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īdṛk va paramaṃ tattvaṃ jānanti kavayo yadi / pradhānapuruṣārthajñān sarvajñān ko na manyate | If poets know such a supreme truth, who would not consider [them], knowing primordial matter and the highest human purpose, to be omniscient? |
saṃsāribhiḥ pṛthagjanair anucitamanabhyastam ity arthaḥ | The meaning is that [it is] not familiar to and not practiced by worldly ordinary people. |
kathaṃ hitāya prabhavati yena tadarthaṃ deśitam ity āha | [One] asks: "How does it lead to benefit that it has been taught for that purpose?" |
jñātaṃ sākṣātkṛtaṃ satkleśajanmādilakṣaṇasyāśeṣānartharāśer nivartakaṃ bhavati | When directly known and realized, it becomes the remover of the entire mass of misfortunes characterized by afflictions, birth, and so forth. |
uttarakālam api tadabhyasyamānaṃ rathyādivaiśeṣikaguṇābhinivartakam ityeva paramaṃ puruṣārthopayogitattvaṃ yadi kavayo 'dhigacchanti te 'pi santu sarvajñāḥ | Even later, when it is being practiced, it brings about specific excellent qualities; if poets understand such a truth that serves the highest human purpose, let them also be omniscient. |
na hyasmābhirekapuruṣāvadhikam eva sarvajñatvamabhyupeyate, kiṃ tarhiya evaṃ yathoditatattvavedī sa eva sarvavidiṣyate nānyaḥ, na caivaṃ kavīnām asti, tenātiprasaṅgo na bhavati | For we do not maintain that omniscience is limited to just one person; rather, whoever knows the truth as stated, he alone will be known as all-knowing, not another; and poets do not have this [knowledge], therefore there is no unwanted consequence [of too broad application]. |
idaṃ ca varddhamānāder nairātmyajñānamīdṛśam | This knowledge of the [doctrine of] non-self as described [here] does not belong to Vardhamāna and others |
na samastyātmadṛṣṭau hi vinaṣṭāḥ sarvatīrthikāḥ | Indeed, all the religious teachers have become lost in the view of [the existence of] self |
syād vādākṣaṇikasyādi pratyakṣādiprabo[dhi]tam | [Their doctrines] such as syādvāda and [the theory of] non-momentariness are refuted by direct perception and other [means of valid cognition] |
vahnevāyuktamuktaṃ yaiḥ syuḥ sarvajñāḥ kathaṃ nu te | How indeed could those who have stated such unreasonable things about fire and other [matters] be omniscient? |
vāhīkādiprasiddhe 'smin pratyakṣe 'rthe skhalanti ye | Those who stumble regarding such directly perceptible things that are well-known even to plowmen and others |
kathaṃ sambhāvyate teṣām apratyakṣādhigamaḥ sphuṭaḥ | How could their clear understanding of imperceptible things be possible? |
asarvajñatvam evaṃ tu [a]spaṣṭamavagamyate | Thus their non-omniscience is clearly understood |
mithyājñānānuṣaṅgitvād viparītaprakāśanāt | Due to [their] attachment to false knowledge and [their] exposition of contrary [teachings] |
sthāṇau nara iti bhrāntaḥ paripattyā[ttā] yathā paraḥ | Just as another person who has the misconception "this is a person" regarding a post |
sarvābhiś ca parīkṣābhir vijñeyo hetusiddhitaḥ | [One] is to be recognized through all examinations [and] through establishment of reasons |
samyak sarvapadārthānāṃ tattvajñānāc ca sarvavit | And [one becomes] omniscient through correct knowledge of the true nature of all things |
hetāvato na sambodhyā saṃdigdhavyatirekitā | Therefore [our] reason should not be regarded as having doubtful exclusion [from the contrary] |
yathoktaṃ tattvajñānaṃ yadi varddhamānakapilādīnāṃ sambhavet tadā teṣām api sarvajñatvaṃ bhavatu | If the aforementioned knowledge of reality were possible for Vardhamāna, Kapila and others, then let them also be omniscient |
sarva evāmī sarvadoṣaprasavahetuvitathātmagrahagrāhagṛhītāḥ pratyakṣādipramāṇabādhitākṣaṇikādipadārthānām upadeṣṭāraḥ | All these [teachers] are seized by the crocodile-grip of the false conception of self, which is the cause of all faults, [and are] teachers of [doctrines about] non-momentary and other entities that are refuted by perception and other means of valid cognition |
naca yatra samyag jñānaṃ tatra tadviruddhasya mithyājñānasya sambhavaḥ | And where there is right knowledge, there cannot be the possibility of false knowledge which contradicts it |
syād etat yadi nāma viparītārthaprakāśaṇam eṣām, tathāpi mithyājñānānuṣaṅgitvam ato 'vasātuṃ na śakyate, yato 'nyathāpi vyavahārāḥ śakyante kartuṃ vicitrātibhisandhitvāt puruṣāṇām | Even if these [teachers] present contrary meanings, still one cannot conclude from this that they are attached to false knowledge, since actions can be performed differently due to the diverse intentions of people |
ābhiprāyikam eteṣāṃ syād vādādivaco yadi | If these [teachers'] statements about syādvāda and other [doctrines] were [made] with [some other] intention |
yadi hyanyabhiprāyeṇa tairetat syād vādādipramāṇaviruddham ityuktam ityabhidhīyate | If it is claimed that "they stated these [doctrines] like syādvāda which contradict valid means of knowledge with some other intention" |
abhidhīyatām, nahyasmābhiḥ svātantryeṇa varddhamānādīnām asarvajñatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam | Let them claim [that]; for we do not wish to independently prove the non-omniscience of Vardhamāna and others |
kiṃtu bhavatā parasparaviruddhamatāvasthitena kapilādiṣu yadi sugataḥ sarvajñas tadā kapilo neti kā prametyuktam | Rather, you, who stand on mutually contradictory doctrines, asked "If Buddha is omniscient, what is the proof that Kapila is not?" |
atrāsmābhiḥ pramāṇaṃ bhavan matyā teṣāṃ matabhedam aṅgīkṛtyābhidhīyate, tena nāsiddhatā hetoḥ | Here we state as proof, accepting according to your view their difference of opinion, therefore the reason is not inadmissible |
tathā hi yadyeṣām ābhiprāyikaṃ vaco varṇyate tadā kimeṣāṃ pāramārthikaṃ vasturūpamiṣṭam iti vaktavyam | Moreover, if their statements are described as intentional, then what according to them is the ultimate nature of reality must be explained |
anātmakṣaṇikatvādi yadyevaṃ sarvadarśinaḥ | "[The doctrine of] no-self, momentariness, etc." - if this is so, [they are] all-seeing |
sākṣāt samastavastūnāṃ tattvarūpasya darśanāt | Because of [their] direct perception of the true nature of all things |
santu tepi samastānām aikamatyena saṃsthiteḥ | Let them be [omniscient], due to [their] unified agreement about everything |
parasparaviruddhārthaṃ nītārthaṃ na hi te jaguḥ | They indeed did not teach mutually contradictory meanings that need interpretation |
yadi sātmādīni brūyāt tadā matabheda evoktaḥ syād iti nāsiddhatā bhavet | If one were to speak of [doctrines like the existence of] self etc., then difference of opinion would indeed be established, thus [the reason] would not be inadmissible |
yadyevam ityādinottaram āha nahyasmābhiḥ śṛṅgagrāhikayāyam asau sarvajña ityevaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ, kiṃtu sāmānyena | [The author] gives this answer beginning with "if this is so": we do not wish to prove "this particular one is omniscient" by pointing fingers, but [only] in general |
yadi kapilādīnāṃ evaṃvidhatattvaparijñānam abhyupagamyate na tarhi bhavatāvaktavyam matabhedaḥ kathaṃ tayor iti, sarveṣām aikamatyena sthitatvāt | If such knowledge of reality is admitted for Kapila and others, then you should not ask "how [can there be] difference of opinion between them?", because all would be established in agreement |
yastu parasparaviruddhārthopadeśas teṣāṃ sa neyārthatayā vyavatiṣṭhate | But their teaching of mutually contradictory meanings stands as requiring interpretation |
pratipāditarūpasya sarvavastugatasya ca sākṣāt tattvasya vijñānāt sugatāḥ sarvadarśinaḥ | [The] Buddhas are omniscient solely because they have direct knowledge of truth regarding all things, as [previously] explained. |
teṣāṃ caivaṃvidhe jñāne sugatatvaṃ na bhidyate | And if such knowledge belongs to them [i.e., other teachers], their Buddha-hood does not differ [from that of the Buddha]. |
praśastajñānayogitvād etāvat tasya lakṣaṇam | Because [they too] possess perfect knowledge, and this alone is its [i.e., Buddha-hood's] characteristic. |
nahyaikamatyena sthitāḥ parasparaviruddhaṃ nītārtham tāttvikaṃ rūpaṃ gadantīti yuktam | For those who hold the same opinion cannot reasonably expound mutually contradictory teachings about the true nature of things. |
tasmān matabhedamicchatānā{mā---}bhiprāyikaṃ vaco vācyam | Hence when encountering those who desire [to maintain] different opinions, [their] statement should be understood as having a different intended meaning. |
eṣāṃ matabhedābhyupagame ca na vaktavyam ko nāmaiko nirūpyatām iti | And if these [teachers] are accepted as having different opinions, one cannot ask "who indeed should be selected as the one [who is omniscient]?" |
yataḥ sugata eva yathoktajñānayogitayā sarvajñatvenāvadhāryate nānya iti nirūpitam etat | Because it has been established that only the Sugata [Buddha], through possessing the aforementioned knowledge, is determined to be omniscient, not another. |
kiñca kapilādīnāṃ yathoktajñānābhyupagame sugatatvam evāpadyata | Moreover, if Kapila and others are accepted as having the aforementioned knowledge, they would indeed attain Buddha-hood. |
pratipāditaṃ prasādhitaṃ pramāṇato rūpaṃ svabhāvo yasyānātmādilakṣaṇasyatattvasya tat tathoktam | That truth whose nature has been explained [and] established through valid means of knowledge as having the characteristic of non-self and so forth is thus described. |
praśastajñānayogitvam sugatatvasya | [Having] perfect knowledge [is the characteristic] of Buddha-hood. |
yato nairātmyajñānāt praśastaṃ samastajñeyādyāvaraṇagrahaṇaṃ gata iti sugata ucyate | For [one] is called 'Sugata' because [he] has attained perfect [knowledge] of non-self and has gone beyond all obscurations regarding the knowable and so forth. |
kiñca sāmānyenāpi sarvajñasambhave sādhyamāne bhagavatyevāvatiṣṭhate sāmarthyād iti darśayati tat sambhavyapītyādi / | Further, even when omniscience is being established in general terms, it comes to rest in the Blessed Lord alone through [logical] implication; this is what [the author] shows [by saying] "tat sambhavyapi..." |
tatsambhavyapi sarvajñaḥ sāmānyena prasādhitaḥ / | Even when [the existence of] an omniscient one is established in general terms... |
taditi tasmāt / | 'Tat' means 'therefore' |
sarvajñalakṣaṇāvinābhāvāt // | Because [in him alone] the characteristics of omniscience are invariably present. |
nanu viśeṣanirdeśamantareṇa katham asau labhyata ity āha anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo 'pītyādi / | [One might ask:] "Without specifying particulars, how can this [conclusion] be reached?" [To this, the author] says "anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo 'pi..." |
anirdiṣṭaviśeṣo 'pi sarvajñaḥ ko 'pi sambhavet / yo yathāvat jagatsarvaṃ vettyanātmādirūpataḥ // | Even without specifying particulars, that person alone could be omniscient who knows the entire world as it truly is, in its nature of [being] soulless and so forth. |
yo hi sarvaṃ jagadanātmādirūpeṇa yathāvad avagacchati sa sarvajña ityevaṃ sāmānyena kṛte 'pi sarvajñalakṣaṇe yatra tadupalabhyate sa sāmarthyād viśeṣo 'vagamyata eveti viśeṣopādānam anarthakam etacca sarvajñalakṣaṇaṃ bhagavatyevopalabhyate nānyatra vicitrairupāyair avikalacatuḥsatyalakṣaṇasābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvaprakāśanād iti bhāvaḥ / | For when the definition of omniscience is given generally as "one who understands the entire world as it truly is, in its nature of [being] soulless and so forth is omniscient," the particular [person] in whom this [definition] is found is understood through implication, making the mention of particulars pointless. And this characteristic of omniscience is found only in the Blessed Lord and nowhere else, since [he alone] has revealed through various means the truth of what is to be accepted and rejected, along with its means, through [his teaching of] the complete four noble truths. |
nahyaviditaṃ vastu tathābhāvais tathāvattadaviparītamavikalam upadeṣṭuṃ śakyate / | For what is not known cannot be taught completely and correctly in its true nature without distortion. |
yathoktam "parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram" iti // | As has been said: "The explanation of what is to be attained though imperceptible and its causes is indeed difficult." |
pratyakṣīkṛtanairātmye na doṣo labhate sthitim / | When [one has] directly perceived selflessness, no fault can find a foothold. |
tadviruddhatayā dīpe pradīpe timiraṃ yathā // | Just as darkness [cannot exist] in opposition to a burning lamp |
kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam, tatra kleśā eva rāgādayo bhūtadarśanaprati [p.870] bandhā{ndha---}bhāvāt kleśāvaraṇam ucyante, dṛṣṭasyāpi heyopādeyatattvasya yat sarvākārāparijñānaṃ pratipādanāsāmarthyaṃ ca jñeyāvaraṇam / | Omniscience arises from the elimination of the obscurations of afflictions and knowables; there the afflictions themselves, such as attachment and [aversion], being obstacles to the perception of reality, are called "afflictive obscurations," while the "cognitive obscuration" is the inability to fully understand and explain all aspects of what should be abandoned and what should be adopted, even when [partially] seen. |
tatra kleśāvaraṇasya nairātmyapratyakṣīkaraṇāt prahāṇiḥ / | Among these, the afflictive obscuration is eliminated through direct perception of selflessness. |
jñeyāvaraṇasya tu tasyaiva nairātmyadarśanasya sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsāt / | The cognitive obscuration [is eliminated] through respectful, uninterrupted, and long-term cultivation of that very vision of selflessness. |
tathāhyamī rāgādayaḥ kleśā vitathātmadarśanamūlakā anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitāḥ na bāhyārthabalabhāvinaḥ / | For these afflictions like attachment and so forth are rooted in mistaken views of self, as established through positive and negative correlation, [and] do not arise from the force of external objects. |
yataḥ satyapi bāhyārthe nāyonisaumanacchā{skā---}ramantareṇotpadyante / | Because even when external objects are present, [afflictions] do not arise without improper mental attention. |
naca sa{ya---}tsadasattānuvidhāyi yan na bhavati tat tatkāraṇaṃ yuktaṃ atiprasaṅgāt / | And what does not follow [something else's] presence and absence cannot reasonably be its cause, as [this would lead to] unwanted consequences. |
nāpyete paraparikalpitātmasamavāyinaḥ, tasyātmano nirastatvāt / | Nor are these [afflictions] inherent in the self imagined by others, because that self has been refuted. |
satyapi vā tasminnityaṃ rāgādīnām utpattyanapāyaprasaṅgāt / | Even if such [a self] existed, it would absurdly follow that attachment and other [afflictions] would arise constantly without cessation. |
utpattisthitikāraṇasyāvikalasyātmanaḥ sarvadā sannihitatvāt / | Because the self, [supposedly] being the unimpaired cause of [their] arising and continuance, would always be present. |
parair anādheyātiśayasya tadapekṣānupatteśceti bahudhā carcitam etat / | And because [such a self], which cannot have any excellence added to it by others, could not depend on anything else—this has been discussed in many ways. |
sadasatoścāśrayaṇaniṣedhād ayuktam eṣāṃ kvacit samavāyitvam ityato na nityahetupratibaddhātmasthitayaḥ / | Since the [same] substratum has been denied for both sat and asat [existence and non-existence], their inherence in anything is incorrect; therefore, these [kleśas] are not established in [their] nature as connected with eternal causes. |
nāpi bāhyārthabalabhāvinaḥ / | Nor do they arise from the force of external objects. |
kiṃtvabhūtātmadarśanabalasamudbhāvinaḥ, tathāhyaham ityapaśyato nātmasnehaujāyate, nāpi mametyagṛhṇata ātmamukhotpādānukūlatvenāgṛḥīte vastunyātmīyatvenābhiṣvaṅgaḥ samudbhavati / | Rather, they arise from the force of an incorrect view of the Self (ātman). Thus, for one who does not have the notion "I", self-love does not arise; and for one who does not grasp [the notion] "mine", attachment to an object as one's own does not arise when [that object] is not grasped as conducive to producing pleasure for the Self. |
dveṣo 'pi nahi kvacid asaktasyātmātmīyapratikūlatvenāgṛhīte vastuni prādurbhāvamāsādayati / | Hatred also does not manifest for someone unattached towards an object that is not grasped as adverse to [one's] Self and what belongs to [one's] Self. |
ātmīyānuparodhini taduparodhapratighātini ca tasyāsambhavāt / | Because it [hatred] cannot exist towards what does not obstruct what belongs to oneself or towards what removes that obstruction. |
evaṃ nāmādayo 'pi prasūte tau cātmīyasneham so 'pi dveṣādikam ityanvayavyatirekābhyām ātmagrahād ātmātmīyagrahamūlatvam eṣāṃ sphuṭataramāgopālāṅganamavasitam eva / | Thus also [with regard to] name and the others. Through [observation of] presence and absence [it is clear that] those two [notions of "I" and "mine"] produce love for what is one's own, and that [love] produces hatred and the rest. Thus from the grasping of Self arises the root of grasping Self and what belongs to Self - this is clearly established [as true] from the cowherd to the learned man. |
ātmadarśanaviruddhaṃ ca nairātmyadarśanam tadviparītākārālambanatvāt / | And the view of no-Self is contrary to the view of Self, because it rests on the opposite form [of cognition]. |
anayor hi yugapad ekasmin santāne rajjusarpatajjñānayor iva sahāvasthānamaikyaṃ ca viruddham / | For the co-existence and identity of these two in one single continuum is contradictory, like [the contradictory nature] of the cognitions of rope and snake [regarding the same object]. |
ato nairātmyadarśanasyātmadarśanavirodhāt tanmūlair api rāgādibhiḥ saha virodho bhavati dahanaviśeṣeṇeva śītakṛtaromaharṣādiviśeṣasya / | Therefore, because the view of no-Self contradicts the view of Self, it also contradicts attachment and the other [afflictions] which are rooted in that [view of Self], just as a particular fire [contradicts] the particular horripilation and other [effects] produced by cold. |
tena sarvadoṣavirodhinairātmyadarśane pratyakṣīkṛte sati na tadviruddho rāgādidoṣagaṇo 'vasthānaṃ labhate timiravad ālokaparigate deśa ityato nairātmyadarśanāt kleśāvaraṇagrahaṇaṃ bhavati / | Therefore, when the view of no-Self, which contradicts all faults, is directly realized, the host of faults such as attachment and others that contradict it cannot maintain [their] existence, just as darkness [cannot exist] in a place pervaded by light. Thus from the view of no-Self comes the removal of the covering of afflictions. |
prayogaḥ yatra yadviruddhavastusamavadhānaṃ na tatra tadaparamavasthitimāsādayati yathā dīprapradīpaprabhāvaprasarasaṃsargiṇi dharaṇitalaṃ timiram astica doṣagaṇaviruddhanairātmyadarśanasamavadhānaṃ pratyakṣīkṛtanairātmyadarśane puṃsīti viruddhopalabdhiḥ / | When something contrary [to x] obtains a footing somewhere, then x cannot secure a footing there - just as darkness cannot secure a footing on ground flooded with lamplight; and [similarly] the perception of nairātmya, which is contrary to the host of defects, [obtains a footing] in a person who has directly realized nairātmya - thus [this is] the perception of contraries. |
syād etat yathā nairātmyadarśanasamākrānte cetasi viruddhatayātmadarśanasyotpattumanavakāśas tathā vairātmyadarśanasyāpyātmadarśanasamākrānte manasi, virodhasya tulyatvāt, tataś ca kasyacinnairātmyadarśanasyāsambhavād asiddho hetuḥ / | [Someone might object:] "Just as when consciousness is pervaded by the perception of nairātmya there is no room for the arising of its contrary - the perception of ātman - similarly there would be no room for the perception of nairātmya when the mind is pervaded by the perception of ātman, since the contradiction is equal [in both cases]. Therefore, since the perception of nairātmya would be impossible for anyone, [your] reason is unestablished." |
sambhavatu vā na vā nairātmyadarśanam, tathāpyanayor virodha satyapi nātyantaṃ bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ siddhyati, yathā rāgadveṣayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayor vā / | Whether there is perception of nairātmya or not, even though these two are contradictory, they are not established as absolutely negating each other - just like [in the case of] attraction and aversion, or pleasure and pain. |
yato 'tyantaprahāṇam iha sādhayitum iṣṭam / natu tāvatkālāsamudācāramātramityato 'naikāntikatā hetoḥ / | Since what is intended to be proved here is absolute elimination [of one by the other], not mere temporary non-manifestation, therefore [your] reason is inconclusive. |
dṛśyate 'pi satāmakhaṇḍitamahimāno rāgādayaḥ samudayamāsādayanta ityato 'pi hetor naikāntikateti / | Moreover, since attraction and so forth are seen to arise with undiminished power even in good people, for this reason too [your] reason is inconclusive. |
naitad asti / | This is not so. |
yadi nairātmyavikalpasyotpādo 'grahaṇakleśasya santāne na sambhavet tadā na sambhavennairatmyadarśanodayāvakāśaḥ, yāvatānubhavasiddhas tāvannairātmyavikalpasaṃmukhībhāvaḥ sarveṣām eva / | If it were impossible for the conceptual cognition of nairātmya to arise in the continuum of [someone] whose afflictions have not been grasped [as defects], then there would be no opportunity for the arising of the perception of nairātmya; however, the presence of the conceptual cognition of nairātmya is established by experience for everyone. |
api ca yathāndhakāraparigate deśe kālāntareṇa prakāśodayāvakāśasambhavas tathehāpi kiṃ na sambhāvyate / | Moreover, just as in a place enveloped by darkness there is the possibility of light arising after some time, why should that not be possible here too? |
nacāpyevaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum saiva tādṛśī bhāvanā na kasyacit sambhavati, yātathābhūtapratyakṣajñānakāle sarveṣām evānarthitvaṃ vā kāraṇaṃ bhavetprekṣāvataḥ pravṛtter arthitayā vyāptatvāt / | And it cannot be said that "such cultivation [of nairātmya] is impossible for anyone", because at the time of direct perception of reality, either everyone would have to lack the desire [for it] - [which is impossible] since the activity of a discriminating person is pervaded by desire. |
satyapi tatsvarūpajñāne nityatvaṃ vā doṣāṇāṃ paśyaṃstat prahāṇāya na yatnamārabhate ---, svatantrasyāsambhavaducchedatvāt / | Or even when there is knowledge of their true nature, [one might] see the permanence of the defects and not undertake effort to eliminate them - [thinking that] what is independent cannot be cut off. |
satyapi vā kāraṇavattve tat kāraṇasvarūpaniścayād api nādriyate bhāvanāyām api jñātanidānasya vyādhiriva prahātumaśakyatvāt / | Or even when there is causality, one might not pay attention to ascertainment of the nature of those causes, [thinking] that even with cultivation [of insight], like a disease whose cause is known, [the defects] are impossible to remove. |
bhavatu vā tat kāraṇaparijñānaṃ kiṃ tatkāraṇaṃ nityamavagamya notsahate tatprahāṇāya prekṣāpūrvakārī avikalakāraṇasya pratibaddhum aśakteḥ / | Or even if there is full understanding of those causes, having understood those causes to be permanent, a person acting with discrimination might not be enthusiastic about eliminating them, [thinking] that what has unimpaired causes cannot be obstructed. |
anityatve 'pi vā tatkāraṇasya doṣāṇāṃ prāṇidharmatāmavetya na prayatate svabhāvasya hātumaśakyatvāt / | Or even if [one accepts] the impermanence of the defects [kleśas], having recognized [them as] inherent in living beings, one does not make an effort [to remove them], because what is natural cannot be removed. |
asvabhāvatve vā doṣāṇāṃ kṣayopāyāsambhavannivartate na hy upāyavikalasyopeyasamprāptir asti / | Or if the defects are not inherent in [beings'], nature, one desists [from effort] because there are no means of destroying [them], for there can be no attainment of the goal without means. |
sattve 'pi copāyasya tadaparijñānād asambhavattadanuṣṭhāno bhavet / | And even if the means exist, their implementation would be impossible due to not knowing them, since what is not known cannot be practiced. |
aparijñātasvarūpasyānuṣṭhānāsambhavāt parijñāne 'pi vā laṅghanād iva vyavasthitotkarṣatayā janmāntarāsambhavena vā bhāvanāyā atyantaprakarṣamasambhāvayannābhiyogavān bhavati bhavatu vātyantaprakarṣagamanasambhavāt pratipakṣodayena doṣāṇāṃ kṣayaḥ, tathāpi tāmrādikāṭhinyavat punar api doṣādayaṃ sambhāvayannābhiyogamārabhata iti tatra na tāvad anarthitvaṃ siddham / | Or even if one knows [the means], one does not make an effort, thinking it impossible for mental cultivation to reach the highest perfection - as if by a [single] leap - either due to the fixed nature of excellence or due to the impossibility of [future] births; or even granting that mental cultivation could reach the highest perfection and that the defects could be destroyed through the arising of their opposites, still, thinking that the defects might arise again like the hardness of copper and other metals, one does not begin the effort - thus the lack of desire [for liberation] is not yet established. |
tathā hi ye tāvajjātyādiduḥkhotpīḍitamānasāḥ saṃsārād unnastamanasas tadupaśamamātmanaḥ prārthayante, teṣāṃ śrāvakādibodhaniyatānāṃ saṃsārād bhayam eva nairātmyabhāvanārthitvanimittam / | For those whose minds are afflicted by sufferings such as birth and who are frightened of saṃsāra desire peace for themselves; for these [people] who are destined for the enlightenment of śrāvakas and others, fear of saṃsāra itself is the cause of their desire for the cultivation of selflessness. |
ye tu gotraviśeṣāt prakṛtyaiva parahitakaraṇaikābhirāmāḥ saṃskārādiduḥkhatritayapīḍitaṃ jagadavekṣya kṛpāparatantratayā tadduḥkhaduḥkhinaḥ svātmani vyapekṣām apāsya sakalāneva saṃsāriṇa ātmatvenābhyupagatās tatparitrāṇāya praṇidadhate teṣāṃ karuṇaiva bhāvanāpravṛttinimittam parokṣopeyataddhtos tadākhyānasya duṣkaratvāt / | But those who, due to their special lineage, are by nature delighting solely in benefiting others, seeing the world afflicted by the three types of suffering beginning with dispositions, through their dependence on compassion become pained by its pain, and abandoning concern for themselves, accept all beings in saṃsāra as [their] self and resolve to rescue them - for them compassion alone is the cause of the arising of cultivation, because it is difficult to explain that [cultivation] and its cause which are imperceptible. |
parahitakaraṇena prekṣāvataḥ kiṃ prayojanam iti cen na / | If [someone asks] "What purpose does a wise person have in doing good to others?" [we say] no [such question applies]. |
tadeva prayojanamiṣṭalakṣaṇatvāt tasya / | That itself is the purpose, because it has the characteristic of being desirable. |
nacāpekṣāvattvaprasaṅgaḥ / | Nor does this entail [unwanted] dependence. |
parikalpitātmagrahanibandhanatvād ātmahitakaraṇābhiniveśasya sakalasādhujanasaṃmatatvāt / | Because attachment to doing good for oneself is based on a constructed grasp of self, [and] because it is accepted by all good people. |
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