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samāsena tu cittena vettyeva ca rasādikam // | But in fact he knows taste and so forth collectively through the mind. |
yatrāpyatiśayo dṛṣṭaḥ svasvārthānatilaṅghanāt / dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syān na rūpe śrotravṛttitaḥ // | Even where excellence is seen in the perception of remote and subtle things and so forth, [it occurs] without transgressing their respective objects, [but] not through the functioning of the ear with respect to color. |
ityādikamato 'niṣṭaṃ parair uktaṃ na yo yataḥ / svārthāvilaṅghanenaiva mānase 'tiśayo mataḥ // | Therefore these and other undesirable consequences stated by others do not apply [to our view], because excellence is accepted in mental [cognition] solely without transgressing its objects. |
yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇaiś ca yajjātīyārthadarśanam / dṛṣṭaṃ samprati lokasya tathā kālāntare 'pi naḥ // | [Just] as certain objects are perceived by certain means of cognition in the present world, so [were they perceived] by us in other times as well. |
yadi cakṣurādīndriyadhiyāṃ sarvārthaparijñānam abhyupagataṃ bhavet, tadā bhavedyathoktadoṣaprasaṅgaḥ | If it had been accepted [by us] that sense-cognitions like visual perception [could] apprehend all objects, then the aforementioned fault would indeed apply. |
yāvatā, samastavastugatānityatvādilakṣaṇāśeṣatattvābhyāsaprakarṣaparyantajena manovijñānena sattvārthagocareṇa sphuṭapratibhāsāvisaṃvāditvābhyāṃ pratyakṣatām upagatena yugapad aśeṣavastugrahaṇātsarvavidiṣṭaḥ natu cakṣurādidhiyā | However, [we hold that] the Omniscient One [is omniscient] because [He] simultaneously grasps all objects through mental cognition—which arises from the culmination of practicing meditation on all truths characterized by impermanence etc. inherent in all things, which has the nature of perception due to its clear manifestation and non-contradictoriness, and which encompasses all real objects—and not through sense-cognitions like vision. |
naca manojñānaṃ sarvārthagocaratayā na prasiddham iti yuktaṃ vaktum yato bhavatāpi rūpaśabdādiviṣayaṃ smārttaṃ jñānam upavarṇitam | And it is not reasonable to say that "mental cognition is not known to encompass all objects," since you yourself have described memorial cognition as having color, sound, etc. as its objects. |
tacca manojñānam eva | And that [memorial cognition] is indeed mental cognition. |
svapne ca rūpādipratibhāsamatipratītam eveti nāsyāpahnavaḥ śakyakriyaḥ | And in dreams, the cognition manifesting colors etc. is well-established, so its denial is impossible. |
tena svārthāvilaṅghanenaivātiśayasyeṣṭatvānnāsmākaṃ kiñcid aniṣṭamāpāditaṃ bhavatā | Therefore, since [we] accept this special capability only within its proper domain, nothing undesirable has been established against our [position] by you. |
viśuddhaṃ vā bhavejjñānaṃ sarvaṃ sarvārthagocaram | Or, all cognition, when purified, would apprehend all objects. |
hetoḥ sambhāvyate kaścit phale 'pyatiśayaḥ kvacit | In some cases, some special quality in the effect may be possible due to [special] causes. |
nahi sūkṣmaphalā dṛṣṭā āmalakyo marāviti / sarvās tattvena tadrūpā anyatrāpi bhavanti tāḥ | Just because āmalakī trees are seen to have small fruits in the desert, it does not [follow that] they all necessarily have the same form elsewhere as well. |
śṛṇvanti cakṣuṣā sarpā ityeṣāpi śrutis tataḥ | Similarly, there is this scriptural statement that "serpents hear with [their] eyes." |
sambhāvyārthā vicitrā hi sattvānāṃ karmaśaktayaḥ | Indeed, the capacities for action belonging to beings are wonderful [and] may have [many] possible meanings. |
kāraṇabhedena hi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvabhedapratiniyamān na śakyate kvacid ekadā dṛṣṭasya vastunaḥ sarvatra sarvadā tathā bhāvo niścetum | Due to the diversity of causes, the nature of things varies and becomes restricted; therefore it is not possible to determine that an object once seen somewhere will retain the same nature everywhere and at all times. |
nahi sūkṣmaphalā āmalakyo maruṣu samupalabdhā ityetāvatā sarvatra deśe satyapi kāraṇabhedasambhave tathātvenāvadhārayituṃ darśanamātreṇa prekṣāvanto yuktāḥ | For instance, merely because small-fruited āmalakī [trees] are found in deserts, rational people should not conclude from this observation alone that they would be the same in all places, even though different causal conditions may exist. |
tena cakṣuṣāpi yogābhyāsaviśeṣabalaśalākonmīlitena kaścid api sarvārthān paśyatītyaviruddham | Therefore it is not contradictory that someone might see all objects even through [their physical] eye when it is enhanced by the special power obtained through yogic practice. |
yasyādhvatritayasthaṃ hi sarvaṃ vastvavabhāsate / tathā niyatasāmarthyaṃ vaktumitthaṃ sa śobhate | One who perceives all objects existing in the three times [past, present, future] along with their restricted capacities - only such a one is fit to make such statements. |
tathā niyatasāmarthyam iti | [This refers to things] having their capacities thus restricted. |
teneṣṭarūpeṇa niyatasāmarthyaṃ sarvaṃ vastvavabhāsata iti sambandhaḥ | The connection [of the previous statement] is that all objects appear with their capacities restricted in the desired manner. |
kīdṛśaṃ tadvaktuṃ ity āha yajjātīyair ityādi | [When asked] "What kind of statement [is being referred to]?", he responds with "yajjātīyair" etc. |
yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇais tu yajjātīyārthadarśanam | "[The statement that] the perception of certain kinds of objects through certain kinds of means of knowledge..." |
idānīm api lokasya śaktir jñātuṃ na śakyate / bhavatā jantumātreṇa sarvaśaktyaviniścayāt | Even at present, the capacity of people cannot be known by you, [who are] merely a creature lacking definite knowledge of all capacities. |
niḥśeṣasattvaśaktīnāṃ jñāne sarvajñatā bata | Indeed, if [you had] knowledge of the capacities of all beings, [that would constitute] omniscience! |
nacānumānataḥ siddhir anyathābhāvaśaṅkayā | Nor can [such knowledge] be established through inference, due to the possibility of things being otherwise. |
syād etat na vayaṃ pratyakṣato jñātvaivaṃ brūmaḥ tathā kālāntare 'pyabhūd iti, kiṃ tarhi anumānāt / yatpramāṇaṃ yajjātīyārthagrāhi dṛṣṭaṃ tat kālāntare 'pi tathaivābhūt pramāṇatvād iti, tatrāha na cānumānataḥ siddhir iti / | "[One might say:] We do not make this statement [about the past] based on direct perception, saying 'thus it was also in another time,' but rather from inference – [namely that] whatever means of cognition is seen to grasp objects of a certain kind must have done so also in another time, because it is a means of cognition." To this [we] reply: "Nor can [it] be established through inference." |
āmalakyādivaddhetuviśeṣaṇakāryasya viśeṣadarśanāt / | Because, as in the case of the āmalakī [fruit], specific effects are seen [to arise] from specific causal conditions. |
anyathāpi vijātīyārthagrahaṇadvāreṇa pravṛtteḥ sambhāvyamānatvād anaikāntikatā hetoḥ // | Because it is possible that [the means of cognition] functions differently through grasping objects of a different kind, the reason [given] is inconclusive. |
atīndriyārthavijñānayogenāpyupalabhyate / prajñādiguṇayogitvaṃ puṃsāṃ vidyādiśaktitaḥ // | It is observed that through connection with the knowledge of supersensuous objects, [some] people possess intelligence and other qualities due to the power of learning and other [factors]. |
asti hīkṣaṇikādyākhyā vidyāyāṃ suvibhāvitā / paracittaparijñānaṃ karotīhaiva janmani // | For there exists the well-established art called īkṣaṇika and others which produces knowledge of others' minds even in this very birth. |
śrutānumitadṛṣṭaṃ ca yanna vastvatra janmani / | And [it reveals] things that are neither heard, inferred, nor seen in this birth. |
sasaṃvādamabhivyaktamāviṣṭāḥ puruṣā iha / vicitramantranāgendrarakṣoyakṣādiśaktitaḥ // | People here are clearly and verifiably possessed by the powers of various mantras, nāga-lords, demons, yakṣas and others. |
māvā bhūd dṛṣṭamityādi tathāpyatra na bādhakam / | Even if [these things] are not seen [by everyone], etc., there is still no refutation here. |
kiñcitpramāṇam astīti tadabhāvo na siddhyati // | [Since] there is some valid means of knowledge [for these things], their non-existence cannot be established. |
natvatīndriyārthadarśanādityasiddham etat, tathā hi īkṣaṇikādividyābalena ḍākinyādīnāṃ paracittajñānaṃ bhūtabhavad bhaviṣyad vastuparijñānaṃ copalabhyata eva / | The statement that "it is not due to the perception of supersensuous objects" is unproven, because through the power of sciences like īkṣaṇika, witches and others are indeed observed to have knowledge of others' minds and knowledge of past, present and future things. |
ādiśabdena gāndhārīprakṛtīnāṃ grahaṇam / | By the word "ādi" [others], [we mean] the inclusion of Gāndhārī and similar [beings]. |
vicitrabhūtagrahāc cā{dyā---}veśabalāccātīndriyārthaparijñānadarśanād anyatrāpyapratikṣepaḥ / | And because knowledge of supersensuous objects is seen [to arise] from possession by various beings and planets and through the power of obsession, there can be no rejection [of this] in other cases either. |
mā bhūd vā vyabhicāraviṣayadarśanam / tathāpyaprati{lambha}mātreṇa sarvavido nābhāvo niścetuṃ yuktaḥ / | Let it be [granted] that there is no perception of any instance to the contrary. Even so, merely by non-apprehension [of Him], it is not proper to determine the non-existence of the Omniscient One. |
tadabhāvaḥ atīndriyārthadṛgabhāvo na siddhyati // | Therefore, the non-existence of Him [who is] the perceiver of supersensuous objects cannot be established. |
prājño 'pi hītyādāvāha uktena cetyādi / | He states [this] beginning with "even the wise" and "by what has been said" etc. |
uktena ca prakāreṇa vedakāre prasādhite / avaśyābhyupagantavyastvayātīndriyadṛgnaraḥ // | When the author of the Veda has been established in the manner described, you must necessarily accept [the existence of] a person who can perceive the supersensuous. |
ataḥ prājño naraḥ sūkṣmānarthān draṣṭuṃ kṣamo bhavet / sajātīrapyatikrāman parānabhibhavennarān // | Therefore, a wise person would be capable of perceiving subtle objects, surpassing other persons even of his own kind. |
ukteneti a{śru---}tiparīkṣāyām // | [This is] as stated in the examination of śruti. |
atraivopapattimāha yathā svaviṣayā ityādi / yathā svaviṣaye śaktiḥ śrotrādeḥ praviśiṣyate / | Right here he states the reasoning beginning with "just as in their own objects" etc.: "Just as the power of the ear and other [senses] becomes enhanced in their own objects." |
yathā gativiśeṣeṇāñjanādilakṣaṇayogaviśeṣeṇa ca śrotrādeḥ svārthaśaktir viśiṣyate tathā manaso 'pi hetuviśeṣaṇa śaktiḥ praviśiṣyata iti sambhāvyam // | Just as the capacity of the ear and other [senses] regarding their own objects becomes enhanced through special practices and through special applications such as unguents, similarly it is possible that the power of the mind too becomes enhanced through special causes. |
tathā hi vīkṣyate rūpaṃ gṛdhrair dūratarasthitam / tiraskṛtaṃ nidhānādi tathā siddhāñjanādikaiḥ // | For indeed, form [even when] situated very far away is seen by vultures, and likewise hidden treasures and such are [seen] through magical unguents and the like. |
yogaviśeṣakṛtamapyāha tiraskṛtam ityādi / | He also states what is accomplished through special yogic practices, beginning with [the word] "hidden" etc. |
siddhāñjanādikair iti / vīkṣyata iti sambandhaḥ / | [It] is seen through [the use of] mystic collyrium and other [substances]. |
hetau karaṇe vā tṛtīyeyam // | This instrumental case ending [indicates either] cause or instrument. |
evaṃ gativiśeṣeṇa devāder darśanaṃ bhavet / sūkṣmavyavahitādīnāṃ svopapattyānurūpyataḥ // | Thus, through special practices, the perception of gods and other [beings], as well as of subtle and concealed things, would occur according to one's capabilities. |
adhastādeṣāṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate norddhvamityevaṃ yathā svamupapattyā ānurūpyeṇa jñānaṃ bhavaccānu mahārājakāyikādīnāṃ devānāṃ kena vāryate // | When knowledge and perception proceed downward for these [beings] and not upward, who can prevent the knowledge of Mahārājika and other gods from occurring according to their own inherent capacities? |
yogābhyāsaviśeṣāc ca yogināṃ mānasaṃ tathā / | And through special yogic practices, the mind of yogis [becomes superior] likewise. |
jñānaṃ prakṛṣṭarūpaṃ syād ityatrāsti na bādhakam // | There is no obstruction to [their] knowledge becoming of an excellent nature in this matter. |
siddhasādhyateti darśayann āha gatiyogādivaikalya iti / | Showing what is to be established, [the author] speaks of the deficiency of practices, yoga, and so forth. |
gatiyogādi vaikalye jñāne tvatiśayo yadi / kṣipyate 'yuktametaddhi hetvabhāvāt phalaṃ nahi // | If superiority in knowledge is rejected due to deficiency in practices, yoga, and so forth, this is indeed improper, for without a cause there is no effect. |
uttarottarataddhetuvaikalye 'tiśayastathā // | Likewise [there would be] superiority in the progressive absence of those causes. |
devānām / | Of the gods. |
yaccoktam śrotragamyeṣvityādi tadapyanenaiva pratyuktam adarśanamātreṇa tathāvidhasyātiśayasya pratiṣeddhumaśakyatvādityabhiprāyaḥ // | What has been stated [by the opponent] regarding "audible things" and so forth is refuted by this very [same argument], the meaning being that it is impossible to deny such superiority merely on [the grounds of] non-perception. |
nacaikadeśavijñānāt sarvajñānāstitocyate / yena vedādivijñānāt svargādyadhyakṣatā bhavet // | The existence of omniscience is not asserted on the basis of knowledge of [just] one part [of things], by which knowledge of the Veda and so forth would [supposedly] lead to direct perception of heaven and other [such things]. |
kiṃtu prajñākṛpādīnām abhyāsād vṛddhidarśanāt / anyo 'pyatiśayas tasmād vardhamānāt pratīyate // | Rather, from seeing the increase of wisdom, compassion and other [such qualities] through practice, other kinds of superiority too are inferred from that gradual increase. |
manoguṇatayāpyeṣāṃ kāṣṭhāparyantasambhavaḥ / | And since these are qualities of the mind, they can potentially reach their ultimate limit. |
nairghṛṇyavan mahābhyāsānniṣṭhāśeṣārthabodhanāt // | Just like cruelty [can reach its limit], through extensive practice [comes] the ultimate understanding of all things. |
dharmā{arthā---}vabodharūpā hi prajñā lakṣaṇataḥ sthitā / | For wisdom is established by definition as consisting in the understanding of dharma and [other] things. |
ekasyāpyaparijñāne sāsamāptaiva vartate // | When even a single thing remains unknown, it [wisdom] remains incomplete. |
nahyasmābhir ekadeśaparijñānamātrād aśeṣapadārthaparijñānamabhyupagamyate, yenābhyadhāyi bhavatā śāstrāntarajñānaṃ tāvanmātreṇa labhyata iti / | For we do not accept that knowledge of all things [comes] merely from knowledge of one part [of things], on account of which you stated that "merely that much yields knowledge of other śāstras." |
kiṃtvābhyāsavaśāt prajñāprakarṣopalambhād anyo 'pyatīndriyaparijñānakṛto viśeṣas tasmād abhyāsād varddhamānāt prakarṣaviśeṣaṃ prāptād bhavatīti sambhāvyate / | Rather, it is considered that through the power of practice, from the attainment of excellence in wisdom, another distinction produced by knowledge of supersensible things arises from that growing practice which has reached a particular excellence. |
etac ca pūrvaṃ prasādhitaṃ punar api bhūyaḥ pramāṇayati prayogaḥ ye ye manoguṇās te 'bhyāsātiśaye sati sambhavat prakarṣaparyantvṛttayaḥ, yathā śrotriyajodiṃga{---}nairghṛṇyam, manoguṇaś ca prajñeti svabhāvahetuḥ / | This has been established before and is further proven by the following formal argument: Whatever qualities of mind there are, they can potentially reach their ultimate limit when there is excellence of practice, just as [in the case of] the cruelty of Vedic sacrificers; and wisdom is a quality of mind—this is a reason based on essential nature. |
na naikāntikatā hetoḥ prajñāyāḥ padārthasvabhāvabodhalakṣaṇāyāḥ prakarṣaparyantagamanaṃ nāśeṣārthaparijñānamantareṇa sambhavati / | The [present] reason is not inconclusive, because wisdom (prajñā), which is characterized by comprehending the nature of things, cannot reach its highest stage without knowledge of all things. |
nāpyaprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatayā hetor asiddhatā, pūrvam abhyāsaviśeṣasambhavasya vistareṇa prasādhitatvāt / | Nor is the reason inadmissible due to [having] an unestablished qualification, because the possibility of special practice has been established in detail before. |
kāṣṭhāśabdaḥ prakarṣaparyāyaḥ // | The word "kāṣṭhā" is synonymous with "highest stage." |
ye vā samānajātīyapūrvabījapravṛttayaḥ / te 'tyantavṛddhidharmāṇaḥ saṃskārotkarṣabhedataḥ // | Those [things] which arise from seeds of the same kind become capable of extreme growth through distinctions in excellence of cultivation. |
vīhyādivat sambhavino dayāmatyādayo 'pi ca / yathābhihitadharmāṇaḥ pravṛddhau sarvadarśitā // | Like vrīhi rice and other [grains], compassion, wisdom and similar [qualities] too are capable [of growth], [and] when these possess the stated qualities, omniscience results from their development. |
athavā ye tulyajātīyapūrvabījaprasūtayas te saṃskāraviśeṣe satyatyantavṛddhidharmāṇaḥ sambhavinaḥ, yathā vrīhyādayaḥ, yathoktadharmāṇaś ca dayāprajñādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Or alternatively, those which spring from seeds of similar kind become capable of extreme growth when special cultivation exists - like rice and other [grains], and like compassion, wisdom and other [qualities] possessing the aforementioned properties - this is a reason based on essential nature. |
atrāpi pūrvavad asiddhānaikāntikatā na bhavati / | Here too, as before, there is neither inconclusiveness nor inadmissibility. |
matiḥ prajñā / | "Mati" [means] wisdom. |
samānajātīyapūrvabījapravṛttaya ity arthaḥ // | The meaning is "arising from seeds of the same kind." |
ye cāpacayadharmāṇaḥ pratipakṣasya sannidhau / atyantāpacayas teṣāṃ kaladhautamalādivat // | Those things which have the nature of decrease [when] in the presence of their opposites undergo complete decrease, like impurities in refined gold. |
sambhāvyante tathā cāmī kleśajñeyānṛtādayaḥ / yathopadiṣṭadharmāṇas tat prahāṇe 'malā dhiyaḥ // | These [factors such as] afflictions, wrong notions of cognizable things and so forth, which possess the characteristics as explained, can be [overcome], [and] upon their elimination, cognitions become pure. |
yathoktadharmāṇām eṣāṃ sambhāvyo yadi vā malaḥ / atyantonmūlane dakṣaḥ pratipakṣas tathaiva hi // | If these [factors], possessing the aforementioned characteristics, can have impurities, then their counteragent is equally capable of completely uprooting [those impurities]. |
athavā ye pratipakṣasannidhāvapacayadharmāṇo dṛṣṭās te pratipakṣātyantavṛddhau satyāṃ sambhavadatyantāpacayadharmāṇaḥ, yathā kanakamalādi, nairātmyādilakṣaṇasaṃmukhībhāve cāpacayadharmāṇo rāgādaya iti svabhāvahetur iti / | Those things which are observed to have the property of diminishing in the presence of their counteragents can potentially have the property of complete diminishment when their counteragent reaches its ultimate development – just as [in the case of] gold impurities and so forth. And [similarly], passion and so forth have the property of diminishing in the presence of the characteristic of selflessness and so forth – this is a reason based on essential nature. |
nāsiddhatā hetoḥ nairātmyajñānena saha kleśāder virodhasya prasādhitatvāt / | The reason is not unestablished, because the opposition between the knowledge of selflessness and afflictions etc. has [already] been proven. |
nāpyanaikāntikatā pratipakṣātyantavṛddhau satyāṃ vipakṣasyāvasthānāsambhavāt / | Nor is [the reason] inconclusive, because when the counteragent reaches its ultimate development, it is impossible for its opposite to remain. |
anyathā yo 'tyantamunmūlayitum asamarthaḥ sa kathamalpamapyapacayaṃ kuryāt / nahi sphuṭatarasphuratsphuliṅgamālojvalajvalanakalāpāntargatam api vajramapacayamanubhavati kadācit / | Otherwise, how could that which is unable to completely uproot [something] bring about even slight diminishment? For indeed, a diamond never experiences any diminishment even when placed within a mass of blazing fire with clearly visible sparks. |
na cāpi vipakṣasyātyantavṛddhyasambhavādanaikāntikatā pūrvaṃ vistareṇātyantavṛddhisambhavasya prasādhitatvāt / | Nor is [the reason] inconclusive due to the impossibility of the opposite reaching ultimate development, because the possibility of such ultimate development has already been proven in detail. |
athavā ye pratipakṣasannidhāvapacayadharmāṇas te sambhavad atyantonmūlanādakṣapratipakṣāḥ tadyathā kanakamalādi yathoktadharmāṇaś ca kleśājñeyāvaraṇādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Or, those things which have the property of diminishing in the presence of their counteragents can potentially have counteragents capable of complete uprooting – just as [in the case of] gold impurities and so forth; and the afflictions, cognitive obscurations and so forth possess the aforementioned characteristics – this is a reason based on essential nature. |
atrāpi pūrvavad asiddhānaikāntikate parihārye / | Here too, [the charges of] inadmissibility and inconclusiveness can be rebutted as before. |
ādiśabdena karmāvaraṇādiparigrahaḥ // | By the word "ādi" [in the above], karmic obscurations and so forth are included. |
tattvadṛṣṭinibandhatvād atyantāpacayaḥ kvacit / bāhyasyevāsya tamasa āntarasyāpi gamyate // | In some cases, an absolute deterioration of [things] that obstruct the perception of truth is observed, just as [in the case] of both external and internal darkness. |
tasya cāpacaye jāte jñānamavyāhataṃ mahat / svātantryeṇa pravarteta sarvatra jñeyamaṇḍale // | When deterioration of this [darkness] occurs, great unobstructed knowledge proceeds independently throughout the entire sphere of knowable things. |
athavā ye tattvadarśananibandhakāriṇas te sambhavadatyantāpacayāḥ, yathā bāhyaṃ śārbaraṃ tamaḥ tattvadarśananibandhakāriṇaś ca kleśajñeyāvaraṇādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Or, those [things] which serve as obstacles to the perception of truth are subject to absolute deterioration, just as external nocturnal darkness [is subject to deterioration], and [similarly] afflictions, cognitive obscurations, and so forth are obstacles to the perception of truth - thus this is a reason based upon [their] inherent nature. |
nacāsyānaikāntikateti darśayann āha tasya ceti / tasyāntarasya tamasaḥ // | Showing that this reason is not inconclusive, he says "when there is deterioration of this" - [where] "of this" [refers to] the internal darkness. |
ye vā sthirāśraye vṛttāḥ kathañcid api cāhitāḥ / tadbhāvāyāpunaryatnavyāpekṣā bādhake 'sati // saṃskārotkarṣabhedena kāṣṭhāparyantavṛttayaḥ / | Those [qualities] which subsist in a permanent substrate, having somehow become established there, and which do not require further effort for their existence when there is no opposing force, reach their ultimate perfection through excellence of cultivation. |
te sambhavanti vispaṣṭaṃ śātakumbhaviśuddhivat // | These come about clearly, just like the purification of gold. |
yathābhihitadharmāṇa ime matidayādayaḥ / | These qualities such as understanding and compassion possess the characteristics just mentioned. |
teṣāṃ paryantavṛttau ca sarvavittvaṃ prabhāsvaram // | And when these [qualities] reach their ultimate state, [there arises] brilliant omniscience. |
laṅghanodakatāpābhyāṃ naceha vyabhicāritā / na hi tallaṅghanād eva laṅghanaṃ balayatnayoḥ // | Nor is there any deviation here due to [the examples of] jumping and heating water, for jumping does not result from jumping itself but from strength and effort. |
athavā ye sthirāśrayavartinaḥ sakṛc ca yathākathañcid āhitaviśeṣāḥ santo 'sati virodhipratyaye tadbhāvāyā punar yatnāpekṣiṇaḥ, te saṃskārotkarṣabhedena sambhavat prakarṣaparyantavṛttayaḥ. | Or, those [qualities] which subsist in a permanent substrate and have once somehow acquired some distinction, when there is no opposing force, do not require further effort for their existence, [and] through excellence of cultivation they can reach the ultimate state of perfection, as in the case of the purification of gold and such things. |
tad yathā kanakaviśuddhyādayaḥ yathoktadharmāṇaś ca prajñākṛpādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | [Properties] like the purity of gold and the aforementioned qualities such as wisdom and compassion [constitute] a svabhāvahetu [natural cause]. |
laṅghanodakatāpābhyāṃ na ceha vyabhicāriteti / | And this [reasoning] cannot be invalidated by [the examples of] jumping and heating of water. |
Subsets and Splits