buddhist-nlp/tatpa-cleaned · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 2 508	english stringlengths 2 924 ⌀
na hi yathoktasādhyadharmeṇa kvacid dṛṣṭānte hetoḥ pratibandho 'stīti yāvat	For there is no invariable concomitance between the reason and the probandum as described in any example whatsoever.
tadeva darśayann āha tathāhītyādi	Showing this very [point], [the text] states "for thus..."
saudhasopānagopurāṭṭālakādayaḥ anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ	All such [products] as mansions, stairs, gateways, towers and the like are definitively known to be preceded by many [makers] with impermanent cognitions.
kiṃ ca na kevalamasiddho 'naikāntikaśca hetuḥ api tu viruddho 'pi	Moreover, the probans is not only unproven and inconclusive, but also contradictory.
ata evāyamiṣṭasya vighātakṛdapīcyate	For this very reason, this [probans] is also said to be destructive of what is desired.
anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvaprasādhanāt	Because it establishes [the thing's] being preceded by many [makers] with impermanent cognitions.
ata eveti sādhyaviparītadharmavyāptitaḥ	[This is] for this very reason, namely because of [its] pervasion by a property contrary to what is to be proved.
na kevalaṃ pūrvoktena vidhināsiddho 'naikāntikaścetyapiśabdenāha	The word "api" [also] indicates that it is not only unproven and inconclusive in the previously stated manner.
nanu ca viparyaye pratibandhasadbhāve sati viruddhaḥ syāt	[One might object:] "It would be contradictory only if there were a necessary connection with the opposite [of what is to be proved].
asya ca buddhimatpūrvakamātre 'pi na pratibandho 'sti tatkathaṃ tadviśeṣe syāt	And since there is no necessary connection even with mere precedence by an intelligent being, how could there be [a connection] with that particular [type of intelligent being]?"
buddhimaddhetumātre hi pratibandhastvayoditaḥ	For you have stated [there is] a necessary connection with mere intelligent causation.
dvitīye punarasmābhir vispaṣṭamabhidhīyate	But in the second [part], we will state [this] very clearly.
tvayeśvaravādinā buddhimaddhetumātre pratibandho varṇitaḥ	You, the proponent of God, have described a necessary connection with mere intelligent causation.
anyathā sāmānyenāpi pratibandhāsiddhau kathamīśvarahetukatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ siddhyet	If [the concomitance] were not [established] even in general, how could the [fact that] things have Īśvara as their cause be proven?
tasmād bhavadabhiprāyato buddhimatpūrvakatvamātrasya siddhasya siddhatvam abhyupetya bhavadabhimatāt sādhyaviśeṣāsyadetadvitīyamanityānekavijñānapūrvakatvalakṣaṇamiṣṭaviparītasādhyaṃ tasmin dvitīye sādhyaviśeṣe 'smābhir hetor vispaṣṭaṃ pratibandho 'bhidhīyate	Therefore, accepting from your perspective that [the proposition of] mere "having an intelligent cause" is established, we clearly state the concomitance of [your] reason with a second particular probandum contrary to the particular probandum you desire [to prove], this second probandum being characterized as "being preceded by impermanent multiple cognitions."
katham asau vispaṣṭamabhidhīyata ity āha kramākrametyādi	[Someone asks:] "How is this clearly stated?" [The answer] is given beginning with "kramākrama-".
kramākramavirodhena nityā no kāryakāriṇaḥ	Due to the contradiction between sequence and non-sequence, eternal [things] cannot be producers of effects.
viṣayāṇāṃ kramitvena tajjñāneṣvapi ca kramaḥ	And since objects are sequential, [their] cognitions too must be sequential.
na hīśvarādayo nityabhāvāḥ kāryakāriṇaḥ nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt	Indeed, eternal entities such as Īśvara cannot be producers of effects, because for an eternal [entity] there is contradiction between productive activity and [both] sequence and simultaneity.
tasmād anityā evārthākriyākāriṇaḥ	Therefore, only impermanent [things] can be producers of effects.
te ca pratikṣaṇamaparāparasvabhāvā bhavantīti siddhamanityatvamanekatvaṃ ca buddhimataḥ kartuḥ	And since these [producers] have a nature that changes moment by moment, the impermanence and multiplicity of the intelligent agent is established.
yadapīśvarasya nityaikabuddhyupetatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ tadapyanumānaviruddham iti darśayann āha viṣayāṇām ityādi	Showing that even the claimed possession of a single eternal cognition by Īśvara contradicts inference, he speaks [the words] beginning with "viṣayāṇām."
kramabhāvīśvarajñānaṃ kramivijñeyasaṅgateḥ	God's cognition must be sequential because of [its] connection with sequential cognizable objects.
devadattādivijñānaṃ yathā jvālādigocaraṃ	Just like the cognition of Devadatta and others with regard to flames and other [objects].
yatkramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tatkramabhāvi yathā devadattādivijñānaṃ jvālādigocaram kramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ ceśvarajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	A cognition whose object is cognizable successively must itself be successive, just as [we see] in the case of Devadatta's and others' cognition which has flames and similar [successive things] as its object; and God's cognition has objects that are cognizable successively - [this is] a natural reason.
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedam /	And this is a prasaṅga-type argument [i.e., reductio ad absurdum].
tenāśrayāsiddhatā hetor nāśaṅkanīyā /	Therefore, the [possible] objection that the reason lacks a proper basis need not be feared.
sāmānyādipadārthaviṣayaṃ devadattādivijñānaṃ sādhanadharmavikalam iti jvālādigocaramudāgṛtam /	Since Devadatta's and others' cognition concerning universals and similar [eternal] categories would lack the property to be proven, [only] the example of flames and similar [things] is cited.
kiṃ punar atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam /	"What then is the refuting proof in this case?"
ucyate yadi kramavatā viṣayeṇa tadīśvarajñānaṃ svanirbhāsamupajanyeta tadā siddham eva kramitvam /	[In reply] it is said: "If God's cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object that has succession, then its successiveness is indeed established;
atha na janyate tadā pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvān na tajjānīyāt /	but if it is not produced [by such an object], then due to the absence of a basis for proximity, He would not cognize that [object] at all.
viṣayamantareṇāpi bhavataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vābhyupagataṃ hīyeta / naṣṭājāte ca viṣaye nirviṣayatvaprasaṅgaḥ syād iti /	Either the validity of cognitions would have to be accepted even without objects, or your accepted [doctrine] would have to be abandoned. And regarding objects that are destroyed or not yet produced, [His] cognition would end up being objectless."
idamatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //	This is the refuting proof in this case.
aṇusaṃhatimātraṃ ca ghaṭādyasmābhiriṣyate /	And a jar and similar [things] are considered by us to be merely aggregates of atoms.
tat kārakaḥ kulālādir aṇūnām eva kārakaḥ //	[Therefore] the potter and others are makers of atoms only.
na vyāvṛttas tato dharmaḥ sādhyatvenābhivāñchitaḥ / aṇūdāharaṇādasmādvaidharmyeṇa prakāśitāt //	The property intended as the probandum is not excluded from these atoms which have been presented as an example by dissimilarity.
avayavino vistareṇa pratiṣetsyamānatvāt pratiṣiddhatvāccetyataḥ kulālāder aṇūnām eva kārakatvaṃ prasiddham /	Because the [existence of] composite wholes will be extensively refuted and has [already] been refuted, it is established that the potter and others are makers of atoms only.
ato buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ sādhyadharmo 'ṇubhyo vaidharmyeṇa prakāśitebhyo na vyāvṛtta ityavyāvṛttasādhyadharmatā doṣo vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasya //	Therefore the property to be proven - 'being preceded by intelligence' - is not excluded from the atoms presented as [examples] by dissimilarity, [and thus] the example by dissimilarity has the defect of non-exclusion of the property to be proven.
buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ ca sāmānyena yadīṣyate /	And if 'being preceded by intelligence' is accepted in general,
tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṃ hi karmajam //	then we have no dispute about that, for the diversity [of the world] is produced by karma.
evaṃ hi siddhasādhyatādoṣaḥ /	For thus [there arises] the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven.
kasmād ity āha vaiśvarūpyaṃ hītyādi vaiśvarūpyam satvabhājanalokasya vaicitryam karmajam iti /	[If one asks] "Why?", [the answer is that] the diversity, i.e., the varied nature of the world of living beings, is produced by karma.
ataḥ śubhāśubhakarmakāriṇaḥ puruṣā buddhimanto 'sya kāraṇatām āpadyanta iti siddhasādhyatā //	Therefore intelligent persons who perform good and bad karma become its cause - thus [arises] the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven.
so'pi tavārthaḥ kṛtakatvāt	[Thus] your argument [too] becomes futile (80)
viśeṣeṇa tarhi sādhyata iti cedāha nityetyādi	If [you say] "then let it be proved specifically," [the author] states [the verse starting with] "nitya," etc.
nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā	In proving [things to be] produced by one [being] with eternal consciousness, there is absence of the probandum
vyabhicārāś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇāt	And [there is] deviation [of the reason], since houses and such [things] are seen to be made by many [agents]
etac ca pūrvam uktam api nigamanārthaṃ punar abhihitam	Although this was stated earlier, it is stated again for the purpose of concluding [the argument]
ekā buddhirasyetyekabuddhiḥ nityaścāsāvekabuddhiśceti vigrahaḥ	The compound analysis is: "ekabuddhiḥ" means "one who has single consciousness" and "nitya" means "eternal and having single consciousness"
yadvā nityaikā buddhir asyeti samāsaḥ	Or alternatively, the compound means "one whose consciousness is eternal and single"
sādhyaśūnyateti sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasyeti śeṣaḥ	"Absence of the probandum" [means] "of the example of similarity" - this is to be supplied
vyabhicāraśceti hetor ityadhyāhāraḥ	"And deviation" [means] "of the reason" - this is to be supplied
kathamityāha saudhetyādi	[If asked] "how?", [the author] states [the line beginning with] "saudha," etc.
yac coktaṃ tarvadīnām ityādi tatrāha etad evetyādi	Regarding what was said about trees etc., [the author] states "etad eva," etc.
etadeva yathāyogyamavaśiṣṭeṣu hetuṣu	This same [criticism applies] appropriately to the remaining reasons
yojyaṃ dūṣaṇamanyac ca kiñcinmātraṃ prakāśyate	[This] criticism is to be applied, and some other [criticism] is briefly revealed
tatrāpi hi rūpādimattvādityādisādhaneṣvetad eva hi yathāsambhavaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam	Indeed, even regarding those proofs [beginning with] "because they possess form etc.," this same criticism is to be stated as applicable
asiddhatvaṃ pratibandhābhāvād vyabhicāraḥ sati pratibandhe viruddhatvaṃ sādhyavaikalyam sāmānyena siddhasādhyatetyādi	[The fallacies are:] unestablishedness, deviation due to lack of invariable concomitance, contradictoriness when there is concomitance, lack of probandum, proving what is [already] established in general, etc.
tathā hi tatrāpi yādṛśaṃ rūpādimattvaṃ cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitaṃ tādṛśaṃ tarvādiṣu na siddham	For instance, that [particular] presence of color etc. which is controlled by a conscious being is not established in trees etc.
rūpādimattvamātrasya pratibandhāsiddher vyabhicāraḥ	Due to the non-establishment of invariable concomitance of mere presence of color etc., [the reason] is inconclusive.
pratibandhābhyupagame sati iṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddhatvam	If invariable concomitance is accepted, [the reason] becomes contradictory by proving the opposite of what is desired.
sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā nityaikacetanādhiṣṭhitatvena sādhyadharmeṇānvayāsiddheḥ	The positive example lacks the probandum due to non-establishment of concomitance with the property to be proved, namely being controlled by a single eternal conscious being.
sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa vyabhicāro ghaṭādiṣvanyathādarśanād	[There is] proving what is [already] proved in general terms, and deviation in particular cases due to seeing otherwise in pots etc.
evam anyeṣvapi hetuṣu yojyam	This [criticism] is to be applied to other reasons as well.
sthitvā pravṛttiraṇvāder na siddhā kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ	The intermittent activity of atoms etc. is not established due to momentariness.
vyabhicāraś ca tenaiva tasyāpi kramavṛttitā	And [there is] deviation with reference to that very [God], since his activity too is sequential.
sarvabhāvānāmudayasamanantarāpavargitayā kṣaṇamātram api na sthitir astīti kutaḥ sthitvā pravṛttir bhaviṣyati	Since all entities cease immediately after arising and do not remain even for a moment, how can there be intermittent activity?
tasmāt prativādyasiddho hetuḥ	Therefore, the reason is unproven for the opponent.
anaikāntikaśca tenaiveśvareṇa yata īśvaraḥ kramavat su kāryeṣu sthitvā pravartate	And [it is] inconclusive with reference to that very God, since God acts intermittently on sequential effects.
atha ca nāsau cetanāvadadhiṣṭhito 'navasthāprasaṅgāt	And yet he is not controlled by a conscious being, as that would lead to infinite regress.
athācetanatve satīti saviśeṣaṇo hetuḥ kriyate yathā praśastamatinā kṛtaḥ	If the reason is qualified with "being non-conscious" as done by Praśastamati...
tathāpi saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatayānaikāntikatvamanivāryam eva	...even then inconclusiveness is unavoidable due to doubtful exclusion from the counter-example.
yadeva hi viśeṣaṇaṃ vipakṣāddhetuṃ nivartayati tadeva nyayyam	For only that qualification is logical which excludes the reason from the counter-example.
yatpunarvipakṣe sandehaṃ na vyāvartayati tadupāttamapyasatkalpameva	But that which does not remove doubt about [the reason's presence in] the counter-example is as good as non-existent even if stated.
pūrvoktaścāsiddhatādidoṣaḥ saviśeṣaṇatve 'pi tadavastha eva	And the previously mentioned faults like "unproven" etc. remain exactly the same even with the qualification.
pralaye luptavijñānasmṛtayaḥ puruṣā na naḥ /	According to us, at [cosmic] dissolution, persons do not [continue to] exist with lost consciousness and memory;
ābhāsvarādisambhūtes tata eveha sambhavāt //	because they are born in the Ābhāsvara [and other luminous] regions, and from these [very regions] they are born here [in this world].
uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāmityetadviśeṣaṇamasiddham	The qualification "of those who become awakened later" is unproven.
tathā hi nāsmanmatena pralayakāle praluptajñānasmṛtayo vitanukaraṇāḥ puruṣāḥ santiṣṭhante	For according to our doctrine, at the time of dissolution, persons do not remain [in a state of] lost consciousness and memory with weakened organs.
kintvābhāsvarādiṣu spaṣṭajñānātiśayayogiṣu devanikāyeṣūtpadyante	Rather, they are born among the divine hosts in the Ābhāsvara and other [regions], which possess superior clear consciousness.
ye tu pratiniyatanirayādivipākasaṃvartanīyakarmāṇas te lokadhātvantareṣūtpadyanta	Those however who have karma that must ripen into fixed hell-states and such are born in other world-spheres.
iti vivarttakāle 'pi tata evābhāsvaradeścyutvehāluptajñānasmṛtaya eva sambhavanti	Thus even at the time of evolution, falling from those very Ābhāsvara [regions], they are born here with consciousness and memory intact.
tasmād uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānām iti viśeṣaṇamasiddham	Therefore the qualification "of those who become awakened later" is unproven.
anekāntikaś ca hetuḥ sandigdhavipakṣāvyāvṛttikatvāt	And the reason is inconclusive, because its exclusion from the contrary of what is to be proved is doubtful.
kiñcānyopadeśapūrvakatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyam anāder vyāvahārasya sarveṣām evānyopadeśapūrvakatvasyeṣṭatvāt	Moreover, if what is to be proved is merely [the fact of] being preceded by others' teaching, [the argument] proves what is [already] proven, since all accept that beginningless worldly practice depends on others' teaching.
atheśvaralakṣaṇapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvaṃ sādhyate tadānaikāntikatvam	If then what is to be proved is [the fact of] being preceded by teaching from a person characterized as God, then [the reason] is inconclusive.
anyathāpi vyavahārasambhavāddṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā	Because practice is possible in other ways too, the example lacks what is to be proved.
etac ca pūrvam eva sāmānyaṃ dūṣaṇamuktam	And this general refutation has already been stated before.
vimukhasyopadeṣṭṛtvaṃ śraddhāgamyaṃ paraṃ yadi	If the teachership of one without a mouth can only be known through faith,
vaimukhyaṃ vitanutvena dharmādharmavivekataḥ	[his] mouthlessness [follows] from [his] bodilessness, due to [his] being free from merit and demerit.
yadīśvaropadeśapūrvakatvaṃ vyavahārasya sambhavet tadā syād aviruddhatā hetoḥ	If it were possible for worldly practice to be preceded by God's teaching, then the reason would not be contradictory.
yāvatāsau vimatamukhatvād upadeṣṭā na yuktaḥ	However, because he lacks a mouth, he cannot reasonably be a teacher.
tac ca nimukhatvaṃ vitanutvena śarīravirahādity arthaḥ /	And His being mouthless [follows] from His being bodiless, that is, from [His] being devoid of a body.
tac ca vimutatanutvamasya kathaṃ siddham ity āha dharmādharmavivekata iti /	[One asks:] "How is His being bodiless established?" [Answer:] "Through the distinction regarding dharma and adharma."
śarīrakāraṇadharmādharmavirahād ity arthaḥ /	That is, due to the absence of dharma and adharma, which are the causes of [having] a body.
tathācodyotakāreṇoktaṃ / yathā buddhisattāyāmīśvarasya pramāṇasambhavo naivaṃ dharmādisattve pramāṇamasti iti	Thus Uddyotakara has said: "Just as there is possibility of proof for the existence of intelligence in Īśvara, there is not likewise any proof for the existence of dharma and other [qualities in Him]."
tasmād īśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvāsambhavāt tadupadeśakatvaṃ vyavahārasya na sidhyati kiṃ tvīśvaravyatiriktānyapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvamata iṣṭavighātakāritvād viruddho hetuḥ /	Therefore, due to the impossibility of Īśvara's teachership, [His] being the teacher of worldly usage is not established; rather, [usage] is preceded by the teaching of persons other than Īśvara; hence the reason is contradictory because it destroys what is desired [to be proved].
atheśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvamaṅgīkriyate tadā vimukhatvamabhyupetaṃ hīyata ityabhyupetabādhā /	If Īśvara's teachership is accepted, then [His] accepted mouthlessness is abandoned, which is a contradiction of what is accepted.
mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktam ityādau tu prayoge hetūnāṃ pūrvavadanekāntikatvaṃvipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti yojanīyam //	In the argument beginning with "the manifest [world] consisting of the great elements," etc., the reasons, as before, [have the following flaws]: inconclusiveness due to absence of contradicting proof in the counter-case, futility when taken generally, and when taken specifically, the example lacks the probandum - thus should it be understood.
anumānavirodhaś ca vyāpteḥ sarvatra sādhane /	And in all proofs, [there is] contradiction of inference regarding the pervasion,

na hi yathoktasādhyadharmeṇa kvacid dṛṣṭānte hetoḥ pratibandho 'stīti yāvat

For there is no invariable concomitance between the reason and the probandum as described in any example whatsoever.

tadeva darśayann āha tathāhītyādi

Showing this very [point], [the text] states "for thus..."

saudhasopānagopurāṭṭālakādayaḥ anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ

All such [products] as mansions, stairs, gateways, towers and the like are definitively known to be preceded by many [makers] with impermanent cognitions.

kiṃ ca na kevalamasiddho 'naikāntikaśca hetuḥ api tu viruddho 'pi

Moreover, the probans is not only unproven and inconclusive, but also contradictory.

ata evāyamiṣṭasya vighātakṛdapīcyate

For this very reason, this [probans] is also said to be destructive of what is desired.

anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvaprasādhanāt

Because it establishes [the thing's] being preceded by many [makers] with impermanent cognitions.

ata eveti sādhyaviparītadharmavyāptitaḥ

[This is] for this very reason, namely because of [its] pervasion by a property contrary to what is to be proved.

na kevalaṃ pūrvoktena vidhināsiddho 'naikāntikaścetyapiśabdenāha

The word "api" [also] indicates that it is not only unproven and inconclusive in the previously stated manner.

nanu ca viparyaye pratibandhasadbhāve sati viruddhaḥ syāt

[One might object:] "It would be contradictory only if there were a necessary connection with the opposite [of what is to be proved].

asya ca buddhimatpūrvakamātre 'pi na pratibandho 'sti tatkathaṃ tadviśeṣe syāt

And since there is no necessary connection even with mere precedence by an intelligent being, how could there be [a connection] with that particular [type of intelligent being]?"

buddhimaddhetumātre hi pratibandhastvayoditaḥ

For you have stated [there is] a necessary connection with mere intelligent causation.

dvitīye punarasmābhir vispaṣṭamabhidhīyate

But in the second [part], we will state [this] very clearly.

tvayeśvaravādinā buddhimaddhetumātre pratibandho varṇitaḥ

You, the proponent of God, have described a necessary connection with mere intelligent causation.

anyathā sāmānyenāpi pratibandhāsiddhau kathamīśvarahetukatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ siddhyet

If [the concomitance] were not [established] even in general, how could the [fact that] things have Īśvara as their cause be proven?

tasmād bhavadabhiprāyato buddhimatpūrvakatvamātrasya siddhasya siddhatvam abhyupetya bhavadabhimatāt sādhyaviśeṣāsyadetadvitīyamanityānekavijñānapūrvakatvalakṣaṇamiṣṭaviparītasādhyaṃ tasmin dvitīye sādhyaviśeṣe 'smābhir hetor vispaṣṭaṃ pratibandho 'bhidhīyate

Therefore, accepting from your perspective that [the proposition of] mere "having an intelligent cause" is established, we clearly state the concomitance of [your] reason with a second particular probandum contrary to the particular probandum you desire [to prove], this second probandum being characterized as "being preceded by impermanent multiple cognitions."

katham asau vispaṣṭamabhidhīyata ity āha kramākrametyādi

[Someone asks:] "How is this clearly stated?" [The answer] is given beginning with "kramākrama-".

kramākramavirodhena nityā no kāryakāriṇaḥ

Due to the contradiction between sequence and non-sequence, eternal [things] cannot be producers of effects.

viṣayāṇāṃ kramitvena tajjñāneṣvapi ca kramaḥ

And since objects are sequential, [their] cognitions too must be sequential.

na hīśvarādayo nityabhāvāḥ kāryakāriṇaḥ nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt

Indeed, eternal entities such as Īśvara cannot be producers of effects, because for an eternal [entity] there is contradiction between productive activity and [both] sequence and simultaneity.

tasmād anityā evārthākriyākāriṇaḥ

Therefore, only impermanent [things] can be producers of effects.

te ca pratikṣaṇamaparāparasvabhāvā bhavantīti siddhamanityatvamanekatvaṃ ca buddhimataḥ kartuḥ

And since these [producers] have a nature that changes moment by moment, the impermanence and multiplicity of the intelligent agent is established.

yadapīśvarasya nityaikabuddhyupetatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ tadapyanumānaviruddham iti darśayann āha viṣayāṇām ityādi

Showing that even the claimed possession of a single eternal cognition by Īśvara contradicts inference, he speaks [the words] beginning with "viṣayāṇām."

kramabhāvīśvarajñānaṃ kramivijñeyasaṅgateḥ

God's cognition must be sequential because of [its] connection with sequential cognizable objects.

devadattādivijñānaṃ yathā jvālādigocaraṃ

Just like the cognition of Devadatta and others with regard to flames and other [objects].

yatkramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tatkramabhāvi yathā devadattādivijñānaṃ jvālādigocaram kramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ ceśvarajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

A cognition whose object is cognizable successively must itself be successive, just as [we see] in the case of Devadatta's and others' cognition which has flames and similar [successive things] as its object; and God's cognition has objects that are cognizable successively - [this is] a natural reason.

prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedam /

And this is a prasaṅga-type argument [i.e., reductio ad absurdum].

tenāśrayāsiddhatā hetor nāśaṅkanīyā /

Therefore, the [possible] objection that the reason lacks a proper basis need not be feared.

sāmānyādipadārthaviṣayaṃ devadattādivijñānaṃ sādhanadharmavikalam iti jvālādigocaramudāgṛtam /

Since Devadatta's and others' cognition concerning universals and similar [eternal] categories would lack the property to be proven, [only] the example of flames and similar [things] is cited.

kiṃ punar atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam /

"What then is the refuting proof in this case?"

ucyate yadi kramavatā viṣayeṇa tadīśvarajñānaṃ svanirbhāsamupajanyeta tadā siddham eva kramitvam /

[In reply] it is said: "If God's cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object that has succession, then its successiveness is indeed established;

atha na janyate tadā pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvān na tajjānīyāt /

but if it is not produced [by such an object], then due to the absence of a basis for proximity, He would not cognize that [object] at all.

viṣayamantareṇāpi bhavataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vābhyupagataṃ hīyeta / naṣṭājāte ca viṣaye nirviṣayatvaprasaṅgaḥ syād iti /

Either the validity of cognitions would have to be accepted even without objects, or your accepted [doctrine] would have to be abandoned. And regarding objects that are destroyed or not yet produced, [His] cognition would end up being objectless."

idamatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //

This is the refuting proof in this case.

aṇusaṃhatimātraṃ ca ghaṭādyasmābhiriṣyate /

And a jar and similar [things] are considered by us to be merely aggregates of atoms.

tat kārakaḥ kulālādir aṇūnām eva kārakaḥ //

[Therefore] the potter and others are makers of atoms only.

na vyāvṛttas tato dharmaḥ sādhyatvenābhivāñchitaḥ / aṇūdāharaṇādasmādvaidharmyeṇa prakāśitāt //

The property intended as the probandum is not excluded from these atoms which have been presented as an example by dissimilarity.

avayavino vistareṇa pratiṣetsyamānatvāt pratiṣiddhatvāccetyataḥ kulālāder aṇūnām eva kārakatvaṃ prasiddham /

Because the [existence of] composite wholes will be extensively refuted and has [already] been refuted, it is established that the potter and others are makers of atoms only.

ato buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ sādhyadharmo 'ṇubhyo vaidharmyeṇa prakāśitebhyo na vyāvṛtta ityavyāvṛttasādhyadharmatā doṣo vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasya //

Therefore the property to be proven - 'being preceded by intelligence' - is not excluded from the atoms presented as [examples] by dissimilarity, [and thus] the example by dissimilarity has the defect of non-exclusion of the property to be proven.

buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ ca sāmānyena yadīṣyate /

And if 'being preceded by intelligence' is accepted in general,

tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṃ hi karmajam //

then we have no dispute about that, for the diversity [of the world] is produced by karma.

evaṃ hi siddhasādhyatādoṣaḥ /

For thus [there arises] the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven.

kasmād ity āha vaiśvarūpyaṃ hītyādi vaiśvarūpyam satvabhājanalokasya vaicitryam karmajam iti /

[If one asks] "Why?", [the answer is that] the diversity, i.e., the varied nature of the world of living beings, is produced by karma.

ataḥ śubhāśubhakarmakāriṇaḥ puruṣā buddhimanto 'sya kāraṇatām āpadyanta iti siddhasādhyatā //

Therefore intelligent persons who perform good and bad karma become its cause - thus [arises] the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven.

so'pi tavārthaḥ kṛtakatvāt

[Thus] your argument [too] becomes futile (80)

viśeṣeṇa tarhi sādhyata iti cedāha nityetyādi

If [you say] "then let it be proved specifically," [the author] states [the verse starting with] "nitya," etc.

nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā

In proving [things to be] produced by one [being] with eternal consciousness, there is absence of the probandum

vyabhicārāś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇāt

And [there is] deviation [of the reason], since houses and such [things] are seen to be made by many [agents]

etac ca pūrvam uktam api nigamanārthaṃ punar abhihitam

Although this was stated earlier, it is stated again for the purpose of concluding [the argument]

ekā buddhirasyetyekabuddhiḥ nityaścāsāvekabuddhiśceti vigrahaḥ

The compound analysis is: "ekabuddhiḥ" means "one who has single consciousness" and "nitya" means "eternal and having single consciousness"

yadvā nityaikā buddhir asyeti samāsaḥ

Or alternatively, the compound means "one whose consciousness is eternal and single"

sādhyaśūnyateti sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasyeti śeṣaḥ

"Absence of the probandum" [means] "of the example of similarity" - this is to be supplied

vyabhicāraśceti hetor ityadhyāhāraḥ

"And deviation" [means] "of the reason" - this is to be supplied

kathamityāha saudhetyādi

[If asked] "how?", [the author] states [the line beginning with] "saudha," etc.

yac coktaṃ tarvadīnām ityādi tatrāha etad evetyādi

Regarding what was said about trees etc., [the author] states "etad eva," etc.

etadeva yathāyogyamavaśiṣṭeṣu hetuṣu

This same [criticism applies] appropriately to the remaining reasons

yojyaṃ dūṣaṇamanyac ca kiñcinmātraṃ prakāśyate

[This] criticism is to be applied, and some other [criticism] is briefly revealed

tatrāpi hi rūpādimattvādityādisādhaneṣvetad eva hi yathāsambhavaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam

Indeed, even regarding those proofs [beginning with] "because they possess form etc.," this same criticism is to be stated as applicable

asiddhatvaṃ pratibandhābhāvād vyabhicāraḥ sati pratibandhe viruddhatvaṃ sādhyavaikalyam sāmānyena siddhasādhyatetyādi

[The fallacies are:] unestablishedness, deviation due to lack of invariable concomitance, contradictoriness when there is concomitance, lack of probandum, proving what is [already] established in general, etc.

tathā hi tatrāpi yādṛśaṃ rūpādimattvaṃ cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitaṃ tādṛśaṃ tarvādiṣu na siddham

For instance, that [particular] presence of color etc. which is controlled by a conscious being is not established in trees etc.

rūpādimattvamātrasya pratibandhāsiddher vyabhicāraḥ

Due to the non-establishment of invariable concomitance of mere presence of color etc., [the reason] is inconclusive.

pratibandhābhyupagame sati iṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddhatvam

If invariable concomitance is accepted, [the reason] becomes contradictory by proving the opposite of what is desired.

sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā nityaikacetanādhiṣṭhitatvena sādhyadharmeṇānvayāsiddheḥ

The positive example lacks the probandum due to non-establishment of concomitance with the property to be proved, namely being controlled by a single eternal conscious being.

sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa vyabhicāro ghaṭādiṣvanyathādarśanād

[There is] proving what is [already] proved in general terms, and deviation in particular cases due to seeing otherwise in pots etc.

evam anyeṣvapi hetuṣu yojyam

This [criticism] is to be applied to other reasons as well.

sthitvā pravṛttiraṇvāder na siddhā kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ

The intermittent activity of atoms etc. is not established due to momentariness.

vyabhicāraś ca tenaiva tasyāpi kramavṛttitā

And [there is] deviation with reference to that very [God], since his activity too is sequential.

sarvabhāvānāmudayasamanantarāpavargitayā kṣaṇamātram api na sthitir astīti kutaḥ sthitvā pravṛttir bhaviṣyati

Since all entities cease immediately after arising and do not remain even for a moment, how can there be intermittent activity?

tasmāt prativādyasiddho hetuḥ

Therefore, the reason is unproven for the opponent.

anaikāntikaśca tenaiveśvareṇa yata īśvaraḥ kramavat su kāryeṣu sthitvā pravartate

And [it is] inconclusive with reference to that very God, since God acts intermittently on sequential effects.

atha ca nāsau cetanāvadadhiṣṭhito 'navasthāprasaṅgāt

And yet he is not controlled by a conscious being, as that would lead to infinite regress.

athācetanatve satīti saviśeṣaṇo hetuḥ kriyate yathā praśastamatinā kṛtaḥ

If the reason is qualified with "being non-conscious" as done by Praśastamati...

tathāpi saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatayānaikāntikatvamanivāryam eva

...even then inconclusiveness is unavoidable due to doubtful exclusion from the counter-example.

yadeva hi viśeṣaṇaṃ vipakṣāddhetuṃ nivartayati tadeva nyayyam

For only that qualification is logical which excludes the reason from the counter-example.

yatpunarvipakṣe sandehaṃ na vyāvartayati tadupāttamapyasatkalpameva

But that which does not remove doubt about [the reason's presence in] the counter-example is as good as non-existent even if stated.

pūrvoktaścāsiddhatādidoṣaḥ saviśeṣaṇatve 'pi tadavastha eva

And the previously mentioned faults like "unproven" etc. remain exactly the same even with the qualification.

pralaye luptavijñānasmṛtayaḥ puruṣā na naḥ /

According to us, at [cosmic] dissolution, persons do not [continue to] exist with lost consciousness and memory;

ābhāsvarādisambhūtes tata eveha sambhavāt //

because they are born in the Ābhāsvara [and other luminous] regions, and from these [very regions] they are born here [in this world].

uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāmityetadviśeṣaṇamasiddham

The qualification "of those who become awakened later" is unproven.

tathā hi nāsmanmatena pralayakāle praluptajñānasmṛtayo vitanukaraṇāḥ puruṣāḥ santiṣṭhante

For according to our doctrine, at the time of dissolution, persons do not remain [in a state of] lost consciousness and memory with weakened organs.

kintvābhāsvarādiṣu spaṣṭajñānātiśayayogiṣu devanikāyeṣūtpadyante

Rather, they are born among the divine hosts in the Ābhāsvara and other [regions], which possess superior clear consciousness.

ye tu pratiniyatanirayādivipākasaṃvartanīyakarmāṇas te lokadhātvantareṣūtpadyanta

Those however who have karma that must ripen into fixed hell-states and such are born in other world-spheres.

iti vivarttakāle 'pi tata evābhāsvaradeścyutvehāluptajñānasmṛtaya eva sambhavanti

Thus even at the time of evolution, falling from those very Ābhāsvara [regions], they are born here with consciousness and memory intact.

tasmād uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānām iti viśeṣaṇamasiddham

Therefore the qualification "of those who become awakened later" is unproven.

anekāntikaś ca hetuḥ sandigdhavipakṣāvyāvṛttikatvāt

And the reason is inconclusive, because its exclusion from the contrary of what is to be proved is doubtful.

kiñcānyopadeśapūrvakatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyam anāder vyāvahārasya sarveṣām evānyopadeśapūrvakatvasyeṣṭatvāt

Moreover, if what is to be proved is merely [the fact of] being preceded by others' teaching, [the argument] proves what is [already] proven, since all accept that beginningless worldly practice depends on others' teaching.

atheśvaralakṣaṇapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvaṃ sādhyate tadānaikāntikatvam

If then what is to be proved is [the fact of] being preceded by teaching from a person characterized as God, then [the reason] is inconclusive.

anyathāpi vyavahārasambhavāddṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā

Because practice is possible in other ways too, the example lacks what is to be proved.

etac ca pūrvam eva sāmānyaṃ dūṣaṇamuktam

And this general refutation has already been stated before.

vimukhasyopadeṣṭṛtvaṃ śraddhāgamyaṃ paraṃ yadi

If the teachership of one without a mouth can only be known through faith,

vaimukhyaṃ vitanutvena dharmādharmavivekataḥ

[his] mouthlessness [follows] from [his] bodilessness, due to [his] being free from merit and demerit.

yadīśvaropadeśapūrvakatvaṃ vyavahārasya sambhavet tadā syād aviruddhatā hetoḥ

If it were possible for worldly practice to be preceded by God's teaching, then the reason would not be contradictory.

yāvatāsau vimatamukhatvād upadeṣṭā na yuktaḥ

However, because he lacks a mouth, he cannot reasonably be a teacher.

tac ca nimukhatvaṃ vitanutvena śarīravirahādity arthaḥ /

And His being mouthless [follows] from His being bodiless, that is, from [His] being devoid of a body.

tac ca vimutatanutvamasya kathaṃ siddham ity āha dharmādharmavivekata iti /

[One asks:] "How is His being bodiless established?" [Answer:] "Through the distinction regarding dharma and adharma."

śarīrakāraṇadharmādharmavirahād ity arthaḥ /

That is, due to the absence of dharma and adharma, which are the causes of [having] a body.

tathācodyotakāreṇoktaṃ / yathā buddhisattāyāmīśvarasya pramāṇasambhavo naivaṃ dharmādisattve pramāṇamasti iti

Thus Uddyotakara has said: "Just as there is possibility of proof for the existence of intelligence in Īśvara, there is not likewise any proof for the existence of dharma and other [qualities in Him]."

tasmād īśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvāsambhavāt tadupadeśakatvaṃ vyavahārasya na sidhyati kiṃ tvīśvaravyatiriktānyapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvamata iṣṭavighātakāritvād viruddho hetuḥ /

Therefore, due to the impossibility of Īśvara's teachership, [His] being the teacher of worldly usage is not established; rather, [usage] is preceded by the teaching of persons other than Īśvara; hence the reason is contradictory because it destroys what is desired [to be proved].

atheśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvamaṅgīkriyate tadā vimukhatvamabhyupetaṃ hīyata ityabhyupetabādhā /

If Īśvara's teachership is accepted, then [His] accepted mouthlessness is abandoned, which is a contradiction of what is accepted.

mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktam ityādau tu prayoge hetūnāṃ pūrvavadanekāntikatvaṃvipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti yojanīyam //

In the argument beginning with "the manifest [world] consisting of the great elements," etc., the reasons, as before, [have the following flaws]: inconclusiveness due to absence of contradicting proof in the counter-case, futility when taken generally, and when taken specifically, the example lacks the probandum - thus should it be understood.

anumānavirodhaś ca vyāpteḥ sarvatra sādhane /

And in all proofs, [there is] contradiction of inference regarding the pervasion,