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tulyaḥ paryanuyogo 'yam anyathā puruṣe 'pi vaḥ / | If [it were] otherwise, this same objection would apply equally to your [concept of] puruṣa; |
tacchaktibhedasadbhāvāt sarvam eva nirākulam // | but due to the existence of differences in its potencies, everything becomes entirely clear. |
kiṃ cātmālambanatve 'pyahaṅkārasya, tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ kimityātmāntare 'pi na pravartata iti / | Moreover, even if the I-notion has the ātman as its basis, the same objection applies: why does it not operate with respect to another ātman? |
śaktipratiniyamānnaivam iti cet, yadyevam asmākam api śaktiniyamāt kvaciddevādhyātmike vastuni pravartate, na sarvatreti vyavasthānaṃ sarvam eva nirākulam // | If [you say] "it is not so due to the restriction of potencies," then for us too, due to the restriction of potencies, it operates only with respect to certain internal objects, not everywhere - thus everything is perfectly clear. |
nityālambanapakṣe tu sarvāhaṅkṛtayas tataḥ / sakṛd eva prasūyeran śaktahetuvyavasthiteḥ // | However, if [one accepts] the position that [the I-notion] has an eternal basis, then all I-notions would arise simultaneously, since their efficient cause would be established [permanently]. |
anityālambanatve 'pi spaṣṭābhāḥ syus tataḥ pare / | And if [it had] a non-eternal basis, then subsequent [I-notions] would be clearly manifest. |
ālambanārthasadbhāvaṃ vyarthaṃ paryanuyuñjate // | [Therefore] others needlessly question the existence of the object serving as basis [for the I-notion]. |
tathā hyasyālambanaṃ bhavannityaṃ vā bhaved anityaṃ vā / | For its basis must either be eternal or non-eternal; |
yadi nityam, tadā sarvā ahaṅkṛtayaḥ ahaṅkārā yugapad bhaveyur avikalakāraṇatvāt / | if eternal, then all I-notions [and] I-consciousness would arise simultaneously due to [their] cause being complete; |
na hyakāraṇamālambanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | for it is not reasonable for the basis to be without cause, as [this would lead to] unlimited contingencies. |
na cāpi śaktasya kāraṇasya sahakārikāraṇāpekṣā bhavatītyasakṛccarvitam etat | And [it has been] repeatedly stated that an efficient cause, when capable, does not require auxiliary causes. |
na caika evāyam ahaṅkāra iti śakyaṃ vaktum, kādācitkatayānekatvasiddheḥ | Nor can it be said that "this I-consciousness is only one", since [its] multiplicity is established by [its] occasionality. |
tathā hi gāḍhasvāpamadamūrchāsu nāhaṅkāraḥ saṃvedyate, punar anyadā ca saṃvedyata iti siddham asya sarvadānupalambhāt kādācitkatvam | For instance, in deep sleep, intoxication, and fainting, I-consciousness is not experienced, while at other times it is experienced; thus its occasionality is established from [its] non-apprehension at all times. |
kādācitkatvāccānekatvam api siddham iti sarvā ahaṅkṛtayas tadbhāvamātrabhāvinyo yugapat prasūyeran | And since [its] multiplicity is established from [its] occasionality, all I-notions dependent merely on that [cause's] existence would arise simultaneously. |
athānityamālambanam iti pakṣaḥ tadā cakṣurādivijñānavat sphuṭatarapratibhāsāḥ sarvā ahaṃkṛtayaḥ prasajyeran | If the position is taken that [it has] a non-eternal basis, then all I-notions would be as clearly manifest as visual and other cognitions. |
sākṣādvastusvalakṣaṇagrāhitvāt | Because [they would be] directly grasping the specific characteristics of the object. |
tataḥ tasmāt, pare tīrthikāḥ kumārilaprabhṛtayo vyartham evāsyālambanaṃ paryanuyuñjate / tasyājñānalakṣaṇaḥ ko nu viṣayaḥ parikalpita ityādi | Therefore other philosophers like Kumārila and others needlessly investigate its basis, [asking] "What object characterized by cognition is assumed [as its basis]?" and so forth. |
tatra yaduktamanālambana evāyam ahaṅkāro 'nādisatkāyadṛṣṭivāsanābalād bhrāntaḥ pravartata iti | In this context, what has been stated [is that] this I-notion is indeed baseless [and] proceeds erroneously due to the force of the beginningless disposition of the view of the existing body. |
jñātari pratyabhijñānaṃ vāsanā kartumarhati | The disposition can bring about recognition in the knower. |
nātasmin sa iti prajñāṃ na hyasau bhrāntikāraṇam | [It cannot bring about] the cognition "that [is] he" in what is not that, for that [disposition] is not a cause of error. |
tan nāhampratyayo bhrāntir iṣṭaś ced bādhavarjanāt | That I-cognition cannot be accepted as an illusion, if [considered] in the absence of sublation. |
vāsanā hi jñātṛviṣayāṃ pratyabhijñāṃ kartum arhati | For disposition is capable of producing recognition regarding the cognizer. |
na punar atasmin ajñātari saḥ jñātā iti prajñāṃ jñānaṃ vāsanā kartumarhatīti sambandhaḥ | [But] disposition cannot produce cognition that [takes] what is not a cognizer [to be] "that [is] the cognizer" - this is the connection [of the statement]. |
kasmāt na hy asau bhrāntikāraṇam api tu yathānubhūtārthaviṣayam evāsau jñānaṃ janayati na bhrāntam ity arthaḥ | Why? Because it cannot be the cause of illusion; rather, it produces cognition only of objects exactly as they were experienced [before], not erroneous [cognition] - this is the meaning. |
tasmād ayam ahaṅkāro vāsanāta utpadyamānatvāt bādhakapramāṇābhāvāc ca na bhrānto yuktaḥ | Therefore, since this I-notion arises from dispositions and because there is no contradicting valid cognition, it cannot reasonably be [considered] erroneous. |
cecchabdo bhinnakramo bādhavarjanād ity asyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyaḥ | The word "cet" [if] should be read out of sequence, after [the phrase] "in the absence of sublation." |
īśvarādiṣu bhaktānāṃ taddhetutvādivibhramāḥ vāsanāmātrabhāvāc ca jāyante vividhāḥ katham | How do the various illusions of devotees regarding God and others as being the cause [of things] etc. arise merely from dispositions? |
tan nāhampratyayagrāhyo jñātā kaścana vidyate | Therefore no cognizer that is grasped by I-cognition exists. |
tataḥ sarvapramāṇeṣu na dṛṣṭānto 'sti siddhibhāk / | Therefore, in all [these] means of knowledge, there is no valid corroborative example. |
hetavāś cāśrayāsiddhā yathāyogam udāhṛtāḥ // | And [these] reasons with unestablished substrates have been explained according to [their] respective applications. |
yadi hi vāsanā bhrāntikāraṇaṃ na bhavet tadānīmīśvaraḥ sarvotpattimatāṃ hetuḥ sarvajño nityabuddhisamāśraya ityādayo vibhramāḥ katham iva vāsanāmātrasambhavād udbhaveyuḥ / | If vāsanā [latent disposition] were not the cause of illusion, then how could such illusions as "[there is an] Īśvara [who is] the cause of all products, [who is] omniscient, [who is] the receptacle of eternal cognition" and so forth arise merely from vāsanā? |
vāsanāmātrabhāvacceti mātragrahaṇaṃ tathābhūtālambanārthavyavacchedārtham / | In [the compound] "vāsanāmātrabhāvāt", the word "mātra" [merely] serves to exclude [the possibility of] a corresponding objective substrate. |
tasmād ahaṅkārasya nirālambanatvān na tadgrāhyo jñātā kaścit prasiddho 'stīti na tasmād ātmā siddhyatīti / | Therefore, because ego-consciousness is without [objective] substrate, there exists no well-established cognizer that could be grasped by it; hence, the ātman is not established from this [argument]. |
yac ca vyatītāhaṅkṛtigrāhya ityādinityasādhanam uktam tatrāha tadityādi / | And regarding what was stated as proof of [the soul's] permanence through [arguments] such as "[the soul exists because it] is grasped by past ego-cognitions" and so forth, [the author] states this and the following. |
kaścaneti / | [The phrase] "kaścana" [means that there is no such cognizer]. |
nityo 'nityo vā jñātā dṛṣṭāntadharmī nāstītyasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | [The point is that] there exists no subject for comparison [that could be] either a permanent or an impermanent cognizer; thus the example is unestablished. |
tathā hi prathamadvitīyoḥ prayogayor dharmyasiddhir dṛṣṭāntadoṣaḥ idānīṃtanasya hyastanasya cāhampratyayagamyasya jñātuḥ kasyacid abhāvāt / | For instance, in the first and second arguments, there is the flaw of the unestablished subject in the example, because there exists no cognizer whatsoever that could be apprehended by I-cognitions of both today and yesterday. |
tṛtīye tu prayoge ekabuddhivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyasādhanavikallaḥ / | But in the third argument, the example "like [in the case of] a single cognition" lacks both the probandum and the probans. |
abhimatāyā ekabuddher ekasantānasambaddhajñātrahampratyayatvasya ekaviṣayatvasya cāsiddhatvāt / | Because [their] intended single cognition - [claimed to be] the I-notion of a cognizer connected with a single continuum and relating to a single object - is not proven. |
ato dharmadvayasiddhimukhenāsyāpyasiddhatvam uktam / | Therefore, due to the non-establishment of these two properties, this [example] itself has been declared to be unproven. |
udāhṛtāḥ pūrvam upanyastā ye hetavaḥ yathāyogam yathāsambhavam / | [These are] the reasons that were previously presented [and] adduced, according to their respective applicability. |
tathā hi prathamadvitīyayoḥ prayogayor ye hetavas ta āśrayāsiddhāḥ ahampratyayagrāhyasya kasyacid api dharmiṇo jñātur asiddhatvāt / | Thus, in the first and second arguments, the reasons are āśrayāsiddha ["having an unestablished locus"], because no subject [dharmin] whatsoever that is a cognizer apprehended by the I-notion is established. |
tṛtīye tu prayoge nāśrayasiddhiḥ / pratyayānāṃ dharmiṇāṃ siddhatvāt / kintu teṣām ekasantānasambaddhajñātṛviśeṣeṇamasiddham / nirālambanatvasya prasiddhatvāt / | In the third argument, however, there is no āśrayāsiddhi, because the cognitions [which are] the subjects are established. But their qualification by a cognizer connected with a single continuum is unproven, because [their] baselessness is well-known. |
ato yathāyogamityuktam / | Therefore it has been said "according to [their respective] applicability." |
iti mīmāṃsakaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā / | Thus [ends] the examination of the Soul as conceived by the Mīmāṃsakas. |
caitanyam anye manyante bhinnaṃ buddhisvarūpataḥ / | Others consider consciousness to be distinct from the essential nature of intellect. |
ātmanaś ca nijaṃ rūpaṃ caitanyaṃ kalpayanti te / | They postulate consciousness as the intrinsic form of the Self. |
pradhānenopanītaṃ ca phalaṃ bhuṅkte sa kevalam / | And he [the Self] merely experiences the fruits presented by pradhāna [primordial matter]. |
kartṛtvam naiva tasyāsti prakṛter eva tanmatam // | [He] is not the 'doer'; the character of 'doer' is held to belong to prakṛti alone. |
anya iti sāṃkhyāḥ / | "[By] others" [is meant] the Sāṃkhyas. |
te hi buddhivyatiriktaṃ caitanyamātmano nijaṃ rūpaṃ kalpayanti / | They indeed postulate consciousness (caitanya) as the self's own form [as something] different from buddhi. |
yato buddhiḥ pradhānasvabhāvā caitanyaṃ tu puruṣasyaiva svarūpam iti teṣāṃ samayaḥ / | For their doctrine is that buddhi is of the nature of pradhāna, while consciousness is the essential form of puruṣa alone. |
sa ca puruṣaḥ śubhāśubhakarmaphalasya pradhānopanītaya bhoktā na tu karmaṇāṃ kartā prakṛter evāśeṣajagatpariṇatirūpāyāḥ kartṛtvasyeṣṭatvāt / | And this puruṣa is the enjoyer of the fruits of good and bad actions presented by pradhāna, but not the doer of actions, since doership is held to belong to prakṛti alone, which contains the evolution of the entire world. |
atra ca pramāṇayanti yat saṃghātarūpaṃ vastu tatparārthaṃ dṛṣṭam tadyathā śayanādi saṃghātarūpāś ca cakṣuradaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | And here they present as evidence: Whatever is of the nature of an aggregate is seen to be for another's purpose - like beds and such things - and the eyes and other [organs] are of the nature of aggregates - this is an argument based on essential nature. |
yaścāsau paraḥ sa sāmarthyād ātmeti siddham / | And this "other" is established through implication to be the ātman. |
tatrāpi rūpaśabdādicetasāṃ vedayte katham / suvyaktaṃ bhedavadrūpam ekā cec cetaneṣyate // | Regarding that [view], if consciousness is held to be one only, how is it that in the cognitions of form, sound, etc., what is clearly perceived has a differentiated form? |
tathā hi caitanyaṃ puruṣasya nijaṃ rūpam iti bruvatā caitanyaṃ nityaikarūpam iti pratijñātaṃ bhavati nityaikarūpātpuruṣāt tasyāvytiriktatvāt / | For when [they] say that "consciousness is puruṣa's own form," it becomes postulated that consciousness is eternal and of one form, due to its non-difference from puruṣa who is eternal and of one form. |
etac ca pratyakṣaviruddham yato rūpaśabdādicetasāṃ suvyaktam sphuṭataram eva svasaṃvidā bhedavadrūpam bhinnasvabhāvaḥ vedyate / | And this contradicts direct perception, since in cognitions of form, sound, etc., a form possessed of difference - a distinct nature - is very clearly perceived through self-awareness. |
taccaikatve sati cetanāyā nopapadyate // | And this would not be possible if consciousness were one. |
ekarūpe ca caitanye sarvakālamavasthite / nānāvidhārthabhoktṛtvaṃ kathaṃ nāmopapadyate // | If [the] caitanya ['sentience'] is of one form and exists at all times, how indeed can [it] be possible for [it to be] the experiencer of objects of various kinds? |
ekarūpaścātmā atha ca nānāvidhasyārthasya bhokteti parasparaviruddham / | [That] the ātman is of one form and yet [is] the experiencer of manifold objects - this is mutually contradictory. |
abhoktavasthānirviśiṣṭatvāt | Because [it] cannot be distinguished from the state of non-experiencing. |
na didṛkṣādayo bhinnās tasya bhoganibandhanam / | The desire to see and other [states], [though] different, are not the basis of its experience. |
bhavanti hi tathā bhāve pumānutpattimān bhavet // | For if they were to exist in that way, [then] the puruṣa would become something produced. |
yadi rūpādiṣu didṛkṣāśuśrūṣādayas tasya parasparato bhinnā bhoganibandhanatvenopakalpitās te 'pyasyātmano na bhavanti na jāyante / | If with regard to forms and other [objects], the desire to see, desire to hear and other [states], which are different from each other, were assumed to be the basis of its experience, they cannot exist or arise for this ātman. |
yadi hi jāyeras tadā tathā bhedena bhāve jātau satyām pumānutpattimān bhavet / didṛkṣādivat tadavyatirekāt // | For if they were to arise, then when they come into existence with such difference, the puruṣa would become something produced, like the desire to see etc., due to being non-different from them. |
etad eva vyaktīkurvann āha caitanyavyatiriktaṃ hītyādi / | Making this very [point] clear, [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "distinct from consciousness indeed." |
caitanyavyatiriktaṃ hi na didṛkṣādi vidyate / | The desire to see and other [states] indeed do not exist as distinct from consciousness. |
tasyodayavyayāveśe durvāraḥ puruṣe 'pyasau // vyatireke hi tasya ta iti sambandhānupapattiḥ / | If [consciousness] were subject to arising and passing away, that [same arising and passing away] would be unavoidable for the puruṣa also, for if they were distinct, their connection would be impossible. |
asāviti / udayavyayasamāveśaḥ / | "That" means: the attribution of arising and passing away. |
prayogaḥ yasya sadbhāvavyavasthānibandhanaṃ nāsti nāsau prekṣāvatā tadbhāvena vyavasthāpyaḥ yathākāśaṃ mūrtatvena | When there is no basis for restricting the existence of something, that [thing] should not be restricted in that way by an intelligent person - just as space [should not be restricted] by materiality. |
na cāyam asiddho hetur iti pratipāditam | And this reason is not unproven, as has been explained [before]. |
śubhāśubhaṃ ca karmāsti naiva cedātmanā kṛtam / tadeṣa bhogabhedo 'sya kutaḥ samupajāyate | If good and bad karma is indeed not done by the ātman, then whence does this diversity of [his] experiences arise? |
na hyakṛtasya karmaṇaḥ kaścit phalamupabhuṅkte akṛtābhyāgamādidoṣaprasaṅgāt | For no one experiences the fruit of an action not done [by him], because [this would lead to] the fault of accruing what was not done and other [absurdities]. |
atra parasyottaramāśaṅkate abhilāṣānurūpeṇetyādi | Here [the author] anticipates the opponent's reply [beginning with] "in accordance with desires." |
abhilāṣānurūpeṇa prakṛtiścetprayacchati / paṅgvandhavaddhi sambandhas tayor eṣa vyavasthitaḥ | "If prakṛti bestows [fruits] in accordance with [the soul's] desires, and this relationship between these two is established like [that between] the lame and the blind..." |
yadyapi puruṣaḥ karmaṇāṃ kartā na bhavati tathāpi prakṛtir asya yathābhilaṣitam arthamupanayati tamasau bhuṅkta ityadoṣaḥ | "Although the puruṣa is not the doer of actions, still prakṛti presents objects to him according to his desires, and he experiences them - thus there is no fault." |
nanu prakṛtir acetanā satī kathaṃ śubhādikarmaṇāṃ kartrī bhavati yenāsau yathābhimataṃ karmaphalaṃ puruṣasya sampādayatītyāha paṅgvandhavaddhītyādi | [One might ask:] "How can prakṛti, being non-conscious, be the doer of good and other karma, by which it produces the fruits of karma for the puruṣa according to his wishes?" Thus [the opponent] says "[like] the lame and blind..." |
yathā kilāndhasya cakṣuṣmatpuruṣasambandhād artheṣu pravṛttir bhavati tathā mahadādikaṃ liṅgaṃ cetanapuruṣasamparkāccetanāvad iva dharmādiṣu kāryeṣvadhyavasāyaṃ karotītyadoṣaḥ | Just as a blind person acts towards objects through connection with a sighted person, so the manifest [principles] beginning with mahat, through contact with the conscious puruṣa, make determinations regarding effects like dharma etc. as if conscious - thus there is no fault. |
tathā coktam puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya / | Thus it has been said: "The purpose of [the existence of] Spirit [puruṣa] is perception, and likewise [the purpose] of Primordial Nature [pradhāna] is liberation [of Spirit]; |
paṅgvandhavadubhayor api saṃyogas tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ iti // | their connection is like [that of] the lame and the blind, and from this [connection] creation proceeds." |
yadyevam ityādinā pratividhatte / | [The opponent] responds with [the words] "if that is so" and so forth. |
yadyevam iṣṭavāñchāyāṃ satyam api na siddhyati / kimiti prakṛtir naiva kiñcidanyadapekṣate // | If that is so, why is it that even when there is desire for something desired, it is not fulfilled? [And] why does Primordial Nature [prakṛti] not depend on anything else? |
yadi hi prakṛtirakṛtasyāpi karmaṇaḥ phalam abhilaṣitamupanayatīti syāt tadā sarvadaiveṣṭavāñchāyāṃ sarvasya puṃso 'bhilaṣito 'rthaḥ kimiti na siddhyet / | For if it were true that Primordial Nature brings the desired fruit even of unperformed actions, then why would not the desired object of every person be fulfilled whenever there is desire for something desired? |
syān matam tatkāraṇasya dharmasyābhāvān na siddhyatīti āha prakṛtir naivetyādi / | One might think "it is not fulfilled due to the absence of its cause in the form of merit [dharma]" - [to this] he says "prakṛtir naiva" and so forth. |
prakṛtir hi dharmaḥ kāryam sa ca tadavyatiriktatvāt sadaivāstīti bhavedevābhimataṃ phalam / | For merit is a product of Primordial Nature, and being non-different from it, it must always exist; therefore the desired fruit should indeed arise. |
tathā hi etad eva sarvaṃ yaduta prakṛtipuruṣau tau ca sadā sannihitāv iti / ato nityam eva phalaṃ bhavet / | For indeed, all this [universe] consists of nothing but Primordial Nature and Spirit, and these two are always in proximity; therefore the fruit should always exist. |
kiṃ ca yadyabhilaṣitam arthaṃ prakṛtiḥ prayacchati tadāniṣṭaṃ kimiti prayacchet na hyaniṣṭaṃ kaścid abhilaṣati // | Moreover, if Primordial Nature gives [only] what is desired, why would it give what is undesired? For certainly no one desires what is undesired. |
arthopabhogakāle ca yadi naivāsya vikriyā / | And if at the time of experiencing objects there is indeed no modification in him [i.e., Spirit], |
naiva bhoktṛtvam asya syāt prakṛtiś copakāriṇī // | Neither could he [i.e. the Soul] be an enjoyer, nor could prakṛti be of service [to him]. |
vikriyāyāś ca sadbhāve nityatvam avahīyate / | And if modification exists [in him], [his] eternality is lost. |
anyathātvaṃ vikāro hi tādavasthye ca tat kathaṃ // | For modification means becoming different, and how could that [occur] while remaining in the same state? |
yadi hi sukhaduḥkhādināhlādaparitāpādirūpāṃ vikṛtiṃ nopanīyate tadākāśavad abhoktṛtvam eva syāt / | If he [i.e. the Soul] is not made to undergo modification in the form of joy, sorrow and such, [consisting of] pleasure, pain and the like, then like ākāśa he would indeed be a non-enjoyer. |
prakṛtiś copakāriṇī na syād iti sambandhaḥ / | And prakṛti cannot be of service [to him] - such is the [syntactic] connection. |
avikṛtātmany upakārasya kartumaśakyatvāt / | Because service cannot be rendered to that which has an unmodifiable nature. |
atha vikāritvam asyābhyupagamyate tadā nityatvahāniprasaṅgaḥ / | If then his modifiability is accepted, then the unwanted consequence is the loss of [his] eternality. |
yato 'tādavasthyam evānityatāṃ brūmaḥ / | Because we call non-eternality precisely [this] not remaining in the same state. |
tac ca vikāritve saty astīti katham asya nityatā syāt / tādavasthyarūpatvān nityatvasya // | And since this exists when there is modifiability, how could his eternality exist? Because eternality consists in remaining in the same state. |
syān mataṃ viṣayākārā buddhir ādau vivartate / | It might be thought that "first the intellect transforms into the form of objects." |
tayā vyavasitaṃ cārthaṃ puruṣaḥ pratipadyate // | When this object has been determined [upon] by cosmic intellect, the puruṣa attains it. |
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