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yasyātsarvavastugatanairātmyādyālambanāya manaso yatsphuṭapratibhāsitvaṃ tadevāsya sarvajñatvaṃ nānyat /
For that clear manifestation of the mind which [serves] for apprehending selflessness and so forth present in all things - that alone is its omniscience, nothing else.
tathā hi bhāvyamānavastusphuṭapratibhāsitvena bhāvanāyāḥ sāmānyena vyāptau siddhāyāṃ sāmarthyāt sarvajñatvenāpi siddhaiva /
Thus indeed, when the pervasion of meditation by clear manifestation of the meditated object in general is established, [its pervasion] by omniscience is also established by logical necessity.
yathoktadharmiṇyasya sphuṭapratibhāsitvasyāsambhavāt /
Because no other clear manifestation is possible for the aforementioned subject.
etena ye sattāsādhane doṣāḥ proktās te pratyuktāḥ /
By this [argument], those objections that were put forward regarding proving [the Omniscient One's] existence have been answered.
sarvajñasattāyā asādhyatvāt /
Because the existence of the Omniscient One is not what is to be proved;
prasiddhe manasi dharmiṇaḥ sphuṭapratibhāsitvasya sādhyatvāt /
Because what is to be proved is the clear manifestation of the subject [of knowledge] in [his] well-known mind.
evam anena prakāreṇa prasiddhatvāt sākṣāt kṛtiviśeṣāt kāyavānuvāgbuddhivaiguṇyalakṣaṇāyā doṣavāsanāyāḥ prahāṇāt siddhamāvaraṇadvayaprahāṇam /
Thus, due to [its] being well-established through this direct specific action, through the elimination of defective impressions characterized by the imperfections of body, speech and mind, the elimination of both types of obstruction is established.
ataḥ sarvāvaraṇavimuktyā siddhaṃ sarvajñatvam //
Therefore, through freedom from all obstructions, omniscience is established.
etacca sugatasyeṣṭamādau nairātmyakīrtanāt / sarvatīrthakṛtāṃ tasmātsthitāṃ mūrdhni tathāgataḥ //
And this [omniscience] is accepted as belonging to the Sugata because [he] proclaimed the doctrine of no-self at the outset; therefore, the Tathāgata stands at the head of all religious teachers.
etad yathoktaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ sugatasyaiveṣṭam siddham / na kapilādeḥ /
This aforementioned omniscience is established as belonging to the Sugata alone, not to Kapila and others.
etad uktaṃ bhavati /
This is what is being said:
yenedaṃ sarvapadārthānāṃ skandhapañcakatvādideśanayā sarvākāramādau prathamato nairātmyaṃ kīrtitam, sa evādau sarvadharmāṇāṃ vicitrāprabhedanairātmyakīrtanāt kāryaliṅgāt siddhaḥ puruṣaviśeṣo 'smābhiḥ sugata ity ucyate /
He who first proclaimed the no-self [doctrine] in all its aspects through teachings such as [the doctrine that] all entities consist of five aggregates - that very special person, established through the inferential mark of [his] having proclaimed at the outset the no-self [doctrine] with its various distinctions regarding all dharmas, is called by us the Sugata.
tasyānayā deśanayā sābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvasthirāśeṣajñānaṃ sādhyate /
Through this teaching of his, [his] complete and firm knowledge of reality - along with the means [of attaining it] and what is to be rejected and accepted - is established.
tena jñāna yogādevāsau sarvajñaḥ pramāṇabhūtaśceti taduktapratipattikāmaiḥ sādhayituṃ yuktaḥ, natu kīṭasaṅkhyādijñānāt
Through this yoga of knowledge alone He [becomes] omniscient and authoritative - this is what those who wish to understand His teachings should establish, not [merely] through [His] knowledge of [such things as] the number of insects.
kiṃtu kīṭasāṅkhyādāvapi tasya jñānasambhavaḥ sādhyate
However, it is established that His knowledge extends even to such things as the number of insects.
tattvasthirāśeṣajñānaṃ tvāhatya
[His] knowledge encompasses all truths and is permanent.
tathā hi pramāṇasaṃvādinairātmyadeśanayā tattvajñānaṃ yasya siddham, tasyaiva nairātmyasya pūrvāparāvyāhatadeśanayā sthirajñānam, navāṅge 'pi śāstrapravacane priyānaviṣayāyām api deśanāyāṃ duḥkhādilakṣaṇasatyadeśanāyā ekavākyatvāt
For indeed, through [His] teaching of no-self (nairātmya) which accords with valid means of knowledge, His knowledge of truth is established; [and] through [His] teaching of that very no-self as being uncontradicted in past and future, [His] knowledge is proven permanent, because His teaching about the characteristics of suffering and so forth is in harmony with both the nine sections of scripture and the teaching concerning the path.
vicitraiścopāyaiścatuḥsatyaprakāśanād aśeṣajñānamasyānumīyate
From His illumination of the Four Truths through various means, His omniscience is inferred.
śeṣasya sarvākārajñānapratipādanāsamarthyalakṣaṇasya prahāṇāt
Because any remaining incapacity to demonstrate knowledge of all aspects has been eliminated.
nahyaviditasarvākāraguṇadoṣastat pratipādanākuśalaś ca tathā pratipādayati
For one who neither knows all the aspects, merits and faults [of things], nor is skilled in teaching them, cannot teach in such a way.
nāpi vedād vijñāya pratipādayatīti yuktam
Nor is it reasonable [to say] that "He teaches having learned from the Veda."
tasya pauruṣeyatvapratipādanād iti bhāvaḥ
Because it has been established that it [the Veda] is of human origin - this is the meaning.
ato 'śeṣatīrthakaramūrdhni bhagavān jñānātiśayayogāt sthita iti siddham
Therefore it is established that the Blessed One stands at the head of all religious teachers due to [His] possession of superior knowledge.
tenetyādi
[This is shown] by [the words] beginning with "through this" [in the following verse].
na tulyahetuyogatānyeṣāṃ viruddhārthopadeśinām
There is no equality of causes with others who teach contradictory meanings.
pramāṇagocarā yeṣāṃ pramābādhākulaṃ vacaḥ
[Those] whose words fall outside the scope of valid means of knowledge [and] are fraught with invalidation by valid cognition.
teṣām atyakṣavijñānaśaktiyogo hi dūrataḥ
Indeed, the possession of the power to know supersensible things is far from them.
nahyeṣāṃ jñānātiśayayogitāprasādhakaḥ kaściddhetur asti
There is no reason whatsoever to prove that these [other teachers] possess superior knowledge.
tathā hi heturbhavat vacanākhyam eva liṅgaṃ bhavet
If there were such a reason at all, it could only be in the form of an inferential mark, namely their word [teaching].
taccaiṣāṃ pramāṇaviruddhārthapratipādakam iti kathaṃ tato jñānātiśayayogitāmīṣāṃ pratīyeta
And since their word has been found to assert things contrary to valid means of cognition, how could their superior knowledge be proven from it?
sambaddhānuguṇopāyaṃ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam
[The words of the Buddha are] well-connected, propound compatible means, and set forth what is beneficial for human beings.
dṛṣṭe 'pyarthe pramāṇābhyām īṣadapyaprabodhitam
Even regarding perceptible objects, they are not contradicted even slightly by the two means of valid cognition.
sambaddham vākyānām ekārthopasaṃhāreṇa parasparaṃ saṅgatam natu daśadāḍimādivākyavat parasparasaṅgatam
"Well-connected" [means that] the sentences are mutually connected through comprising one unified purpose, not disconnected like statements such as "ten pomegranates" [and] so forth.
anuguṇaḥ śakyānuṣṭhānatayā nairātmyabhāvanādilakṣaṇa upāyo yasminnupadiṣṭas tat tathoktam, natu viṣapraśamanāya takṣakacūḍāratnālaṅkāropadeśavad aśakyopāyam
That is called "compatible means" wherein a method characterized by meditation on selflessness etc. is taught as being practicable, not an impracticable means like teaching about decorating with the crest-jewel of Takṣaka [the serpent king] for curing poison.
puruṣārthaḥ abhyudayaniḥśreyasalakṣaṇaḥ, tasyābhidhāyakam, natu kākadantaparīkṣāvad apuruṣārthaphalam
"Beneficial for human beings" means expressing that which is characterized by prosperity and the highest good, not something fruitless like examining crow's teeth.
nanu caitat sarvaṃ kapilādivākyeṣvapyastītyāha
[The opponent] says: "But all this exists in the words of Kapila and others as well."
dṛṣṭe pratyakṣānumānaviṣayatvenābhiprete
"Perceptible" means what is intended as the object of perception and inference.
pramāṇābhyām pratyakṣānumānābhyām
"By the two means of valid cognition" [means] by perception and inference.
abādhitaṃ yathā nirdiṣṭasyārthasya tathābhāvāt /
Because the state of things is exactly as [it has been] spoken of [in the Buddha's words].
tathā hi nīlādisukhaduḥkhādinimittod grahaṇarāgādibuddhilakṣaṇasya skandhapañcakasya pratyakṣatvenābhimatasya nānyathātvaṃ sambhavati, apratyakṣatvenacābhimatānām apratyakṣateva /
That is, the fivefold group of skandhas - characterized by cognitions of blue and other [colors], pleasure and pain and other [feelings], their causes, apprehension, attraction and other [mental states] - which is accepted as being perceptible cannot be otherwise [than as stated], just as things accepted as imperceptible are indeed imperceptible.
yathā paraiḥ pratyakṣābhimatānāṃ rūpaśabdādisanniveśenāṃ sukhādīnāṃ dravyakarmasāmānyasaṃyogādīnāṃ ca /
[This applies] to what others consider perceptible, such as arrangements of form, sound and other [sensibles], pleasure and other [feelings], and substance, action, universal, conjunction and other [categories].
tathā vastubalapravṛttānumānaviṣayatvenābhipretānāṃ tathā bhāva eva /
Likewise, those things which are considered to be objects of inference operating through the force of real entities are exactly as [stated by the Buddha].
yathā caturṇāmāryasatyānām atadviṣayatveneṣṭānāṃ cātadviṣayatvam eva /
Just as the Four Noble Truths, which are accepted as not being objects of that [inference], are indeed not objects of that [inference].
yathā parair vastubalānumānaviṣayatvenābhimatānām ātmādīnām /
Just as [in the case of] the ātman and other [entities] which others consider to be objects of inference operating through the force of real entities.
apiśabdādadṛṣṭe 'pi na vikriyeti darśitam /
The word "api" shows that [the Buddha's words] do not change even with respect to unseen things.
tathāhyatra rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ vā dharmamuddiśya tatprahāṇāya tannidānātmadarśanavirodhena nairātmyadarśanam eva pratipakṣo deśito natu kapilādiśāstravat tannidānāviruddhaḥ snānāgnihotrādirupadiṣṭaḥ //
For here, regarding attachment and other [defilements] or the dharmas arising from them, for their elimination [the Buddha] taught the view of no-self as the antidote, in opposition to the view of self which is their root cause - not, like the śāstras of Kapila and others, [prescribing] bathing, agnihotra and other [rituals] which are not opposed to their root cause.
ata eva viśuddhasuvarṇavat parīkṣya grāhyametad vicakṣaṇair iti bhagavatoktamityetat sūcayann āha tāpādityādi /
Saying "tāpādi" etc., he indicates this: that for this very reason the Blessed One said "This should be accepted by the wise after examination, like pure gold."
yathā kaladhautaṃ suvarṇamamalaṃ sarvadoṣarahitaṃ parīkṣyamāṇaṃ tāpādibhir na vikriyāṃ pratipadyate tathā bhagavad vacoratnaṃ pratyakṣeṇa tāpasadṛśena vastubalapravṛttānumānena nikaṣaprakhyeṇāgamāpekṣānumānenāpi chedadṛṣṭāntasūcitena na vikriyate /
Just as pure gold, washed clean [and] free from all imperfections, when tested by heating and other [methods], undergoes no change, so too the jewel-like words of the Blessed One undergo no change when tested by perception, which is like heating, by inference based on the force of real entities, which is like rubbing [on a touchstone], and by inference dependent on scripture, which is indicated by the example of cutting.
ataḥ prekṣāpūrvakāriṇa evambhūtādevāgamāt pravṛttir yuktā nānyata ityabhiprāyaḥ //
Therefore, it is proper that the activity of discriminating persons should proceed from such [authoritative] scripture alone, not from anything else – this is the intended meaning.
samastakumatadhvāntavidhvaṃsānuguṇodayam / tathāgatavacoratnamalabdhaṃ bahukalmaṣaiḥ //
The jewel-like word of the Tathāgata, whose arising is conducive to the destruction of all darkness of wrong views, is not obtained by those who are greatly afflicted by impurities.
tataḥ sugatamevāhuḥ sarvajñamatiśālinaḥ /
Therefore, the wise ones have declared the Sugata alone to be omniscient.
sugatastena sarvajñaḥ kapilo neti tu pramā /
Thus [there is] valid knowledge that the Sugata is omniscient, not Kapila.
anantaroditā vyaktāpyeṣā mūḍhair na lakṣitā //
Though this [valid knowledge] has been clearly stated just now, it is not perceived by the confused ones.
kumatam eva dhvāntamandhakāram, tasya vidhvaṃso vināśaḥ, tasminnanuguṇa udayo yasya tat tathoktam /
Wrong views are indeed darkness; its destruction [means] annihilation; conducive to that is his arising – thus it is so called.
bahukalmaṣair iti / apuṇyavadbhiḥ /
"By those with many impurities" means "by those lacking merit."
anantaroditeti / yathoktavacanākhyakāryaliṅgajā //
"Stated just now" means [the knowledge] arising from the inferential mark consisting in the aforementioned statement.
gaṇitādyekadeśeṣvityādāvāha yathoditāntarādityādi / yathoditāntarādeva viśeṣo 'pyavadhāryate /
[The opponent] states regarding particular domains like mathematics etc., as mentioned before, that "from what was stated before itself, the distinction too is ascertained."
yathoktajñānātiśayayogād bhagavato mārajito ṛṣabhavarddhamānādibhyo viśeṣe siddhe sati na yuktaṃ satyavacasā bhavatā vaktum na viśeṣo 'vadhāryata iti samudāyārthaḥ //
When the distinction [superiority] of the Blessed One, the Conqueror of Māra, over Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna and others is established through [his] possession of the aforementioned superior knowledge, it is not proper for you, speaking truthfully, to say that "no distinction is ascertained" – this is the meaning of the whole.
ko hi niḥśeṣaśāstrārthatattvajñaṃ manyate jaḍaḥ / samānabhojanajñānān mātṛkāmātravedanāt //
What fool would consider [someone] who merely knows the alphabet to be knowledgeable about the essence of all śāstras, merely because [that person] has the same knowledge about food?
tadyena hetunaikasya sarvajñatvaṃ prasādhyate / taddhetuvastuno 'sattvān na so 'nyasyopatiṣṭhate //
That reason by which omniscience is established for one [person] does not apply to another [person], due to the absence of the essential basis of that reason.
taditi / tasmāt /
"Tat" [means] therefore; thus.
taddhetuvastuna iti /
[This refers to] "the essential basis of that reason."
yadi nāma śabdamātram asti syād vādādīnām aviparītārthānāṃ sarvārthavyāpinām upadeṣṭṛtvāditi, tathāpi tasya vastupratibaddhasya hetuvastuno hetvarthasyābhāvānnāsau hetur anyasya kapilāder upatiṣṭhate vastveva hi vastupratibaddhatvād vastu gamayati na śabdamātram //
Even if the mere verbal expression of the reason might exist [in the form] "because [they are] teachers of the Syādvāda and other doctrines which are true and all-pervading," nevertheless, due to the absence of that essential factor of the reason which is bound to reality, that reason does not apply to Kapila and others; for only a real thing, being bound to reality, leads to [knowledge of] a real thing, not mere words.
dūṣaṇānītyādāvāha taddūṣaṇānītyādi / taddūṣaṇānyasaṃrambhāḥ sarvajñajinaśāsane /
Regarding [the verse beginning with] "dūṣaṇāni," he states [the verse beginning with] "taddūṣaṇāni": "Those objections [are made] without anger against the teachings of the omniscient Jina."
śākyā yāni vadantyevaṃ tānyaśaktā digambarāḥ //
What the Buddhists thus say, the Digambaras [say] without hostility.
asaṃrambhā iti /
"Asaṃrambhāḥ" means "without anger."
kṛpayaiva parānugrahāya teṣāṃ pravṛtter na bhavatām iva roṣamānādibhiḥ /
Because their activity is solely out of compassion for the benefit of others, not like yours [which is] with anger, pride, and so forth.
evam iti / tadupadiṣṭasya syādvādāder duṣṭatvapratipādanāt //
"Thus" [refers to this] because it has been demonstrated that the Syādvāda and other [doctrines] taught by him are defective.
yatsiddhapratibandhena pramāṇenopapāditam tattvaṃ saugatasiddhānte siddhaṃ nānyamate tathā
The truth that has been established through proofs with well-established premises in the Buddhist doctrine has not been [established] likewise in any other doctrine.
tena vyavasthitais teṣāṃ bhinnaiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇaiḥ pratibimbodayāgrastair nirṇayaḥ kriyatāmalam
Therefore, let clear conclusions be drawn through their various proofs and refutations which are well-established [and] not overwhelmed by [their own] reflections.
yaditi yasmāt
"Yat" [means] "because."
vastubalapravṛtter naḥ siddhatādātmyatadupattilakṣaṇapratibandhenetyarthaḥ
"[Having] well-established premises" means "through relations characterized by identity and causation, [operating] by the force of reality."
tasmāt
Therefore.
yasya jñeyetyādāvāha sarvākārajñatāyāstu na kaścid api vidyate
[As] stated in [the passage beginning with] "yasya jñeya," there exists no [contradiction] whatsoever with respect to omniscience.
sākṣāditarathā vāpi virodho jñeyatādibhiḥ
[There is] neither direct nor indirect contradiction with cognizability and other [qualities].
ajñeyatvādiviśleṣāt jñeyatvādi vyavasthitam
Cognizability and other [qualities] are established through the exclusion of incognizability and other [qualities].
arthāntaravidhānenārthāntarasya niṣedhaṃ pratipādayitum icchatā sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā viruddhasyaiva vidhānāt pratipādanīyo nāviruddhasya
When one wishes to establish the negation of one thing through the affirmation of another thing, one should establish [it] through the affirmation of something that is contradictory either directly or indirectly, not through [the affirmation of] something non-contradictory.
anyathā hi yasya kasyacid vidhānena sarvasya niṣedhaḥ syāt
For otherwise, the negation of everything would follow from the affirmation of just anything.
naca sarvajñatvasya jñayatvādibhiḥ saha kaścit sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā virodho 'sti
And there is no contradiction whatsoever, either direct or indirect, between omniscience and cognizability etc.
tathā hi dvividha eva bhāvānāṃ virodho nirūpyamāṇo 'vatiṣṭhate parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo vā yathā bhāvābhāvayoḥ kramākramayor vā
For indeed, when examined, contradiction between entities stands [as being] of only two types: [either] characterized by mutual exclusion, as between existence and non-existence or between succession and non-succession.
sahānavasthānalakṣaṇo vā yathāgniśītasparśayoḥ /
[Incompatibility may be] in the form of impossibility of co-existence, as between fire and cold touch.
tatrādyastāvajjñeyatvādibhiḥ saha sarvajñatvasya na sambhavatīti darśayati ajñeyatvād ityādi /
[The text] shows that the first [kind of incompatibility] does not exist between omniscience and cognisability [and other such properties] through [the words] starting with "due to incognisability."
yadvyavacchedanāntarīyako yasya paricchedas tayor eva parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo virodha iti pūrvam uktam /
It has been stated earlier that incompatibility in the form of mutual exclusion exists only between those two things where the cognition of one necessarily involves the exclusion of the other.
na ca jñeyatvādi sarvajñatvavyavacchedena sthitam, kiṃ tarhi ajñeyatvādivyavacchedena //
And cognisability [and similar properties] do not exist by excluding omniscience, but rather by excluding incognisability and similar [properties].
nāpi dvitīyo virodhaḥ sambhavatīti darśayann āha sarvajñatvamityādi /
Showing that the second type of incompatibility also does not exist [in this case], [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "sarvajñatvam."
sarvajñatvaṃ nacāpyetat kvacit pūrṇakāraṇam / sattvādisambhave paścāt prākpravṛttaṃ nivartate //
This omniscience has never before appeared [even] with its complete cause, such that it could cease later upon the appearance of [properties like] existence and so forth.
yasya hyavikalakāraṇasya bhavato yat sannidhānād abhāvas tayor eva sahānavasthānalakṣaṇo virodhaḥ, nacaitat sarvajñatvamavikalakāraṇaṃ prākpravṛttaṃ dṛṣṭam, yena paścāt sattvādisambhave sati nivartata iti syāt //
For incompatibility in the form of non-coexistence exists only between those two things where one does not arise even in the presence of its complete cause due to the presence of the other, and this omniscience has never been seen to appear before with its complete cause, such that it could cease later when [properties like] existence appear.
kasmān na pravṛttam ity āha naiḥsvābhāvya ityādi /
[Someone] asks "Why has [omniscience] not appeared?" [The author] states [the words] beginning with "due to absence of inherent nature."
nāviruddhavidhāne ca yuktam anyanivartanam /
When establishing something that is not incompatible, it is not reasonable to negate something else.
anyathā rūpasadbhāvād rasābhāvo 'pi gamyate //
Otherwise, from the presence of color, the absence of taste would also be established.
yastu manyate yadyapi jñeyatvādayo na viruddhyante sarvajñatvena, vaktṛtvaṃ tu viruddhyata eva, pāramparyeṇaitat kāraṇena vikalpena sarvajñatvasya sahānavasthānāt /
Some think that although cognisability and similar [properties] are not incompatible with omniscience, the property of being a speaker is indeed incompatible [with it], because omniscience cannot co-exist with speakership, which has conceptual thought as its indirect cause.
tathā hi nāvitarkya nāvicārya vācaṃ bhāṣata iti nyāyād vacanasya vikalpo hetuḥ
According to the principle that "[one] does not speak without cogitation and consideration," conceptual thought is the cause of speech.
vikalpānāṃ ca sarveṣām abhilāpasaṃsṛṣṭatayā na vastusvarūpagrahaṇam asti
And since all conceptual thoughts are connected with verbal expression, there can be no grasping of the real nature of things [through them].
tasya nirvikalpajñānagocaratvāt
Because that [real nature of things] is the object only of non-conceptual cognition.
ato vikalpāvasthāyāṃ vastusvarūpaparijñānābhāvān na sarvajñatvam astīti
Therefore, due to the absence of complete knowledge of the real nature of things during the conceptual state, there can be no omniscience.
siddhāsya vaktṛtvasya vipakṣāt sarvajñatvalakṣaṇāt kāraṇānupalabdhyā vyatirekaniścitir iti nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ
Thus, [it is established that] speakership, being opposed to the characteristic of omniscience, [leads to] the determination of mutual exclusion due to the non-apprehension of [their common] cause, [and therefore] the reason is not inconclusive.
ayaṃ ca vaktṛtvākhyo hetuḥ yasya jñeyaprameyatvavastusattvādilakṣaṇā ityatrādiśabdenākṣipta eveti
And this reason called "speakership" is indeed implied by the term "ādi" in [the phrase] "that which has the characteristics of being knowable, cognizable, real existence, etc."
tadetat tadatrādipadākṣipta ityādināśaṅkya
Having raised this doubt about [speakership] being implied by the word "ādi" here.
atrāpi ye pravaktṛtvam ityādinā pariharati
[The author] responds with [the verse] beginning "ye pravaktṛtvam."
tadatrādipadākṣipte vaktṛtve yo 'bhimanyate
[This refers to] one who maintains [the view] about speakership being implied by the word "ādi" here.