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iṣṭaṃ ca pariṇāmi / | And yet [the substance] is accepted to be subject to modification. |
prayogaḥ yat pūrvottarāvasthāsu na viśeṣyate tat pariṇāmi na bhavati yathākāśam na viśiṣyate ca caitanyaṃ sarvāvasthāsviti vyākānupalabdheḥ | [The following is] the argument: What cannot be differentiated in its preceding and succeeding states is not subject to modification - like space [ākāśa]; and consciousness is not differentiated in any state; hence due to non-perception of the wider [characteristic], [the narrower must be denied]. |
deśakālasvabhāvānām ityādinā hetoḥ paramatenāsiddhimāśaṅkate | [The opponent] raises doubt about the non-establishment of the reason according to the other view by [the verse beginning with] "deśakālasvabhāvānām." |
deśakālasvabhāvānām abhedādekatocyate / saṅkhyālakṣaṇasaṃjñārthabhedād bhedas tu varṇyate | Due to non-difference of place, time, and nature, unity is spoken of; however, difference is described due to distinction in number, characteristic, name, and function. |
rūpādayo ghaṭaśceti saṅkhyāsaṃjñāvibheditā | [In the case of] "color etc." and "jar," there is difference in number and name. |
kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛttī lakṣaṇārthavibheditā | [There is] difference in characteristic and function through continuity and discontinuity of effects. |
dravyaparyāyayor evaṃ naikāntenāviśeṣavat / dravyaṃ paryāyarūpeṇa viśeṣaṃ yāti ce{tsva}yam | Thus between substance and modes, there is not absolute non-differentiation, as substance itself undergoes differentiation in the form of modes. |
tathā hi yadyekāntena paryāyebhyo dravyaṃ vyatireki bhavet tadā syāt tasyā viśeṣaḥ yāvatā deśakālasvabhāvābhedād dravyaparyāyayor aikyamiṣṭam | For if substance were absolutely different from modes, then there would be no differentiation in it, since unity between substance and modes is accepted due to non-difference of place, time, and nature. |
saṅkhyādibhedāt tu bhedaḥ | However, there is difference due to distinction in number and other [factors]. |
tatra saṅkhyā ekatvabahutvādi / tathā hi dravyamekasaṅkhyāyuktam paryāyās tu sukhādayonekasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭāḥ | Here, number [means] singularity, plurality, etc.; for substance is connected with singularity while modes like pleasure etc. are characterized by plurality. |
lakṣaṇam api bhinnam | The characteristic also is different. |
yato 'nuvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ dravyam paryāyās tu vyāvṛttilakṣaṇāḥ saṃjñā nāma arthaḥ kāryam | Because substance has the characteristic of continuity while modes have the characteristic of discontinuity; [where] saṃjñā means name and artha means function. |
tathā coktam deśakālasvabhāvābhedābhedo dharmadharmiṇoḥ saṅkhyāsaṃjñālakṣaṇakāryabhedāt tu bhedaḥ tadyathā ghaṭasya rūpādīnāṃ ceti / | It has been thus stated: "Between the qualified [object] and [its] qualification[s], there is non-difference due to non-difference in their place, time and nature, but there is difference due to difference in their number, name, characteristic, and function, as [can be seen] between the jar and its color and other properties." |
tathā hi ghaṭatadrūpādīnāṃ deśādibhir abhedaḥ ya eva hi deśakālasvabhāvaś ca ghaṭasya sa eva rūpādīnām saṅkhyādibhiś ca ghaṭāt teṣāṃ bhedaḥ / | For indeed, between the jar and its color etc., there is non-difference regarding place and other [aspects], since whatever place, time and nature belongs to the jar is the very same [that belongs] to [its] color etc., while they differ from the jar regarding number and other [aspects]. |
tathā hyeko ghaṭo bahavas tu rūpādaya iti saṅkhyābhedaḥ / | For example, the jar is one while [its] properties, color and the rest, are many - this is difference in number. |
ghaṭo rūpādaya iti ca saṃjñābhedaḥ / | [When we say] "jar" and "color etc." - this is difference in name. |
anuvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ ghaṭādidravyaṃ vyāvṛttilakṣaṇās tu rūpādayaḥ paryāyā iti lakṣaṇabhedaḥ / | The substance in the form of jar etc. has the characteristic of permanence, while the successive properties like color etc. have the characteristic of change - this is difference in nature. |
ghaṭenodakāharaṇaṃ kāryaṃ kriyate rūpādibhis tu vastrarāgādīti kāryabhedaḥ / | With the jar, the function of carrying water is performed, while with color etc., [the function is] dyeing cloth etc. - this is difference in function. |
evam ātmadravye 'pi caitanyātmake sukhaduḥkhādiṣu paryāyeṣu cohyam / | This should be understood similarly regarding the soul-substance, which is of the nature of consciousness, and [its] successive properties like pleasure, pain etc. |
kāryabhedas tu tatraivaṃ boddhavyaḥ caitanyenārthānubhavaḥ kriyate sukhādibhis tu pīḍānugrahādīti / | The difference in function there should be understood thus: through consciousness, the experience of objects is performed, while through pleasure etc., [the functions of] affliction, favor etc. [are performed]. |
tadetaddarśayati rūpādaya ityādi / | This is what is shown [in the text beginning with] "rūpādayaḥ" etc. |
saṅkhyāsaṃjñāvibhediteti / | [This refers to] the difference in number and name. |
dravyaparyāyayor iti vakṣyamāṇaṃ sambadhyate / | The phrase "between substance and modes" is to be connected [with what follows]. |
kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛttī lakṣaṇārthavibhediteti yathāyogaṃ sambandhaḥ / | The terms "function," "permanence," and "change" are to be connected respectively with "difference in purpose." |
kāryabhedo 'rthavibheditā anuvṛttivyāvṛttīlakṣaṇavibhediteti sambandhaḥ / | The connection is: difference in function is difference in purpose, and permanence and change constitute difference in characteristic. |
dravyaparyāyor ityatra chedaḥ / | Here there is a break [in the text] at [the phrase] "between substance and modes." |
evam ityādinā hetor asiddhim upasaṃharati | [Through the words] "evam" etc., [the author] concludes [his discussion of] the fallacy of the unproven reason. |
evaṃ ca kṛtvā dravyam ekāntena nāviśiṣṭaṃ kintu paryāyarūpabhedena viśeṣaṃ pratipadyate | Thus it is established that substance is not entirely undifferentiated, but rather becomes differentiated through the diversity in the forms of the modes. |
tena paryāyebhyo dravyasyaikāntena bhedābhāvād ityasiddho hetuḥ | Therefore, because substance is not absolutely different from [its] modes, the reason [stated by the opponent] is unproven. |
svabhāvābheda ityādinā pratividhatte svabhāvābheda ekatvaṃ tasmin sati ca bhinnatā kathañcidapi duḥsādhyā paryāyātmasvarūpavat | [The author] responds with "[regarding] non-difference of nature" etc.: Non-difference of nature [means] identity, and if this [identity] exists, then difference would be impossible to establish in any way, just as [in the case of] the essential nature of modes themselves. |
yadi hi dravyaparyāyayor abhedo 'pyaṅgīkriyate | If indeed non-difference between substance and modes is accepted... |
tadā sarvātmanaivābhedo 'yaṃ bhavet bhedaś ca tadviparītaḥ kathaṃ bhavet | ...then this non-difference would have to be complete, so how could there be difference, which is its opposite? |
na hyekasyaikadā vidhipratiṣedhau parasparaviruddhau yuktau | For it is not logical [to have] mutual contradictories - affirmation and negation - of one [thing] at the same time. |
[Continued in next part due to length limits...] | null |
atha vā yadanugatātmarūpāvyatiriktaṃ tadanugatātmakam eva yathā dravyarūpam anugatātmarūpāvibhinnasvabhāvāś ca sukhādayaḥ paryāyā iti svabhāvahetur eva / | Or [alternatively], when something is non-different from that which has an inclusive nature, it must also be inclusive in nature – just as the form of substance and the successive modes like pleasure etc. are non-different in nature from [that which has] an inclusive nature; hence this is indeed a natural reason. |
anyathā vibhinnayogakṣematvād bheda eva bhavet / | Otherwise, due to [their] having different destinies, there would necessarily be difference. |
viruddhadharmādhyāsitasyāpyekatve bhedavyavahāroccheda eva syād iti viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | [There is] a countervailing proof against the opposite [view], namely that "if there were unity even of things possessing contradictory properties, there would necessarily be an end to all practical dealings." |
tato nāvasthitaṃ kaścid dravyamātmādi vidyate / | Therefore no permanent substance such as the soul etc. exists, |
pāryāyāvyatiriktatvāt paryāyāṇāṃ svarūpavat // | because [they are] non-different from [their] modes, like the intrinsic nature of the modes themselves. |
ādiśabdena ghaṭavrīhyādiparigrahaḥ // | By the word "ādi" [is meant] the inclusion of jar, rice-grain, etc. |
na cetyādinā dvitīyaprasaṅgasādhanaphalamāha | [The text] states the result of establishing the second implication [starting] with "na ca" etc. |
dravyādavyatiriktatvāt taddravyaniyatātmavat // | Because [it is] non-different from substance etc., like the fixed nature of that substance. |
tasyāpi dravyasya paryāyarūpeṇodayavyayākrāntasyeṣṭatvādato mābhūt sādhyavaikalyaprasaṅga iti niyatātmavad ityuktam / niyataścāsāvātmā svabhāvo dravyādirūpeṇeti viśeṣaṇasamāsaḥ // | [The phrase] "like the fixed nature" is stated [to address the objection] that "since that substance too is accepted as subject to origination and destruction in the form of modes, there might be a lack of what is to be proved"; and the compound "niyatātmā" is a karmadhāraya compound meaning "that which has a fixed nature in the form of substance etc." |
tato niranvayaṃ ityādinā nigamayati | [The text] concludes with "therefore without remainder" etc. |
tato niranvayo dhvaṃsaḥ sthiraṃ vā sarvam iṣyatām / | Therefore either complete destruction or permanence of everything should be accepted. |
ekātmani tu naiva sto vyāvṛttyanugamāvimau // | [Both] exclusiveness and inclusiveness cannot exist in any single entity. |
na kevalaṃ paryāyād abhinnasvabhāvād dravyarūpasyānugatātmano 'siddhiḥ ito 'pi paryāyavyatirekeṇopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher asadvyavahāraviṣayatvam evāsyeti darśayann āha na cetyādi / | [The comprehensive entity called] "substance" is not established, not only because it is non-different in nature from the successive factors, but also because it is not perceived separately from the successive factors even when the conditions for its perception are present, and hence must be treated as non-existent. |
na copalabhyarūpasya paryāyānugatātmanaḥ / dravyasya pratibhāso 'sti tannāsti gaganābjavat // | There is no perception of substance, which [if it existed] should be perceptible as something permeating through successive factors; therefore it does not exist, like a sky-lotus. |
tena yad uktam pratyakṣata evānugato dravyātmā siddha iti, tad asiddham / | Therefore, the claim that "the soul in the form of substance, permeating [through successive factors], is established directly by perception" is not proven. |
na hi paryāyavyatiricyamānaśarīraḥ kvacid api vijñāne pratyakṣasaṃmate pratibhāsamāno 'nugataikarūpo dravyātmā lakṣyate // | For indeed, no such substance as "soul" with a form separate from successive factors is observed appearing in its unifying form in any cognition that is acknowledged [by all] to be perception. |
vividhārthakriyāyogyās tulyādijñānahetavaḥ / | [Things] are capable of diverse purposeful actions [and] are causes of cognitions of similarity and so forth. |
tathāvidhārthasaṅketaśabdapratyayagocarāḥ // | [And they] are objects of conventional verbal expressions and concepts that denote such things. |
vividhāḥ nānāprakārāḥ arthakriyāḥ rūpādīnāṃ paryāyāṇāṃ samānāsamānabhedāt tatra samānā jalasaṃdhāraṇādilakṣaṇāḥ asamānā vastrarāgalocanādijñānotpādalakṣaṇāḥ tatra yogyāḥ samarthā iti vigrahaḥ / | The purposeful actions of successive factors like color are diverse [and] of various kinds, distinguished as similar and dissimilar; the similar [actions] are characterized by holding water and so forth, [while] the dissimilar [actions] are characterized by coloring cloth, producing visual cognition and so forth; [the successive factors] are capable of [performing] these [actions] - this is the analysis of the compound. |
tatra sādhāraṇe kārye sarveṣām eva yaugapadyenopayoga iti samastānāṃ hetutvajñāpanārthamabhinnadravyarūpābhāve 'pi ta eva bhedino 'pi ghaṭa ityādināśabdenaikasaṅkhyāviśiṣṭā ucyante / asādhāraṇakāryopayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ tu nānāsaṃkhyāsta iti saṅkhyābhedaḥkāryabhedaś ca teṣu vyavasthāpyate / | In the case of common effects, all [factors] are employed simultaneously; hence to indicate their collective causality, even though there is no unitary substance-form pervading them and even though they are distinct, they are denoted by singular terms like "jar"; but when their particular causal efficacy is to be expressed, they are spoken of in plural number - thus both numerical difference and functional difference are established among them. |
lakṣaṇabhedas tarhi katham ity āha tulyādijñānahetava iti / | "How then is there diversity of characteristics?" [The answer is that] they are causes of similar and dissimilar cognitions. |
āmapakvādyavasthāsu pratikṣaṇadhvaṃsino 'pi sadṛśasanniveśā viśeṣā evotpadyamānā nirvikalpānubhavaviṣayā anubhūyamānāḥ sarvāvasthāsu ghaṭo ghaṭa ityādisadṛśapratyayahetavo bhavanti / | Even though [things] are destroyed every moment in [their] unbaked, baked and other states, they are produced [again] as particulars with similar configuration, and being apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognition, they become causes of similar cognitions like "pot, pot" in all states. |
śyāmalohitādivarṇavailakṣaṇyena jāyamānā atulyapratyayahetava ityevam ekarūpānugamamantareṇāpi tulyātulyajñānahetavo bhavanto 'nuvṛttivyāvṛttirūpeṇavyavasthāpyanta iti lakṣaṇabhedo vyavasthāpyate / | When [things] arise with distinct colors like dark, red, etc., they become causes of dissimilar cognitions, and thus, even without a single pervading form, they become causes of similar and dissimilar cognitions and are established as having the nature of continuity and exclusion - thus the diversity of characteristics is established. |
tulyādītyādigrahaṇenātulyaṃ jñānaṃ gṛhyate / | By the term 'ādi' in [the compound] 'tulyādi', dissimilar cognition is included. |
kas tarhi saṃjñābheda ity āha tathāvidhetyādi / | "What then is the basis of the diversity of names?" [This is explained by] "of such nature" etc. |
tathāvidhaḥ vividhārthakriyāyogyastulyādijñānahetuśca padārtho rūpādiḥ arthaḥ viṣayo yasya ghaṭa iti rūpādaya iti ca saṅketasya sa tathoktaḥ tathāvidhārthaḥ saṅketo yeṣāṃ śabdapratyayānāṃ te tathoktāḥ teṣāṃ gocarā iti vigrahaḥ // | Things of such nature, i.e., objects like color which are capable of diverse purposeful activities and are causes of similar and dissimilar cognitions, [and which] are the objects denoted by conventional expressions like "pot" and "color" - such things are said to be within the scope of those verbal cognitions which have such conventional meanings. |
tena pratyakṣata eva bhāvānāṃ nairātmyaṃ prasiddhamityupasaṃhāreṇa darśayati udayetyādi / | Thus [the author] shows by way of conclusion that the selflessness of entities is established by direct perception itself, [as stated in] "arising" etc. |
udyayavyayadharmāṇaḥ paryāyā eva kevalāḥ / | Only the successive phases which possess the properties of arising and perishing |
saṃvedyante tataḥ spaṣṭaṃ nairātmyaṃ cātinirmalam // | are experienced, and therefore pure selflessness is clearly established. |
rūpādayaḥ svasaṃviditasvabhāvāśca duḥkhādayaḥ / | [These are] colors etc. and pains etc. which are experienced in their own nature. |
kevalā iti / abhinnaikadravyarūpavirahiṇaḥ / nityasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt / | 'Only' means: devoid of a single substance-form that is non-different [from them], because for an eternal [entity], purposeful activity is incompatible both sequentially and simultaneously. |
arthakriyākāritvameṣāmudayavyayadharmitva eva sati yujyata ityanumānato 'pyeṣāmarthakriyākāriṇāṃ satvaliṅgānnairātmyaṃ prasiddham // | Their capacity for fruitful action is possible only when they possess the nature of arising and perishing; thus through inference also, their being without a Self [nairātmya] is established from the mark of [their] existence, [namely that] they are capable of fruitful action. |
yaduktaṃ na copalabhyarūpasyetyādi tatrārthetyādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | Against what was said [by the Buddhist] beginning with "not of the perceived form," he anticipates the opponent's reply beginning with "in that object." |
saṃmūrcchitam ekalolībhūtam ato vivekena dravyarūpaṃ na pratibhāsate vidyamānam apīti bhāvaḥ / saṃmūrcchitatve kāraṇam āha taddvirūpaṃ hītyādi / | [It is] mixed together [and] become unified, therefore the form of the substance, though existent, does not appear distinctly - this is the meaning. He states the reason for its being mixed together, beginning with "because it is of dual form." |
yasmāt taddvirūpam api sannirbhāgamiṣyate yathā narasiṃhas tasmānnirbhāgatvāt saṃmūrchitobhayarūpaṃ taditi na pṛthagupalabhyate // | Because it, though of dual form, is accepted to be without parts like Narasiṃha, therefore due to [its] being without parts it exists in a mixed form with both natures and thus is not perceived separately. |
tadetat parasparaparāhatamabhidhīyate bhavateti darśayann āha nanvityādi / | Showing that this statement [of the opponent] involves mutual contradiction, he says beginning with "but surely." |
yadi hi nirbhāgaṃ tadā dvirūpam tiyetad vyāhatam nānārthavinibandhanatvādāsya vyapadeśasya kasmāt rūpaśabdena svabhāvasyābhidhānāt / | If [something] is without parts, then [to say] it has dual form is contradictory, because this designation is based on multiple meanings, since the word "form" denotes essential nature. |
tathā hi dve rūpe dvau svabhāvau yasya sa dvirūpa ucyate na caikasya svabhāvadvayaṃ yuktam ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt / | For thus, that which has two forms [means] that which has two essential natures is called "dual-formed," and it is not possible for one [thing] to have two essential natures, as this would result in the loss of [its] unity. |
kevalaṃ dvāveva svabhāvau bhavatā pratipāditau na punar ekaṃ vastu dvirūpamparasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvād ekatvānekatvayoḥ // | You have only established that there are two essential natures, not that there is one entity with two forms, because unity and multiplicity have mutually exclusive characteristics. |
narasiṃho 'pi naivaiko dvyātmakaścopapadyate / | Narasiṃha also cannot be both one and of dual nature; |
anekāṇusamūhātmā sa tathā hi pratīyate // | for he is perceived as such because he consists of an aggregate of many atoms. |
kevalaṃ vivādāspadībhūtaṃ nopapadyata ityapiśabdaḥ / sa iti / narasiṃhaḥ / | The word "api" indicates that not only is [He] not subject to dispute; "sa" [refers to] Narasiṃha. |
tatheti / avayavavaicitryeṇa pṛthutaradeśākrāntirūpeṇa ca / | "Tathā" [refers to the fact that He exists] through the diversity of [His] limbs and through [His] form occupying extensive space. |
anyathaivaṃ na pratibhāṣeta / | Otherwise, He would not appear in this way. |
makṣikāpadamātreṇāpi ca pidhāne tasya tathāvidhasyāvaraṇaprasaṅgaś ca / etena mecakamaṇikalpā varṇādayaḥ pratyuktāḥ / | If [His form] were concealed even to the extent of a fly's foot, He would be hidden to that degree; by this same [argument], [the notion of His] having colors like that of an emerald is refuted. |
etac ca vistareṇāvayaviniṣedhe pratipādayiṣyāma iti bhāvaḥ // | This we shall explain in detail in the section on the refutation of the composite whole. |
Aupaniṣadikātmaparīkṣā | [This concludes] the Examination of the Upaniṣadic Soul. |
apare 'dvaitadarśanāvalambinaścaupaniṣadikāḥ kṣityādipariṇāmarūpanityaikajñānasvabhāvamātmānaṃ kalpayanti / | Others, the followers of the Upaniṣads who adhere to the non-dualist doctrine, postulate a Soul that is of the nature of eternal, unitary consciousness appearing in the form of modifications such as earth. |
atasteṣām eva matamupadarśayann āha nityetyādi / | Therefore, showing their view, [the author] speaks [the verse] beginning with "nitya." |
nityajñānavivarto 'yaṃ kṣititejojalādikaḥ / ātmā tadātmakaśceti saṃgirante 'pare punaḥ // | "This [world] consisting of earth, fire, water and so forth is a transformation of eternal consciousness; and the Soul is of that nature" - thus others declare. |
apara iti / aupaniṣadikāḥ // | "Others" [means] the followers of the Upaniṣads. |
kimatra pramāṇam ity āha grāhyetyādi / | "What is the proof of this?" Thus [the opponent] speaks [beginning with the word] "grāhya." |
grāhyalakṣaṇasaṃyuktaṃ na kiñcidiha vidyate / | Nothing exists here [in this world] that possesses the characteristic of being graspable; |
vijñānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ tasmāt sarvaḥ samīkṣyate // | Therefore all this is observed to be [merely] a transformation of consciousness. |
na hi kṣityādayo jñānavyatirekeṇa grāhyalakṣaṇāpannāḥ santi yena te pratibhāserann avayavinaḥ / | Indeed, earth and other [elements] do not possess the characteristics of being graspable apart from consciousness, by which they could appear as composite objects; |
paramāṇūnāṃ cāsattvāt / | And because atoms do not have [real] existence; |
tasmāt sāmarthyād vijñānapratibhāsarūpā evāmī kṣityādaya iti vyavasīyate / | Therefore, by logical necessity, it is determined that these earth and other [elements] are merely forms appearing in consciousness. |
ayam iti kṣityādiḥ // | "This" refers to earth and the rest. |
teṣām ityādinā pratividhatte / | [The text] responds with [the words] beginning with "teṣām." |
teṣām alpāparādhaṃ tu darśanaṃ nityatoktitaḥ / | Their view has only a small fault, [which comes] from the assertion of permanence; |
rūpaśabdādivijñānāṃ vyaktaṃ bhedopalakṣaṇāt // | Because distinction is clearly perceived in the cognitions of form, sound, and other [objects]. |
ekajñānātmakatve tu rūpaśabdarasādayaḥ sakṛdvedyāḥ prasajyante nitye 'vasthāntaraṃ na ca | If [cognition] were of the nature of a single cognition, then color, sound, taste and other [objects] would necessarily be cognized simultaneously, and in an eternal [entity] there cannot be different states. |
alpāparādham iti | [It is said that] the error is slight. |
jñānamātrasya yuktyupetasyābhyupagamāt | Because [they] accept only consciousness [as real], which is supported by reasoning. |
yadyevaṃ svalpo 'pi kimiti tatrāparādha ucyata ity āha nityatoktita ityādi | If this is so, then why is even a slight error mentioned in their view?" [The answer is:] it is due to the assertion of eternality. |
kasmāt punar nityatvābhyupagamo na yukta ity āha rūpaśabdādītyādi | "But why should the acceptance of eternality not be reasonable?" [He] speaks about color, sound, etc. [in reply]. |
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