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kāryamasyāstīti kāryī kāraṇam ity arthaḥ / | That which has an effect is kāryī, meaning [it is] a cause. |
kāryakāryiṇorbhāvaḥ kāryakāryitā / kāryakāraṇabhāva ity arthaḥ / | The relationship between effect and that which has an effect is kāryakāryitā, meaning the relationship between cause and effect. |
na hi kaścit paramārthataḥ smārta 'nubhāvitā vāsti / | Indeed, in ultimate reality there exists no rememberer or experiencer. |
tato yenaivanubhūtaṃ sa eva smaratīti syāt / | Therefore, it cannot be that the same [entity] who experienced [something] is the one who remembers it. |
kiṃ tarhiyatra santāne paṭīyasānubhavenottarottaraviśiṣṭataratamakṣaṇotpādāt smṛtyādibījamāhitaṃ tatraiva smaraṇādayaḥ samutpadyante, nānyatra pratiniyatatvāt kāryakāraṇabhāvasyeti samāsārthaḥ / | Rather, remembrance and similar [functions] arise only in that continuum where their seed has been planted through the production of increasingly more specialized moments by particularly intense experience, [and] not elsewhere, because the relation of cause and effect is restricted [to that continuum]. |
yathoktam | As has been stated. |
anyasmaraṇabhogādiprasaṅgaś ca na bādhakaḥ | The possibility of [others having] remembrance, experience and so forth is not an invalidating factor. |
asmṛteḥ kasyacittena hyanubhūte smṛtodbhava | For no one's remembrance can arise from what has been experienced by another. |
smaraṇādipūrvakāś ca pratyabhijñānādayaḥ prasūyanta ityaviruddham | Recognition and similar [cognitions] are produced from prior remembrance and thus there is no contradiction. |
na cāpi kvacid ekajñātṛnibandhanāḥ pratyabhijñānādayaḥ siddhāḥ, yenocyate dvibhede tvanibandhanam iti, kāryakāraṇabhāvamātratayā sarvatraiva bhedābhyupagamāt | Nor has it been established anywhere that recognition and similar [cognitions] are based on a single cognizer – by which one could say "if there were difference between the two, [recognition] would be baseless" – since difference must be accepted everywhere simply due to the relationship of cause and effect. |
kāryakāraṇabhūtāś ca tatrāvidyādayo matāḥ / bandhas tadvigamādiṣṭo muktir nirmalatā dhiyaḥ | Therein, avidyā and other [factors] existing as cause and effect are considered bondage, while liberation is held to be the purity of mind [resulting from] their removal. |
nahi kvacid asmākamekapuruṣādhikaraṇau bandhamokṣau prasiddhau, kasyacidbadhamānasya mucyamānasya cāsiddheḥ | For us, bondage and liberation are never established as inhering in a single person, since no one is established as either being bound or being liberated. |
kevalamavidyādayaḥ saṃskārā jarāmaraṇaparyantā duḥkhotpādahetutayā bandhaiti vyavahriyante | The impressions beginning with avidyā and ending with aging-and-death are simply called "bondage" because they are causes producing suffering. |
tathācoktam "evam asya kevalasya hetor duḥkhaskandhasya samudāyo bhavatīti" | Thus it has been said: "In this way, there is an accumulation of this mere mass of suffering [which acts as] a cause." |
teṣāṃ cāvidyādīnāṃ tattvajñānādvigatau satyāṃ yā nirmalatā dhiyaḥ sānirmuktir ity ucyate | When those [factors] beginning with avidyā cease due to knowledge of reality, that purity of mind which [results] is called liberation. |
yathoktam "cittam eva hi saṃsāro rāgādikleśavāsitam / tadeva tair vinirmuktaṃ bhavānta iti kathyate" | As it has been said: "The mind itself, when pervaded by afflictions beginning with attachment, is saṃsāra; that very [mind] when freed from them is called the end of becoming." |
yaccoktam ekādhikaraṇāvityādi, tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti darśayann āha ekādhikaraṇau siddhāv ityādi / | [Regarding] what has been stated about [bondage and liberation having] "one substratum" and so forth, [the author] shows that even there the example is devoid of the probandum by stating "when [both are] established [as having] one substratum" and so forth. |
ekādhikaraṇau siddhau naivaitau laukikāvapi / bandhamokṣau prasiddhaṃ hi kṣaṇikaṃ sarvam eva tat // | When it has been established that everything is momentary, these two—bondage and liberation—cannot be [proven to have] one substratum, even in worldly [experience]. |
sarvam eva hi vastūdayānantarāpavagīti prasādhitaṃ yadā tadā na kvacid ekādhikaraṇatvaṃ bandhamokṣayoḥ prasiddhamastītyaprasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ // | For when it has been proven that every entity perishes immediately after arising, then nowhere is there an established [case of] bondage and liberation having one substratum—thus the example is unestablished. |
tadevaṃ svapakṣaṃ vyavasthāpya sarvathetyādinā parapakṣaṃ pratiṣedhayati | Having thus established his own position, [the author] refutes the opponent's position beginning with "in every way." |
sarvathātiśayāsattvād vyāhatā svātmanīdṛśī / kartṛbhoktṛtvabandhādivyavasthānityatānyathā // | Due to the complete impossibility of [any] distinction [arising], such an arrangement of agency, experiencership, bondage and so forth in regard to the Self is contradicted—or else [there would be] non-permanence. |
yadi hi rāgādibhiḥ kleśair bandho bhāvanādibhiścātiśayaḥ kaścid ātmanaḥ kriyeta tadā tasya bandhamokṣādivyavasthā bhavet / | If indeed bondage were produced in the Self by afflictions such as attachment, and if some distinction [were produced] by contemplation and so forth, then there could be an arrangement of bondage, liberation and so forth for it. |
yāvatā nityatayā na tasyātiśayādhānamastīti neyam īdṛśī niyatakāryakāraṇamaryādālakṣaṇā bandhamokṣādivyavasthā ghaṭate, yathākāśasyeti bhāvaḥ / | However, since due to [its] permanence there can be no production of distinction in it, therefore such an arrangement of bondage, liberation and so forth—which is characterized by the limitation of fixed cause and effect—is not possible, just as in the case of space. |
anyatheti / yadyatiśayotpādo bhavedātmanas tadātiśayasyātmabhūtatvād ātmano 'pi tadavyatirekeṇātiśayavadanityatā syāt / parabhūtastvatiśayo na yuktaḥ sambandhāsiddher iti śatadhā carcitam etat // | "Or else" means: if there were production of distinction in the Self, then because the distinction would be of the nature of the Self, the Self too, being non-different from it, would be impermanent like the distinction. But if the distinction were something separate [from the Self], it would not be logical due to the impossibility of connection—this has been discussed hundreds of times. |
iti karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā // | Thus [ends] the examination of the connection between action and [its] fruit. |
idānīṃ guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ / śūnyam ityetat samarthanārthaṃ ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣopakṣepaṃ kuvarnn āha jātyāder ityādi | Now, making an introduction to the examination of the six categories in order to establish that [reality] is empty of qualifying conditions such as quality, substance, action, universal, inherence and so forth, [the author] states "[regarding] universal and so forth." |
jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktaṃ prākprakāśitam | [It has been claimed that] the formlessness of universals and other [categories] that was previously explained is incorrect. |
dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍarthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ | The six categories beginning with substance exist as ultimately real. |
ityākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ | Thus declare the followers of Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda, [who rely] solely on scriptural authority. |
dravyādipratiṣedho 'yaṃ saṅkṣepeṇa taducyate | This refutation of substance and other [categories] is stated here briefly. |
prāk sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvānnaiveṣṭā kṣaṇabhaṅgitetyanena | Previously in the examination of permanent entities, it was stated thus: "Because universals and other [categories] are formless, momentariness is not attributed to them." |
yato dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyākhyāḥ ṣaṭ padārthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ santītyāhur ākṣapādādayaḥ | The followers of Akṣapāda and others declare that the six categories named substance, quality, action, universal, particularity and inherence truly exist. |
akṣapādaśiṣyatvād ākṣapādā naiyāyikāḥ | The Naiyāyikas are called Ākṣapādas because they are disciples of Akṣapāda. |
kaṇādaśiṣyās tu vaiśeṣikāḥ kāṇādā ucyante | And the Vaiśeṣikas, [who are] disciples of Kaṇāda, are called Kāṇādas. |
āgamamātramapetayuktikameṣām astītyāgamamātrakāḥ | They are [called] āgamamātrakāḥ because they have only scriptural authority, devoid of reasoning. |
kṣityādibhedato bhinnaṃ navadhā dravyam iṣyate | Substance is accepted as being of nine kinds, differentiated according to [categories] beginning with earth. |
catuḥsaṅkhyaṃ pṛthivyādi nityānityatayā dvidhā | The four [elements] beginning with earth are of two kinds: eternal and non-eternal. |
vibhaktasya hi bhedena sukhaṃ dūṣaṇasya vaktuṃ śakyatvāditi bhāvaḥ / | When [something] has been divided into its parts, it becomes easier to point out its faults; this is the underlying idea. |
navadheti / pṛthivyāpastejovāyurākāśaṃ kālo digātmā mana iti sūtrāt / | "Nine kinds," [as stated] from the sūtra [which reads]: "Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ākāśa, Time, Space, Soul, [and] Mind." |
tatra pṛthivyāpastejovāyurityetaccatuḥsaṅkhyaṃ dravyaṃ nityānityabhedena dviprakāram // | Among these, the four substances—Earth, Water, Fire [and] Air—are of two kinds, divided into eternal and non-eternal. |
tadeva dvaividhyamasya draśayann āha pṛthivyādyātmakās tāvadityādi / | Showing these very two types, he states [the verse beginning with] "those having the nature of earth, etc." |
pṛthivyādyātmakās tāvadya iṣṭāḥ paramāṇavaḥ / | The atoms which are accepted as having the nature of earth and the other [elements] are eternal. |
paramāṇavātmakā hi pṛthivyādayo nityāḥ paramāṇūnāṃ nityatvāt / | Indeed, earth and the other [elements] in their atomic form are eternal, because atoms are eternal. |
tadādyaistu prārabdhā anityāḥ hetumanityam iti nyāyāt / | But [those things] composed of atoms and other [particles] are non-eternal, according to the principle that "what has a cause is non-eternal." |
tadādyair iti / te paramāṇava ādyā yeṣāṃ te tadādyāḥ / | "[Composed] of atoms and other [particles]" means those of which atoms are the primary [constituents]. |
ākāśādayastu nityā eveti bhāvaḥ // | But Ākāśa and the other [substances] are indeed eternal—this is the meaning. |
tatraitaccatuḥsaṅkhyaṃ tāvad dravyaṃ niṣeddhum āha tatretyādi / | He proceeds to refute these four substances [mentioned] above, [saying] "among these" etc. |
tatra nityāṇurūpāṇām asattvamupapāditam / niḥśeṣavastuviṣayakṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt // | Among these, the non-existence of [substances] in the form of eternal atoms has [already] been established, through the proof that all things are subject to momentary destruction. |
tatra ya ete nityāṇurūpāḥ pṛthivyādayo varṇitās teṣām aśeṣavastuvyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanān nityatvarūpeṇāsattvaṃ prasādhitam eva / | Among these [properties discussed], what has been described as earth and other [elements] in the form of permanent atoms - their non-existence in the form of permanence has been proven through establishing the 'momentary destruction' which pervades all things. |
yat sattāt sarvaṃ kṣaṇikamakṣaṇikasya yaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ hīyata iti vyāpteḥ prasādhitatvāt // | Because the pervasion has been established that "whatever exists must be momentary, because what is non-momentary cannot have any purposeful action either successively or simultaneously, and hence what is characterized by [such] existence must be abandoned." |
atrāpi bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha nityatva ityādi / | Here also [the text] states the contradictory proof beginning with "permanence." |
nityatve sakalāḥ sthūlāḥ jāyeran sakṛdeva hi / | If [there were] permanence, all gross [things] would indeed be produced simultaneously. |
saṃyogādi na cāpekṣyaṃ teṣām astyaviśeṣataḥ // | And [there would be] no dependence on conjunction etc. for them, due to [their] lack of distinction. |
yadi parvatādīnāṃ sthūlāṃ kāraṇabhūtāḥ paramāṇavo nityāḥ santītyabhyupagamyate tadā tat kāryāṇāṃ sthūlānām avikalakaraṇatvāt sakṛdevotpattiprasaṅgaḥ / | If it is accepted that atoms, which are the causes of gross things like mountains etc., are permanent, then their effects in the form of gross things would necessarily arise simultaneously, because [their] causes would be complete. |
prayogaḥ ye samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇās te sakṛdeva bhavanti / yathā bahavo 'ṅkurās tulyotpādāḥ samagrāpratibaddhakāraṇāś ca / | The application [is]: Those [things] whose causes are complete and unobstructed arise simultaneously - just as many sprouts [arise simultaneously] when [their] causes are complete, unobstructed, and equal in [their power of] production. |
nityāṇukāryatvenābhimatāḥ sthūlā bhāvā iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | [All] gross entities are accepted as effects of permanent atoms - this is the natural reason. |
samagrakāraṇasyāpyanutpāde sarvadaivanutpādaprasaṅgo viśeṣābhāvād iti bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | If [something] were not produced even when [its] complete cause is present, then it would necessarily never be produced at all, since there would be no distinguishing factor - this is the contradictory proof. |
syādetat trividhaṃ kāraṇam iṣṭaṃ samavāyikāraṇam asamavāyikāraṇaṃ nimittakāraṇaṃ ca / | This might be [objected]: The cause is accepted as threefold - the inherent cause, the non-inherent cause, and the instrumental cause. |
tatra hi yat samavaiti kāryaṃ tat tasya samavāyikāraṇaṃ / | When [one] thing inheres in another, that [first thing] is its Inherent Cause. |
asamavetaṃ tu yadyasya kāraṇabhāvaṃ pratipadyate tadasamavāyikāraṇaṃ yathāvayavidravyārambhe 'vayavasaṃyogaḥ / | That which assumes the state of being a cause without inhering [in the effect] is [called] its Non-inherent Cause, as [for example] the conjunction of parts at the beginning of a composite substance. |
pariśeṣaṃ tu kāraṇaṃ nimittakāraṇaṃ tadyathā dharmādaya ityayameṣāṃ vibhāgaḥ / | The remaining [type of] cause is [called] the Efficient Cause, such as merit and so forth - this is their classification. |
tatrāpekṣaṇīyasya saṃyogāder asannihitatvāt samagrakāraṇatvamasiddham ato 'siddho hetur ityāśaṅkyāha saṃyogād iti / | Here, due to the non-presence of the required conjunction and other [factors], the completeness of causes is not established; therefore the cause is unestablished - [anticipating] this objection, he speaks [the words] beginning with "from conjunction." |
yadi hi saṃyogādinā kaścid viśeṣo 'ṇūnāmādhīyeta tadā te tamapekṣeran / | If indeed some particular quality were produced in the atoms by conjunction and other [factors], then they [the atoms] would depend upon that [quality]. |
yāvatā parair anādheyaviśeṣā evāṇavo nityatvāt / | However, the atoms, being eternal, cannot have any particular qualities produced in them by other [things]. |
tat kathaṃ saṃyogādi teṣām apekṣyaṃ syāt / | Therefore, how could conjunction and other [factors] be requirements for them? |
na ca sakṛd eva sthūlānāṃ tanubhavanādīnām udayo 'sti krameṇa tanvādīnām utpattidarśanāt / | And there is no simultaneous arising of gross [things] such as bodies and houses, since [we] observe the sequential production of bodies and other [things]. |
tasmād viparyayaḥ / | Therefore [the conclusion must be] the opposite. |
prayogaḥ ye kramavat kāryahetavas te nityā yathā kramavadaṅkurādikāryanirvartakā bījādayas tathā ca paramāṇava iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The formulation [is this]: Those causes which produce effects in sequence are non-eternal, just as seeds and other [things] which produce sprouts and other effects in sequence; and so [it is] with atoms - this is a natural reason. |
aviddhakarṇastvaṇūnāṃ nityatvaprasādhanāya pramāṇam āha paramāṇūnām utpādakābhimataṃ saddharmopagataṃ na bhavati / | Aviddhakarṇa puts forward the following proof for the permanence of atoms: "What is assumed to be the producer of atoms cannot be endowed with the property of existence [saddharma]..." |
sattvapratipādakapramāṇāviṣayatvāt kharaviṣāṇavad iti / | "...because it is not the object of any means of valid cognition that establishes existence, like a hare's horn." |
sato vidyamānasya dharmaḥ saddharmo 'stitvaṃ tenopagataṃ prāptam astītyarthaḥ / | The 'property of existence' [saddharma] means the property that belongs to an existing thing, [i.e.] that which has obtained [the property of] existence. |
tasya pratiṣedho 'yam / | This is a denial of that [property of existence]. |
aṇūtpādakaṃ kāraṇaṃ nāstītyarthaḥ / | The meaning is that "there is no cause that produces atoms." |
tadetat pramāṇamaśaṅkāpūrvamupadarśayann āha saddharmopagatam ityādi / | He states this proof by first anticipating [objections], beginning with "endowed with the property of existence." |
vidyamānopalambhārthapramāṇāviṣayatvataḥ // aṇūtpādakaṃ saddharmopagataṃ nocediṣyata iti sambandhaḥ / vidyamānasyopalambho 'dhigamaḥ so 'rthaḥ prayojanaṃ yasya pramāṇasya tat tathoktaṃ / | The construction is: "Because it is not the object of a means of valid cognition whose purpose is the apprehension of what exists, the producer of atoms is not accepted as being endowed with the property of existence." Here, 'apprehension' means cognition, which is the purpose of that means of valid cognition. |
etenāṇūnām anityatvapratijñāyā anumānabādhitatvamudbhāvitam, sadakāraṇavannityam iti vacanāt / akāraṇavattvenāṇūnāṃ nityatvasya siddhatvāt // | By this, it is shown that the claim of atoms' impermanence is contradicted by inference, because of the statement that "what exists without a cause is permanent," since the permanence of atoms is established by their being without a cause. |
nāsiddher ityādinā hetor asiddhatām āha | He states the inadmissibility of the reason by saying "not because of non-establishment," etc. |
nāsiddher dṛśyate yena kuvindādyaṇukāraṇam / | [This is] because the cause of atoms is actually perceived in [the form of] weavers and such. |
paramāṇvātmakā eva yena sarve paṭādayaḥ // | [It is accepted] inasmuch as all cloth and other [products] are constituted of atoms. |
nanu kuvindādayaḥ paṭādīnām eva kāraṇatvena siddhā nāṇūnāṃ tat katham aṇukāraṇaṃ kuvindādi dṛśyata ity āha paramāṇvātmakā ityādi / | [When it is asked] "The weaver and others are established as being the cause of cloth and similar [products], not atoms, so how can the weaver and others be seen as the cause of atoms?" - the answer given is 'they are constituted of atoms.' |
etac ca paścāt pratipādayiṣyāma iti bhāvaḥ // | The meaning is that this will be demonstrated later. |
api ca deśakālasvabhāvaiprakṛṣṭānām arthānām upalambhakapraṃānanivṛttāv api sadbhāvā virodhāt tato 'naikāntikatā ca hetor iti darśayati sadgrāhaketyādi / | Moreover, in the case of things far removed in space, time and nature, even when there is absence of any means of cognition [to perceive them], their existence is not contradicted; therefore the reason [given] is inconclusive - this is shown by [the words] beginning with "sadgrāhaka." |
sadgrāhakapramābhāvān na vā sattā prasidhyati / pramāṇavinivṛttau hi nārthābhāve 'sti niścayaḥ // | Though existence cannot be established in the absence of a valid means of cognizing [something as] existent, when there is absence of a means of valid cognition, there can be no certainty about the non-existence of an object. |
piśācādivad iti bhāvaḥ // | The meaning is that [there can be no certainty about non-existence] just as in the case of ghosts and similar [beings]. |
tadārabdhastvavayavī guṇāvayavabhedavān / naivopalabhyate tena na sidhyatyapramāṇakaḥ // | The composite substance made up of those [atoms], which is distinct from qualities and components, is never apprehended; therefore, being without valid proof, it cannot be established. |
guṇā rūpadayaḥ avayavās tantvādayaḥ teṣāṃ bhedo vyatirekaḥ so 'syāstīti tathoktaḥ / | 'Qualities' means color and other [qualities]; 'components' means threads and other [parts]; 'distinct from these' means [something that] has a separate existence from these - thus it is explained. |
sa tathābhūto guṇāvayavavytirikto 'vayavī nopalabhyate / | Such a composite that is distinct from qualities and components is never apprehended. |
nahi paṭādilakṣaṇamavayavi dravyam avikalaṃ śuklādiguṇebhyo 'vayavebhyaś ca tantvādibhyo 'rthāntarabhūtaṃ kvacic cakṣurādijñāne ca bhāsate / | No composite substance characterized as "cloth" etc., [though supposedly] complete in itself and distinct from qualities like whiteness and from components like threads, ever appears in any visual or other cognition. |
tadatra guṇebhyo 'rthāntarabhūtadravyānupalambhena guṇaguṇivādo nirastaḥ / | Due to this non-perception of substance as distinct from qualities, the theory of quality-possessor [and quality] is refuted. |
avayavavyatiriktāvayavavyanupalambhena tvavayavāvayavivādaḥ / | And due to the non-perception of [any] composite distinct from [its] components, the theory of component and composite is [also refuted]. |
prayogaḥ yadupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sadyatra nopalabhyate tat tatra nāsti, yathā kvacit pradeśaviśeṣe ghaṭādiranupalabhyamānaḥ, nopalabhyate ca guṇāvayavebhyo 'rthāntarabhūtas tatraiva deśe guṇī dṛśyatvenāmimato 'vayavī ceti svabhāvānupalabdheḥ / | The syllogism is: Whatever, while being perceptible, is not perceived somewhere, does not exist there - just as an unperceived jar etc. in some particular place. And neither a quality-possessor distinct from qualities and components, though held to be visible, nor a composite [distinct from its components] is perceived in that same place - [this constitutes] a natural non-perception. |
na cāsiddho hetuḥ, mahatyanekadravyavattvād rūpāccopalabdhir iti vacanāt tayor dṛśyatvenābhimatatvāt / | And the reason is not unestablished, because from the statement "perception [arises] from [its] containing many substances and from [its] color" both [quality-possessor and composite] are accepted as being visible. |
nanūpadhānasamparke dṛśyate sphaṭikopalaḥ / tadrūpāgrahaṇepyevaṃ balākādiś ca dṛśyate // | "But surely the crystal is perceived when in contact with [its] substrate, even without grasping its color; similarly, cranes etc. are also perceived [thus]. |
kañcukāntarite puṃsi tadrūpādyagatāv api / puruṣapratyayo dṛṣṭo rakte vāsasi vastradhīḥ // | When a man is covered by a cloak, even without apprehending his complexion etc., the cognition of [him as] a man is seen; [and] with a red cloth, [there is] the cognition of [it as] cloth." |
ta evam āhur guṇavyatirikto guṇī samupalabhyata eva / | They speak thus: "The quality-possessor distinct from qualities is indeed apprehended. |
tadrūpādiguṇāgrahaṇe 'pi tasya grahaṇāt / | Because it is grasped even without grasping its color and other qualities. |
tathā hi sphaṭikopalaḥ sannihitopadhānāvasthāyāṃ svagataśuklaguṇānupalambhe 'pi dṛśyata eva / balākādiś ca rātrau mandamandaprakāśāyāṃ tadgatasitādirūpādarśane 'pi gṛhyata eva / tathāprapadīnakañcukāvacchannaśarīre puṃsi tadā śyāmādirūpādyagrahaṇe 'pi pumān pumāniti pratyayaḥ prasūyata eva / | For instance: The crystal, when in proximity to [its] substrate, is indeed seen even without perceiving its inherent white quality. And cranes etc. in the night's dim light are indeed grasped even without seeing their inherent white color etc. Similarly, when a man's body is covered by a foot-length cloak, even without grasping his dark complexion etc., the cognition that '[it is] a man, a man' indeed arises. |
kaṣāyakuṅkumādirakte vāsasi tadrūpasya saṃsarpirūpeṇābhibhūtasyānupalambhe 'pi vastradhīr bhavatyeva // | In the case of a cloth dyed with saffron and similar [substances], even though its original color is not perceived [as it is] overwhelmed by the superimposed color, the cognition of [it being] "cloth" still exists. |
tadevaṃ tāvat pratyakṣata eva guṇaguṇinor bhedaḥ siddha iti pratipāditam / | Thus it has been established that the difference between quality and quality-possessor is proven through direct perception itself. |
idānīm anumānato 'pi siddha iti pratipādayann āha rūpādītyādi / | Now [the author] states "rūpādi" etc., explaining that [this difference] is also established through inference. |
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