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anyaccedvikalaṃ rūpam ekatvamavahīyate // | If the incomplete form is different [from the complete form], then unity [of the thing] is lost. |
vyapekṣayāpyataścaivaṃ na kāryāṇāṃ kramodayaḥ / | Therefore, even with dependence [on auxiliaries], the successive arising of effects is not possible. |
taiḥ sahakāribhiḥ sambaddhaḥ svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | The compound analysis is: "that whose nature is connected with those auxiliaries." |
teṣām apīti / sahakāriṇām / | "Of them also" [means] "of the auxiliaries." |
nigaḍabaddhapuruṣākarṣaṇe nigaḍākarṣaṇavat teṣām apyanuvṛtteḥ / | Because they [i.e., the auxiliaries] follow along, just as when a person bound by chains is dragged, the chains are [also] dragged. |
evaṃ hi sa eva pūrvasvabhāvāparityāgenānuvṛtto bhavati / | For only thus does it continue without abandoning [its] previous nature. |
yadi hi sahakāriṇā sambaddhaṃ svabhāvaṃ na jahāti tat sambaddhasvabhāvāparityāgena sāmarthyāt sahakāriṇāmapyaparityāgaḥ / | For if it does not abandon [its] nature that is connected with the auxiliaries, then due to the non-abandonment of [its] nature connected [with them], by logical necessity there is also non-abandonment of the auxiliaries. |
pratiyogisavyapekṣatvāt sambandhitvasya / | Because relatedness [to something] necessarily depends on [its] counterpart. |
anyathā saiva tasya prakṛtir na bhavet / | Otherwise its nature would not remain identical [to what it was before]. |
yadi hi sahakārivikalaṃ rūpamasyānyaditīṣyate tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ rūpasya bhāvāvyatirekāt / | If its form without auxiliary [causes] is held to be different [from its form with them], then [its] permanence would be lost, since [its] form is not different from [its] existence. |
tasmāt sahakāriṇo 'pekṣāyām api na sthirāṇāṃ krameṇārthakriyā yuktā // | Therefore, even when depending on auxiliary [causes], permanent entities cannot reasonably perform purposive actions in succession. |
parairapi nityapadārthakāryāṇāṃ naiva yaugapadyamiṣṭam / tathā hi nityatāmetāni kāryāṇi varṇyante / | Even opponents do not accept simultaneity of the effects of permanent entities. For these effects are described [by them] as follows: |
ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhādīni nabhasaḥ śabdāḥ manasaḥ kramavartīni vijñānāni aṇūnāṃ dvyaṇukādikrameṇa sthūlāḥ kāladigīśvarādīnāṃ sarvāṇyevotpattimantīti / | [There are] pleasure, pain, etc. [as effects] of the Self; sounds [as effects] of ākāśa; successive cognitions [as effects] of the mind; gross [substances] through the sequence of dyads etc. [as effects] of atoms; and all produced things [as effects] of Time, Space, God, etc. |
eṣāṃ ca pratyakṣād eva kramodayaḥ prasiddhaḥ // | And it is well-established through direct perception that these [effects] arise in succession. |
tadevaṃ yaugapadyābhyupagame pratyakṣavirodho 'bhyupagamavirodhaścokto bhavati / | Thus, accepting simultaneity [of effects] contradicts both direct perception and [their own] accepted views. |
idānīm anumānavirodhaṃ pratipādaynn āha niḥśeṣāṇītyādi / | Now, showing that [it] contradicts inference as well, [the author] states "niḥśeṣāṇi" etc. |
niḥśeṣāṇi ca kāryāṇi sakṛtkṛtvā nivartate / sāmarthyātmā sa cedārthaḥ siddhāsya kṣaṇabhaṅgitā // | If an entity possessing causal power produces all [its] effects simultaneously and then ceases [to exist], its momentariness is thereby established. |
tathā hi yugapad aśeṣāṇi kāryāṇi kṛtvā sa kiṃ tasyārthakriyāsamarthaḥ svabhāvo nivartate āhosvid anuvartata iti pakṣadvayam / | That is to say, after having produced all effects simultaneously, does that nature [of the thing] which is capable of producing effects cease to exist or does it continue [to exist]? These are the two alternatives. |
tatra yadi nivartata iti pakṣas tadā tasya kṣaṇabhaṅgitvaṃ siddham / | If [one accepts] the position that it ceases to exist, then its momentariness is established. |
pratikṣamaparāparasvabhāvotpatteḥ pūrvapūrvasya ca svabhāvasya svarasavināśāt // | Because in each moment new natures arise one after another, while each preceding nature is destroyed by its own nature. |
tadrūpasyānuvṛttau tu kāryamutpādayet punaḥ / | But if that form [of the thing] continues, it would produce the effect again. |
akiñcitkararūpasya sāmarthyaṃ ceṣyate katham // sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvāt tārāpathasarojavat / | And how can efficacy be attributed to something that produces nothing? [Such things would be] like a sky-lotus, being devoid of all efficacy. |
asanto 'kṣaṇikāḥ sarve śaktir yadvastulakṣaṇam // | All non-momentary things are non-existent, since efficacy is what characterizes [real] things. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣa āśrīyate tadā tadrūpasya samarthāt mano 'nuvṛttau satyāṃ punaḥ kāryamutpādayet atyaktapūrvarūpatvāt prāgavasthāvat / | If the second alternative is accepted, then, when that efficacious form continues to exist, it would produce its effect again, since it has not abandoned its previous form, just like [in] its previous state. |
tataś ca sa eva kramo jāta iti yaugapadyābhyupagamo 'numānaviruddhaḥ / | And thus that very sequence would arise, [which shows that] the acceptance of simultaneity contradicts inference. |
athāpi syān mābhūt tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyā tatha 'pi sāmarthyamasyāstyevetyāha akiñcitkararūpasyetyādi /karyotpādanibandhanaṃ hi bhāvānāṃ sāmarthyaṃ vyavasthāpyate / | Even if one might say "Let it be that its causal efficacy is neither successive nor simultaneous, yet its efficacy still exists," [we] state "How could any efficiency..." etc. For the efficacy of entities is established on the basis of their producing effects. |
yaś ca na kiñcitkaroti sa kathaṃ samarthaḥ syāt / anyathā hyākāśakuśeśayāderapi sāmarthyaṃ kiṃ na vyavasthāpyeta / | And how could that which produces nothing be efficacious? Otherwise, why could efficacy not be established even for a sky-lotus and such things? |
syād etad yadi nāma sāmarthyamasya nivṛttaṃ tathāpi sattvamanivṛttam eva / | [Says the opponent:] "Even though the efficiency of this [thing] has disappeared, its existence still remains undisturbed." |
tataś ca sattvādityanaikāntika eva hetur ity āha asanta ityādi / | Thus [the argument] based on existence is inconclusive, therefore [the author] says "non-existent" etc. |
idam eva hi vastulakṣaṇaṃ yadarthakriyāsāmarthyaṃ taccennivṛttaṃ tat kathaṃ vastutvaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ teṣvavasthāṃ labhate / | For this indeed is the characteristic of a real thing: the capacity for effective action; if that has disappeared, how could existence, being its characteristic, remain in those [things]? |
tadevaṃ kramākramābhyām arthakriyāsāmarthyaśūnyatvād vandhyāputrādivad asadvyavahārayogyā akṣaṇikatvenābhimatā ākāśādaya iti siddham // | Thus it is established that ākāśa and other [things] which are considered to be non-momentary are fit to be treated as non-existent, like the son of a barren woman, because they lack the capacity for effective action [operating] either successively or simultaneously. |
atha nāṅgīkriyetedaṃ vastutvaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam / yadevam anyannirdiśyaṃ vastūnāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ paraiḥ // | If then this capacity is not accepted as the characteristic of entity-ness, then in such case let the opponents point out some other characteristic of entities. |
athāpi syād yadyarthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam eva vastulakṣaṇaṃ bhavet tadaitat sarvaṃ śobheta / yadyevaṃ kimanyad vastulakṣaṇam iti vaktavyam / | [One might say:] "If the capacity for effective action were indeed the characteristic of entities, then all this would be fine." [In that case] it should be explained what other characteristic of entities there could be. |
tathā hi śaśaviṣāṇādau yadavastutvamiṣṭaṃ tatrārthakriyāsāmarthyaviraha eva nibandhanam / | For indeed, when non-entity-ness is accepted in [cases like] the hare's horn and so forth, its basis is precisely the absence of capacity for effective action. |
vastvavastunoścānyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt / sāmarthyād avastulakṣaṇaviparītamarthakriyāsāmarthyam eva vastulakṣaṇamavatiṣṭhata iti bhāvaḥ // | And since entity and non-entity have the nature of mutual exclusion, by logical necessity the capacity for effective action, being opposite to the characteristic of non-entity, stands as the characteristic of entity - this is the meaning. |
atra parasyottaramāśaṅkate sattetyādi / | Here [the author] anticipates the opponent's answer [starting with the words] "sattā" etc. |
sattāsambandha iṣṭaśced vastūnāṃ lakṣaṇaṃ na tat / | If the characteristic of entities is claimed to be the relation with existence, that [claim] is not [correct]. |
asiddheḥ samavāyādeḥ kathaṃ vānyonyalakṣaṇam // | How could [inherence and existence] be the characteristic features of one another, given [their] non-establishment? |
na hyarthakriyāsāmarthyaṃ vastulakṣaṇaṃ kiṃ tarhi sattāsambandhaḥ sattāsamavāya iti yāvat / | [Says the opponent:] "The defining characteristic of entities is not the capacity for effective action; rather, it is the relation to existence - that is to say, the inherence of existence." |
na taditi / | [We reply:] That is not so. |
vastulakṣaṇaṃ yuktamiti śeṣaḥ / | [That means:] This cannot be the correct characteristic feature of entities. |
samavāyāder asiddhatvāt / | Because inherence and such [relations] are not established. |
ādiśabdena sattāparigrahaḥ / | By the word "and such" [ādi], existence [sattā] is included. |
yadi samavāyādiḥ siddho bhavet tadā samavāyo vastulakṣaṇaṃ syāt / yāvatā teṣām eva sādhyatvena prastutatvāt / | If inherence and such [relations] were established, then inherence might be the characteristic feature of entities; however, these very [relations] are what is to be proved [by the opponent]. |
vakṣyamāṇabādhakapramāṇasadbhāvāc ca / | And because there exist contradictory valid proofs that will be stated [later]. |
yadi vā pūrvoktād eva bādhakāt pramāṇāt sattāyāḥ samavāyasya cāsiddhiḥ / kenacit saha sattāyāḥ sambandhāsiddhes tasyānupakāryatvāt / | Or alternatively, from the previously stated contradictory proof follows the non-establishment of both existence and inherence, because existence cannot have a relation with anything, since it cannot be helped by anything. |
na hyanupakāriṇoḥ parasparaṃ sambandho 'tiprasaṅgād ityuktam / | For as has been stated, there can be no relation between two things that do not help each other, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
kiṃ ca tayor api sattāsamavāyayor antyānāṃ ca viśeṣāṇāṃ vastutve kiṃ lakṣaṇam iti vaktavyam / na hi samavāye viśeṣeṣu ca sattā samavaiti / | Moreover, [you] must explain what is the characteristic mark of Being, Inherence and the ultimate Particularities in their entity-hood, for Being does not inhere in Inherence nor in the Particularities. |
nāpi sattāyām kiṃ tarhi dravyaguṇakarmasu tripadārthasatkarī satteti samayāt / | Nor [does Being inhere] in Being itself; rather, according to convention, Being establishes the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action as entities. |
tasmād avyāpīdaṃ vastulakṣaṇam / | Therefore this characteristic mark of entity-hood is too narrow [in scope]. |
tathāpi na sattāsamavāyo lakṣaṇo yuktam arthāntaratvāt / | Moreover, the inherence of Being cannot be the characteristic mark [of entities] because it is something entirely different. |
na hy arthāntaram arthāntarasya svarūpam yena tasya tallakṣaṇaṃ bhavet / | For something entirely different cannot constitute the essential nature of another thing, by which it could be its characteristic mark. |
tathā hi vastusvarūpāparijñānān mūḍhadhiyaṃ prati tallakṣaṇe prakṛte tatsvabhāva eva kutaścid vyāvṛttyā pratīto lakṣaṇatvena vācyo yena tadeva vastusvarūpatvenāvadhārayati yathā pṛthivī kharakaṭatvena / | Thus, for someone whose mind is confused due to not knowing the true nature of entities, when defining their characteristic mark, one should point out as the characteristic mark some inherent nature [of the entity] that distinguishes it from something else, by which one can determine its nature as an entity – just as Earth [is determined] by [its] roughness. |
na cānyaḥ padārtho 'nyapadārthasvarūpamanyatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | And one category cannot be the essential nature of another category, as this would result in the loss of [their] difference. |
tat kathaṃ tallakṣaṇaṃ bhavet / lakṣaṇaśabdasya svabhāvavacanasya prastutatvāt // | How then could it be its characteristic mark, especially since the word 'characteristic mark' in this context refers to [essential] nature? |
sarvaścārthavicārādivyāpāro 'rthakriyārthinaḥ / nirākuladhiyo yukto nonmattakatayā punaḥ // | All operations involving the investigation of things should be undertaken by one who seeks practical results [and] has an undisturbed mind, not by one who is deranged. |
tatra yannāma keṣāñcit kathañcidupayujyate / kvacitkadācittatraiva yuktā sattāvyavasthitiḥ // | Therefore, existence should be established only for that which is useful to some [people], in some way, somewhere, at some time. |
tadrūpasyaiva cārthasya kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhyate / | [It is] the momentariness of precisely such a thing that [we] are proving; |
vyāptiḥ sarvopasaṃhārā tasminnevābhidhīyate // | The universal (sarvopasaṃhārā) pervasion (vyāptiḥ) is asserted only with reference to that same [thing]. |
athasya hi vastumātrasya yo 'yam astitvanāstitvena vicāraḥ sa sarvo 'rthakriyārthinaḥ na vyasanitayā / | Indeed, any consideration of a mere thing regarding [its] existence or non-existence is [undertaken] by one seeking a practical purpose (arthakriyārthin), not due to [mere] addiction [to philosophizing]. |
anyathā hyunmattaḥ syāt / | For otherwise, one would be [considered] mad. |
tena yadeva padārthajātaṃ keṣāñcidarthakriyārthināṃ kathañcitsākṣātpāramparyeṇa vā kvacid deśe kadācitkāla upayujyate tatraiva vastuvyavasthā yuktāprekṣāvataḥ / | Therefore, a rational person's determination of reality applies only to that class of things which is useful to some people seeking practical purposes, either directly or indirectly, in some place [and] at some time. |
na tvanyatra nibandhanābhāvānniṣparayojanatvād iti bhāvaḥ / | [It does] not [apply] elsewhere, due to lack of justification and purposelessness—this is the meaning. |
ādigrahaṇenārthaviśeṣāṇāṃ dahanasalilādīnāṃ vicāro gṛhyate / | By taking [the word] "ādi," the consideration of particular things such as fire, water, etc. is included. |
tataś ca prekṣāpūrvakāriṇāṃ yadevārthakriyākāri tadeva vastviti yadetat prasiddham tasyaiva tadrūpasya arthakriyākārirūpasyāsmābhiḥ kṣaṇikatvaṃ prasādhyate / | And thus [we] are proving the momentariness of precisely that which has the nature of being capable of fruitful action, which is well-known [to be] the only real thing for those who act with forethought, being that which accomplishes practical purposes. |
yato 'rthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇasya hetutvenābhīṣṭatvān nāsti vyabhicāraḥ / | Since the characteristic of capacity for fruitful action is intended as the reason, there is no deviation. |
tasyaivambhūtasya hetoḥ sarvopasaṃhārāt sādhyena vyāptisiddheḥ / | Because for such a reason, the pervasion with what is to be proved is established through universal inclusion. |
yā hi pakṣasapakṣavibhāgamakṛtvā sāmānyena hetor vyāptiḥ pradarśyate sā sarvopasaṃhārā vyāptiḥ // | For that pervasion which is shown as the general pervasion of the reason without making a division between the subject and similar instances is [called] the universal (sarvopasaṃhārā) pervasion. |
athārthakriyāsāmarthyaśūnyasyāpi kasmād vastutvaṃ neṣyata ity āha niḥśeṣetyādi / | [Now the text] explains why the character of being a real entity cannot be attributed to what is devoid of causal efficacy, [beginning with the word] "niḥśeṣa." |
niḥśeṣaśaktiśūnyaṃ tu yadvandhyāsutasannibham / sarvajñacetaso 'pyeti hetutvaṃ na kadācana // | That which is completely devoid of all potency and is like the son of a barren woman never becomes a cause even for the consciousness of an omniscient being. |
kriyate tatra naivedaṃ kāryarūpādyadṛṣṭitaḥ / | And in such a thing, this [establishment of existence] is not done, due to non-perception of effects, characteristics and so forth. |
na tasmin sādhitenārthaḥ kṣaṇikatvena kaścana / tatra paryanuyogaś ca kriyamāṇo 'pi niṣphalaḥ // | There is no purpose served by proving momentariness in regard to that [non-entity], and any objection raised regarding that is also fruitless. |
sarvajñacetaso 'pīti / | [The phrase] "even for the consciousness of an omniscient being" [is explained as follows]: |
na kevalaṃ samānajātīyasya kṣaṇasya jaladhāraṇādeś ca kāryasyetyapiśabdaḥ / | The word "api" [even] indicates that [it applies] not only to moments of the same kind [series] and effects like holding water and so forth. |
kāryarūpādyadṛṣṭita iti / | [The phrase] "due to non-perception of effects, characteristics and so forth" [is explained as follows]: |
kāryam tadīyaṃ phalam rūpam tasya svabhāvaḥ ādiśabdena tasya deśaḥ kālo 'vasthāviśeṣaś ca gṛhyate / | "Kārya" means its result, "rūpa" means its nature, and by the word "ādi" [and so forth] are included its place, time, and specific conditions. |
tasya caivaṃrūpasya śaśaviṣāṇādibhyo na kaścid viśeṣo 'stīti bhāvaḥ / | The meaning is that such a thing has no difference whatsoever from [absolute non-entities] like a hare's horn and so forth. |
nacāpi tasmiṃstathābhūte vastuni kṣaṇikatvena sādhitenārthaḥ kiñcit prayojanam asti / | Nor is there any purpose whatsoever served for one seeking practical results by proving momentariness with respect to such an entity. |
tasya dṛṣṭādṛṣṭayor hitāhitaprāptiparihārāyogyatvāt / | Because the perception or non-perception of it [i.e., such a characteristic] would not be capable of either obtaining benefit or avoiding harm. |
yathoktam arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kiṃ tadarthinā / ṣaṇḍasya rūpavairūpye kāminyāḥ kiṃ parīkṣayā // | As has been stated: "What [use] is there in discussions for one seeking [something] capable of useful action? What [use] is there for a woman in examining whether an impotent man is handsome or ugly?" |
ata eva katham idaṃ gamyate tatkṣaṇikamityādiparyanuyogaḥ prativādinā kriyamāṇo viphala eva tasya vādinā kṣaṇikatvena sādhayitumaniṣṭatvāt | Therefore, when the opponent raises such questions as "How is it known that this is momentary?", [such questioning] is entirely futile, because the proponent does not wish to prove its momentariness. |
idānīṃ paro 'rthakriyāsāmarthyam api vastulakṣaṇamayuktam ativyāpitvāditi darśayati | Now the opponent shows that even "capacity for fruitful activity" is not a proper definition of "real entity" due to being too broad. |
tathā hi nabhastāmarasādayo nabhastāmarasaṃ nabhastāmarasamityādijñānotpādalakṣaṇāyām arthakriyāyāṃ samarthāḥ naca te paramārthataḥ santi ato 'tivyāpīdaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ śaktir bhāvalakṣaṇam iti | For instance, things like the sky-lotus are capable of fruitful activity in the form of producing cognitions such as "[this is] a sky-lotus, [this is] a sky-lotus," yet they do not truly exist; therefore this definition that "capability is the characteristic of an entity" is too broad. |
atra parihāram āha nirālambanamevetyādi | Here [the author] gives the answer beginning with "nirālambanaṃ eva." |
nirālambanamevedam ambarāmbhoruhādiṣu | This [attribution of capability] with regard to sky-lotuses and such things is entirely baseless. |
tajjalpavāsanāmātrabhāvi jñānaṃ pravartate | The cognition [of such things] arises merely from the residual impression of speaking about them. |
asiddhamākāśāmbhoruhādīnām arthakriyāsāmarthyam tadvikalpānāṃ svavikalpavāsanāparipākamātreṇaivotpattir nirālambanatvāt | The capacity for fruitful activity of sky-lotuses and such things is unproven, [since] the conceptualization of them arises merely from the maturation of conceptual impressions, being without any [real] basis. |
abhāvakāraṇatve tu nairantaryeṇa sambhavet / nābhāvo 'pekṣate kiñcin nirviśeṣatayā sadā | If non-existence were the cause [of such cognitions], they would occur continuously, because non-existence, being always without distinction, does not depend on anything. |
abhāvo nabhastāmarasādi kāraṇaṃ yasya tat tathoktam tadbhāvas tattvam tasmin sati tannabhavastāmarasādijñānaṃ sarvadaiva bhavet utpadyeta nityasannihitavikalakāraṇatvāt / | If [something] has a non-existent thing like a sky-lotus as its cause, then the cognition of such non-existent things like sky-lotus would always arise, because its cause would be eternally present in its incomplete form. |
nacāpi tasya parairanupakāryasya tadapekṣā yuktā yena sahakārivaikalyāt kadācijjanayed iti syāt // | Nor can that [cognition], being inherently unhelpable by others, reasonably depend on them, such that it might sometimes produce [its effect] due to the absence of auxiliaries. |
kṣaṇikeṣvapi bhāveṣu nanu cārthakriyā katham / | "Even if things are momentary, how indeed can there be any purposive action? |
viśeṣādhāyino 'nyonyaṃ na hyādyāḥ sahakāriṇaḥ // | For the initial auxiliaries cannot produce specificities in each other; |
jātau sarvātmanā siddhair ajātāvastvabhāvataḥ / | Because if [they are] produced, [they are] already completely established; if unproduced, [they are] non-existent; |
nirviśeṣādviśeṣasya bhāve kāryaṃ na kiṃ bhavet // | From what is undifferentiated, why would an effect with differentiation not arise? |
nacānyato viśiṣṭās te tulyaparyanuyogataḥ / | Nor are they differentiated from anything else, as the same question applies [to them]; |
sahakārikalāpānām anavasthā ca te bhavet // | And there would be an infinite regress of auxiliary collections for you. |
na bhavanti tatas teṣāṃ vyarthaḥ kṣaṇikatāśrayaḥ // | Therefore, since they cannot exist, their basis in momentariness is pointless. |
sahakārikṛtaścaivaṃ yadā nātiśayaḥ kvacit / sarvadā nirviśeṣaiva tadā santatiriṣyate // | And thus when no excellence is produced anywhere by auxiliaries, then the continuum is admitted to be always undifferentiated. |
vināśe yadyahetuḥ syād ādāveva bhavedayam / | If destruction were without cause, it would occur right at the beginning; |
sambhavo yadi nāsyādāvante 'pi sa kathaṃ bhavet // | If it cannot occur at the beginning, how could it occur at the end? |
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