sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
na hi yathoktasādhyadharmeṇa kvacid dṛṣṭānte hetoḥ pratibandho 'stīti yāvat | For there is no invariable concomitance between the reason and the probandum as described in any example whatsoever. |
tadeva darśayann āha tathāhītyādi | Showing this very [point], [the text] states "for thus..." |
saudhasopānagopurāṭṭālakādayaḥ anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ | All such [products] as mansions, stairs, gateways, towers and the like are definitively known to be preceded by many [makers] with impermanent cognitions. |
kiṃ ca na kevalamasiddho 'naikāntikaśca hetuḥ api tu viruddho 'pi | Moreover, the probans is not only unproven and inconclusive, but also contradictory. |
ata evāyamiṣṭasya vighātakṛdapīcyate | For this very reason, this [probans] is also said to be destructive of what is desired. |
anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvaprasādhanāt | Because it establishes [the thing's] being preceded by many [makers] with impermanent cognitions. |
ata eveti sādhyaviparītadharmavyāptitaḥ | [This is] for this very reason, namely because of [its] pervasion by a property contrary to what is to be proved. |
na kevalaṃ pūrvoktena vidhināsiddho 'naikāntikaścetyapiśabdenāha | The word "api" [also] indicates that it is not only unproven and inconclusive in the previously stated manner. |
nanu ca viparyaye pratibandhasadbhāve sati viruddhaḥ syāt | [One might object:] "It would be contradictory only if there were a necessary connection with the opposite [of what is to be proved]. |
asya ca buddhimatpūrvakamātre 'pi na pratibandho 'sti tatkathaṃ tadviśeṣe syāt | And since there is no necessary connection even with mere precedence by an intelligent being, how could there be [a connection] with that particular [type of intelligent being]?" |
buddhimaddhetumātre hi pratibandhastvayoditaḥ | For you have stated [there is] a necessary connection with mere intelligent causation. |
dvitīye punarasmābhir vispaṣṭamabhidhīyate | But in the second [part], we will state [this] very clearly. |
tvayeśvaravādinā buddhimaddhetumātre pratibandho varṇitaḥ | You, the proponent of God, have described a necessary connection with mere intelligent causation. |
anyathā sāmānyenāpi pratibandhāsiddhau kathamīśvarahetukatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ siddhyet | If [the concomitance] were not [established] even in general, how could the [fact that] things have Īśvara as their cause be proven? |
tasmād bhavadabhiprāyato buddhimatpūrvakatvamātrasya siddhasya siddhatvam abhyupetya bhavadabhimatāt sādhyaviśeṣāsyadetadvitīyamanityānekavijñānapūrvakatvalakṣaṇamiṣṭaviparītasādhyaṃ tasmin dvitīye sādhyaviśeṣe 'smābhir hetor vispaṣṭaṃ pratibandho 'bhidhīyate | Therefore, accepting from your perspective that [the proposition of] mere "having an intelligent cause" is established, we clearly state the concomitance of [your] reason with a second particular probandum contrary to the particular probandum you desire [to prove], this second probandum being characterized as "being preceded by impermanent multiple cognitions." |
katham asau vispaṣṭamabhidhīyata ity āha kramākrametyādi | [Someone asks:] "How is this clearly stated?" [The answer] is given beginning with "kramākrama-". |
kramākramavirodhena nityā no kāryakāriṇaḥ | Due to the contradiction between sequence and non-sequence, eternal [things] cannot be producers of effects. |
viṣayāṇāṃ kramitvena tajjñāneṣvapi ca kramaḥ | And since objects are sequential, [their] cognitions too must be sequential. |
na hīśvarādayo nityabhāvāḥ kāryakāriṇaḥ nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt | Indeed, eternal entities such as Īśvara cannot be producers of effects, because for an eternal [entity] there is contradiction between productive activity and [both] sequence and simultaneity. |
tasmād anityā evārthākriyākāriṇaḥ | Therefore, only impermanent [things] can be producers of effects. |
te ca pratikṣaṇamaparāparasvabhāvā bhavantīti siddhamanityatvamanekatvaṃ ca buddhimataḥ kartuḥ | And since these [producers] have a nature that changes moment by moment, the impermanence and multiplicity of the intelligent agent is established. |
yadapīśvarasya nityaikabuddhyupetatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ tadapyanumānaviruddham iti darśayann āha viṣayāṇām ityādi | Showing that even the claimed possession of a single eternal cognition by Īśvara contradicts inference, he speaks [the words] beginning with "viṣayāṇām." |
kramabhāvīśvarajñānaṃ kramivijñeyasaṅgateḥ | God's cognition must be sequential because of [its] connection with sequential cognizable objects. |
devadattādivijñānaṃ yathā jvālādigocaraṃ | Just like the cognition of Devadatta and others with regard to flames and other [objects]. |
yatkramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tatkramabhāvi yathā devadattādivijñānaṃ jvālādigocaram kramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ ceśvarajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | A cognition whose object is cognizable successively must itself be successive, just as [we see] in the case of Devadatta's and others' cognition which has flames and similar [successive things] as its object; and God's cognition has objects that are cognizable successively - [this is] a natural reason. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedam / | And this is a prasaṅga-type argument [i.e., reductio ad absurdum]. |
tenāśrayāsiddhatā hetor nāśaṅkanīyā / | Therefore, the [possible] objection that the reason lacks a proper basis need not be feared. |
sāmānyādipadārthaviṣayaṃ devadattādivijñānaṃ sādhanadharmavikalam iti jvālādigocaramudāgṛtam / | Since Devadatta's and others' cognition concerning universals and similar [eternal] categories would lack the property to be proven, [only] the example of flames and similar [things] is cited. |
kiṃ punar atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | "What then is the refuting proof in this case?" |
ucyate yadi kramavatā viṣayeṇa tadīśvarajñānaṃ svanirbhāsamupajanyeta tadā siddham eva kramitvam / | [In reply] it is said: "If God's cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object that has succession, then its successiveness is indeed established; |
atha na janyate tadā pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvān na tajjānīyāt / | but if it is not produced [by such an object], then due to the absence of a basis for proximity, He would not cognize that [object] at all. |
viṣayamantareṇāpi bhavataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vābhyupagataṃ hīyeta / naṣṭājāte ca viṣaye nirviṣayatvaprasaṅgaḥ syād iti / | Either the validity of cognitions would have to be accepted even without objects, or your accepted [doctrine] would have to be abandoned. And regarding objects that are destroyed or not yet produced, [His] cognition would end up being objectless." |
idamatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | This is the refuting proof in this case. |
aṇusaṃhatimātraṃ ca ghaṭādyasmābhiriṣyate / | And a jar and similar [things] are considered by us to be merely aggregates of atoms. |
tat kārakaḥ kulālādir aṇūnām eva kārakaḥ // | [Therefore] the potter and others are makers of atoms only. |
na vyāvṛttas tato dharmaḥ sādhyatvenābhivāñchitaḥ / aṇūdāharaṇādasmādvaidharmyeṇa prakāśitāt // | The property intended as the probandum is not excluded from these atoms which have been presented as an example by dissimilarity. |
avayavino vistareṇa pratiṣetsyamānatvāt pratiṣiddhatvāccetyataḥ kulālāder aṇūnām eva kārakatvaṃ prasiddham / | Because the [existence of] composite wholes will be extensively refuted and has [already] been refuted, it is established that the potter and others are makers of atoms only. |
ato buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ sādhyadharmo 'ṇubhyo vaidharmyeṇa prakāśitebhyo na vyāvṛtta ityavyāvṛttasādhyadharmatā doṣo vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasya // | Therefore the property to be proven - 'being preceded by intelligence' - is not excluded from the atoms presented as [examples] by dissimilarity, [and thus] the example by dissimilarity has the defect of non-exclusion of the property to be proven. |
buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ ca sāmānyena yadīṣyate / | And if 'being preceded by intelligence' is accepted in general, |
tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṃ hi karmajam // | then we have no dispute about that, for the diversity [of the world] is produced by karma. |
evaṃ hi siddhasādhyatādoṣaḥ / | For thus [there arises] the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven. |
kasmād ity āha vaiśvarūpyaṃ hītyādi vaiśvarūpyam satvabhājanalokasya vaicitryam karmajam iti / | [If one asks] "Why?", [the answer is that] the diversity, i.e., the varied nature of the world of living beings, is produced by karma. |
ataḥ śubhāśubhakarmakāriṇaḥ puruṣā buddhimanto 'sya kāraṇatām āpadyanta iti siddhasādhyatā // | Therefore intelligent persons who perform good and bad karma become its cause - thus [arises] the fallacy of proving what is [already] proven. |
so'pi tavārthaḥ kṛtakatvāt | [Thus] your argument [too] becomes futile (80) |
viśeṣeṇa tarhi sādhyata iti cedāha nityetyādi | If [you say] "then let it be proved specifically," [the author] states [the verse starting with] "nitya," etc. |
nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā | In proving [things to be] produced by one [being] with eternal consciousness, there is absence of the probandum |
vyabhicārāś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇāt | And [there is] deviation [of the reason], since houses and such [things] are seen to be made by many [agents] |
etac ca pūrvam uktam api nigamanārthaṃ punar abhihitam | Although this was stated earlier, it is stated again for the purpose of concluding [the argument] |
ekā buddhirasyetyekabuddhiḥ nityaścāsāvekabuddhiśceti vigrahaḥ | The compound analysis is: "ekabuddhiḥ" means "one who has single consciousness" and "nitya" means "eternal and having single consciousness" |
yadvā nityaikā buddhir asyeti samāsaḥ | Or alternatively, the compound means "one whose consciousness is eternal and single" |
sādhyaśūnyateti sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasyeti śeṣaḥ | "Absence of the probandum" [means] "of the example of similarity" - this is to be supplied |
vyabhicāraśceti hetor ityadhyāhāraḥ | "And deviation" [means] "of the reason" - this is to be supplied |
kathamityāha saudhetyādi | [If asked] "how?", [the author] states [the line beginning with] "saudha," etc. |
yac coktaṃ tarvadīnām ityādi tatrāha etad evetyādi | Regarding what was said about trees etc., [the author] states "etad eva," etc. |
etadeva yathāyogyamavaśiṣṭeṣu hetuṣu | This same [criticism applies] appropriately to the remaining reasons |
yojyaṃ dūṣaṇamanyac ca kiñcinmātraṃ prakāśyate | [This] criticism is to be applied, and some other [criticism] is briefly revealed |
tatrāpi hi rūpādimattvādityādisādhaneṣvetad eva hi yathāsambhavaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam | Indeed, even regarding those proofs [beginning with] "because they possess form etc.," this same criticism is to be stated as applicable |
asiddhatvaṃ pratibandhābhāvād vyabhicāraḥ sati pratibandhe viruddhatvaṃ sādhyavaikalyam sāmānyena siddhasādhyatetyādi | [The fallacies are:] unestablishedness, deviation due to lack of invariable concomitance, contradictoriness when there is concomitance, lack of probandum, proving what is [already] established in general, etc. |
tathā hi tatrāpi yādṛśaṃ rūpādimattvaṃ cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitaṃ tādṛśaṃ tarvādiṣu na siddham | For instance, that [particular] presence of color etc. which is controlled by a conscious being is not established in trees etc. |
rūpādimattvamātrasya pratibandhāsiddher vyabhicāraḥ | Due to the non-establishment of invariable concomitance of mere presence of color etc., [the reason] is inconclusive. |
pratibandhābhyupagame sati iṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddhatvam | If invariable concomitance is accepted, [the reason] becomes contradictory by proving the opposite of what is desired. |
sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā nityaikacetanādhiṣṭhitatvena sādhyadharmeṇānvayāsiddheḥ | The positive example lacks the probandum due to non-establishment of concomitance with the property to be proved, namely being controlled by a single eternal conscious being. |
sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa vyabhicāro ghaṭādiṣvanyathādarśanād | [There is] proving what is [already] proved in general terms, and deviation in particular cases due to seeing otherwise in pots etc. |
evam anyeṣvapi hetuṣu yojyam | This [criticism] is to be applied to other reasons as well. |
sthitvā pravṛttiraṇvāder na siddhā kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ | The intermittent activity of atoms etc. is not established due to momentariness. |
vyabhicāraś ca tenaiva tasyāpi kramavṛttitā | And [there is] deviation with reference to that very [God], since his activity too is sequential. |
sarvabhāvānāmudayasamanantarāpavargitayā kṣaṇamātram api na sthitir astīti kutaḥ sthitvā pravṛttir bhaviṣyati | Since all entities cease immediately after arising and do not remain even for a moment, how can there be intermittent activity? |
tasmāt prativādyasiddho hetuḥ | Therefore, the reason is unproven for the opponent. |
anaikāntikaśca tenaiveśvareṇa yata īśvaraḥ kramavat su kāryeṣu sthitvā pravartate | And [it is] inconclusive with reference to that very God, since God acts intermittently on sequential effects. |
atha ca nāsau cetanāvadadhiṣṭhito 'navasthāprasaṅgāt | And yet he is not controlled by a conscious being, as that would lead to infinite regress. |
athācetanatve satīti saviśeṣaṇo hetuḥ kriyate yathā praśastamatinā kṛtaḥ | If the reason is qualified with "being non-conscious" as done by Praśastamati... |
tathāpi saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatayānaikāntikatvamanivāryam eva | ...even then inconclusiveness is unavoidable due to doubtful exclusion from the counter-example. |
yadeva hi viśeṣaṇaṃ vipakṣāddhetuṃ nivartayati tadeva nyayyam | For only that qualification is logical which excludes the reason from the counter-example. |
yatpunarvipakṣe sandehaṃ na vyāvartayati tadupāttamapyasatkalpameva | But that which does not remove doubt about [the reason's presence in] the counter-example is as good as non-existent even if stated. |
pūrvoktaścāsiddhatādidoṣaḥ saviśeṣaṇatve 'pi tadavastha eva | And the previously mentioned faults like "unproven" etc. remain exactly the same even with the qualification. |
pralaye luptavijñānasmṛtayaḥ puruṣā na naḥ / | According to us, at [cosmic] dissolution, persons do not [continue to] exist with lost consciousness and memory; |
ābhāsvarādisambhūtes tata eveha sambhavāt // | because they are born in the Ābhāsvara [and other luminous] regions, and from these [very regions] they are born here [in this world]. |
uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāmityetadviśeṣaṇamasiddham | The qualification "of those who become awakened later" is unproven. |
tathā hi nāsmanmatena pralayakāle praluptajñānasmṛtayo vitanukaraṇāḥ puruṣāḥ santiṣṭhante | For according to our doctrine, at the time of dissolution, persons do not remain [in a state of] lost consciousness and memory with weakened organs. |
kintvābhāsvarādiṣu spaṣṭajñānātiśayayogiṣu devanikāyeṣūtpadyante | Rather, they are born among the divine hosts in the Ābhāsvara and other [regions], which possess superior clear consciousness. |
ye tu pratiniyatanirayādivipākasaṃvartanīyakarmāṇas te lokadhātvantareṣūtpadyanta | Those however who have karma that must ripen into fixed hell-states and such are born in other world-spheres. |
iti vivarttakāle 'pi tata evābhāsvaradeścyutvehāluptajñānasmṛtaya eva sambhavanti | Thus even at the time of evolution, falling from those very Ābhāsvara [regions], they are born here with consciousness and memory intact. |
tasmād uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānām iti viśeṣaṇamasiddham | Therefore the qualification "of those who become awakened later" is unproven. |
anekāntikaś ca hetuḥ sandigdhavipakṣāvyāvṛttikatvāt | And the reason is inconclusive, because its exclusion from the contrary of what is to be proved is doubtful. |
kiñcānyopadeśapūrvakatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyam anāder vyāvahārasya sarveṣām evānyopadeśapūrvakatvasyeṣṭatvāt | Moreover, if what is to be proved is merely [the fact of] being preceded by others' teaching, [the argument] proves what is [already] proven, since all accept that beginningless worldly practice depends on others' teaching. |
atheśvaralakṣaṇapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvaṃ sādhyate tadānaikāntikatvam | If then what is to be proved is [the fact of] being preceded by teaching from a person characterized as God, then [the reason] is inconclusive. |
anyathāpi vyavahārasambhavāddṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā | Because practice is possible in other ways too, the example lacks what is to be proved. |
etac ca pūrvam eva sāmānyaṃ dūṣaṇamuktam | And this general refutation has already been stated before. |
vimukhasyopadeṣṭṛtvaṃ śraddhāgamyaṃ paraṃ yadi | If the teachership of one without a mouth can only be known through faith, |
vaimukhyaṃ vitanutvena dharmādharmavivekataḥ | [his] mouthlessness [follows] from [his] bodilessness, due to [his] being free from merit and demerit. |
yadīśvaropadeśapūrvakatvaṃ vyavahārasya sambhavet tadā syād aviruddhatā hetoḥ | If it were possible for worldly practice to be preceded by God's teaching, then the reason would not be contradictory. |
yāvatāsau vimatamukhatvād upadeṣṭā na yuktaḥ | However, because he lacks a mouth, he cannot reasonably be a teacher. |
tac ca nimukhatvaṃ vitanutvena śarīravirahādity arthaḥ / | And His being mouthless [follows] from His being bodiless, that is, from [His] being devoid of a body. |
tac ca vimutatanutvamasya kathaṃ siddham ity āha dharmādharmavivekata iti / | [One asks:] "How is His being bodiless established?" [Answer:] "Through the distinction regarding dharma and adharma." |
śarīrakāraṇadharmādharmavirahād ity arthaḥ / | That is, due to the absence of dharma and adharma, which are the causes of [having] a body. |
tathācodyotakāreṇoktaṃ / yathā buddhisattāyāmīśvarasya pramāṇasambhavo naivaṃ dharmādisattve pramāṇamasti iti | Thus Uddyotakara has said: "Just as there is possibility of proof for the existence of intelligence in Īśvara, there is not likewise any proof for the existence of dharma and other [qualities in Him]." |
tasmād īśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvāsambhavāt tadupadeśakatvaṃ vyavahārasya na sidhyati kiṃ tvīśvaravyatiriktānyapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvamata iṣṭavighātakāritvād viruddho hetuḥ / | Therefore, due to the impossibility of Īśvara's teachership, [His] being the teacher of worldly usage is not established; rather, [usage] is preceded by the teaching of persons other than Īśvara; hence the reason is contradictory because it destroys what is desired [to be proved]. |
atheśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvamaṅgīkriyate tadā vimukhatvamabhyupetaṃ hīyata ityabhyupetabādhā / | If Īśvara's teachership is accepted, then [His] accepted mouthlessness is abandoned, which is a contradiction of what is accepted. |
mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktam ityādau tu prayoge hetūnāṃ pūrvavadanekāntikatvaṃvipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti yojanīyam // | In the argument beginning with "the manifest [world] consisting of the great elements," etc., the reasons, as before, [have the following flaws]: inconclusiveness due to absence of contradicting proof in the counter-case, futility when taken generally, and when taken specifically, the example lacks the probandum - thus should it be understood. |
anumānavirodhaś ca vyāpteḥ sarvatra sādhane / | And in all proofs, [there is] contradiction of inference regarding the pervasion, |
Subsets and Splits