sanskrit
stringlengths 2
508
| english
stringlengths 2
924
⌀ |
|---|---|
sākṣād ayoguḍāṅgārā{ra}vahnivan na ca kāryakṛt // | And [he is] not actively engaged [in action], just like the fire in an iron ball [which exists but is not active]. |
kārye dṛśye 'pi vā tena nānvayo 'sya pratīyate // | Even if [his] action were visible, [his] connection with that [action] would not be cognized. |
sarvārthajño yato 'dṛśyaḥ sadaiva jaḍadhīdṛśām / | Because one who knows all things is always invisible to those whose eye of understanding is dull. |
nāto 'numānatas tasya sattā siddhiṃ prayāsyati // | Therefore his existence cannot be established through inference. |
ahetvavyāpakaṃ coktaṃ pramāṇaṃ vastuno 'sya ca / | And it has been stated that there can be no proof [based on] cause or pervasion for this entity. |
nivṛttāvasya bhāvo 'pi dṛṣṭastenāpi saṃśayaḥ // | Even though inference is impossible, [its] existence is observed, and therefore there is doubt. |
nekṣyeta sākṣād iti sambandhanīyam / | The [word] "sākṣāt" [directly] is to be connected with "nekṣyeta" [would not be seen]. |
nahi yāvāt kiñcit sakṛtsarvamupalabhyam, yenopalambhābhāvāt sarvajñābhāvaḥ syāt, sato 'pyanyapuruṣagatasya vikalpasya parair anupalambhāt / | Indeed, not everything must be cognized at once, whereby one could argue that "due to lack of perception, the omniscient one does not exist," since the conceptions present in other persons, though existing, are not perceived by others. |
nāpyavaśyaṃ kāraṇāni sadaiva samārabdhakāryāṇi bhavanti, yena sarvajñasya kāryānupalambhād asattvaṃ syāt, anārabdhadhūmakāryasyāpyayogolakavahnyāder darśanāt / | Nor is it necessary that causes should always be engaged in producing their effects, whereby one could argue that "due to non-perception of the omniscient one's activity, he does not exist," since we observe fire in a red-hot iron ball even when it has not begun to produce smoke. |
bhavatu nāma sadaiva kāraṇānāṃ kāryavattvaṃ tathāpi na tat kāryābhāvaniścayaḥ, nahi sarvakāryamutpannam iti dṛśyatvena vyāptam, yena kāryānupalabdhyā tadabhāvaḥ siddhyet / | Let it be granted that causes are always producing effects; even then, there can be no certainty about the absence of those effects, because not every produced effect is pervaded by perceptibility, whereby non-perception of an effect could prove its non-existence. |
utpannasyāpi kāryasyādarśanāt / | Because even a produced effect may not be perceived. |
anyakalpajrāgavat yathānyasya puruṣasya kalpādayonisaumanaskārājjāto 'pirāgo nopalabhyate, na cāsyābhāvaḥ / | Just as in the case of love from another's imagination, when love arises in another person's mind due to pleasant thoughts [about something], [though] it is not perceived [by others], its non-existence cannot be claimed. |
satyapi vā kāryadarśane tat kāraṇasyātīndriyatvād agṛhītatadanvayavyatirekasya puṃsas tadanumānānutpattisambhavāt, tathā satyapi sarve{sarvajñe} nānumānāt siddhir bhaved iti sambhāvyate / | Even when an effect is perceived, if its cause is beyond the senses and a person cannot grasp its positive and negative concomitance, no inference of that [cause] is possible; similarly, even though an omniscient being exists, it is possible that [his existence] cannot be established through inference. |
dhīreva dṛk dhīdṛg, jaḍā dhīdṛg yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | Cognition itself is the eye - [hence] dhīdṛg; those whose cognitive eye is dull are called thus. |
apica pūrvam uktam yathā na pramāṇaṃ vastuno hetuḥ, nāpi vyāpakaṃ, tat katham asyānumānasyāhetu{tva}vyāpakabhūtasya nivṛttāvapi vastu nivarteteti bhāvaḥ / | Moreover, as stated before, a means of knowledge is neither the cause nor the pervader of a thing, so how could the absence of inference, which is neither the cause nor the pervader [of the omniscient being], lead to the absence of that thing? |
ahetuś ca tadavyāpakaṃ ceti tathoktam nacāpyetacchakyaṃ vaktum, akāraṇāvyāpakabhūtasyāpyanumānākhyasya pramāṇasya nivṛttau vastu nivartamānaṃ dṛṣṭam eva{mati} / | The compound means "neither cause nor pervader," and it cannot be said that when the means of knowledge called inference, which is neither cause nor pervader, is absent, the thing [in question] is seen to be non-existent. |
nahi dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ nāmetyāśaṅkyāha nivṛttāvasya bhāvo 'pi dṛṣṭa iti / | [Anticipating the objection] "surely there can be nothing wrong in what is actually seen," [the text] states that even in [inference's] absence, [the thing's] existence is observed. |
asyānumānasya nivṛttāvapi satyām asya vastuno bhāvo 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ, yathā ayogolakavahnyāder iti pūrvam uktam // | Even when this inference is absent, the existence of this thing is observed, as in the case of fire in a red-hot iron ball, as was stated before. |
tasmāt sarvajñasadbhāvabādhakaṃ nāsti kiñcana / | Therefore, there exists nothing that can negate the existence of the omniscient being. |
pramāṇaṃ sādhakaṃ tvasya vistareṇābhidhāsyate // | The proof establishing [the omniscient being's existence] will be explained in detail [later]. |
syād etat yathāsmākaṃ na kiñcit tadbādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti, tathā bhavatāṃ {na} tat sādhanam apītyatrāha sādhakaṃ tvasyeti // | [To the objection] "just as we have no proof negating it, you too have no proof establishing it," [the author] responds with "the proof establishing [it], etc." |
niḥśeṣārthaparijñānasādhane viphale 'pi ca / sudhiyaḥ saugatā yatnaṃ kurvantyanyena cetasā // | Even though the attempt to establish the knowledge of all things may be futile, the wise Buddhists make this effort with a different intention. |
anena cetaseti | With this intention [see verse 3308 above] |
anyenābhiprāyeṇa | With a different intention/motive |
kaḥ punar asāv ityāha svarge ityādi | "What then is that [intention]?" — thus [the text] states [beginning with] "svarge" |
svargāpavargasamprāptihetujño 'stīti gamyate | It is understood that there exists one who knows the means of attaining heaven and liberation |
sākṣān na kevalaṃ kintu sarvajño 'pi pratīyate | Not only [that] directly, but it is also understood that [he] is omniscient |
mukhyaṃ hi tāvat svargamokṣasamprāpakahetujñatvasādhanaṃ bhagavato 'smābhiḥ kriyate | For primarily, we establish the Lord's knowledge of means for attaining heaven and liberation |
yat punar aśeṣārthaparijñātṛtvasādhanam asya tat prāsaṅgikam | But as for establishing his knowledge of all things without exception, that is incidental |
anyatrāpi bhagavato jñānapravṛtter bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sākṣād aśeṣārthaparijñānāt sarvajño bhavan na kenacid bādhyata iti | Because there is no opposing evidence against the Lord's knowledge extending to other [domains] also, [and] because of [his] direct knowledge of all things without exception, when being omniscient [he] is not obstructed by anything |
ato na prekṣāvatāṃ tat pratikṣepo yuktaḥ | Therefore rejection of that [omniscience] is not proper for the wise |
kiṃtu ye sarvajñatvādhigamārthinas teṣāṃ tadarthapravṛttir yuktā ceti darśitaṃ bhavati | But for those who seek to establish omniscience, their effort toward that purpose is proper — thus it is shown |
tataśca bādhakābhāve sādhane sati ca sphuṭe | Therefore, in the absence of opposing [evidence] and in the presence of clear proof |
kasmād vipratipadyante sarvajñe jaḍabuddhayaḥ | Why do the dull-minded doubt [the existence of] the omniscient one? |
syād etat tathābhūtapuruṣasaṃsādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ tathāvidhaṃ nāstītyevaṃmanyamānair asmābhiḥ pratikṣipyante, natu mohād | This might be [objected]: "We reject [it] because we think there is no such proof establishing such a person, not out of delusion" |
ity āha mābhūd vā ityādi | Thus [the text] states beginning with "mābhūd vā" |
mābhūd vā sādhanaṃ tatra bādhake tv aviniścite | Even if there be no proof for that, when the opposing [evidence] is uncertain |
saṃśayaḥ syād ayaṃ tv eṣāṃ niścayaḥ kiṃnibandhanaḥ | There should be doubt — but on what is their certainty based? |
etac cābhyupagamyocyate, sādhanaṃ tu vakṣyamāṇam asty eva | This is stated while granting [their position], but there actually is proof which will be stated [later] |
ayam niścaya iti / nāsti sarvajña ityevaṃ mīmāṃsakānām // | "This certainty," [refers to] the certainty of the Mīmāṃsakas that "there exists no omniscient being." |
yaccocyate bhavadbhiḥ codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitam ityevañjātīyakam arthaṃ śaknotyavagamayituṃ nānyatkiñcanendriyam iti | And what is stated by you [Mīmāṃsakas], that "indeed the Vedic injunction alone can make known such objects as the past, present, future, subtle, and remote, and no other sense organ [can do so]" |
bhūtādibodhane śaktā codanaivāparaṃ natu | "Only the Vedic injunction is capable of providing knowledge about the past etc., and nothing else" |
ityayaṃ niyamo yukto hyanyāsattve viniścite // aparam iti | This restriction would be reasonable only if the non-existence of other [means of knowledge] were established. [Here] "nothing else" [means] |
sarvajñapratyakṣādi | [Nothing else such as] the perception of the omniscient one and so forth. |
anyāsattva iti | [The phrase] "non-existence of other [means]" [means]: |
anyasya sarvajñasyāsattve viniścite satyevaṃ vaktuṃ yuktaṃ nānyathā, avadhāraṇasya naiṣphalyāt | Only if the non-existence of the other [means], namely the omniscient one, were established with certainty would it be reasonable to speak thus, not otherwise, because [otherwise] the restriction would be futile. |
tatra sarvaṃ jagatsūkṣmetyādāvāha pradhānetyādi | Regarding this [matter of] "the whole world, the subtle" etc., [the text] states "regarding the primary" etc. |
pradhānapuruṣārthajñasarvārthajñaprasiddhaye / tacca mānaṃ puraḥ proktaṃ paścād anyacca vakṣyate | For establishing [the existence of] the knower of primordial matter and spirit, and the knower of all things, that proof has been stated before, and another [proof] will be stated later. |
ataḥ sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñārthaprasādhane / nāsthāne kliśyate lokaḥ saṃrambhād granthavādayoḥ | Therefore, people do not labor in vain when they endeavor to prove the existence of the knower of all subtle distinctions in the whole world through zealous treatises and debates. |
nahyasmābhiḥ sarvajñaviṣayāṃ cintāṃ muktvā sarvajñasādhane prayatnaḥ kiryate / | When we attempt to prove [the existence of] an omniscient being, we do not abandon consideration regarding [the nature of] omniscience. |
kiṃ tarhi pradhānabhūtadharmajñasādhana eva / | Rather, [our] effort is directed solely towards proving [the existence of] one who knows the principal dharma. |
tathā ca pūrvam tenārthāpattilabhyeta dharmajñopagamenetyādi dharmajñasādhane 'rthāpattyākhyaṃ bhavan matenaiva pramāṇam uktam, paścāccānumānākhyaṃ pramāṇam abhidhāsyate, tena nāsthāne lokaḥ kliśyate, kiṃ tarhi sthāna eva | Thus previously we set forth proof through arthāpatti in accordance with your own view regarding the establishment of the knower of dharma, and later we shall present proof through inference; therefore people do not struggle needlessly but rather for a proper purpose. |
sarvapramātṛsambaddhapratyakṣādyanivāraṇāt / | Due to the impossibility of rejecting perception and other [means of knowledge] connected with all knowers. |
kevalāgamagamyatvaṃ nāpyate puṇyapāpayoḥ // | [It follows that] merit and demerit are not knowable through scripture alone. |
dharmādiviṣayasya sarvapramātṛsambaddhasya pratyakṣāder darśanamātreṇa nivārayitum aśakyatvān na dharmādharmayor āgamamātragamyatvaṃ labhyate // | Since perception and other [means of knowledge] concerning dharma etc. connected with all knowers cannot be rejected merely by [their] observation, it does not follow that dharma and adharma are cognizable through scripture alone. |
yaccoktametāvatā cetyādi tatrāha etāvatetyādi / etāvatā ca mīmāṃsāpakṣe 'siddhe 'pi yaḥ punaḥ / sarvajñavāraṇe yatnaḥ so 'tisaukhyātparaiḥ kṛtaḥ // | Even though the Mīmāṃsā position is unestablished, the effort made by others to refute [the existence of] an omniscient being was made out of excessive foolishness. |
asiddhe 'pīti / | [The meaning of] "even though unestablished" [is as follows]: |
dharmajñasya siddhatvāt / | Because of the establishment of the knower of dharma. |
parair iti mīmāṃsakaiḥ // | By "others" [is meant] the Mīmāṃsakas. |
ye tvavicchinnamūlatvād dharmajñatve 'hate sati / sarvajñāt puruṣānāhur dhīmattā taiḥ prakāśitā // | Since the [concept of] knower of dharma remains unrefuted due to [its] unbroken foundation, those who have asserted [the existence of] omniscient persons have demonstrated their wisdom. |
ahata ityakārapraśleṣo draṣṭavyaḥ | [The word] "ahata" should be analyzed with insertion of short 'a'. |
bauddhaiḥ | [Said] by the Buddhists |
rasanendriyasambandhān madyāśucirasādayaḥ / vedyeran yadi tasyaiva tadānīṃ nindyatā bhavet | If those impure tastes like [that of] wine were to be experienced through contact with the taste organ, only then would [his] blameworthiness arise. |
bhūtārthabhāvanodbhūtamānasenaiva cetasā / aprāptā eva vedyante ninditā api saṃvṛttau | [But] even things condemned in conventional [reality] are perceived without direct contact, through mind alone whose perceptiveness arises from impressions of real objects. |
yadi nāma sākṣān madyarasādisaṃvedanamabhūt tasya tathāpi na dharmajñatvahānir bhavet | Even if he had direct experience of wine-taste and such things, that would still not diminish his knowledge of dharma. |
yo rasanādīndriyasaṃsargeṇa tān rasanādīn saṃvedayate sa lokasaṃvṛttyā nindyo bhavet, natu bhagavāṃs tathā saṃvedayate, kiṃ tarhi manasā, taccāprāptaviṣayam iti na loke tat kṛtaṃ pratītam | One who experiences those tastes through contact with the taste organ becomes blameworthy in worldly convention, but the Blessed One does not experience [them] in that way - rather [he experiences them] through mind, and that [mind] without contact with objects, [so] that [blame] is not recognized in the world. |
nahi nindyatvaṃ paramārthataḥ kasyacidasti, anavasthitatvāt tasya | Indeed no one is blameworthy in ultimate reality, because that [blameworthiness] is not fixed. |
tathā hi śrotriyasya yannindyaṃ na tajjordviṃgasya, kiṃtu saṃvṛtyā loke madyādayo garhitās tān saṃvedayas tathāpi bhagavato na nindyatvam madyasya manasaiva vedanāt | For what is blameworthy for a Vedic scholar is not [blameworthy] for an outcast; but conventionally in the world, wine and such things are condemned - yet even if the Blessed One perceives these, [he incurs] no blame because [his] perception of wine is through mind alone. |
yathā rasanendriyasambandhād anyeṣāṃ madyādisaṃvittau duḥkhādyanubhavas tathā manasāpi saṃvedayataḥ prāpnotīti | [One might object that] just as others experience suffering etc. from perceiving wine etc. through contact with the taste organ, so too would one who perceives [it] through mind alone. |
naitad asti | This is not so. |
rasanādīndriyasambandhenānubhūyamānā rasādaya indriyasyānugrahopaghātaṃkurvanto duḥkhādihetavo bhavanti | Tastes etc. when experienced through contact with the taste organ etc. become causes of pleasure and pain etc. by benefiting or harming that organ. |
te cākuśalādikarmānurūpeṇa viparyastacetasāṃ keṣāñcid eva tathā duḥkhādihetutvena prakhyāyante na sarveṣām | They appear as causes of suffering only to some whose minds are disturbed due to [the influence of their] unwholesome actions, not to all. |
yathāhi pretānāṃ pūyādirūpeṇa salilādi | Just as water appears in the form of pus etc. to the pretas [but] not to others. |
nacaivaṃ {cedaṃ} bhagavataḥ sarvam asti | All this, however, is not [present] in the case of the Blessed One. |
tathā hi manasaiva saṃvedanānnendriyopaghātādisambhavaḥ, anāśravapañcavyavahārātmakatvād bhagavato nāpi sāśravakarmādhipatyasambhavaḥ, aviparītānityādirūpeṇa saṃvedanānnāpi viparyastatvam, ata eva bhagavato mānasasyāpi daurmanasyādilakṣaṇasya duḥkhāder asambhavaḥ, tasya mohajatvāt | Since [His] experience is through mind alone, there is no possibility of injury to [His] sense organs; and since the Blessed One's fivefold activity is free from āśravas, there can be no influence of karma with āśravas; and since [His] perception is of the impermanent etc. in their true form, there is no distortion [of cognition]; therefore there is no possibility of mental suffering characterized by dejection etc. for the Blessed One, since these arise from delusion. |
etac ca sarvaṃ bāhyārthasambhave sati rūpaskandhāsambhavān na santyevāśucyādayas teṣām mā bhūt tān parikalpyā dūrībhūtāśeṣāśucyādipratibhāsānāṃ darśane pratibāsante yathā timirādidoṣāpagame 'nupahatacakṣuṣāṃ darśane na keśādayaḥ | And all this, given the possibility of external objects, due to the impossibility of the form-aggregate, there are no impurities etc. for them, let them not be imagined; [these] do not appear in the vision of those who are free from all impure appearances, just as hair-nets etc. do not [appear] in the vision of those whose eyes are free from [disorders] like timira. |
yathoktam nanvajñānena bhāsante tasyāśucirasādayaḥ | As it has been said: "Through ignorance appear to him impurities, tastes and other [things]; |
asaṃvedās tataḥ siddhā dvitīyaśaśibimbavat | Therefore they are established as imperceptible, like a second moon[-image]." |
yasya tu viprasya vyāpitayā sakalāśucideśasambaddhā vedadhvanayo vadanodarādivartinaḥ sadaiva sa katham iha loke na nindyo bhavet | But how can that brāhmaṇa not be blameworthy in this world, in whose mouth and stomach always dwell the sounds of the Veda which, being all-pervading, are connected with all impure places? |
naca vedopavedāṅgetyādāvāha yata evetyādi / yata eva na vedādiproktārthapratipādakam / tāyino dṛśyate vākyaṃ tata eva sa sarvavit | And [he] states regarding the Veda, auxiliary Vedas etc.: "Precisely because no statement of the Tāyin is seen to establish the meanings proclaimed in the Vedas etc., therefore he is omniscient." |
pramādādhītamātmādi vede 'līkaṃ bravīti hi | For he declares that the self and other [concepts] studied carelessly in the Veda are false. |
yadyathaivāvasthitaṃ vastu sadādirūpeṇa tasya tathaiva jñānāt sarvavidbhavati / | [One] becomes omniscient by knowing each thing exactly as it exists in its true or other forms. |
naca yathā vede nirdiṣṭā ātmādayo 'rthās te tathaiva santi pramāṇena bādhyamānatvāt / | And the things like ātman that are described in the Veda do not exist exactly as [they are] described there, because they are contradicted by valid means of knowledge. |
tat kathaṃ tathaiva tānupadiśaṃs tattvadarśī bhavet / | How then could [one] become a "knower of truth" by teaching these things exactly as [they are taught] in the Veda? |
nacaitacchakyaṃ vaktuṃ mithyātvenāpi te naiva jñātā iti, yathā jñātā eva / | Nor can it be said that these were not known [by the Buddha] even as false, since they were indeed known [by him] as such. |
tathā hi sarva eva prāṇivadhādayo 'kuśalāḥ karmapathyā durgatihetutvena nirdiṣṭāḥ | Thus indeed all [acts] like killing living beings [and other] unwholesome paths of action have been pointed out [by him] as causes of miserable destinies. |
nāstīha sattva ātmā vā dharmastvete sahetukāḥ ityādinātmādayo 'pyasattvenoktā | [As stated in] "There is here no being or self, but these dharmas have causes", and so on, [where] the self and other [such concepts] are declared non-existent. |
ityasiddhaṃ vedādivihitapadārthāparijñānaṃ bhagavataḥ | Therefore it is not established that the Blessed One had no knowledge of the things prescribed in the Veda and other [texts]. |
vineyebhyo hitāyoktaṃ nairātmyaṃ tena tu sphuṭam | The doctrine of no-self was clearly taught by him for the benefit of [his] disciples. |
anyatīrthyair anadhigatatvādidvitīyam, teṣāṃ sarveṣām eva vitathātmadṛṣṭyabhiniviṣṭatvāt / | [It is called] "unique" because it was not understood by adherents of other doctrines, since they were all attached to false views about the self. |
etac ca sarvaṃ nairātmyaviśeṣaṇam / | And all this serves as a qualification of the doctrine of no-self. |
śivadvāram iti / | [It is called] the "gateway to the highest good". |
nirvāṇapraveśopāyabhūtatvāt / | [It is so called] because it is the means of entering nirvāṇa. |
śivam iti nirvāṇam ucyate / | Nirvāṇa is what is meant by the term "śiva" ["highest good"]. |
kudṛṣṭīnām iti / kutsitā ātmādidṛṣṭayo yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ | [The word] "kudṛṣṭīnām" [refers to] those who have perverted views regarding the Self and other [principles], they are thus called [those of wrong views]. |
vitathadṛṣṭyabhiniviṣṭabālajanatrāsakaram ity arthaḥ | [This] means that [the teaching] causes terror to childish people who are fixated on false views. |
yathoktam nāsty ahaṃ na bhaviṣyāmi na me 'sti na bhaviṣyati / iti bālasya saṃtrāsaḥ piṇḍitasya bhayakṣayaḥ | As has been said: "I am not, I shall not be, nothing is mine, nothing shall be mine" - such is the terror of the foolish one, [while] for the wise one there is extinction of fear. |
etena viparītābhiniveśāvasthitais tadadhigamoktum api na śakyate, kimutādhigantum iti darśitaṃ bhavati | By this it is shown that those who remain fixed in contrary views cannot even speak of attaining that [truth], let alone understand it. |
saṃsāryanucitaṃ jñātaṃ sarvānarthanivartakam | [It is] not familiar to those in saṃsāra; [when] known, it removes all misfortunes. |
tadabhyāsādiyuktānāṃ guṇaratnākaraṃ param | For those engaged in practicing it and so forth, it is a supreme mine of virtuous qualities. |
Subsets and Splits
No saved queries yet
Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.