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Here are the sentence pairs with precise translations, using IAST diacritics and square brackets for clarification: | null |
tatra yadacetanaṃ tadadhiṣṭhātāramantareṇa na svakāryamārabhata ityādau prayoge sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatayā hetor anaikāntikateti bhāvaḥ / | In [the case of] those arguments [which state] "What is insentient cannot initiate its effects without a controller," etc., because there is no valid means of cognition refuting the presence of the reason in the opposite of what is to be proved, due to the doubtful exclusion from the counter-example, the reason is inconclusive – this is the meaning. |
yaccāyaṃ svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvāditihetuḥ prathame sādhanaprayoge so 'siddhaḥ katham ity āha yata ityādi / | And how this reason stated as "because it is characterized by a particular arrangement of its constituent parts" is unestablished in the first argument – this is explained by [the words] "because," etc. |
avayavasaṃniveśaśabdena hi saṃyogaviśeṣo 'bhipretaḥ tadviśiṣṭatvaṃ cāvayavyākhyasya dravyasya tayor api viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor asiddhatvād dvidha hetvasiddhiḥ // | By the term "arrangement of parts" a particular kind of conjunction is meant, and [this] being characterized by that [conjunction] belongs to the substance called composite whole; due to both these qualifier and qualified being unestablished, there is a twofold non-establishment of the reason. |
kathaṃ punar dvayamasiddhatvam ity āha dṛśyatvenetyādi / | How are these two unestablished? This is stated by [the words] "because of visibility," etc. |
dṛśyatvenābhyupetasya dvayasyānupalambhanāt / | Because both [things] which are accepted as being perceptible are not [actually] apprehended. |
tatra saṃkṣepeṇa svabhāvānupalambhākhyam eva pramāṇaṃ bādhakamāha / | Here [the author] states briefly the refuting valid cognition which is called non-apprehension of essential nature. |
vistareṇa ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyām anayor dūṣaṇamabhidhāsyate dvayasyāpīti / saṃniveśāvayavisaṃmatasya / | A detailed refutation of these two – both the accepted arrangement and the composite whole – will be stated in the examination of the six categories. |
tathā hi saṃniveśo dṛśyatvenābhyupetaḥ saṃkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpasamavāyāccākṣuṣāṇi iti vacanāt / avayavī ca dṛśyatveneṣṭaḥ mahatyanekadravyavattvādrūpāccopalabdhir iti vacanāt / na rūpādivyatirekeṇāparaḥ saṃyogo 'vayavī ca dṛśyatveneṣṭo buddhau pratibhāsata iti / ata upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ śaśaviṣāṇavad asadvyavahāraviṣayatā / na ca paramāṇūnām atīndriyatvād rūpādīnām anupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ viśiṣṭānām indriyatvābhyupagamād atīndriyatvāsiddheḥ / | For the arrangement is accepted as being perceptible according to the statement "number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity and action are visible due to their inherence in colored [substances]." And the composite whole is accepted as being perceptible according to the statement "there is perception [of it] because it is large, possesses multiple substances, and has color." But apart from color etc., no other conjunction or composite whole that is accepted as being perceptible appears in consciousness. Therefore, due to the non-apprehension of what meets the conditions of perceptibility, it is an object of the usage "non-existent" like a hare's horn. And there is no possibility of non-apprehension of colors etc. due to atoms being beyond the senses, because their being beyond the senses is unestablished due to accepting that [atoms] qualified [by qualities] are perceptible. |
ata eva saṃyogāvayavinorabhāvāt sādharmyadṛṣṭānto ghaṭaḥ sādhanadharmavikala iti darśayati sādhanānanvitam ityādi // evaṃ tāvad viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyāsiddhyā svarūpato 'siddhatvaṃ hetoḥ pratipāditam idānīm āśrayaikadeśāsiddhyāpyasiddhatvam iti darśayati cakṣur ityādi / | For this very reason, due to the non-existence of conjunction and the composite whole, [the author] shows that the jar [given] as a similar example lacks the property to be proved, [as indicated] by the words "not connected with the proof," etc. Thus far the intrinsic non-establishment of the reason has been shown through the non-establishment of the qualifier and qualified; now [the author] shows the non-establishment [of the reason] also due to the non-establishment of part of the substrate by [the words] beginning with "eye." |
cakṣuḥsparśanavijñānaṃ bhinnābhamupajāyate / | Visual cognition and tactile cognition arise [as] appearing differently. |
ekālambanatā nāsti tayor ganchādivittivat // | They do not have one [and the same] object-basis, just like cognitions of odor and other [things]. |
atra hi dvividho dharmī nirdiṣṭo dvīndriyagrāhyamagrāhyaṃ ca / | Here indeed two kinds of substrates have been specified: [that which is] perceptible by two sense-organs and [that which is] imperceptible. |
tatra dvīndriyagrāho na kaścid dharmī siddhaḥ / | Among these, no substrate that is perceptible by two sense-organs is established. |
tathā hi cakṣurjñānaṃ sparśajñānaṃ cobhayaṃ yathākramaṃ nīlādirūpamātrapratibhāsitvāt karkaśādispraṣṭavyabhedamātraprasiddhatvāc ca bhinnamupajāyate / | For indeed, both visual cognition and tactile cognition arise as different, because [they] respectively manifest only blue and other colors, and are known [to manifest] only the different tangibles like roughness and so forth. |
tataś ca tayoścakṣuḥsparśanavijñānayor ekaviṣayatā nāsti bhinnābhatvād gandharasādivittivat / | And therefore these two, visual cognition and tactile cognition, do not have a single object, because [they] appear differently, like cognitions of odor, taste, and other [things]. |
prayogo 'yam bhinnapratibhāse jñāne te naikaviṣaye yathā gandharasavijñāne bhinnābhe ca cakṣuḥsparśanavijñāne iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | This argument [shows] the perception of contradiction with the pervader: those two cognitions that appear differently do not have one object, just as cognitions of odor and taste [do not], and visual and tactile cognitions appear differently. |
tat sāmarthasamudbhūtakalpanānugatātmakaṃ / pratisandhānavijñānaṃ samudāyaṃ vyavasyati // | That recognition-cognition, which consists in an assumption arising from [their] capacities, determines [their] combination. |
jalānalādi naivedaṃ dvīndriyagrāhyamastyataḥ | Such things as water, fire and the like are not perceptible by two sense-organs |
āśrayāsiddhatāsiddher yathābhihitadharmiṇaḥ | Because of the unproven nature [of the subject], the substratum [of the inference] is unestablished, as indicated by the unproven character of the object [dharmin] itself |
tayoḥ varṇaspraṣṭavyamātrapratibhāsinoścakṣuḥsparśanavijñānayoḥ sāmarthyam śaktiḥ tataḥ samudbhūtaḥ kalpanānugata ātmāsyeti vigrahaḥ | Those two cognitions - visual cognition and tactile cognition - which appear only as color and touch [respectively], have [the same] capacity; from that [capacity] arises [their] assumption-based nature - this is the analysis |
tadanena pratisandhānapratyayasyāpratyakṣatvaṃ pratipāditaṃ bhavati | By this, it is established that the cognition of recognition is not a direct perception |
anekasminnekatvādhyavasāyitvenāsya bhrāntitvāt kalpanānugatātmatvāc ca | [This is] because it is erroneous in apprehending unity in what is multiple, and because its nature is pervaded by conceptual construction |
nāpi pramāṇāntaram pūrvajñānaparicchinnaviṣayāvasāyitvena gṛhītaprahaṇāt bhrāntatvāc ca | Nor is it any other means of valid cognition, because it apprehends an object already determined by prior cognition, [thus] grasping what is [already] grasped, and because it is erroneous |
tasmātpratisaṃdhīyamānatvādityanaikāntiko hetuḥ | Therefore, the reason "because it is recognized" is inconclusive |
yadi hi pratisandhānapratyayasya prāmāṇyaṃ siddhaṃ bhavet tadā na syāddhetor anaikāntikatā yāvatā yeṣu rūpādiṣu sādhāraṇaḥ sāmarthyaprakāśanāya ghaṭādiprajñaptayaḥ kutās teṣu yathāstvaṃ cakṣuḥsparśanābhyām anubhūteṣūttarakālaṃ yathāparidṛṣṭaviṣayamanurūpasaṅketāhitasaṃskārabhedamekatvādhyavasāyi prakṛtibhrāntaṃ smārttamidaṃ jñānam utpadyate | If the validity of recognition were established, then the reason would not be inconclusive; [but] when notions of such things as jars arise for manifesting a common capacity in colors etc., after these have been experienced separately through vision and touch, there arises at a later time this memorial cognition which is inherently erroneous and determines unity [based on] the differentiated impressions established by corresponding signs in accordance with the observed object |
tathā hi tathā samanvāhāre tatra varṇo 'pi nīlādiḥ pratibhāsate | For thus in such a synthesis, even color such as blue appears [in it] |
na ca sparśanavijñāne varṇapratibhāsanaṃ yuktaṃ tasya cakṣurvijñānaviṣayatvāt | And it is not correct that color appears in tactile cognition, since that [color] is the object of visual cognition |
tasmād yad etad ācāryair uktam cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ yathāsvaṃ bhinnaṃ viṣayamupalabhyānyadeva tat sahacaraṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ smārttabhedajñānam utpadyata iti tad eva nyāyyyaṃ | Therefore, what the teachers have stated is indeed reasonable: "After perceiving different objects separately through vision and touch, there arises a different memorial discriminative cognition which [takes] those concomitant [objects] as a unified object" |
nanu yadi samudāyaḥ prāgānubhūtaḥ syāt tadā smārttamidam yuktam yāvatā na rūpādivyatiriktaḥ samudāyo bhavatām abhīṣṭo yenāsāv anubhūyeta rūpādiṣu cānubhūteṣu rūpādiriti syāt na ghaṭa iti na cānanubhūte smṛtir yuktā tat katham idaṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ smārttaṃ jñānam utpadyate / | "[One might object:] If the composite whole had been previously experienced, then this remembrance would be justified. However, you [Buddhists] do not accept any composite whole distinct from color etc., by which it could have been experienced. And when color etc. have been experienced [individually], there could only be [remembrance] like 'color' etc., not 'jar'. And remembrance is not possible of something not experienced. So how does this remembrance arise with regard to the composite whole?" |
naitad asti / | "This is not [correct]." |
na hi rūpādibhyo 'nyaḥ samudāyaḥ prāganubhūta ity ucyate yenaitat syāt kiṃ tu ta eva rūpādayaḥ salilādidhāraṇārthakriyākāriṇaḥ samudāyo ghaṭa iti vyapadiśyante / teṣu ca pratyekamindriyajñānānubhūteṣu yathāsaṅketāhitamidaṃ ghaṭa iti smaraṇamutpadyata ityabhidhīyate / | "For we do not assert that a composite whole different from color etc. was previously experienced, which would [make] this [objection valid]. Rather, those very [elements like] color etc., when performing the purposeful action of holding water etc., are designated collectively as 'jar'. And when these have been experienced individually through sense-perception, a remembrance arises [later] according to conventional designation as 'this is a jar'." |
athavā kalpitaḥ samudāyaḥ kalpanājñānātmakatvāt svasaṃvidānubhūyata eveti kimiti tasya smaraṇaṃ notpadyata iti / | "Or alternatively, the composite whole is conceptual, and being of the nature of conceptual cognition, it is indeed experienced through self-awareness. So why should remembrance of it not arise?" |
ataḥ svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvād ityasya hetor āśrayāsiddhatā kasmād ity āha asiddher yathābhihitadharmiṇi iti / | "Therefore, why does the reason 'because it possesses a particular arrangement of its constituent parts' have its substratum unproven? [The answer is:] Because the subject as stated is unproven." |
yathābhihitasya dvīndriyagrāhyadharmiṇo 'siddheḥ kāraṇādāśrayaikadeśāsiddhyā hetor asiddhiḥ //59- [p.47] | "Because the subject as stated, [namely that which is] perceptible by two sense organs, is unproven, the reason is unproven due to the unprovenness of one part of its substratum." |
sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvaṃ yādṛgdevakulādiṣu / kartaryanupalbdhe 'pi yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatiḥ // | "The kind of arrangement that is [found] in temples etc., from the sight of which [arises] the cognition of an intelligent [creator] even when the creator is not perceived," |
tādṛgeva yadīkṣyeta tanvagādiṣu dharmiṣu / yuktaṃ tatsādhanādasmād yathābhīṣṭasya sādhanaṃ // | "if exactly such [an arrangement] were seen in subjects like body and mountains, then from that proof the establishment of what is desired would be justified." |
yo hi saṃniveśaviśeṣo buddhimatpuruṣavyāpārapūrvakatvena devakulādiṣvanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ loke prasiddho yasya darśanādadṛṣṭatatkartṛkasyāpi buddhimatkāraṇāvagatir bhavati tathābhūto yadi tanutarugiriprabhṛtiṣu sādhyadharmiṣu hetutvenopādīyate tadā syād bhavatāmabhimatasādhyasiddhiḥ / | "For if that particular arrangement which is well-known in the world through positive and negative concomitance as being preceded by the activity of an intelligent person in temples etc., from the sight of which arises the understanding of an intelligent cause even when its creator is unseen - if such [an arrangement] were to be taken as a reason in subjects to be proved like bodies, trees, mountains etc., then your desired conclusion would be established." |
nahyanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ suvivecitaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vyabhicarati tasyāhetukatvaprasaṃgāt / | For when a cause and effect have been well ascertained through positive and negative concomitance, the effect cannot deviate from [its] cause, as [if it did] that would result in it not being a cause. |
na ca tathābhūtasanniveśaviśeṣastarugiriprabhṛtiṣu prasiddhaḥ kevalaṃ saṃniveśa iti pralāpamātraṃ prasiddham / | And no such specific arrangement is well-known in trees, mountains and such things; only the mere verbal assertion that "there is arrangement" is well-known. |
na ca prakṛtyā parasparam arthāntaratvena vyavasthito 'pi dharmaḥ śabdamātreṇābhedī hetutvenopādīyamāno 'bhimatasādhyasiddhaye paryāpto bhavati / | And a property which by nature exists as something distinct cannot become non-distinct through mere words, and when put forward as a reason [probans], it cannot be sufficient for establishing the desired conclusion. |
sādhyaviparyaye 'pi tasya bhāvāvirodhāt / | Because its presence is not incompatible even with the opposite of what is to be proved. |
yathā valmīke dharmiṇi kumbhakārakṛtatvasiddhaye mṛdvikāramātraṃ hetutvenopādīyamānam iti samudāyārthaḥ / | As for instance, when "being merely a modification of clay" is put forward as a reason to establish [the property of] "being made by a potter" for the subject anthill - such is the meaning of this whole [passage]. |
yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatiriti / yasya sanniveśasya dṛṣṭau satyāṃ buddhimataḥ kāraṇasya gatiranumitir bhavatītyarthaḥ / | "From seeing which [there is] inference of an intelligent [agent]" means: upon seeing which arrangement, there arises an inference of an intelligent cause. |
tanvagādiṣviti / | [Now regarding the compound] "tanv-aga-ādiṣu": |
tanuḥ śarīram agāḥ parvatā vṛkṣā vā ādiśabdena sāgarādayo gṛhyante / | "Tanu" means body; "aga" means mountains or trees; by the word "ādi" [things] like oceans are included. |
yathābhīṣṭasyeti / buddhimat pūrvakatvasya / | "[Of that which is] desired" means: of [the property of] having an intelligent being as [its] antecedent. |
sādhanam iti siddhiḥ / | "Sādhana" means proof. |
kathaṃ yuktamityāha anvayetyādi / | [The text] states "anvaya" etc. [in response to the question] "how would it be correct?" |
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ yatkāryaṃ yasya niścitaṃ / niścayas tasya taddṛṣṭāviti nyāyo vyavasthitaḥ // | When an effect is definitely ascertained to belong to a [particular] cause through positive and negative concomitance, then the perception of that [effect] establishes [the presence of] that [cause] – such is the established rule. |
sanniveśaviśeṣas tu naivāmīṣu tathāvidhaḥ / na tu tarvādibhedeṣu śabda eva tu kevalaḥ // | The peculiar arrangement [of parts] in these [things] like mountains and such is not of this kind [i.e., not such an effect]; regarding these different things, there is merely a verbal assertion. |
tādṛśaḥ procyamānastu sandigdhavyatirekatām / āsādayati valmīke kumbhakārakṛtādiṣu // | Such a [reason], when put forward, leads to doubtful negative concomitance, as in [claiming] that "an anthill is made by a potter" and similar [cases]. |
yatkāryam iti dhūmādi | "Effect" refers to [things] such as smoke. |
niścayas tasyety analāder eva | "Definitely ascertained" refers to [its relation with] fire and such. |
taddṛṣṭāv iti dhūmādikāryadṛṣṭau satyām | "Upon perception of that" [means] when there is perception of the effect such as smoke. |
yady evam ihāpi tathaiva bhaviṣyatītyāha sanniveśaviśeṣas tv ityādi | [To the objection] "If this is so, then it would be the same in this case also," [the author] states "The peculiar arrangement, however" etc. |
yas tarhi śabdasāmānyataḥ siddhaḥ sanniveśaḥ, sa eva hetur bhaviṣyatīti ced, āha tādṛśa ityādi | [To the objection] "Then the arrangement that is established through verbal testimony in general could serve as the reason," [the author] states "Such [a reason]" etc. |
tādṛśaḥ śabdamātreṇābhedī | "Such" [means that which is] undifferentiated through mere verbal testimony. |
kumbhakārakṛtāviveti | [It is] like [claiming something to be] "made by a potter." |
mṛdvikāratvamātram iti śeṣaḥ. | [This refers to] merely being a modification of clay. |
tad evaṃ sanniveśiviśeṣasyāsiddhiḥ. | Thus then, the specific arrangement [in question] is unproven. |
sanniveśamātrasya tv anaikāntikatvam iti pratipāditaṃ bhavati | And mere arrangement is shown to be inconclusive. |
nanv ityādinā paro jātyuttaram udbhāvayati | Through [the words] beginning with "nanu," the opponent brings up the jātyuttara [futile rejoinder]. |
sāmānyam eva kāryādi sādhanaṃ pratipāditaṃ | [What has been] put forward [by you] is merely the general characteristic of being an effect and such [properties] as proof. |
kāryasādhanaṃ jātyuttaram etat | This is a futile rejoinder based on the proof from [being an] effect. |
tathā hi kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabda ity ukte jātivādī codayati | For instance, when it is stated that "sound is non-eternal because it is produced," the proponent of the futile rejoinder objects. |
kim idaṃ ghaṭādigataṃ kṛtakatvaṃ hetutvanopādīyate, kiṃ vā śabdagatam athobhayagatam iti | [He asks:] "Is this 'being produced' that you employ as a reason that which exists in jars etc., or that which exists in sound, or that which exists in both?" |
ādye pakṣe hetor asiddhiḥ | In the first case, the reason is unproven. |
na hy anyadharmo 'nyatra vidyate | For indeed, the property of one thing cannot exist in another thing. |
dvitīye 'pi sādhanavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ | In the second case also, the example would lack [the required] proof. |
tṛtīye 'py etāv eva doṣāv iti | In the third case also, these same two faults [would apply]. |
etac ca kāryasamaṃ nāma jātyuttaram iti pratipāditam | And this has been explained as the futile rejoinder called kāryasama ["similar to effect"]. |
kāryatvānyatvaleśena yatsādhyāsiddhidarśanaṃ tatkāryasamam | That [rejoinder] which shows the non-establishment of what is to be proved through even the slightest difference from being an effect is [called] kāryasama. |
yataḥ kāryatvasāmānyam eva gṛhītvānityatvānumānam iṣyate, na viśeṣam. | Because the inference of non-eternality is sought [to be established] by grasping only the generic character of being an effect, not any particular [aspect]. |
tena sāmānyena sādhane 'bhīṣṭe dharmaviśeṣavikalpena yad uttaram, tat kāryasamaṃ jātyuttaram iti vyavasthitam. | When something is intended to be proved through such a general [property], any rejoinder based on the assumption of a particular property is established as the futile rejoinder called "similar to [the rejoinder about] an effect." |
etac ca dharmebhedena vikalpanam ato jātyuttaram iti. | And this [rejoinder] is based on assuming a difference of properties, therefore [it is] a futile rejoinder. |
atadrūpaparāvṛttaṃ vastumātramanityatām tādātmyātsādhayatyeṣa na nyāyo 'stīha sādhane. | This mere thing [i.e. effect in general], excluded from all that is not of its nature, proves non-eternality due to [their] identity in essence; there is no [valid] argument against this proof. |
yuktam etat. | This [argument] is correct. |
yataḥ kṛtakatvamātram anityatāṃ sādhayati. | Because mere producedness proves non-eternality. |
tasya tādātmyalakṣaṇapratibandhasadbhāvād iti. | Because there exists between these [two] an invariable connection characterized by identity in essence. |
iha tu svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśeṣiṣṭatvamātrasādhane nāyaṃ nyāyo 'sti. | But in this case, there is no [valid] argument for proving mere possession of a particular arrangement of constituent parts that produce [the thing] itself. |
sanniveśasāmānyasya viparyaye bādhakābhāvāt pratibandhāsiddheḥ yasya tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ yadupalambhādakriyādarśino 'pi kṛtabuddhir bhavati tasyāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ. | Because there is no invariable connection, since there is no contradiction in the opposite of arrangement in general, and because that connection characterized by production from it, from observing which one forms the notion of [something being] produced even without seeing the action [of producing], is not established - this is the meaning. |
atha tadutpattyāpratibandhaviśeṣaṃ parityajya sāmānyam eva liṅgam ucyate tadā vyabhicāriteti darśayann āha dhūmetyādi. | Now, showing that if one abandons the particular connection of being produced from that and speaks of only the general [character] as the mark [of inference], then there would be deviation [from the intended conclusion], he says "smoke" etc. |
dhūmātmā dhavalo dṛṣṭaḥ pāvakāvyabhicāravān / | The smoke, which has been observed to be invariably concomitant with fire, is white. |
sitābhidheyatāmātrān na himādapi tadgatiḥ // | From the mere fact of [something] being denoted as "white," [the presence of] fire cannot be inferred, [not] even from snow. |
kathaṃ tarhi kāryasamaṃ jātyuttaram udāhṛtam ity āha sāmānyetyādi / | [Someone asks:] "How then is the jātyuttara [fallacious rejoinder] said to be similar to [the fallacy of] kārya [effect]?" [The answer] is given beginning with [the word] "sāmānya." |
sāmānyapratibandhe tu viśeṣāśrayaṇī yadā / codanā kriyate tatra jātyuttaram udāhṛtam // | When an objection is raised based on a particular instance while the invariable concomitance has been stated in general terms, that is called a jātyuttara [futile rejoinder]. |
sādhyena saha sāmānyena sādhanadharmasya vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇavṛttyā pratibandhe siddhe 'pi sati yatra dharmaviśeṣam āśritya codanā kriyate, taj jātyuttaram. na ceha sāmānyena pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ yasya tu sanniveśaviśeṣapratibandho 'sti so 'siddha iti na jātyuttaram etat // | When, even though the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum has been established in general terms through the operation of contradictory evidence in the counter-instance, an objection is raised based on a particular property, that is a jātyuttara. However, in this case, the invariable concomitance is not established in general terms, and that which has concomitance only in particular configurations is unestablished; therefore this is not a jātyuttara. |
gośabdavācyatāmātrād digādīnāṃ viṣāṇitā / | From the mere fact of being denoted by the word "go," the possession of horns [would follow] for quarters and other [things]. |
saṃsiddhyedanyathā hyeṣa nyāyo nāśrīyate yadi // | This would indeed follow if this [correct] method of reasoning were not adopted. |
evaṃ hi svargadigvacanalocanakiraṇakuliśabhūpayasām api gośabdābhidheyatāmātrād bāhuleyādivadviṣāṇavattānumānaprasaṅgaḥ // | For thus, from the mere fact of being denoted by the word "go," the possession of horns would have to be inferred for heaven, quarters, speech, eyes, rays, thunderbolt, earth, and water, just as [it is inferred] for a spotted cow. |
syād etat kṛtakatvādivadasyāpi sanniveśaviśeiṣṭa buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakatvameva pratibandho 'styevety āha yadi tv ityādi | [The opponent might say that] just as [there is an invariable concomitance] in the case of being produced etc., there exists an invariable concomitance between [something's] having a specific arrangement [of parts] and being preceded by an intelligent cause. |
yadi tu pratibandho 'smin pramāṇe nopapadyate / tadatra yuktitaḥ siddhe na vivādo 'sti kasyacit | If such an invariable concomitance were established by a valid means of cognition, then [the conclusion] would be established by reasoning and no one could dispute [it]. |
kiṃ tu sa eva pratibandho na siddha iti darśayann āha kiṃ tv ityādi | But [the text] shows that this very invariable concomitance is not established, stating "but..." |
kin tu nityaikasarvajñanityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ | But [the existence of] one who is eternal, one, and the substratum of eternal omniscience... |
sādhyavaikalyato 'vyāpter na siddhimupagacchati | ...cannot be established, due to the non-pervasion resulting from the absence of the probandum. |
na hi bhavatāṃ buddhimatpūrvakatvamātraṃ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ kiṃ tu nitya ekaḥ sarvajñāyā buddher nityāyā āśrayaḥ sakalabhuvacanahetur buddhimānīśvarābhidhāno yaḥ padārthaḥ tatpūrvakatvamasya sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ | For you [Naiyāyikas] do not wish to prove mere precedence by an intelligent being, but rather [you wish to prove] precedence by that entity called Īśvara who is intelligent, who is eternal, one, the substratum of eternal omniscient consciousness, [and] who is the cause of the entire world. |
tasyaiva vivādāspadībhūtatvāt sa ca tathābhūto na siddhimupagacchati | Since that very [being] is the subject of dispute, such a being cannot be established. |
kasmāt / sādhyavaikalyato 'vyāpteḥ | Why? Because of non-pervasion due to the absence of the probandum. |
ghaṭādeḥ sādharmyadṣṭāntasya yathoktasādharmyavaikalyāt tathābhūtena sādhyadharmeṇa hetor vyāptyasiddheḥ | Because the positive example like a pot lacks the aforementioned similarity, the pervasion of the reason with such a probandum is not established. |
Subsets and Splits