" means all three types [of momentum]. |
tatra vegākhyasya karmasambadhanākhyaṃ kāryam asiddham / | Among these, the effect called connection-with-action of that which is called velocity is not established. |
aśeṣapadārthajātavyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhitatvāt / | Because the momentariness pervading all categories of existing things has been proven. |
tataś ca svabhāvapratilambhād ūrdhvaṃ sarvabhāvānām asattvān na kācit kriyāsti yasyāḥ kriyāyāḥ prabandhasya hetur asau bhavet / | And therefore, since all entities cease to exist immediately after attaining their own nature, there is no action whatsoever of which that [velocity] could be the cause of [its] continuity. |
samavāyikāraṇaṃ (m.c. ?) svopādānadeśaparihāreṇa pratīyamāno bhāvānām utpāda eva kriyāprabandho 'bhipretas tathāpyanaikāntikatvam | If by 'continuity of action' [it] is meant [to refer to] the arising of entities that is perceived as separate from the location of its material cause, even then [there is] non-conclusiveness. |
yataḥ pūrvikā eva hetupratyayā bhāvānāṃ tathā tathotpadyamānānāṃ tathāvidhātmabhūtakriyāprabandhato 'numīyante na yathoktaḥ saṃskāraḥ | Because from such a continuity of action, [only] the prior causal conditions of the things arising in such ways are inferred, not the aforementioned momentum. |
tena saha kvacid apyanvayāsiddheḥ | Because concomitance with that [momentum] has not been established anywhere. |
kiṃ ca yadi tathāvidhasaṃskārabalād apatanamiṣvādīnāṃ syāt tadā na kadācid api te pateyuḥ sarvatra pātapratibandhahetor vegasyāvasthitatvāt | Moreover, if the non-falling of arrows and such were due to the force of such momentum, then they would never fall at all, since the velocity that prevents falling would be present everywhere. |
tataścāviśiṣṭākāśadeśaprasarpiṇo viśikhasyākasmād yadetat patanamupalabhyate tat katham upapadyate | And therefore, how is it to be explained that this sudden falling is observed of an arrow moving through an undifferentiated region of space? |
na ca mūrtimatāṃ satāṃ vāyvādīnāṃ saṃyogād upahataśaktitvād vegasya vināśāt patanam iti śakyaṃ vaktum arvāg eva patanaprasaṅgāt sarvatraiva vāyusaṃyogās tadvirodhī vidyata eva | And it cannot be said that "the falling occurs due to the destruction of velocity caused by its force being impaired through contact with corporeal substances like air", because [in that case] falling would occur too early, since the contact with air that opposes it exists everywhere. |
athāpi syād arvāgekāntabalīyastvād vegasya virodhinam api vāyusaṃyogaṃ pratividhyāsau vego nayati deśāntamiṣum iti | One might argue that "before [falling], due to the velocity being extremely strong, it pierces through even the opposing contact with air and carries the arrow to another place." |
yadyevaṃ parasmāt kena tasyābalīyastvaṃ yena sudūram api deśaṃ taṃ na nayet | If this were so, what causes its subsequent weakness due to which it does not carry [the arrow] even further? |
dṛśyate hi sarvatrāviśiṣṭavāyusaṃyogavatyākāśatale prasarpato 'pi śarasyāntarāle patanam | For it is observed that in all cases the arrow falls midway while moving through the plane of space which has uniform contact with air throughout. |
naca vegasya paścādanyatvaṃ śakyam vaktum, anyathotpattikāraṇābhāvāt | And it cannot be said that the velocity becomes different later on, because there is no cause for [its] different production. |
sarvatraiva hi tat samavāyikāraṇamiṣvādi nirviśiṣṭam eva | For its inherent cause, namely the arrow etc., remains undifferentiated throughout. |
naca karmākhyaṃ kāraṇaṃ paścād viśiṣyata iti yuktam abhidhātum tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogatvāt | And it is not reasonable to say that the cause called 'motion' becomes qualified later, because that too is subject to the same counter-question. |
anyatve 'pi vā paścād vegasya pūrvakasya vināśakāraṇābhāvāt tādavasthyamevetyapāta eva syāccharasya | Or even if [there were] difference later on in the velocity, since there would be no cause for the destruction of the prior [velocity], there should only be continuation of the same state and thus no falling of the arrow. |
naca vāyusaṃyogas tasya vināśakāraṇamarvāgeva patanaprasaṅgādityuktam etatsarvatra vāyoraviśeṣeṇa tat saṃyogasyāpyaviśiṣṭatvād iti yatkiñcidetat // | The contact of air cannot be the cause of destruction of this [velocity], since [if it were], it would result in [the arrow] falling before [reaching its target], as stated before; since the air is uniformly [present] everywhere, and its contact [with the arrow] would also be uniform; thus this [explanation] is worthless. |
bhāvanākhyastu saṃskāraścetaso vāsanātmakaḥ / | The momentum known as 'bhāvanā' is of the nature of a mental impression [vāsanā]. |
yukto nātmaguṇaścedaṃ yujyate tannirākṛteḥ // | [This momentum] cannot be a quality of the soul, since this [notion] has [already] been rejected. |
yadi hi smṛtyādikāryataḥ sāmānyena bhāvanāmātraṃ tadā siddhasādhyatā / | If [the existence of] impression is postulated merely in general as the cause of remembrance and similar [effects], then [this argument] proves what is already established. |
tathā hi pūrvānubhavāhitasāmarthyalakṣaṇā cetasaḥ svātmabhūtā bhāvanā smṛtyādiheturiṣyata eva / | For we already accept that the cause of remembrance and similar [effects] is an impression which is inherent in the mind [itself], characterized by a potency produced by previous experience. |
yasyā vāsaneti prasiddhiḥ / | Which is well-known by the term 'vāsanā'. |
athātmaguṇasvabhāvā bhāvanā sādhayitum iṣṭā tadā kvacid api tathāvidhayā saha smṛtyādīnām anvayāsiddheranaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | If [what] is intended to be proved is impression as having the nature of a quality of the soul, then, since no concomitance between such [an impression] and remembrance etc. has ever been established, the reason is inconclusive. |
pratijñāyāścānumānabādhā / | And the proposition is contradicted by inference. |
ātmanas tadādhārasya pūrvaṃ nirākṛtatvenāsattvāt tasyā apyasattvasiddhiḥ / | Since the soul, which is its substrate, has been previously refuted and thus does not exist, its [alleged quality] is also proved to be non-existent. |
prayogaḥ ye yadāśritās te tasyābhāve sati nāvasthitimaśnuvate, yathā citraṃ kuḍyādyabhāve, āśritaścātmānaṃ saṃskāraḥ paramateneti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdher na ceṣṭāsiddhiḥ / | The formulation is: Those things which inhere in something cannot maintain their existence when that [substrate] is absent - like a painting [cannot exist] in the absence of a wall; and according to the opponent's view, the momentum inheres in the soul - thus there is perception of what contradicts the pervader, and therefore what is desired [by the opponent] is not established. |
tasyātmanaḥ pūrvaṃ nirākṛtatvāt / | [This is correct] especially since the Self has been previously refuted. |
tasmāccetaso vāsanātmaka eva yuktaḥ saṃskāro nātmaguṇa iti pramāṇaphalametat / | Therefore, this is the conclusion from the means of valid cognition: that impression (saṃskāra) must be of the nature of a mental trace (vāsanā) in consciousness, and not a quality of the Self. |
ekasya pramāṇasiddhatvād aparasya viparyayād iti bhāvaḥ // | The meaning is that while one [view] is established by valid means of knowledge, the other is contradicted [by them]. |
sthitasthāpakarūpastu na yuktaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ / sthitārthāsambhavād bhāve tādrūpyādeva saṃsthitiḥ // | The quality of elasticity (sthitasthāpaka) is not logical due to momentary destruction [of things], because lasting objects are impossible; if something exists, its continuance [must be] due to its having that very nature. |
tathā hi yamasau padārthaṃ sthitaṃ sthāpayati kadācid asau svayamasthirasvabhāva eva, yadvā sthirasvabhāva eveti pakṣadvayam / | For indeed, that entity which this [quality] re-establishes as lasting must either be inherently non-lasting by nature, or inherently lasting by nature - these are the only two alternatives. |
yadyasthirasvabhāvas tadā tasya kṣaṇād ūrdhvamabhāvāt kasyāsau sthāpako bhavet / | If it is inherently non-lasting, then since it ceases to exist after a moment, what would this [quality] be the re-establisher of? |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā bhāve sattve sthitānām arthānāṃ tādrūpyādeva apracyutasthitarūpatvāt sthitir iti kim akiñcitkareṇa sthāpakena parikalpiteneti pūrvavad dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam // | If [we take] the second alternative, then when things exist and are lasting, their continuance follows from their very nature of being undeviated from their stable form - so what need is there for a postulated ineffective re-establisher? This objection should be stated as before. |
kṣaṇaṃ tvekamavasthānaṃ svahetor eva jātitaḥ / | The existence for a single moment arises only from its own cause by its nature. |
pūrvapūrvaprabhāvāc ca prabandhenānuvartanam // | And the continuous succession [of moments] is due to the influence of each preceding [moment]. |
svahetor evaṃ niṣpadyamānā ekakṣaṇasthāyinaḥ sidhyanti / | Things that last for a single moment are established as being produced thus from their own causes. |
tathāhyātmapratilambhalakṣaṇaivāmīṣāṃ sthitir ucyate, natu pratilabdhātmasattākānām uttarakālamātmarūpasandhāraṇalakṣaṇā, svayaṃ calātmana uttarakālamavasthānābhāvāt / | For what is called their "existence" is characterized merely by their acquiring their own nature, not by maintaining their form subsequent to acquiring their existence, since by their very nature they cannot persist beyond [that initial] moment. |
avasthāne vā kadācid apyanivṛttiprasaṅgaḥ pūrvavat / | If [the thing] exists [permanently], then it follows that it would never cease to exist, [remaining] as before. |
paścād apyaviśiṣṭatvāt, atat svabhāvaprasaṅgāc ca / | And [it would remain] unchanged even afterwards, or else it would follow that [it would have] a nature different from its own. |
pūrvapūrvakāraṇasāmarthyakṛtaścottarottarakāryaprasava iti prabandhe 'pi na saṃskārasya sāmarthyaṃ sidhyati // | In the [causal] chain, each subsequent effect is produced by the potency of its immediately preceding cause; thus even here, the potency of saṃskāra [momentum] is not established. |
nānyathodayavāneṣa kasyāsau sthāpakas tataḥ / nacāsya dṛṣṭaṃ hetutvaṃ saṃskāro 'nyo 'pi vā bhavet // | This [non-momentary entity] does not arise in any other way; of what then could that [momentum] be the establisher? Neither has its causality been observed; [therefore] either this momentum or something else could be [the cause]. |
utpannasyaiva ceṣṭo 'yaṃ vastrādeḥ sthāpako guṇaḥ / | Moreover, this quality [called momentum] is supposed to be the establisher of what is already produced, such as cloth and so forth. |
guṇasaṃskāranāmaivaṃ sarvathāpi na sambhavī // | Thus, what is called a "quality" and "momentum" is in no way possible. |
yo hyakṣaṇikas tasyānyathātvāsambhavāt svata eva sthitir iti kiṃ kurvāṇas tasyāsau sthāpako bhavatītyuktam etat / | This has been stated: since what is non-momentary cannot become otherwise [than it is], its existence is self-established, so what could that establisher accomplish for it? |
athāpi syāt mābhūdasau sthāpakaḥ kintu kṣaṇasyaivotpādako bhavatītyāha nacātyetyādi / | If it might be argued that "let it not be an establisher, but rather let it be the producer of the moment itself," [the answer] is stated [beginning with] "nor has..." |
pramāṇādhīnā hi prameyasya tattvavyavasthitiḥ, na cāsya prasiddhakāraṇavyatirekeṇa vastrādiṣu pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ cakṣurādivadvā kāryavyatirekato dṛṣṭam niścitaṃ hetutvam, yena tadvyavahāraḥ syāt / | For the determination of the reality of a knowable object depends on valid means of knowledge, and its causality is not definitively observed in things like cloth through perception and non-apprehension as distinct from well-known causes, or through distinction from effects as in the case of eyes etc., by which [observation] such usage [of calling it a cause] could occur. |
athādṛṣṭasāmarthyasyāpi hetutvaṃ kalpyate tadā saṃskāraḥ, anyo 'pi vā śukabakādirutpatter heturbhavet / kalpanīya iti śeṣaḥ / | If it is supposed that "even though its potency is unobserved, causality might still be assumed," then either momentum or anything else, such as parrots and cranes, could be [assumed to be] the cause of origination. [The phrase] "could be assumed" is to be supplied [at the end]. |
na hyadṛṣṭaśaktitvena kaścid viśeṣo 'sti yenaikasminneva saṃskārātmanyapariniścitasāmarthye kalpanāparitoṣo bhavatāṃ syāt | [The mere] fact of [its] power not being perceived does not constitute any specific distinguishing feature by which you should be satisfied with postulating [the existence of] only momentum—whose potency has not been ascertained. |
nacāpyayam utpādahetur iṣṭo bhavadbhiḥ api tūtpannasya sato vastrāder uttarakālaṃ sthāpako guṇa iṣyate | Moreover, this [momentum] is not accepted by you as a cause of production; rather, it is considered to be a quality that maintains [the existence of] already produced things like cloth in subsequent time. |
tatra cākiñcitkaratvam asyeti pūrvam upavarṇitam | And in this [regard], its ineffectiveness has been explained previously. |
abhyupagamya tūtpattihetutvaṃ dūṣaṇamidam abhihitam | However, this objection has been stated [only] after assuming [for argument's sake] its being a cause of production. |
kadācit kaścit svasamayasīmānam apyatipatyaivaṃ kalpayed iti bhāvaḥ | [This is stated with] the idea that someone might sometime postulate this even by transgressing the boundaries of their own doctrine. |
guṇasaṃskāranāmetyādinā pūrvamupasaṃharati | [The author] concludes the previous [discussion] with [the words] beginning with "qualities" and "impressions." |
dharmādharmalakṣaṇaguṇadūṣaṇam āha mana ityādi | [The author] states the refutation of the qualities characterized as merit and demerit, beginning with [the words] "mind" etc. |
manoyogātmanāṃ pūrvaṃ vistareṇa nibandhanāt paroktalakṣaṇopetaṃ nādṛṣṭamupapadyate | Because the mind, [its] conjunction, and the soul have been extensively refuted before, the adṛṣṭa [force] characterized as stated by the opponent cannot be established. |
kartṛphaladāyyātmaguṇa ātmamanaḥsaṃyogajaḥ svakāryavirodhyadṛṣṭam | The adṛṣṭa [force], which gives fruits to the agent, [is] a quality of the soul, [is] produced from the conjunction of soul and mind, [and is] destroyed by its own effect. |
tac ca dvividha dharmādharmabhedāt | And that [force] is of two types due to the distinction between merit and demerit. |
tatra dharmaḥ kartuḥ priyahitamokṣahetuḥ | Of these, merit is the cause of [the] agent's pleasure, well-being, and liberation. |
adharmastvapriyāhitapratyavāyahetur iti paroktādṛṣṭalakṣaṇam | And demerit is the cause of [the agent's] displeasure, harm, and transgression—such is the opponent's definition of the adṛṣṭa [force]. |
tadetad ātmano manasas tadyogasya ca tat kāraṇatvenābhimatasya pūrvaṃ niṣiddhatvāt kāraṇābhāvād evāsaditi siddham / | Since the Soul, the Mind, and their contact—which were considered to be the cause of that [Force]—have been rejected earlier, there can be no cause [for that Force], and hence it is established that it cannot exist. |
śabdastvākāśaguṇatayābhīṣṭaḥ sa prāgeva nirasto 'kramādyāpatita ityādineti na punar asya dūṣaṇam ucyate // iti guṇapadārthaparīkṣā // | As for Sound, which was accepted as a quality of Ākāśa, it has already been rejected above when it came up [for discussion] out of sequence; therefore its refutation is not repeated here. [Thus ends] the examination of the category of Quality. |
kṣaṇakṣayiṣu bhāveṣu karmotkṣepādyasambhavi / | In entities that perish in [each] moment, action such as upward throwing is impossible; |
jātadeśe cyutereva tadanyaprāptyasambhavāt // | because [such an entity] ceases [to exist] in the very place where it originates, making it impossible to reach any other place. |
utkṣepaṇamapakṣepaṇamākuñcanaṃ prasāraṇaṃ gamanam iti karmāṇīti sūtram / | The sūtra states: "Throwing upward, throwing downward, contraction, expansion, and movement are the [types of] actions." |
tatrotkṣepaṇamūrdbhādhaḥpradeśābhyāṃ saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ yat karmotpadyate / | Among these, upward throwing is that action which arises as the cause of conjunction and disjunction with the upper and lower regions. |
yathā śarīrāvayave tat sambaddhe vā mūrtimati dravye loṣṭādāvūrdhvadigbhāgopādhibhir ākāśapradeśādyaiḥ saṃyogakāraṇamadhodigbhāgāvacchinnaiś ca vibhāgakāraṇaṃ prayatnādivaśād yatkarmopajāyate tadutkṣepaṇamucyate / | For instance, when an action arises due to effort in a bodily part or in a connected corporeal substance like a clod, causing conjunction with spatial points in the upper region and disjunction from those in the lower region—that is called upward throwing. |
etad viparītaṃ saṃyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ karmāvakṣepaṇaṃ / | Downward throwing is the opposite of this [as] a cause of conjunction and disjunction. |
ṛjudravyasya kuṭilatvaheturākuñcanam, yathoktam ṛjuno bāhvādidravyasya ye 'grāvayavā aṅgulyādayas teṣāṃ svasaṃyogibhir ākāśādair vibhāge sati mūlapradeśaiścāṃśādibhiḥ saṃyoge sati yena karmaṇāvayavī bāhvādilakṣaṇaḥ kuṭilaḥ samutpadyate tadākuñcanam iti / | Contraction is the cause of curvature in a straight object, as has been described thus: When the front parts like fingers of a straight object like an arm become disjoined from their associated spaces while remaining in conjunction with their base parts, that action by which the whole object characterized as the arm becomes curved is called contraction. |
etad viparyayeṇa tu saṃyogavibhāgotpattau yena karmaṇāvayavī ṛjuḥ sampadyate tat prasāraṇam / | When conjunctions and disjunctions arise in the opposite manner [to contraction], that action by which the whole [object] becomes straight is [called] expansion. |
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