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na cāsiddho hetuḥ / | And the reason is not unestablished. |
svabhāvātiśayasyātmāvyatiriktatvāt / tadādhāne satyātmana evādhānaṃ syāt / | Because the exceptional property is not distinct from the soul, if there were such an addition, it would be an addition to the soul itself. |
tataścānityatvaprasaṅgaḥ / | And from that would follow [the unwanted consequence of] non-permanence [of the soul]. |
vyatireke ca svabhāvātiśayasya sambandhanibandhanābhāvāt tadīyo 'sāviti sambandho na siddhyet / tasmānnityasya na kaścid upakārī sambhavati tasya tatrākiñcitkaratvāt / | And if the exceptional property were distinct [from the soul], due to the absence of any basis for connection, the relation expressed as "this belongs to that" would not be established. Therefore, nothing can be useful to an eternal [entity], because it can do nothing whatsoever to it. |
yaccoktam kasya cātmā śarīram iti tadapyasamyak / | And what has been said [by you], "who [considers] the soul to be the body?" - that too is incorrect. |
santi hi kecid evaṃvidhā ye śarīrādīnātmapariṇāmarūpān varṇayanti / yathopaniṣaddhādinaḥ / | For there are indeed some such [people] who describe the body and other [things] as forms of transformation of the soul - for example, the followers of the Upaniṣads. |
atastān pratiṣidhyate / | Therefore the refutation is directed against them. |
yaccoktam uttarapadārthaviṣayatvānnisaḥ kiṃ sātmakam iti vācyam iti / tadapyasaṅgatam / na hyuttarapadārthaḥ sanneva niṣidhyate / kiṃ tarhi samāropitaḥ / | And what has been said, that "since the prefix 'nis' must refer to what follows, [you] must state what it is that is 'with soul'," - that too is irrelevant. For it is not [something] actually existing that is being negated, but rather [something] superimposed. |
sataḥ pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvāt / | A real [existent] entity cannot be denied. |
tataś ca yo 'sau pareṇa bhrāntyā samāropito 'rthaḥ sa evottarapadārtho bhavati / | Thus, that entity which has been superimposed by the opponent through delusion becomes the meaning of the latter term [in the compound]. |
yatastamevānūdya parasya mithyājñānatvamākhyāpayituṃ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate / | Because the denial is made by referring to that [superimposed entity] in order to proclaim that the opponent's knowledge is false. |
anyathā hyakṣaṇikāḥ pradīpādaya ityādau bauddhaparikalpitakṣaṇikatvaniṣedhe bhavatā kriyamāṇe codyametadāpatatyeva na hyasatyuttarapade naṭaḥ prayogaṃ paśyāma iti / | For otherwise, when you make the denial of the Buddhist-conceived momentariness in [statements] such as "lamps and other [things] are non-momentary," this same objection would apply, since we never see the use of a negative without a subsequent term. |
yaccoktam kasya vā śarīre ātmā vidyata iti tadapyasamyak / | And what has been stated [by you], namely "Who maintains that a Soul exists in the body?" - that too is incorrect. |
tathā hi yeṣāṃ darśanamaṅguṣṭhaparvārddhaśyāmakādiphalapramāṇa ātmeti teṣāṃ matenātmano mūrttatvāccharīrasthitirastyeveti tān prati{prati}ṣedho yujyataeva / | For according to those whose view [holds] that the Soul is of the measure of half a thumb-joint or a śyāmāka grain, the Soul, being corporeal, does indeed reside in the body; therefore the denial [made] against them is entirely appropriate. |
yaccoktam śarīrasyātmasambandhitvaniṣedhe dṛṣṭānto nāstīti tadasiddham / | What has been stated, that "there is no example for the denial of the body's relation to the Soul" - that is unproven. |
parasparamupakāryopakārakatvābhāvād vindhyahimavator iva nātmaśarīrayoḥ sambandho 'stīti pūrvavatprasādhayituṃ śakyatvāt / | Because it can be proven as before that "there is no relation between Soul and body, due to the absence of mutual benefactor-beneficiary relationship, just as [there is none] between the Vindhya and Himālaya [mountains]." |
yaccoktam viśeṣapratiṣedhāc ca sāmānyaṃ gamyata iti tadanekāntam / | And what has been stated, that "from the denial of the particular, the general is understood" - that is inconclusive. |
bhavadbhiḥ pradīpādīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvapratiṣedhe 'pi kasyacitkṣaṇikatvasāmānyenānabhyupagamāt / | Because even when you deny the momentariness of lamps and other [things], you do not accept momentariness in general of anything. |
athāpi syād iṣyata evāsmābhiracirakālāvasthāyitvanibandhanā pradīpādau kṣaṇikaśabdapravṛttirataḥ sāmānyena kṣaṇikatvaṃ siddhameveti / | But it might be said: "We do indeed accept the application of the word 'momentary' to lamps and such things based on [their] not remaining for a long time; therefore momentariness in general is established." |
yadyevamātmaśabdapravṛttirapyasmābhir ahaṅkārasaṃmiśrite cet asīṣṭaiveti siddhaḥ sāmānyenātmā / | If that is so, then since we too accept the application of the word 'Soul' to consciousness mixed with ego-sense, the Soul in general is [thereby] established. |
yaccoktam athātmaśabdo 'nityatvaviṣaya ityādipakṣadvayam tadapyasaṅgatam eva / | What has been asserted regarding the two alternative views about the term "ātman" [supposedly] denoting something transient and so forth - that too is entirely irrelevant. |
anabhyupagamāt / | Because [we] do not accept [this premise]. |
na hyātmaśabdasya kaścit paramārthena viṣayo 'bhyupagataḥ / nāpi rūpādivyatiriktaḥ / | For we have not accepted anything as being truly denoted by the term "ātman", nor [have we accepted] anything distinct from color and other [sensible qualities]. |
na cāpi nityaśabdasya paramārthena kvacin nitye vastuni vṛttiḥ siddhā yena vyabhicāraḥ syāt / | Nor is the application of the term "eternal" established in regard to any eternal entity in reality, by which there could be any deviation [from our position]. |
nāpi śarīrādiṣvātmaśabdasyopacārādvṛttiraskhaladvṛttitvādityuktam ato na prasiddhasādhanam // | Nor can the use of the term "ātman" in reference to the body and so forth be [considered] metaphorical, since its application never fails, as has been explained - therefore there is no proving of what is [already] established. |
itthamātmāprasiddhau ca prakriyā tatra yā kṛtā / nirāspadaiva sā sarvā vandhyāputra iva sthitā // | Thus, when the ātman is not established, all theoretical constructs made regarding it stand entirely without foundation, like the son of a barren woman. |
tadevamātmākhyasya dharmiṇaḥ pramāṇavyāhatatvenāprasiddhatvāt tatra yā kartṛtvabhoktṛtvādiprakriyā bhavadbhir upacaritā sā vandhyāputra iva nirāspadeti na pṛthagdūṣaṇamasyāḥ kriyate / | Thus, since what is called "ātman" as a property-bearer is unestablished due to being contradicted by valid means of knowledge, the theoretical construct regarding its being an agent, experiencer and so forth that has been set up by you is without foundation like the son of a barren woman - therefore no separate refutation of it is undertaken. |
āśrayanirākaraṇenaivāsyāḥ pratikṣiptatvāt / | Because it is rejected merely through the rejection of its foundation. |
kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamadoṣaś ca yathā na bhavati tathā karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣāyāṃ pratipādayiṣyate // | And how [our view] is not subject to the fault of destruction of what is done and occurrence of what is not done will be explained in the examination of the relation between action and [its] result. |
mīmāṃsakaparikalpitātmanirākaraṇam āha vyāvṛttyanugamātmānam ityādi / | [The text] states the refutation of the ātman imagined by the Mīmāṃsakas, beginning with "vyāvṛttyanugamātmānam". |
vyāvṛttyanugamātmānam ātmānamapare punaḥ / | Others again [maintain] the ātman [to be] of the nature of exclusion and inclusion. |
caitanyarūpamicchanti caitanyaṃ buddhilakṣaṇam // | They consider caitanya [consciousness] to be characterized by buddhi [intelligence]. |
vyāvṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhādyavasthānāṃ paramparato bhedāḥ;anugamaḥ caitanyadravyatvasattvādīnām anuvṛttiḥ;tāvetau vyāvṛttyanugamāvātmā svabhāvo yasyeti vigrahaḥ / | [There is] differentiation of the successive states of pleasure, pain, etc.; [and there is] continuity of consciousness, substantiality, being, etc.; these two - differentiation and continuity - constitute the nature of the ātman. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati sukhādirūpeṇa vyāvṛttaṃ sattvādirūpeṇānugatamātmānañcidrūpamapare jaiminīyā varṇayanti / | The other followers of Jaimini describe the ātman as being of the nature of consciousness, differentiated in the form of pleasure etc., and continuous in the form of being etc. |
tac ca caitanyaṃ na buddhivyatirekāṇānyat;yathā sāṅkhyair iṣyate;kiṃ tarhibuddhireveti darśayati caitanyaṃ buddhilakṣaṇam iti / | And this consciousness is not different from intelligence, as maintained by the Sāṅkhyas; rather, it is intelligence itself, as shown by [the statement] "consciousness is characterized by intelligence." |
buddhilakṣaṇam buddeḥ svarūpam ity arthaḥ / | The meaning is that [consciousness] is the essential nature of intelligence. |
buddhivyatirekeṇāparasya cidrūpatvāpratīter iti bhāvaḥ // | The idea is that apart from intelligence, no other form of consciousness is recognized. |
yathāheḥ kuṇḍalāvasthā vyapaiti tadanantaram / sambhavatyārjavāvasthā sarpatvaṃ tvanuvartate // | Just as the coiled state of a snake disappears and thereafter the straight state appears, while snake-ness continues [throughout], |
tathaiva nityacaitanyasvabhāvasyātmano 'pi na / niḥśeṣarūpavigamaḥ sarvasyānugamo 'pi vā // | similarly, for the ātman whose nature is eternal consciousness, there is neither complete disappearance of [its] form nor continuation of everything. |
kintvasya vinivartante sukhaduḥkhādilakṣaṇāḥ / | Rather, its characteristics such as pleasure and pain cease [and return], |
avasthāstāś ca jāyante caitanyaṃ tvanuvartate // | and these states arise [again], while consciousness continues [throughout]. |
yathā kilāheḥ sarpasyaikasyāpi sataḥ kuṇḍalāvasthānivṛttāvārjavāvasthāprādurbhāvaḥ;sarpatvaṃ punaravasthādvaye 'pyanuvartate | Just as in the case of a serpent, though remaining one and the same, when its coiled state disappears, the straight state appears, while its serpent-nature continues in both states |
nityacaitanyasvabhāvasyaikasyāpi sato nāśeṣasvabhāvavigamo nāpi naiyāyikādiparikalpitātmavadaśeṣasvabhāvānugamaḥ kiṃ tarhi sukhādyavasthā nivartante pravartante ca caitanyarūpaṃ tu sarvatrānuyāyī | Similarly, though the ātman is of eternal consciousness-nature and remains one, neither does its entire nature disappear, nor does it maintain its entire nature [unchanged] like the Soul postulated by the Naiyāyikas; rather, the states of pleasure etc. cease and arise [again], while the form of consciousness pervades throughout |
avayavārthastūcyate nityacaitanyasvabhāvasyeti | The meaning of the compound is explained thus: "nityacaitanyasvabhāvasya" [means] "that which has eternal consciousness as its nature" |
sarvasyeti rūpasyeti śeṣaḥ | [The word] "sarvasya" [refers to] "of the form" - this is to be supplied |
neti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ | "na" [is to be] connected with the preceding [statement] |
tāśceti sukhaduḥkhādyavasthāḥ | "tāś ca" [refers to] the states of pleasure, pain, etc. |
syātāṃ hyatyantanāśe hi kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau | If there were absolute destruction [of the Soul], there would indeed be destruction of [the effects of] what has been done and the accrual of [the effects of] what has not been done |
sukhaduḥkhādibhogaś ca naiva syād ekarūpiṇaḥ | And there could be no experience of pleasure, pain, etc. for [a Soul] that remains of one form |
yadi hi niranvayo vināśaḥ syāt tadā kṛtasya karmaṇo nāśaḥ syāt kartuḥ phalānabhisambandhāt | If indeed there were complete destruction [without continuation], then there would be destruction of [the effects of] actions done, because the agent would not come into contact with the fruits [of the actions] |
akṛtābhyāgamaś ca syād akartuḥ phalābhisambandhanāt | And there would be accrual of [the effects of] what was not done, because one who did not perform [the action] would come into contact with the fruits |
ekarūpatve cātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhādibhogo na syāt ākāśavat | And if the ātman remained of one form, there could be no experience of pleasure, pain, etc., just like space |
abhoktravasthāto bhoktravasthāyāṃ viśeṣābhāvāt / tathā coktaṃ kumārilena | Since there would be no difference between the state of non-experiencing and the state of experiencing, thus [it has been] stated by Kumārila |
tasmād ubhayahānena vyāvṛttyanugamātmakaḥ / puruṣo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ kuṇḍalādiṣu sarpavat | Therefore, rejecting both [extremes], the puruṣa must be accepted as having the nature of both exclusion and inclusion, like a serpent in [its] coiled and other forms |
na ca kartṛtvabhoktṛtve puṃso 'vasthāṃ samāśrite | The agency and experiencing of the puruṣa do not depend on [its particular] state |
tato 'vasthāsu tat tatvāt kartaivāpnoti tatphalam | Therefore, since it [remains] the same through [all] states, the agent himself obtains that fruit |
na hi puṃsaḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtve avasthāṃ samāśrite kintu puruṣam eva | For the agency and experiencing of the puruṣa do not depend on [its] state but rather on the puruṣa itself |
yasmāt pumān eva karoti bhuṅkte ca na tvavasthā | Since it is the puruṣa itself that acts and experiences, not [its] state |
tataḥ tasmāt avasthāvataḥ puruṣasya tattvāt parityaktapūrvarūpatvāt kartaiva tatphalam tasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āpnotītyadoṣaḥ | Therefore, since the puruṣa possessing states remains the same [and] does not abandon its previous form, the agent himself obtains the fruit of that action—[thus] there is no fault |
kiṃ punar asyātmano 'stitve sādhakaṃ pramāṇam ity āha pumān ity āha | [Now to the question:] "What then is the valid means of proof establishing the existence of this ātman?"—he says "pumān" ["the puruṣa"] |
pumānevamvidhaścāyaṃ pratyabhijñānabhāvataḥ | This puruṣa of such a nature is proved through the existence of recognition |
pramīyate prabādhā ca nairātmyasyāmunaiva hi | And the doctrine of no-self is indeed refuted by this very [recognition] |
ahameva jñātavān aham evas vedmītyāderekakartṛviṣayasya pratyabhijñānasya bhāvataḥ satvāt ātmā prasiddhaḥ / | By the existence of recognition [that is] involved in [such notions as] "I indeed knew [it]" [and] "I indeed know [it]" etc., where there is recognition of a single agent, the ātman is established. |
amunaiva ca pratyabhijñānena bauddhādiparikalpitasya nairātmyasya bādhāpi siddhā / | And by this very [same] recognition, the refutation of the doctrine of no-self (nairātmya), as conceived by the Buddhists and others, is also established. |
yathoktam tenātmāt pratyabhijñānāt sarvalokāvadhāritāt / nairātmyavādabādhaḥ syāt iti // | As has been declared: "Thus from recognition of the self, which is acknowledged by all people, there would be a refutation of the doctrine of no-self." |
ahaṃ vedmītyahambuddhir jñātāraṃ pratipadyate / | The notion of "I" in [the conception] "I know" apprehends the knower. |
sa cātmā yadi vā jñānaṃ syād ekāntavinaśvaram // | And this [knower] would be either the self (ātman) or [merely] absolutely perishable cognition. |
yadyātmā viṣayas tasyāścaturastraṃ tadākhilam / kṣaṇikajñānapakṣe tu sarvamevātidurghaṭam // | If the self is the object of that [notion], then everything is well-ordered; but in the case of momentary cognition, everything indeed becomes extremely problematic. |
tathā hi jñātavān pūrvamaham eva ca samprati / aham eva pravedmīti yā buddhirupajāyate // tasyā jñānakṣaṇaḥ ko nu viṣayaḥ parikalpyate / atītaḥ sāmprataḥ kiṃ vā kiṃ vāsāvatha santatiḥ // | For when a notion arises in the form "I indeed knew [it] before and I indeed know [it] now," which moment of cognition is conceived to be its object? Would it be past, present, or would it be a continuum? |
tatrādye viṣaye jñāte jñātavāniti yujyate / | In the case of the first option, when the object is known, [the statement] "I knew [it]" would be appropriate. |
jānāmīti na yuktaṃ ca nedānīṃ vetyasau tataḥ // | But [the statement] "I know [it]" would not be appropriate, because one is not knowing it at that moment. |
vartamāne tu viṣaye pravedmītyupapadyate / jñātavānityasatyaṃ tu naivāsīt prāgidaṃ yataḥ // | However, in the case of a present object, [the statement] "I know [it]" would be fitting, but "I knew [it]" would be untrue, because this [object] did not exist previously. |
ata eva dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ naiva tasyāḥ prakalpyate / | Therefore, both cannot be conceived as the object of that [notion]. |
Here are the sentence pairs, with precise translations: | null |
na hyubhau jñātavantau vā jānīto vādhunā punaḥ // | Neither did both [moments] cognize [it] in the past, nor do both cognize [it] now. |
santāno 'pi na tadbāhyo dvitayasyāpyasambhavāt / | And the series [of moments] cannot be external to that [cognition], due to the impossibility of both. |
na hyasau jñātavān pūrvam avastutvān na vādhunā // | For this [series] did not cognize [it] in the past, and due to [its] non-entity status, [it does] not [cognize it] now. |
tasmād ayamahaṅkāro vartate yatra gocare / uktādanyatra siddho 'sāvātmā śāśvatarūpavān // | Therefore, that wherein this I-consciousness subsists—[which must be] something distinct from what was mentioned—is established as the eternal-formed Self. |
ahaṃ vedmītyayam ahampratyayo jñātāraṃ pratipadyata ityatrāvivāda eva vedmīti kartṛpratyayasāmānādhikaraṇyāt / | That this "I know" conception apprehends the cognizer is beyond dispute, because of the co-reference with the agent-notion in [the expression] "I know." |
sa ca jñātā bhavannātmā vā bhavet jñānaṃ vā bhavatparikalpitamekāntavinaśvaraṃ kṣaṇikamiti kalpanādvayam / | And regarding this cognizer, there are two possible theories: either it could be the Self, or [it could be] the absolutely perishable, momentary cognition postulated by you. |
tatra yadyātmeti pakṣastadākhilaṃ caturastram abhimatārthaprasiddheḥ / | If among these [the theory] that "it is the Self" is accepted, then everything becomes coherent, due to the establishment of the desired meaning. |
atha jñānam iti pakṣas tadā sarvamatidurghaṭam / | But if the theory that "it is cognition" [is accepted], then everything becomes extremely problematic. |
tathā hi ahaṃ jñātavānaham eva ca sāmprataṃ vedmīti yo 'yam ekakartṛpratyavamarśenāhambuddhirupajāyate tasyāvijñānakṣaṇo viṣayatvena kalpyamānaḥ kadācidatīto vā kalpyate yadvā sāmprato vartamāna utātītasāmprato yadvā santatir iti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ / | For when this I-cognition arises with a recognition of a single agent [in the form] "I cognized [it] and I myself now know [it]," if a moment of cognition is assumed as its object, [that moment] must be conceived as either past, present, both past and present, or as a series—these are the four alternatives. |
tatrādye atīte jñāne viṣayatvena kalpyamāno jñātavānityayam ākārāvasāyo yujyate pūrvaṃ tena jñātatvāt / | Among these, regarding the first [alternative], when a past cognition is assumed as the object, the determination in the form "I cognized" makes sense, because it was cognized by that [cognition] previously. |
samprati jānāmītyetat tu na yuktam na hyasāvatītajñānakṣaṇa idānīṃ vartamānakāle vetti tasya pūrvaniruddhatvāt / | But [the notion] "I know [it] now" is not tenable, for that past moment of cognition does not know [anything] at the present time, since it has previously ceased. |
atha vartamānaṃ viṣaya iti dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā vedmītyetadyuktam idānīṃ tasya vedakatvāt / | If the second alternative is accepted - that the present [cognitive moment] is the object [of I-consciousness], then the notion "I know [this]" would be correct, as it [the present cognitive moment] is indeed the cognizer at present. |
jñātavānityevam ākāragrahaṇaṃ tu na yuktam / kasmātnaivāsīt prāgidaṃ yataḥ / | But the apprehension in the form "I knew [it]" would not be correct - why? Because this [present cognition] did not exist in the past. |
idam iti vartamānaṃ jñānam / | The word "idam" refers to the present cognition. |
ata eva asyā buddher vaimukhyena pravṛtteḥ nātītaṃ sāmprataṃ ca vijñānadvayaṃ grāhyamiti siddham / | Therefore, since this cognition operates in both directions, it is established that neither the past nor the present - both cognitive moments - can be the object [of I-consciousness]. |
na hi vartamānātītāvubhau jñānalakṣaṇau jñātavantau nāpi sāmprataṃ jānītaḥ / | For indeed, both these cognitive characteristics - present and past - neither cognized [in the past] nor do they cognize in the present. |
kiṃ tarhieko jñātavānaparo jānāti / | Rather, one [moment] cognized [in the past] while another [moment] cognizes [in the present]. |
ata eva santāno 'pi tayāhambuddhyā grāhyo na bhavati dvitayasya atītavartamānajñānakriyādvayasyāsambhavāt / | For this very reason, even the series [of cognitions] cannot be the object of that I-consciousness, because the duality of cognitive acts - past and present - is impossible [in it]. |
tathā hi nāsau santāno jñātavān pūrvaṃ nāpyadhunā jānāti tasya kalpitatvenāvastutvāt na cāvastuno jñātṛtvaṃ bhavati tasya vastudharmatvāt / | For indeed, this series neither cognized in the past nor does it cognize now, because being merely conceptual it is not a real entity; and what is not a real entity cannot be a cognizer, since being a cognizer is a property [that belongs only] to real entities. |
tasmād yathoktajñānavyatirekeṇa yatra viṣaye 'yamahaṅkāro vartate sa ātmetisiddham / | Therefore it is established that that entity wherein this I-consciousness subsists - [which must be] distinct from the cognition as explained above - is the Self. |
vyatītāhaṅkṛtiścādyo jñātādyāpyanuvartate / ahampratyayagamyatvād idānīntaraboddhṛvat / | The cognizer who was the object of I-consciousness in the past continues [to exist] even today, because [it] is knowable through I-consciousness, just like the present cognizer. |
eṣa vā hyastano jñātā jñātṛtvāt ata eva vā | [This Cognizer is the same as] the cognizer of yesterday, either because of [his] being a cognizer or for the same reason [i.e., being the object of ahaṃpratyaya] |
hyastanajñātṛvat teṣāṃ pratyayānāṃ ca sādhyatā | Like the cognizer of yesterday, all these cognitions [also] fulfill the conditions of the probandum |
yo 'hampratyayagamyaḥ so 'dyāpyanuvartate yathedānīntano boddhā | He who was the object of ahaṃpratyaya [in the past] continues to exist even today, just as [does] the present cognizer |
ahampratyayagamyaścāyam idānīntano boddheti svabhāvahetuḥ | And this present cognizer is the object of ahaṃpratyaya - this is the svabhāvahetu [natural reason] |
tata eveti ahampratyayagamyatvāt | [The phrase] "for that same reason" [means] because of being the object of ahaṃpratyaya |
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