sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
tatrāpi nānāgatāvasthāyāṃ tasyās tadānīm adṛśyatvāt / | Even there [it is] not [established] with regard to future states, because they are imperceptible at that time. |
tasmāt sthitam etat dṛśyasyaiva kāryakāraṇādibhāvaḥ siddhyatīti / yaścātmā saviśeṣaṇa iti / | Therefore, this is established: the relationship of cause and effect and so forth is proven only for what is perceptible, [and the same applies to] the nature [of a thing] with its qualifications. |
tatra ātmā svabhāvaḥ, saha viśeṣaṇena vartata iti saviśeṣaṇaḥ / | Here, 'ātmā' means 'essential nature', and 'with qualification' means 'existing together with qualification'. |
tatra viśeṣaṇaṃ trividhaviprakarṣarahitatvam / | Here, the qualification is freedom from the three kinds of remoteness. |
etā adṛṣṭaya iti / kāraṇādyanupalabdhayaḥ sarvajñasya kenacit saha kāryakāraṇabhāvavirodhavyāpyavyāpakābhāvāsiddheḥ / | These non-perceptions [i.e.,] the non-apprehensions of causes and so forth cannot prove [anything about] the omniscient one, because the relationships of cause and effect, contradiction, and pervasion and pervaded cannot be established between [the omniscient one] and anything else. |
satsvanyeṣūpalambhakāraṇeṣu kvacit kadācit pratyakṣatvāsiddheś ca / | Also because, even when other causes of perception are present, [the said person's] perceptibility is not established at any place or time. |
niṣedhāṅgaṃ nacāparamastyanupalabdhiviśeṣaṃ tyaktvā // | There is no other factor of negation except for this particular kind of non-apprehension. |
yadi tvadṛṣṭimātreṇa sarvavin pratiṣidhyate / tadā mātṛvivāhādiniṣedho 'pi bhavet tava // | If [you claim] the omniscient one is denied merely by your non-perception [of him], then you might also have to deny your mother's marriage and such [events]. |
tataś ca jārajātatvamāpannaṃ bhavata iti bhāvaḥ / | And consequently, you would incur the implication of being illegitimately born - this is the meaning. |
yathoktam yadyatra bhavato mandacakṣuṣo 'nupalabdhir arthānāpakuryāt hanta hato 'si, pitṛvyapadeśanibandhanasyāpyapravṛttiprasaṅgād iti // | As has been said: "If your non-apprehension, [you who are] of dull vision, were to invalidate things, then alas, you would be lost, since even the basis for designating your father would become inapplicable." |
atra parasya parihāramāśaṅkate sutākhyetyādi / | Here [the text] anticipates the opponent's reply [beginning with the words] "sutākhya" etc. |
sutākhyakāryadṛṣṭyā ceddhetos tasyāstitāgatiḥ / tadabhāve 'pi tat kāryaṃ nanu kasyāñcidīkṣate // | If [you say] that "the existence of that cause is known through seeing the effect named 'son'", [then we reply that] indeed, in some cases that effect is seen even in the absence of that [cause]. |
tasya mātṛvivāhādikasya hetoḥ sutākhyādikāryadarśanād anumānapramāṇataḥsiddhatvāt tadanupalabdhir na siddheti na tadabhāvaprasaṅgaḥ / | [If you say] "Because that cause - the mother's marriage etc. - is established through the valid means of inference from seeing the effect named 'son' etc., there is no non-apprehension of it, hence there is no possibility of its absence." |
tasya vivāhasyābhāve tathā vivāhitabhartrā ca saha suratopabhogābhāve 'pikasyāścid duṣṭayoṣitaḥ parapuruṣasaṅgatyā sutākhyaṃ kāryamupalabhyate tadvad bhavatu māturapi syād ityādityasiddham anumānam, tataś ca bhavato jārajātatvaprasaṅgo durnivāraḥ / | Even in the absence of that marriage, and in the absence of conjugal relations with a married husband, the effect named 'son' is observed in the case of some wicked woman through association with another man, and similarly it could be the case with [your] mother too - thus the inference is unestablished, and consequently the possibility of your being illegitimately born is difficult to avoid. |
ācāryadharmakīrtināpi viśiṣṭapitṛvyapadeśanibandhanābhāvaprasaṅgāpādanasya vivakṣitatvājjārajātatvaprasaṅgāpādanam eva kṛtam // | Teacher Dharmakīrti too has made this very same point about the possibility of illegitimate birth, since he intended to show the consequence of the absence of basis for designating a specific father. |
anyopalambhata ityādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate | The following text sets forth the opponent's answer [to the above] and rejects it. |
anyopalambhatas tasya nāsattā gamyate yadi / nanu cānyopalambhaste siddhastadviṣayaḥ katham // | If it is said that "the non-existence of it is not cognized because others perceive it," then [we ask] how is your [claim about] others' perception of it established? |
anyeṣāṃ puruṣāṇām upalambho 'nyopalambhaḥ / | "Anyopalambha" [means] the perception of other persons. |
mātṛvivāhādeḥ / | "Tasya" [refers to] the mother's marriage and such things. |
nāsattā gamyate, kiṃ tarhi sattaiva / atrānyopalambhāsiddhiḥ, tadbhāvayann āha nanu cetyādi // | "Non-existence is not cognized" means rather existence itself [is cognized]. Here [the issue is] the non-establishment of others' perception, [and] explaining this, he says "nanu ca" etc. |
katham iti pṛṣṭaḥ sanpara āha upadeśād iti / | Being asked "how?", the opponent says "[it is known] from testimony." |
upadeśān na sarvajñe 'pyayaṃ kiṃ vidyate tathā / idaṃ ca svoktamaparaṃ kimatra na samīkṣyate // sarvadā caiva puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānṛtavādinaḥ / yathādyatve na visrambhas tathātītārthakīrtane // | [We reply:] "Is not such testimony found regarding the omniscient one also? And why is your own other statement not considered here? [Namely that] men are generally liars at all times. Just as there can be no trust in [their words about] present matters, so too regarding accounts of past things." |
siddha iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | The word [upadeśāt] is to be construed with "siddha" from the previous [text]. |
atiprasaṅgāpādanāmu{du---}padeśasyānaikāntikatāmādarśayann āha na sarvajñe 'pīti / | Showing the inconclusiveness of testimony by pointing out [its] over-application, he says "Is there not [such testimony] regarding the omniscient one also?" |
sarvajñe kiṃ na vidyate, apitu vidyata eva, tatra yadi mātṛvivāhādyupadeśaḥ pramāṇīkriyate, sarvajño 'stītyayam asmadīyo 'pyupadeśaḥ kiṃ na pramāṇīkriyeta, viśeṣābhāvāt / | Does it not exist regarding the omniscient one? Rather, it certainly exists. In this case, if testimony about the mother's marriage and such things is accepted as valid, why should our testimony that "the omniscient one exists" not also be accepted as valid, since there is no difference [between the two cases]? |
kiñca svavācaivopadeśasyāprāmāṇyam uktaṃ bhavateti darśayati idaṃ cetyādi // | Further, [the author] points out that you yourself have declared the unreliability of assertions in your own words, [as shown] in the passage beginning with "idaṃ ca." |
mā vābhūd upadeśo 'sya prāmāṇyam vā tathāpi vaḥ / kṛto 'yaṃ niścayaḥ sarvaiḥ sarvavinnopalabhyate // | Let there be no such assertion [about the omniscient one], or let such assertion lack reliability; even so, you have arrived at this certainty that "the omniscient one is not perceived by anyone." |
evaṃ hi niścayo hi syāt sarvasattvātmadarśane / taddṛṣṭau sarvavidbhūto bhavān iti ca varṇitam // | Such certainty would only be possible if you could see the souls of all beings; and if you had such perception, you yourself would be omniscient, as has been explained. |
sarvavido 'stitvapratipādakam iti śeṣaḥ / | [The word] "assertion" means that which establishes the existence of the omniscient one. |
asya prāmāṇyaṃ vetyupa[deśasya] / | [The phrase] "asya" [refers to] the reliability of this assertion. |
sarvasattvātmadarśana iti / sarvasattvasvabhāvadarśane / | [The phrase] "seeing the souls of all beings" means seeing the essential nature of all beings. |
astyevāsmākaṃ sarvasattvātmadarśanam iti cedāha taddṛṣṭavityādi / taddṛṣṭau sarvasattvātmadṛṣṭau // | If one says "We do indeed have the vision of all beings' souls," [the author] responds with "taddṛṣṭau" etc., [meaning] "in the case of seeing the souls of all beings." |
anyathā saṃśayo yukto 'nupalambhe 'pi sattvavat / | Otherwise, even in the case of non-perception, there would only be doubt, just as [there is] regarding [the existence of certain] beings. |
kecit sarvavidaḥ santo vidantīti hi śaṅkyate // svayam evātmanātmānam ātmajyotiḥ sa paśyati / | For it is conceivable that some holy ones who are omniscient do exist, [and] that he [the omniscient one], being self-luminous, sees himself through himself. |
ityapyāśaṅkyate 'taś ca sarvādṛṣṭiraniścitā // | This too is conceivable, and therefore the non-perception [of the omniscient one] by all is uncertain. |
anyatheti sarvasattvātmadarśanābhāve | "If it were not so" [means] if there is no perception of the souls of all beings |
deśādiviprakṛṣṭasya vastunaḥ sattāyām iva sattvavat | Like [in the case of] the existence of an object far removed in space and such [factors], [it is] like [its] existence |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yathā deśādiviprakṛṣṭasya vastunaḥ satyapyanupalambhe tatsattāyāṃ bhavati, satyapi vastunyanupalambhāt, evam anyapuruṣavartini sarvajñāviṣayopalambhe 'pi saṃśayo yuktaḥ | This means that just as in the case of an object far removed in space etc., even when there is non-apprehension despite the object's existence, there is [doubt] regarding its existence due to non-apprehension despite the object's existence, similarly doubt is justified regarding the object of omniscience that pertains to other persons even when [it is] apprehended |
athavā ayam arthaḥ yathā sarvajñasattāyām anupalambhe 'pi saṃśayas tathā sarvajñatvaviṣayopalambhe 'pi saṃśayaḥ, dvayor api svabhāvaviprakarṣeṇānupalambhasambhavāt | Or, this is the meaning: just as there is doubt regarding the existence of the omniscient one even in [case of] non-apprehension, so too there is doubt even in [case of] apprehension of [his] omniscience, since non-apprehension is possible in both cases due to remoteness of [their] essential nature |
nanu vastusattve saṃśayo yukto yataḥ satyapi vastuni tadanupalambhasya darśanātkadācit syād iti sambhāvyamānatvāt | [One might object:] "Indeed doubt regarding the existence of an object is justified because, even when the object exists, its non-apprehension is observed, [so] there is the possibility that it might sometimes exist" |
natu sarvajñadarśanaṃ kasyacid arvāgdarśanasya sambhāvyate, nacāsambhāvyamāne vastuni prekṣāvataḥ saṃśayo yukta ityata āha kecid ityādi | "But perception of the omniscient one is not possible for anyone of limited vision, and doubt is not justified for a discerning person regarding an impossible object" - therefore [the author] says "some [persons]" etc. |
svayam eveti parasiddhāntābhyupagamād uktam | "[By] himself indeed" - this is stated based on accepting the established doctrines of others |
svayam evetyasyaiva nirdeśa ātmaneti | The term "by himself" is indicated by the very word "ātmanā" |
ātmeti puruṣaḥ | "Ātmā" [means] the person |
jyotir iti cidrūpatvena prakāśātmakatvād ātmanaḥ | "Light" [refers to] the self because it has the nature of consciousness and thus has the essence of luminosity |
tathāhītyādinā idam eva samarthayate / | Thus [this] is supported by the following: |
tathā hi sarvaśabdena sarve prāṇabhṛto matāḥ / sa ca sarvābahirbhūta ityadṛṣṭiraniścitā // | For by the word 'sarva' [all] all living beings are meant; and since he [the omniscient one] is not outside of 'all', therefore the non-perception [of him] is uncertain. |
sa ceti / sarvajñaḥ // | 'He' means the omniscient one. |
tadekaparihāreṇa pratibandho 'tra ko bhavet / na hyanyair aparijñānāt svarāgādi nivartate // | By excluding that one [person], what connection could there be? For one's own affliction does not cease merely because others do not know of it. |
yadi hi tasya sarvajñasya parihāreṇānyeṣām arvāgdarśināmanupalambho hetutvenopādīyate tadānaikāntikatā, tasya svānupalambhatvasarvajñābhāvena sahāvinābhāvalakṣaṇasya prativacanasyābhāvāt / | If the non-perception by others of limited vision is taken as a reason for excluding [the existence of] that omniscient one, then [that reason] is inconclusive, because there is no response [possible] characterized by an invariable connection between one's own non-perception and the non-existence of the omniscient one. |
nahītyādinā tameva pratibandhābhāvaṃ samarthayate // | The statement beginning with "for [one's own affliction] does not" supports this very absence of connection. |
kecid arvāgdṛśo vāpi prapaśyante 'numānataḥ / | Even some people of limited vision perceive [him] through inference. |
kāścid eva hi keṣāñcin nipuṇā mataḥ kvacit // | Indeed, only some views of some people are accurate in some cases. |
tathā hi vedabhūmyādeḥ kṣaṇikatvādisādhanam / puraḥ proktaṃ suvispaṣṭam api no lakṣitaṃ jaḍaiḥ // | For example, the proof of momentariness of the Veda, earth, and so forth, though clearly stated before [us], is not understood by dull-witted people. |
tadevaṃ śaṅkayā nāsya jñānābhāvo 'pi niścitaḥ / yato 'sattvaṃ prapaśyante nirviśaṅkā hi jātayaḥ // | Therefore, due to [this] doubt, even the absence of his knowledge is not certain, [just] because some people confidently perceive his non-existence. |
kecinnupaṇamataya arvāgdarśino 'pi santaḥ kadācid anumiteḥ sarvajñaṃ pratipadyante iti sambhāvyamānatvāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatvam abhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtatvād ityasya hetoḥ / | Some people, even though they have limited vision, sometimes comprehend the Omniscient One through inference; therefore, due to this possibility [of His existence], the reason "because [He] is the object of the means of cognition [called] non-apprehension" is doubtful and inadmissible. |
tathā hi vedadhvanidharaṇigiritanuvajrādīnāṃ kṣaṇikatvānātmatvādi sphuṭataram api bhavadbhir mīmāṃsakapaśubhir anupalakṣitam api sat, asmābhir dṛḍhatarasādhanopadarśanena prasādhitam | For instance, although the momentariness and soullessness of the Vedic sound, earth, mountains, body, diamond and such things - though quite evident - is not apprehended by you beast-like Mīmāṃsakas, [yet] it has been proven by us through the demonstration of very firm arguments. |
tathā sarvajñe yadi nāma sādhanam idānīṃ nopalabhyate tathāpi sambhāvyamānatvāt sandigdhamityataḥ pramāṇapañcakavirahasvabhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvamasiddham / | Similarly, even if proof regarding the Omniscient One is not found at present, still, due to [His] possibility [of existence], it is doubtful; therefore, the [reason that His] form is the object of the means of cognition which consists in the absence of the five means of proof is inadmissible. |
sandihyamānatvāt / | Because it is doubtful. |
yata iti / mānābhāvāt // | Because there is no proof. |
kiñca mābhūnāmārvāgdarśināṃ sarveṣām eva sarvajñasiddhāvanumānam / | Moreover, let it be that not all people of limited vision can infer the existence of the Omniscient One. |
tathāpyanaikāntikatā hetor iti darśayann āha abhāve 'pyanumānasyetyādi / | Nevertheless, showing that the reason is inconclusive, [the author] states "even in the absence of inference" and so forth. |
abhāve 'pyanumānasya nāto 'sattāviniścayaḥ / | Even in the absence of inference, there cannot be certainty about [His] non-existence from this. |
asamārabdhadhūmādikāryavahnyādisattvavat // | Like the existence of fire and such things whose effects like smoke have not yet begun [to appear]. |
pratipāditaṃ hi pūrvaṃ yathā na pramāṇaṃ vastuno hetur nāpi vyāpakaṃ tat katham asya nivṛttāvapi vastu nivartate / | For it has been explained before that a means of proof is neither the cause of a thing nor its pervader; how then can the thing cease to exist when this [means of proof] ceases? |
tathā hyayogolakavahnyāder anārabdhadhūmādikāryasyāpavarakakuharāntargatasya liṅgābhāvān nānumānam utpadyate / | For instance, of fire in an iron ball and such things, whose effects like smoke have not yet begun [to appear] and which are hidden inside a room, no inference arises due to the absence of [inferential] marks. |
atha ca tasya sattvamanivṛttam iti nāsattāniścayas tadvat sarvajñābhāvasādhane anumānābhāve saṃśayaḥ / | And yet its existence is not negated, so there can be no certainty about its non-existence; similarly, in proving the non-existence of the Omniscient One, when there is no inference, there is doubt. |
ata iti anumānābhāvāt / | [It means] "that alone," [referring to] mere absence of inference. |
asamārabdhaṃ dhūmādikāryaṃ yena vahnyādinā sa tathoktaḥ asamārabdhadhūmādikāryaścāsau vahnyādiśceti vigrahaḥ tasya sattāyām iva sattvavat // | [The compound means] "that fire etc. which has not begun to produce its effects like smoke"; regarding the existence of such a fire, there can be no certainty, just as [there can be no certainty] regarding [its] existence. |
kadācidupalabdhe 'rthe sandeho nanu yujyate / | Indeed, doubt is possible regarding an object that has been perceived at some time, |
yathā sthāṇau tathā hyeṣa ubhayāṃśāvalambakaḥ // | just as in the case of a post, since it partakes of both aspects [of the doubt]. |
yataḥ sthāṇunarau dṛṣṭau kadācid iti tadgatiḥ / | Because both post and man have been seen at some time, therefore such [doubt] arises. |
saṃśayo yujyate tatra dṛṣṭastvevaṃ na sarvavit // | Doubt is possible in that case, but the omniscient one has never been thus perceived. |
yo hyarthaḥ kadācid upalabdhapūrvas tatraiva saṃśayo yujyate, yathā sthāṇau nānyatra, tatho{syo---}bhayāṃśāvalambitvāt / | For doubt is possible only regarding an object that has been perceived before, as in the case of a post and not elsewhere, because it [alone] partakes of both aspects. |
anyathā hi yatkiñcid adṛṣṭaṃ tat sarvamālambeta saṃśayaḥ / tataścobhayāṃśāvacambitvaniyamo na syāt / | For otherwise, doubt would arise regarding everything unseen; and thus the rule about partaking of both aspects would not hold. |
tenāyogolakavahnyādau yuktaḥ saṃśayo natu sarvajñe tasya kadācid apyanupalambhāt // | Therefore, doubt is justified regarding fire in an iron ball and such things, but not regarding the omniscient one, as [such a being] has never been perceived at any time. |
nanvityādinā pratividhatte / | [The author] responds with [the words] beginning with "nanu" [in the next verse]. |
nanu mātṛvivāhāder asattvaṃ muktasaṃśayam / etenaiva prakāreṇa tava dhīman prasajyate // | In this manner, O clever one, the non-existence of your mother's marriage [and so forth] becomes established, free from doubt. |
yadi kadācid upalabdhe 'rthe saṃśayo 'nyatrābhāvaniścayastadāmunā nyāyena bhavato mātṛvivāhādessa{rasa}ttvamasaṃśayitaṃ prāpnoti / | If there can be doubt only regarding something that has been perceived at some time, and certainty of non-existence regarding everything else, then by this principle, the non-existence of your mother's marriage becomes established beyond doubt. |
nahi bhavatā kadācin mātṛvivāha upalabdhapūrvaḥ / | For you have never before perceived [your] mother's marriage. |
yenātrāpi nābhāvāniścayo bhavedbhavataḥ / | Due to which there could not be any uncertainty regarding its non-existence for you. |
atra ca śeṣaṃ codyamuttarapūrvavad vācyam / | And here the remaining objection is to be answered as before. |
yadyevaṃ nirnibandhana eva tarhi saṃśayaḥ prāpta ity āha asmābhir ityādi / | [The opponent] says: "If such is the case, then doubt would have no basis at all." [The author responds with] "We..." etc. |
asmābhiḥ saṃśayastvatra pramābhāve 'pi varṇyate / | We maintain that doubt exists even in the absence of valid cognition. |
bhāve 'bhāve ca vastūnāṃ pramāṇavinivṛttitaḥ // | [It arises] regarding both existence and non-existence of things, due to the absence of operations of valid means of knowledge. |
pramāṇābhāvamātrasya hi vastubhāvābhāvayor api pradarśanād avyavasthitatvamataḥ sadasattāniścayānutpatter evaṃ saṃśayo varṇyate / | Since mere absence of valid means of knowledge can be shown regarding both existence and non-existence of things, [and] due to this non-definitiveness, there is no arising of certainty about existence or non-existence, thus doubt is explained. |
yathoktam upalabdhyanupalabdhyavyavasthāto viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṃśaya iti // | As has been stated: "Doubt is that consideration which depends on the specific [nature of things] due to the non-definitiveness of perception and non-perception." |
netrādīnāṃ hi vaikalye vastusattve 'pi na pramā / | For when there is a defect in the eyes [and other sense organs], there is no valid cognition even when the object exists. |
teṣām avikalatve 'pi vastvabhāvād ghaṭādivat // | Even when these [sense organs] are intact, there is no cognition due to the absence of the object, just as in the case of [the non-perception of] a jar. |
tataścānupalambhasya kevalasya dvidhekṣaṇāt / tat pramābhāvato 'pyastu sarvajñe saṃśayo varam // | And thus, since mere non-apprehension is observed in both ways, it is better that there should be doubt regarding [the existence of] an omniscient being [even] from the absence of valid cognition. |
tathā hi satyapi ghaṭādike vastuni netravikalasya na pramāṇaṃ pravartate / | For even when an object such as a jar exists, [if] one lacks eyes, the means of valid cognition does not function. |
teṣāṃ ca netrādīnām avaikalye 'pi viṣayākhyasya vastuno 'sannihitatvenāsattve 'pi na pravartata iti prakṛtena saha sambandhaḥ / | And even when those [organs] like eyes are intact, if the object called the subject [of cognition] is absent in the sense of not being proximate, [cognition] does not function - this is to be connected with the present context. |
yathā ghaṭādau yogyadeśāsannihite / | As in the case of a jar [and similar objects] not present in a suitable location. |
kevalasyeti / dṛśyatāviśeṣaṇarahitasya / | "Mere" means: without the qualification of perceptibility. |
dvidhekṣaṇād iti bhāve 'bhāve ca / | "Observed in both ways" means: in [cases of] existence and non-existence. |
taditi / tasmāt / | "Tat" means: therefore. |
varam iti / kuśalamūlapratisandhānakāraṇāt / | "Better" [is said] because [it is better] than [attempting] to establish the cause of a wholesome root. |
tathā hi mithyādṛṣṭyā samucchinnakuśalamūlānāṃ kuśalamūlapratisandhānaṃ{ne---} kāṅkṣāsti, dṛṣṭibhyāṃ varṇyate sandhiḥ kāṅkṣāsti dṛṣṭibhyām iti vacanāt / ata eva tatra tatrācāryāḥ saṃśayaṃ vidadhate bhāve kiṃ pramāṇam iti cedata eva saṃśayostviti // | For when wholesome roots have been cut off by wrong views, there is a desire for reconnection with wholesome roots, as stated in the words "The connection is described by two views, there is desire due to two views." Hence the teachers establish doubt in various contexts, [saying] "If one asks what is the proof of [His] existence, let there be doubt for this very reason." |
syād etat yadi sarvajño 'sti kimiti kadācit kenacinnopalabhyate / | [One might ask:] if an omniscient being exists, why is he never perceived by anyone? |
sa hi sannapi nekṣyeta jaḍairanyavikalpavat / | For even though existing, he would not be seen by dull-witted [persons], just as [one does not see] the conceptions of others. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.