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yathaiva kaṇṭakādīnāṃ taikṣṇyādikamahetukam / | Just as the sharpness and other [qualities] of thorns and such things are without cause. |
yadi nāma pratyakṣato nirhetukatvaṃ duḥkhādīnāṃ na siddhaṃ tathāpyanumānataḥ siddhameva / | Even though the causelessness of pain and other [internal things] is not proven through direct perception, it is nevertheless proven through inference. |
tathā hi yatkādācitkaṃ tadahetukaṃ niścitaṃ yathā kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādi kādācitkaṃ ca duḥkhādīnīti svabhāvahetuḥ / | For whatever occurs only occasionally is definitely without cause - like the sharpness of thorns and such things; and pain and other [internal things] occur only occasionally - this is an inference based on essential nature. |
na cāpi yasya bhāvābhāvayoryasya bhāvābhāvau niyamena bhavataḥ tat tasya kāraṇam iti yuktam vyabhicārāt / | Nor is it correct [to say] that when the presence and absence of something invariably follows the presence and absence of something else, the latter is the cause of the former, because there are exceptions. |
tathā hi sati sparśe cakṣurvijñānaṃ bhavatyasati ca na bhavati / | For instance, when there is touch [in an object], visual cognition occurs, and when [touch] is absent, it does not occur. |
atha ca nāsau cakṣurvijñānakāraṇam / | And yet that [touch] is not the cause of visual cognition. |
tasmātkāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇametadvyabhicārītyataḥ siddhaṃ sarvahetunirāśaṃsaṃ bhāvānāṃ janmeti / | Therefore, since this definition of the causal relation is fallible, it is established that the origination of things is independent of all causes. |
sarojakesarādīnām anvayavyatirekavat / avasthātiśayākrāntaṃ bījapaṅkajalādikam // | With respect to lotuses, filaments and so forth, [their causes] such as seeds, mud, water and the like are found under specific conditions, [as established] through positive and negative concomitance. |
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ niścitaṃ kāraṇaṃ yadā / kimityanyas tadā heturamīṣāṃ paripṛcchyate // | When the cause is ascertained through perception and non-apprehension, why then do you ask about some other cause for these [things]? |
anena hetor asiddhiṃ pratyakṣavirodhaṃ ca pratijñārthasya darśayati / | By this [text], [the author] shows the unproven nature of the reason and the contradiction to perception of the proposition's meaning. |
yaduktaṃ rājīvakesarādīnāṃ kāraṇaṃ nopalabhyata iti tadasiddham pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ bījapaṅkajalāder anvayavyatirekataḥ kāraṇatvena niścitatvāt / | What was claimed - that "no cause is perceived for lotuses, filaments and so forth" - is unproven, because through perception and non-apprehension, the causal nature of seeds, mud, water and so forth is ascertained through positive and negative concomitance. |
tathā hi yasminsatyeva yasya janma bhavati yasya ca vikārādyasya vikāras tat tasya kāraṇam ucyate / | For indeed, when something arises only when something else exists, and [the former] undergoes modifications corresponding to the modifications of the latter, then that [latter] is called the cause of that [former]. |
taccaivambhūtaṃ bījādikamucchūnādiviśiṣṭāvasthāprāptaṃ niścitamityasiddho hetuḥ / | And it is ascertained that seeds and so forth, having reached specific states such as swelling, are such [causes] - thus the reason is unproven. |
yaccāpyuktaṃ kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇaṃ vyabhicārīti tadasiddham / | And what was also claimed - that "the definition of cause and effect is fallible" - that too is unproven. |
sparśasyāpi rūpahetutayā cakṣurvijñāne 'pi nimittabhāvasyeṣṭatvāt / | Because touch too, being a cause of color, is accepted as being instrumental in visual cognition as well. |
sparśa iti bhūtānyucyante | The term "sparśa" [touch] refers to the material elements. |
tāni copādāyopādāya rūpaṃ vartate tataścakṣurvijñānaṃ prati sparśasya nimittabhāvo 'styeva | Form exists by depending on these [elements], and therefore touch does indeed serve as a cause with respect to visual cognition. |
kevalaṃ sākṣātpāramparyakṛto viśeṣaḥ | The only difference lies in [whether the causation is] direct or indirect. |
na cāpi vyatirekamātramasmābhiḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaniścayahetutvenābhyupagamāt | Moreover, mere absence is not accepted by us as the means of determining the causal relation. |
kiṃ tarhi / viśiṣṭam eva | What then? [It is] only a qualified [absence]. |
tathā hi yeṣu satsu samartheṣu tadanyeṣu hetuṣu yasyaikasyābhāvād yan na bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam iti varṇyate | For when something does not occur due to the absence of just one [factor], even while other efficient causes are present, that [absent factor] is described as its cause. |
na tu yasyābhāve yan na bhavatīti vyatirekamātram | But not mere absence in the sense that "when X is absent, Y does not occur." |
anyathā mātṛvivāhocitadeśajanmanaḥ piṇḍakharjūrasya mātṛvivāhābhāve satyabhāvaprasaṅgāt | Otherwise, a date palm growing in a place suitable for one's mother's marriage would [absurdly] not exist if the mother's marriage had not occurred. |
na caivambhūtasya vyatirekasya sparśena vyabhicāro 'sti | And there is no deviation of such a [qualified] absence with respect to touch. |
tathā hi yadi rūpādisannidhānaṃ pradarśya sparśasyaikasyābhāvāccakṣur vijñānaṃ na bhavatītyeva pradarśyeta tadā syādvyabhicāro na caitacchakyaṃ pradarśayitum | For if it could be shown that visual cognition does not occur due to the absence of touch alone, even when color and other [factors] are present, then there would be deviation - but this cannot be shown. |
ato nāsti kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇasya vyabhicāraḥ | Therefore there is no deviation in [our] definition of the causal relation. |
niyatau deśakālau ca bhāvānāṃ bhavataḥ katham / | How do particular points of space and time arise in relation to things? |
yadi taddhetutā naiṣāṃ syus te sarvatra sarvadā // | If these [points of space and time] were not their cause, those [things] would exist everywhere and always. |
kvacit kadācitkasmiṃśidbhavanto niyatāḥ punaḥ / tatsāpekṣā bhavantyete tadanyaparihārataḥ // | But in fact, [things] arise at some [specific] place, at some [specific] time, and in some [specific] receptacle, being dependent on these [conditions] and excluding all others. |
yadi hi rājīvādīnāṃ taddhetutā pratiniyatadeśakālahetutā na syāt tadā yeyam upalādideśaparihāreṇa salilādāveva pratiniyatadeśe vṛttiḥ yā ca śiśirādisamayaparihāreṇa nidāghādisamaye vṛttiḥ sā na prāpnoti / | If lotuses and similar [things] did not have these particular points of space and time as their cause, then their occurrence exclusively in specific places like water etc. (but not in places like stone etc.), and their occurrence in specific seasons like summer (but not in seasons like winter), would not be possible. |
kiṃ tu sarvatra deśe kāle ca te rājīvādayo bhāvā bhaveyus tannirapekṣatvāt / | Rather, those lotuses and other entities would arise in all places and at all times, due to being independent of those [conditions]. |
tadanyadeśakālaparihārānniyamena pratiniyatadeśādau vartamānās tatsāpekṣā bhavantīti niścīyate // | It is therefore conclusively established that they are dependent on these [conditions], since they regularly occur only in specific places etc. while excluding other places and times. |
tadapekṣā tathāvṛttirapekṣā kāryatocyate / pratyakṣā ca tathā vṛttiḥ siddhās teneha hetavaḥ // | This dependence, [namely] their occurring in that manner, is called being an effect; and such occurrence is perceptible, therefore these causes are established here. |
tadanyadeśādiparihāreṇa niyate deśādau yā vṛttir iyamevāpekṣetyucyate / | This occurrence in specific places etc. while excluding other places etc. is what is meant by "dependence." |
natvabhiprāyātmikā / | [It is] not [dependence] in the sense of intention. |
syād etadyadi nāma tadapekṣā teṣām tathāpi tatkāryatā katham avasitetyāha apekṣā kāryatocyata iti / | [One might object:] "Even if this is their dependence [on space and time], how is it established that they are effects of these?" [To this we reply:] "Dependence is what is called being an effect." |
na hyanyā tatkāryatā kiṃ tarhi / yeyaṃ tathāvṛttilakṣaṇāpekṣā saiva tatkāryatocyate / | [There is] no other character of effect; rather, this dependence characterized by coming into existence in that manner is itself called the character of effect. |
sā ca tathāvṛttir eṣāṃ kathaṃ siddheti cedāha pratyakṣetyādi // | If [one asks] "How is this coming into existence in that manner of these [things] established?", [the answer] is stated [beginning with] "through perception." |
tatsvābhāvikavādo 'yaṃ pratyakṣeṇa prabādhyate / | This doctrine of inherent nature is refuted by perception. |
pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ heturūpasya niścayāt // | Because the nature of the cause is ascertained through both perception and non-apprehension. |
taditi / tasmāt / | "Tat" means "therefore." |
teṣu vā rājīvādiṣu svābhāvikavāda iti samāsaḥ / | Or [it is] a compound meaning "the doctrine of inherent nature with regard to lotuses and other [things]." |
pratyakṣeṇa prabādhyata iti / | [It] is refuted by perception. |
anupalambhasyāpyanyopalambhanatayā pratyakṣātmakatvāt / yatpunaḥ sukhādīnām ahetukatvasādhanāya kādācitkatvād iti sādhanam uktaṃ tat sādhyaviparītasādhanād viruddham / | Since non-apprehension too has the nature of perception by being the apprehension of something else; moreover, the reasoning stated for proving the causelessness of pleasure and other [mental states] from [their] occasionality is contradictory because it proves the opposite of what is to be proved. |
aheturanapekṣasya kādācitkatvānupapatteḥ / | Because occasionality is impossible for what is causeless and independent. |
dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalateti bhāvaḥ // | [This] means that the example [cited] lacks the property to be proved. |
evaṃ tāvat pratyakṣaviruddhatvaṃ pratijñārthasya hetoścāsiddhatodbhāvitā / sāmpratamabhyupagamyahetoḥ siddhimanaikāntikatvaṃ pratipādayann āha mā vetyādi / | Thus far it has been shown that [their] conclusion is contrary to perception and [their] reason is unproven. Now, accepting the validity of [their] reason [for argument's sake], [the author] proceeds to show its inconclusiveness by stating "mā vā" etc. |
yadyanupalambhamātraṃ hetutvenopādīyate tadānaikāntikatā / yato mānābhāvena pramāṇābhāvamātreṇa hetunā naivārthasattāyā abhāvaniścayaḥ // | If mere non-apprehension is put forward as a reason [for non-existence], then [that reason] is inconclusive, because through mere absence of means [of cognition], i.e., through mere absence of valid cognition as a reason, there can never be certainty of the non-existence of a thing. |
kasmān na bhavatīty āha yasmād ityādi / | [One might ask:] "Why can it not be [a valid proof]?" [The author] states "yasmāt" etc. [in response]. |
yasmād arthasya sattāyā vyāpakaṃ na ca kāraṇam / pramāṇaṃ bhedasadbhāvād vyabhicārāt tadudbhavāt // | Because a means of cognition is neither pervasive of the existence of a thing nor its cause, [firstly] due to the presence of difference [between them], [secondly] due to their non-concomitance, and [thirdly] due to [the means of cognition] arising from that [thing]. |
vyāpako hi svabhāvo nivartamānaḥ svaṃ vyāpyaṃ nivartayati kāraṇaṃ vā karyam / tatra tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ vyāpyakāryayoḥ pratibaddhatvāt / | For a pervasive nature, when negated, negates what it pervades, or [similarly] a cause [negates its] effect, because in these cases the pervaded and the effect are bound [to their respective pervaders and causes] through identity and causation respectively. |
na ca pramāṇārthasattayor abhedo bhinnābhāsatvāt / nāpi pramāṇam arthasya kāraṇaṃ vyabhicārāt / | And there is no identity between means of cognition and the existence of things, because they appear as distinct; nor is a means of cognition the cause of a thing, due to their non-concomitance. |
pramāṇam antareṇāpi bhāvāt / | Because [things] exist even without means of cognition. |
tathā hi deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭānam arthānāṃ pramāṇenāviṣayīkṛtānām api sattvamaviruddham eva / | For indeed, the existence of things remote in space, time, and nature, even though not objectified by any means of cognition, is not at all contradictory. |
na ca yena vināpi yadbhavati tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | And that without which something exists cannot reasonably be its cause, as [this would lead to] an unwarranted extension [of the concept of causation]. |
kāraṇatvābhyupagame vā svapakṣaparityāgaḥ / | Or if [they were to] accept [it as] a cause, [it would amount to] abandonment of their own position. |
tadudbhavāc ca na pramāṇam arthasattākāraṇam / | Since [the proof] arises from that [thing], pramāṇa cannot be the cause of the existence of objects. |
tathā hi arthādeva viṣayabhūtātpramāṇamudbhavati / | For indeed, the pramāṇa arises from the object itself which forms its subject matter. |
na punaḥ pramāṇātprameyo 'rthaḥ // | But the cognizable object does not arise from the pramāṇa. |
yaśca naivaṃvidho bhāvas tasya naiva nivṛttitaḥ / | And when something is not of this nature [i.e., not related], its absence does not [necessarily] lead to the absence [of the other thing]. |
naivaṃvidha iti / | "Not of this nature" means: |
na kāraṇaṃ nāpi vyāpakam / | [It is] neither the cause nor the pervader. |
na hyapratibaddhasya nivṛttyānyasya niyamena nivṛttir yuktā atiprasaṅgāt / | For the absence of something that is not inherently connected cannot logically necessitate the absence of another thing, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
evaṃ hyaśvanivṛttau gorapi nivṛttiḥ syāt // | For in that case, the absence of a horse would [absurdly] entail the absence of a cow. |
sarvādṛṣṭiś ca sandigdhā svādṛṣṭir vyabhicāriṇī / | Non-perception by all [people] is doubtful, and one's own non-perception is inconclusive. |
vindhyādrirandhradūrvāder adṛṣṭāvapi satvataḥ // | Because grass and other [plants] in the caves of the Vindhya mountains exist even though [they are] not perceived. |
api cānupalabdher hetutvenopādīyamānā sarvapuruṣopalambhanivṛttilakṣaṇā vopadīyate / svopalambhanivṛttilakṣaṇā vā / | When non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) is put forward as a reason [for non-existence], is it put forward as characterized by absence of perception by all persons, or as characterized by absence of one's own perception? |
na tāvadādyā tasyā arvāgdarśanena niścetumaśakyatayā saṃdigdhatvāt / | The first [alternative] is not [tenable], because due to [our] limited perception, it is impossible to ascertain and hence doubtful. |
nahi sarvaiḥ puruṣair mayūracandrikādīnām adṛṣṭaṃ kāraṇaṃ nopalabhyata ityatrārvāgdarśinaḥ kiñcidasti pramāṇam / | For persons of limited vision have no means of knowing that "the unseen cause of peacock's spots and such things is not perceived by all persons." |
girikuharāntargatasya dūrvāpravalaśilāśakalāder anupalabdhasyāpi satvataḥ satvāvirodhādity arthaḥ / | [This] means that even though grass, coral, stone fragments and such things located inside mountain caves are not perceived, [they] exist, as there is no contradiction in their existence. |
tan na niścitamevāsattvaṃ saṃdehāt / | Therefore non-existence is not certain, due to doubt. |
ahetukatvasiddhyarthaṃ na ceddhetuḥ prayujyate / na cāpramāṇikī siddhirataḥ pakṣo na siddhyati / | If no reason is put forward to prove causelessness, then, since nothing can be proved without valid means of knowledge, [your] position is not proved. |
tatsiddhaye ca hetuścetprayujyeta tathāpi na / siddhes taddhetujanyatvāt pakṣas te samprasiddhyati / | And if a reason is put forward to prove it, even then [your] position is not proved, because the proving would be produced by that reason. |
api caivaṃ bhavān paryanuyojyaḥ / kiṃ nirhetukā bhāvā ityasya svapakṣasya siddhaye bhavatā hetuḥ kaścid upādīyate āhosvin na / | Moreover, you must be asked thus: "Do you adopt some reason or not to prove your own position that 'things are causeless'?" |
na hi pramāṇamantareṇārthasya siddhir asti / | For there is no proving of any matter without valid means of knowledge. |
athopādīyate tathāpi na hi pakṣas te samprasiddhyatīti vakṣyamāṇena sambandhaḥ / | If, on the other hand, [a reason] is adopted, even then your position is not proved - [this] connects with what follows. |
kasmāt / siddhes taddhetujanyatvāt prameyārthaviṣayāyāḥ siddher niścayasya tena hetunā janyamānatvāt / | Why? Because the proving - [that is,] the ascertainment concerning the object to be proved - would be produced by that reason. |
tathā coktamācāryasūripādaiḥ / na heturastīti vadan sahetukaṃ nanu pratijñāṃ svayam eva sādayet / | Thus has it been stated by the venerable Ācāryasūri: "One who declares 'there is no cause,' while [speaking] with reasons, would indeed establish his own thesis [as false] by himself." |
athāpi hetuḥ praṇayālaso bhavet pratijñayā kevalayāsya kiṃ bhavet iti //123- | And if he should be reluctant to present reasons, what could be [achieved] by his mere assertion alone? [Verse 123] |
syād etat jñāpako hetur mayā prayujyate na kārakaḥ / | [Someone] might say this: "The reason that I employ is indicative, not productive." |
tatkasmāt pakṣo me na sidhyatītyāha tathā hītyādi / | [To the question] "Why then is my thesis not established?" he [the author] speaks thus, etc. |
jñāpako hetur iti / trirūpaṃ liṅgaṃ svārthānumānakāle / | The indicative reason [refers to] the three-formed mark at the time of inference for oneself. |
vaco veti / parārthānumānakāle / tatprakāśakam iti / | Or [it is in] the form of words at the time of inference for others, [being] expressive of that [reason]. |
tasya hetoḥ prakāśakam / siddher iti / prameyārthaniścayasya / | [It is] expressive of that reason, [and] of the establishment, i.e., of the ascertainment of the object to be proved. |
anyathā yadi siddher api nimittabhāvaṃ na yāyāt tadā kathaṃ na jñāpakaṃ bhavet / | If it were otherwise, and [the reason] did not assume the state of being a cause of establishment, then how could it not be [merely] indicative? |
evaṃ hi sarvaṃ sarvasya jñāpakaṃ prasajyate // | For in this way, everything would become indicative of everything [else]. |
yadyevaṃ katham ayam ācāryair vibhāgaḥ kārakājjñāpakasya kriyate/ | If this is so, how then is this distinction between productive and indicative made by the teachers? |
atra ca jñānavaśād arthanirdeśo notpādakavadbhūtārthavaśād ity āha ataḥ kāraka evāyaṃ jñāpako hetur ucyate / | Here, the designation [of the reason] is based on cognition, not on actual production like a productive [cause], therefore this indicative reason (jñāpaka-hetu) is called "productive" (kāraka). |
sādhyānutpādakatvāt tu kārako na prakāśyate // sādhyānutpādakatvād asau jñāpaka ucyate na kāraka iti yastu sādhyasyāṅkurāder utpādakaḥ sa kāraka ucyata ityadoṣaḥ / | Because it does not produce what is to be established (sādhya), it is not declared to be "productive" (kāraka); because it does not produce what is to be established, it is called "indicative" (jñāpaka), not "productive" (kāraka); while that which produces what is to be established, such as a sprout and so forth, is called "productive" - thus there is no fault [in this distinction]. |
etena sarveṇa yadācāryasūryuktadūṣaṇasyoparicodyamāpatati tat prativihitaṃ bhavati / | Through all this, whatever objection might arise against the statement of Ācārya Sūri has been countered. |
na heturastīti sahetukaṃ vadannapi kimiti pratijñāṃ sādayet / sa hi jñāpakaṃ hetuṃ brūte kārakaṃ tu pratikṣipatīti / | "Even while asserting with a reason that 'there is no cause', why should one [try to] establish [one's own] thesis? For he asserts an indicative reason while rejecting a productive cause." |
tadatrottaram jñāpako 'pi kāraka eva jñānahetutvād iti / | The answer to this is: "The indicative [reason] too is indeed productive, because it is the cause of cognition." |
etena svavacanavirodha udbhāvyate / | Through this, the self-contradiction in [the opponent's] own statement is revealed. |
na tvahetutvasādhakaḥ kaściddheturasti vyāpteḥ pratyakṣādibādhitatvāt // tasmādityādinopasaṃhāravyājenānumānabādhitatvaṃ ca pratijñārthasya darśayati | There can be no reason that could prove the absence of causation, because [such] a pervasion would be contradicted by perception and other [valid means of knowledge]. Through [the words] beginning with "therefore" (tasmāt), [the author] shows that the thesis-meaning is also contradicted by inference, under the pretext of a conclusion. |
tasmāt sahetavo 'nyo 'pi bhāvā niyatajanmanaḥ / | Therefore, other entities too have causes, because they have restricted origination. |
sādhyārthaviṣayaṃ yadvajjñānaṃ sādhanabhāvi te // | Just as the cognition of the probandum occurs [only] in the presence of the probans. |
anye 'pīti / | [And] others too [have causes]. |
sādhyārthaviṣayajñānavyatirekiṇo rājīvakesarādayaḥ / | Like the lotus filaments and other [objects] which are different from the cognition relating to the object to be proved |
niyatajanmata iti / | [They are regarded as having causes] because their production is restricted |
niyatapadārthasannidhāne satīti śeṣaḥ / | [This means] they are produced only when certain specific things are present |
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