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udyotakarastvāha vipratipannā ayu{ga}patkālāḥ pratyayā ekaviṣayāḥ avyutthāyitat pratyayasāmānādhikaraṇye sati samānaśabdavācyatvāt, vartamānalakṣaṇānekapuruṣapratyayavat / | Uddyotakara says: "The disputed cognitions occurring at different times must have one [and the same] object because, while having an unannulled co-extensiveness with the cognition [of that object], they are expressible by the same words, like the cognitions of multiple persons [occurring] at the present moment." |
tatra vyutthātum anyathābhavituṃ bādhakapramāṇavaśāt śīlamasyeti vyutthāyi na vyutthāyi, avyutthāyi teṣāṃ ghaṭādipratyayānāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ, tat pratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyam avyutthāyi ca tat tat pratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ceti tathoktam / | Here "vyutthāyi" means [that which has] the nature to be otherwise due to contradictory evidence; "avyutthāyi" [means] not "vyutthāyi"; [thus] the co-extensiveness of these cognitions of pot etc. is unannulled - this co-extensiveness of cognitions is unannulled and [refers to] that co-extensiveness of those cognitions - thus it is stated. |
abādhitasāmānādhikaraṇye satītyarthaḥ / | The meaning is: "when there exists an uncontradicted co-extensiveness." |
idaṃ ca viśeṣaṇaṃ pradīpādipratyayair vyabhicāraparihārārtham / | And this qualification is for the purpose of avoiding the deviation [that might arise] through [the example of] cognitions of lamp etc. |
samānaśabdavācyatvaṃ caitrajñānaṃ caitrajñānam ityādi / | "Being expressible by the same words" [means] "[it is] Caitra's cognition, [it is] Caitra's cognition" and so forth. |
tadetad darśayati vivādaviṣayā ityādi / | This is what he shows [by saying] "vivādaviṣayā" etc. |
avaghoṣaṇeti / pratijñā / | [The word] "avaghoṣaṇa" [means] the thesis. |
ekāśrayatvam sāmānādhikaraṇyam abādham avidyamānabādhaṃ ca tadekāśrayatvaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ // | Co-extensiveness [means] the state of having one substrate; [it is] unannulled means having no existing contradiction, and [refers to] that state of having one substrate - this is the analysis [of the compound]. |
atra pratividhatte sādhyenetyādi / | [The opponent] here responds [to the above] with "sādhyena" etc. |
sādhyena vikalaṃ tāvad ādye hetau nidarśanam / hetutvād viṣayaḥ sarvo na hi svajñānakālikaḥ // | In the first reasoning, the corroborative instance is devoid of the sādhya, since [it is] subsumed under the hetu; and no object [of cognition] is simultaneous with its own cognition. |
ādye hetāv iti / tajjñānatvābhidhānata ityatra / | [This refers to] 'in the first reasoning,' where [the hetu] is stated as 'because it is spoken of as the cognition of that.' |
prathamam api hi candrādijñānaṃ satkā{svakā}lāvacchinnacandrādiviṣayaṃ nabhavati / | Indeed, even the first cognition of the moon etc. does not have as its object the moon etc. as limited to the time of [that cognition] itself. |
hetubhūtasyaiva viṣayatvāt / | Because what serves as the object [of cognition] is precisely what is subsumed under the hetu. |
samānakālaṃ ca kāryakāraṇabhāvānupapatteḥ / | And because a cause-effect relationship between simultaneous [things] is impossible. |
yathoktam ---"asataḥ prāgasāmarthyāt paścād anupayogataḥ / prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnāṃ nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saheti // | As has been stated: "Due to the non-existence [of an effect], there can be no prior capacity [in the cause], and afterward there would be no use [for the cause]; all causes must pre-exist [their effects], therefore an object cannot exist simultaneously with its own cognition." |
yadetyādinā pṛthivīsambandhitvenānupalabhyamānatve satīti saviśeṣaṇe 'pi hetāvanaikāntikateti darśayati / | With [the verse beginning with] "yad," [the author] shows that the hetu is inconclusive even with the qualification "while not being apprehended as connected with the earth." |
yadā sūryādiśabdāś ca vivakṣāmātrabhāvinaḥ / dīpādau viniveśyante tajjñānair vyabhicāritā // | When words like "sūrya" etc., whose existence depends merely on [the speaker's] intention to express, are applied to a lamp etc., [then the reason is] contradicted by the cognitions of those [things]. |
dvitīye 'pi hetukadambake jātyāder dharmiṇoḥ sattvād eva kṣaṇabhaṅgitvasyāniṣṭatvāt tatra tadabhāvasādhane siddhasādhyateti darśayati jātyāder ityādi / | In the second set of arguments also [the ones set forth in the Introduction to Texts 464-465], since [the opponent accepts] the existence of the substrates like 'universal' etc., and since momentariness is not accepted [for them], proving their non-momentariness would amount to proving what is [already] established. |
jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvān naiveṣṭā kṣaṇabhaṅgitā / | Due to [their] lack of intrinsic nature, momentariness is certainly not accepted for universals and other [such things]. |
tadabhāvaprasiddhyarthaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ sādhanaṃ vṛthā // | Therefore, the proof given to establish the absence of that [momentariness] is futile. |
ādiśabdena tadāśrayāṇāṃ rūpaghaṭādīnāṃ tadviṣayāṇāṃ ca pratyayānāṃ ca grahaṇam / | By the word 'ādi' [etc.], [we should understand] the substrates of those [universals] such as color, jar, etc., and the cognitions which have those [as their] objects. |
eṣām api hi yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭānām asattvam eva tasmāt teṣu tasyāḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgitāyā abhāvasiddhyarthaṃ yaduktaṃ sādhanaṃ tadvṛthā, tatra vivādābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ / | Indeed, since even these [things], as qualified by the aforementioned qualification, do not exist at all, therefore the proof that has been given to establish the absence of that momentariness in them is futile, as there is no dispute about that [point]. |
atrāpi sūkṣmekṣikā na kṛtā / | Here also, a minute examination has not been made. |
yadi sā kriyate tadā bahutaramatra doṣajālamavatarati / | If that [minute examination] is made, then a great multitude of faults appears here. |
tathā hi yadetat sadasadanyataratvaṃ sādhanamuktaṃ tat sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi cāsiddham vikalpaviṣayatvād anyataraśabdasya vikalpaścānekapadārthasambhave sati bhavati naikasmin / | For instance, this proof which has been stated as "being either existent or non-existent" is not established for the subject to be proved nor for the subject of the example, because the word 'either' refers to an alternative, and an alternative occurs only when multiple things are possible, not in [the case of] a single thing. |
na ca sādhyadharmiṇi dvayoḥ sadasattvayoḥ sambhavo 'sti / | And it is not possible for both existence and non-existence to be present in the subject to be proved. |
tasya vasturūpatvena sattvasyaiva sambhavāt / | Because, being of the nature of a real entity, only existence is possible for it. |
nāpi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi dvayasambhavaḥ / | Nor are both [existence and non-existence] possible in the corroborative instance; |
tasyāvastutvenāsattvasyaiva sambhavāt / | Because, as it [i.e. the corroborative instance] is a non-entity, only non-existence can belong to it. |
hetuś ca vyarthaviśeṣaṇaḥ / | And the reason [as stated] contains a useless qualification; |
tathā hi śabdābhidheyatvādityevam api tāvad atra prayogo na yukto 'bhidheyatvavacanād eva śabdasya siddheḥ / | For instance, the expression "because it is expressible by words" is itself improper here, since the term "expressible" already implies [the qualification] "by words". |
yatpunaḥ samānajātīyādipadair viśeṣaṇaṃ tadatipelavam eva / | Moreover, the qualification expressed by the words "homogeneous" and so forth is entirely superficial. |
evam anyadapi hetuviśeṣaṇamanarthakam eveti grahītavyam / | In the same way, the other qualifications of the reason should also be understood as meaningless. |
sarve cāmī hetavo 'naikāntikāḥ / | And all these reasons are inconclusive, |
sādhyaviparyaye 'mīṣāṃ bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt / | because no contradictory evidence has been shown against the opposite of what is to be proved. |
etac ca paścād abhidhāsyata eva / | And this will indeed be explained later. |
samānaśabdavācyatvaṃ dīpādipratyayeṣvapi / | The property of "being expressed by the same word" exists also in cognitions of [things] like lamps, |
vartate vyabhicāryeṣa hetus tena bhavatyataḥ / | therefore this reason becomes fallible [and] hence inconclusive. |
dīpajñānam iti dīpādipratyayeṣu bhinnaviṣayeṣvapi samānaśabdapravṛttidarśanād atastena dīpādipratyayaviṣayeṇa śabdavācyatvenaiva samānaśabdavācyatvād iti hetur vyabhicārī / | In the case of the cognitions of a lamp, we find that the same expression "cognition of lamp" is applied to cognitions which have different things [in the form of varying flames] for their objects; hence the reason – [namely] "being expressed by the same word" which has the cognition of lamp etc. as its object – is fallible. |
atas teṣu vartamānatvād eva hetus te tava na vyabhicārī bhavati, api tu bhavatyevetyarthaḥ // | "Because [the character] subsists in those [cognitions of the lamp], therefore for you [specifically] the reason is not fallible – but [in reality] it certainly is" – this is the [ironic] meaning. |
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ cediti paramatamāśaṅkate / | [The author] anticipates an opposing view [beginning with] "if co-extensiveness..." |
sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ cedbādhitaṃ kalpyate / vivakṣite 'pi vispaṣṭā bādhaiṣā kiṃ na vīkṣyate // | "If it is claimed that the co-extensiveness is [subsequently] annulled in the case of cognitions of the lamp, then why do you not see this clear annulment in [your] intended [conclusion] as well?" |
avyutthāyitatpratyayasāmānādhikaraṇye satīti hetor viśeṣaṇaṃ dīpādipratyayair vyabhicāraparihārārtham kṛtam, eṣāṃ hi dīpādipratyayānām ekaviṣayatvasya bādhitatvāt / | The qualification "while being rightly co-extensive with the cognition of that thing" has been added to the reason for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy [that arises] from the cognitions of lamps etc., because the single-objectedness of these cognitions of lamps etc. is annulled. |
tathā hi tatkṣaṇam eva dīpo dīrghaśikho tamraśikhaś ca dīpro dīprataraścopalabhyate / | For at one moment the lamp is perceived with a tall flame, [at another] with a copper-colored flame, [at one time] bright, [at another] brighter. |
tat kuto vyabhicāritā hetor iti parasya bhāvaḥ / | "Therefore, how can the reason be fallible?" – this is the opponent's thought. |
tadetadviśeṣaṇamapyasiddham iti darśayannāha vivakṣite 'pītyādi / | Showing that this qualification too is unestablished, [the author] says "even in [your] intended [conclusion]" etc. |
vivakṣitasādhyadharme tatrāpi bādhā kiṃ na vīkṣyate / | Why is the annulment not seen even there, in [your] intended probandum? |
tathā hi caitrādāvapi bālakumārataruṇādibhedena vyāvartamānākāra eva pratyayo jāyate parvatādau śītoṣṇādibhedena tataḥ spaṣṭataramevānyathātvam eṣāṃ pradīpādivat prasiddham / | For even in [the case of] Caitra etc., the cognition arises with changing forms distinguished as infant, youth, young man etc.; [and] in [the case of] mountains etc., [the cognitions vary] with distinctions of cold, hot etc. Therefore, just as with lamps etc., the difference of these [cognitions] is even more clearly established. |
anyathā hi ya eva śītasambaddhaḥ sa eva yadi paścād uṣṇasambaddhaḥ syāt tadāvasthādvaye 'pi śītoṣṇayor upalambhaḥ syāt / | If [it were] otherwise, then if that very [mountain] which is connected with cold were to subsequently become connected with heat, then in both states there would be perception of both cold and heat; |
tat sambaddhasvabhāvasya bhāve tayor api bhāvasya prasaṅgāpatteḥ / | Because when that [thing's] nature is connected [with qualities], the presence of both of those [qualities] would necessarily follow; |
nigaḍabaddhapuruṣākarṣaṇe nigaḍākarṣaṇavad ityuktaprāyam etat / | [It is] just like when a person bound by chains is pulled, the chains are also pulled – this has been mostly explained [before]; |
ataḥ saviśeṣaṇo 'pi hetur asiddhaḥ // | Therefore, even with [this] qualification, the reason is unproven; |
anumānabādhāmapyāha vivādapadam ityādi / | [He] next states the refutation by inference [beginning with] "vivādapadam" etc.; |
vivādapadamārūḍhā naikārthaviṣayā dhiyaḥ / krameṇotpadyamānatvād vidyuddīpādibuddhivat // | The cognitions that have become objects of dispute cannot pertain to one and the same thing, because they arise in succession, like cognitions of lightning, lamp and such things; |
kramabhāvavirodho hi jñāneṣvekārthabhāviṣu / | For there is a contradiction in [having] succession among cognitions that pertain to one and the same thing; |
anyair akāryabhedasya tadapekṣāvirodhataḥ // | And when there is no difference in effect, dependence on other [factors] would be contradictory; |
prayogaḥ yat kramabhāvi tat sadā sannihitāvikalakāraṇaṃ na bhavati yathā vidyuddīpādibuddhayaḥ kramabhāvinyaś ca vivādāspadībhūtā buddhaya iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The formulation [is]: Whatever occurs in succession cannot have its complete cause always present nearby, as [in the case of] cognitions of lightning, lamp and such things; and the cognitions that have become objects of dispute occur in succession – thus there is perception of something contradictory to the pervader; |
nacānaikāntikatvaṃ hetoḥ, ekavastuviṣayatve satyavikalakāraṇasya kramabhāvānupapatteḥ / | Nor is the reason inconclusive, because when [cognitions] pertain to a single object, succession is impossible if the complete cause is present; |
nāpi kāraṇāntarāpekṣā nityasya tenānupakāryatvāt / | Nor [is there] dependence on other causes for what is permanent, because it cannot be assisted by them. |
nacānupakāriṇyapekṣā yuktātiprasaṅgāt / | Nor [is there] dependence on what is non-assisting, as [this would lead to] an undesirable over-extension [of the principle]. |
upakāre vā nityatvahāniprasaṅga iti śataśaścarcitam etat // | And if there were assistance, [it would] result in the loss of permanence - this has been discussed hundreds of times. |
sarveṣveva ca prayogeṣu hetūnām anaikāntikatvaṃ vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvād iti darśayati sandigdhetyādi / | [The author] shows that in all these applications the reasons are free from inconclusiveness, due to the absence of countervailing evidence in the opposing view, [by saying] "doubtful" etc. |
sandigdhavyatirekitvaṃ sarveṣveteṣu hetuṣu / | [There is] doubtful exclusion in all these reasons, |
vipakṣe vartamānānāṃ bādhakānupadarśanāt // | due to the non-demonstration of countervailing [evidence] existing in the opposing view. |
subodham // | [This is] easily understood. |
iti sthirabhāvaparīkṣā // | Thus [ends] the examination of permanent entities. |
idānīṃ karmatatphalasambandhavyavasthādisamāśrayamityetat samarthanārthaṃ codyopakramapūrvakam āha kṣaṇiketyādi / | Now [the author] states [beginning with] "momentary" etc., starting with an objection, for the purpose of establishing this [topic] which depends upon the determination of the relationship between actions and their results. |
kṣaṇikānityatālīḍhaṃ sarvaṃ cedvastu tatkatham / | If all entities are consumed by momentary impermanence, then how [can this be]? |
karmatatphalasambandhakāryakāraṇatādayaḥ // | [The author] now proceeds to examine the relation between actions and their results [as well as] causality and other [topics]. |
kṣaṇikānityatāgrahaṇaṃ kālāntarasthāyyanityatāvyavacchedārtham / | The term "momentary impermanence" is used to exclude [the notion of] impermanence [of things] that persist for some time. |
kṣaṇikānāṃ satāmanityatā kṣaṇikānityatā tayā līḍham samākrāntaṃ yadisarvam eva vastujātaṃ pratijñāyate bhavadbhis tadā ye 'mī karmaphalasambandhādayo lokaśāstrayoḥ pratītās te kathaṃ siddhyeyuḥ / | If you maintain that everything that exists is pervaded by the impermanence of momentary things, then how can the relation between actions and their results and other [phenomena] that are accepted in worldly life and scripture be established? |
ādigrahaṇāddhetuphalādhigantṛ pramāṇam anubhave pratyabhijñānam anyasminnarthe dṛṣṭe 'rthāntare 'bhilāṣaḥ, bandhamokṣau, smaraṇam saṃśayapūrvako nirṇayaḥ, svayaṃ nihitapratyanumārgaṇam dṛṣṭārthakutūhalaviramaṇamityevamprakārāḥ kumatiparikalpitāścodyārāśayo gṛhyante / | By [the word] "and other," [we refer to] the means of cognizing cause and effect, recognition following experience, desire for one thing upon seeing another, bondage and liberation, memory, determination preceded by doubt, searching for something one has put away [oneself], cessation of curiosity about things [already] seen—such are the various objections raised by those of perverted understanding. |
na hi lokaśāstrapratītārthavirodhena pratijñāyamāno 'rthaḥ siddhimāsādayatītyabhyupetapratītabādhā doṣaḥ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ / | The meaning is that a thesis which contradicts what is accepted in worldly life and scripture cannot be established, [and thus] the thesis is flawed by contradicting what is [universally] accepted. |
tathā hi yenaiva kṛtaṃ karma śubhādikaṃ tenaiva tatphalamupabhujyata iti lokepratītam / | For instance, it is well-known in the world that whoever performs good or [bad] actions experiences their results themselves. |
na hi devadattena kṛte karmaṇi śubhādike yajñadattas tatphalam iṣṭam aniṣṭaṃ copabhuṅkta iti prasiddham / | For it is not known [in the world] that when Devadatta performs good or [bad] actions, Yajñadatta experiences their pleasant or unpleasant results. |
nāpi śāstre, yathoktam ---"anenaiva kṛtaṃ karma ko 'nyaḥ pratyanubhaviṣyati"iti / | Nor [is this accepted] in scripture, as it is stated: "When an action has been done by this [person], what other [person] will experience [its results]?" |
taccaitat kṣaṇikapakṣe virudhyate / | And this contradicts the momentariness thesis. |
karmaphalaparigrāhakasyaikasya karturabhāvena kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamadoṣaprasaṅgāt // | Because due to the absence of a single agent who both performs the action and receives its result, [this view] leads to the fault of the destruction of what was done and the occurrence of what was not done. |
katham ity āha ya ityādi / | [The text] explains how [this is so] by [beginning with] "yaḥ" etc. |
yaḥ kṣaṇaḥ kuśalādīnāṃ kartṛtvenāvakalpyate / phalaprasavakāle tu naivāsāvanuvartate // | That moment which is considered to be the agent of virtuous and [other] actions does not continue to exist at the time when the result manifests. |
tena naiṣa kṛtaṃ karma tasya pūrvamasambhavāt | Therefore this [action] cannot be a performed action, because it did not exist before [the result]. |
karmatatphalayor evam ekakartraparigrahāt / kṛtanāśākṛtaprāptirāsaktātivirodhinī | Thus, since no single agent is admitted [as being responsible] for both action and result, [the consequence of] loss of [what was] done and obtaining [what was] not done is incoherent and extremely contradictory. |
naivāsāvanuvartata iti | "[The agent] does not continue to exist." |
tasyotpādānantaram eva niruddhatvāt | Because it [i.e., the agent] is destroyed immediately after its arising. |
ekakartraparigrahād iti | "Since no single agent [is admitted], etc." |
ekena kartrā tayoḥ karmaphalayor aparigṛhītatvād ity arthaḥ | That is, because both action and result are not taken up by one and the same agent. |
kartuḥ phalenānabhisambandhāt kṛtanāśaḥ akartuś ca phalena yogādakṛtābhyāgamaḥ | Due to the agent's lack of connection with the result, [there is] loss of [what was] done, and due to the non-agent's connection with the result, [there is] obtaining of [what was] not done. |
ativirodhinīti | "[It is] extremely contradictory." |
lokaśāstrayor evam adarśanād iti bhāvaḥ | The meaning is that such a thing is not seen in worldly experience or in scripture. |
nairātmyavādapakṣe tu pūrvamevāvabudhyate / madvināśātphalaṃ na syān mattonyasyāpi vā bhavet | Moreover, under the doctrine of no-self, [one] would understand beforehand [that] "due to my destruction, there would be no result [for me], or it would belong to someone other than me." |
iti naiva pravarteta prekṣāvān phalalipsayā / śubhāśubhakriyārambhe dūratas tu phalaṃ sthitam | Therefore a discerning person would not engage in the undertaking of good or bad actions out of desire for results, since the result would remain far distant. |
kṣaṇikatvābhyupagame hi sarvabhāvānāṃ nairātmyamevābhyupagataṃ syāt / hetuparatantratayā sarvasyāsvatantratvāt / | Under the doctrine of momentariness [kṣaṇikatva], it would follow that all entities are devoid of selfhood, because everything, being dependent on causes, lacks independence. |
tasmin sati prekṣāvān kriyāpravṛtteḥ pūrvamevāvabudhyate avadhārayati / | In this situation, a rational person realizes [and] determines [this] even before undertaking any action. |
kiṃ tadityāha madvināśād ityādi / mama vināśād ūrdhvaṃ phalaṃ mama na syāt, phalaprasavakāle mamābhāvāt / | What is that? He says "after my destruction" etc. [He thinks:] "After my destruction the result would not be mine, because I would not exist at the time when the result arises." |
athāpi phalaṃ bhavet, tadā matto 'nyasya kṣaṇāntarasya syād iti jñātvā pravṛttir eva prekṣāvato na sambhavati, kiṃ punaḥ pravṛttipūrvakakarmajanitaṃ phalaṃ bhaviṣyati / | Even if a result were to occur, it would belong to another moment different from me - knowing this, activity is impossible for a rational person, so how could there be any result generated by action preceded by [such] activity? |
tasya dūrata evāsambhāvhyamānatvenāvasthitatvāt // | Because that [result] stands as something impossible from far off. |
evaṃ karmaphalasambandho nopapadyata iti pratipāditam / | Thus it has been established that the relation between action and result is not possible. |
nānāgato na vātīto bhāvaḥ kāryakriyākṣamaḥ / vartamāno 'pi tāvantaṃ kālaṃ naivāvatiṣṭhate // | Neither a future nor a past entity is capable of producing an effect, and even a present [entity] does not remain [in existence] for that duration. |
tāvantam iti / | [The phrase] "for that duration" [means the following]: |
utpadya yāvatā kālena kāryaṃ nivartayati tāvantaṃ kālaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate kṣaṇikatvād iti bhāvaḥ // | [It] does not remain for the duration during which it would arise and produce the effect, because of [its] momentariness - this is the meaning. |
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