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nahi pramāṇapañcakasyā{sva---}svabhāvākāraṇabhūtasya nivṛttāvapratibaddhaṃ sarvajñādivastu nivartate, yenāyaṃ pratyayaḥ satyavamarśnuvīta / | For an entity such as the omniscient one, which is not inherently bound to the absence of the five pramāṇas that are not its essential cause, is not negated [by their absence], by which this cognition could grasp truth. |
tasmān na kiñcid bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarva{jñ}syāstīti bhāvaḥ // | Therefore there exists no pramāṇa that could refute [the existence of] the omniscient one—this is the point. |
syād etat anupralambho yo yuṃṣābhir upavarṇito 'numānatvena sa eva sarvajñasya bādhako bhaviṣyati, kimatrāsmākam anyena pramāṇeneti / | One might object: "That same non-apprehension which you have described as being of the nature of inference will be the refutation of the omniscient one; what need do we have here for another pramāṇa?" |
satyametad anupalambhaḥ pramāṇam / | It is true that Non-apprehension is a [valid] means of cognition. |
kiṃ svopalambhanivṛttis tvayā sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye 'nupalambho 'bhipretaḥ āhosvit sarvapuruṣopalambhanivṛttir vā / | Do you mean by 'Non-apprehension' [meant] for proving the non-existence of the Omniscient One either the absence of your own apprehension or the absence of apprehension by all persons? |
anupalambho 'pi kiṃ nirviśeṣaṇo 'bhīṣṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyetyetasya viśeṣaṇasyānāśrayaṇāt āhosvit savi[śeṣaṇa] iti / | Is this Non-apprehension meant to be unqualified, as shown by the non-employment of the qualification "of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility," or is it meant to be qualified? |
tatra na tāvannirviśeṣaṇaścānupalambhaḥ pramāṇaṃ sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye yukta iti darśayann āha nacāpyadṛṣṭimātreṇetyādi / | Showing that unqualified Non-apprehension cannot be a valid means of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient One, [the author] states "nor merely by non-seeing" etc. |
mātragrahaṇamupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyetyetad viśeṣaṇanirāsārtham / | The term "mātra" [mere] has been used for the purpose of excluding the qualification "of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility." |
tadasattāviniścaya iti / sarvajñāsattāviniścayaḥ / | "Cannot prove His non-existence" means "cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient One." |
kasmāt vastuṣu vastuviṣaye upalambhasya hetutvavyāpakatvāyogāt / | Why? Because with regard to objects, apprehension is neither their cause nor their pervader. |
nahyarvāg darśanasyopalambho vastūnāṃ vyāpako vṛkṣatvam iva śiṃśapātvasya, satyapi vastuni deśādiviprakarṣeṇānupalambhasambhavāt / | For the apprehension by [those of] limited vision is not the pervader of objects, as tree-ness is of śiṃśapā-ness, since non-apprehension is possible even when an object exists, due to distance and other [factors]. |
nāpi kāraṇamagnir iva dhūmasya, vastūnām evopalambhaṃ prati kāraṇatvābhāvāt / | Nor is [apprehension] a cause [of objects] as fire is of smoke, because it is rather the objects that are causes with respect to apprehension. |
nacākāraṇāvyāpakabhūtasyānyasya nivṛttāvanyasya nivṛttir yuktā, atiprasaṅgāt / | And when one thing is neither the cause nor the pervader of another, the absence of one cannot [logically] entail the absence of the other, as [this would lead to] absurd consequences. |
yā ca kāryānupalabdhisattā na sā kāraṇamātrasyābhāvaṃ gamayati / kiṃ tarhi apratibaddhasāmarthyasyaiva / | And the presence of non-apprehension of an effect does not indicate the absence of all causes, but rather [indicates] only [the absence] of that [cause] whose efficacy is unimpeded. |
na cārvāg darśino[ḥ] upalambhaṃ prati vastūnām apratibaddhasāmarthyam asti / | And objects do not have unimpeded efficacy with respect to apprehension by [those of] limited vision. |
yena sa nivartamāno vastūnām abhāvaṃ sādhayet // | By virtue of which its absence could prove the non-existence of objects. |
kāraṇavyāpakayor nivṛttāvapi katham anyasya nivṛttir iti cedatrāha kāraṇetyādi / kāraṇavyāpakābhāve nivṛttiś ceha yujyate / | If one asks how the absence of one thing [follows] from the absence of [its] cause and pervader, [the author] states here beginning with "kāraṇa": When there is absence of cause and pervader, the absence [of the effect and pervaded] is indeed appropriate here. |
hetumadvyāptayos tasmād utpatter ekabhāvataḥ // | Because of [their] arising from it and [their] being of one nature with it, [there is absence] of the caused and the pervaded |
kṛśānupādapābhāve dhūmāmrādinivṛttivat / anyathāhetutaiva syān nānātvaṃ ca prasajyate // | As in the absence of fire and tree there is absence of smoke and mango etc.; otherwise there would be no causality and diversity would result |
hetur vidyate yasya taddhetumat, kāryam ity arthaḥ / | That which has a cause is 'hetumat' [i.e.] the effect |
hetumacca vyāptaṃ ceti vigrahaḥ / | The compound is [analyzed as] 'caused' and 'pervaded' |
tayor hetumad vyāptayor nivṛttir yujyata iti pūrveṇa sambandhaḥ / | These two [terms] 'hetumat' and 'vyāpta' are connected with the preceding [statement] "nivṛttir yujyate" [meaning] that the absence of the caused and pervaded is proper |
atra kāraṇaṃ tasmād utpatter ikabhāvata iti / hetunivṛttau hi satyāṃ hetumānnivartate, tato hetor utpatter ātmabhāvapratilambhāddhetumataḥ, yathā kṛśānunivṛttau dhūmasya nivṛttiḥ, tathā vyāpakanivṛttau vyāpyaṃ nivartate, tena vyāpakena saha tasyaikabhāvataḥ ekasvabhāvatvāt / | The reason for this is "because of arising from it and being of one nature." When there is absence of the cause, the effect ceases, because the effect derives its existence from the cause—as when there is absence of fire, there is absence of smoke. Similarly when there is absence of the pervader, the pervaded ceases, because of its having one nature with that pervader, [i.e.] because of [their] having the same nature |
yathā vṛkṣanivṛttau āmrakhadirādinivṛttiḥ, vṛkṣaviśeṣasyaiva āmrāditvena pratīteḥ / | As in the absence of tree there is absence of mango, khadira etc., because what is known as mango etc. is just a particular type of tree |
anyathā hi yadi kāraṇanivṛttāvapi na nivarteta tat kāraṇam eva na syāt / nahi yadyasmin sa{nnasa---}tyapi bhavati tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | For if it were otherwise—if [the effect] did not cease even when the cause is absent—then it would not be a cause at all. For that which exists even when something else is absent cannot reasonably be its cause, as [this would lead to] unwanted consequences |
nāpi yannivṛttau yan na nivartate sa tasya svabhāvo yukto gauriva gavayasya / | Nor can that which does not cease when something ceases be its nature, just as [the nature of] a gavaya [cannot be the nature] of a cow |
tasmād vyāpaka eva svabhāvo vyāpyaṃ kāraṇam eva ca [p.852] kāryaṃ nivartamānaṃ nivartayet, nānyad atiprasaṅgāt / | Therefore only the pervader [when absent] would cause the cessation of the pervaded, and only the cause [when absent would cause] the cessation of the effect—not anything else, as [this would lead to] unwanted consequences |
yathoktam tasmāt tanmātrasambaddhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvam eva tu / | As has been declared, when a certain nature is connected with a particular thing [this means that] |
nivartayet kāraṇaṃ vā kāryam avyabhicārataḥ // | either the cause would negate [the effect] or the effect [would negate the cause], due to [their] invariable relation. |
anyathaikanivṛttyānyavinivṛttiḥ kathaṃ bhavet / | Otherwise, how could the absence of one thing [imply] the absence of another? |
nāsta{śva---}vāniti martyena na bhāvyaṃ gomatāpi kim // | [Just because someone says] "he has no horse," does this mean that a mortal should not have a cow either? |
athāpi svopalambhasya sarvārthāt prati hetutvaṃ vyāpakatvaṃ cāṅgīkriyate tadā svavacanavirodhaḥ pratijñāyām āpadyata iti darśayann āha svopalambhasyetyādi / | Moreover, if one's own apprehension is accepted as being the cause and pervader with respect to all objects, then a contradiction in one's own statement occurs in [one's] proposition - thus [the author] shows [this] by stating "svopalambhasya" etc. |
kutaścid bhavato jñānāddhetutvavyāpakatvayoḥ // | [If this is established] through some knowledge of yours regarding causality and pervasion, |
bhavān eva tadā siddhaḥ sarvarthajño 'prayatnataḥ / | then you yourself would be established as omniscient without effort, |
tataś ca svātmani dveṣaḥ kaste sarvavidi svataḥ // | and hence what hatred do you have towards yourself as naturally omniscient? |
hetutvavyāpakatvayor iti niścayāpekṣayā ṣaṣṭhī / | The genitive in "hetutvavyāpakatvayoḥ" is in relation to [the word] "certainty." |
upalambhasya cārtheṣviti ṣaṣṭhīsaptamyau hetutvavyāpakatvayor ityetad apekṣya yathākramaṃ sambandhe viṣayabhāve ca yojye / | The genitive in "upalambhasya" and the locative in "artheṣu" are to be connected respectively with relation and objecthood with reference to causality and pervasion. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi bhavatā kutaścit pramāṇāt svopalambhasya sarvārtheṣu hetutve vyāpakatvaṃ niścitaṃ tadātmani sphuṭatarameva tvayā sarvajñatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ bhavati / | This means: if through some means of valid cognition you have ascertained that your own apprehension has causality and pervasion with respect to all objects, then you have clearly asserted omniscience in yourself. |
nahyasarvavido jñānamaśeṣajñeyavyāpakaṃ bhavati / | For the knowledge of one who is not omniscient cannot pervade all knowable objects. |
sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye ca sādhanopādānāt tadeva niṣidhyata iti svavacanavyāghātaḥ // | And [your] accepting means of proof to establish the non-existence of [any] omniscient being negates that very [assertion] - thus [there is] self-contradiction in [your] statement. |
evaṃ tāvannirviśeṣaṇaḥ svānupalambho na sarvavido 'sattvaprasiddhaye nirdeśamarhati nāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya sato 'nupalambhād iti viśeṣaṇāt saviśeṣaṇaḥ | Thus mere non-apprehension without qualification does not deserve to be put forward as proving the non-existence of the Omniscient One, nor [does it deserve to be put forward] with the qualification "due to non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility." |
tathā hi sa nirdiśyamānaḥ svaśabdena vā nirdiśyate, yathā nāsti kvacit pradeśaviśeṣe ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhād iti nirdeśās tathā sarvajñābhāvasiddhaye 'pi syāt | For when such [non-apprehension] is put forward, it could be put forward either directly by its own terms - as in [the argument] "there is no jar in this particular place because of non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility" - and similarly for proving the non-existence of the Omniscient One. |
yathārthāntarasya tat kāraṇavyāpakātmana upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyābhāvopadarśanād asvaśabdena | Or [it could be put forward] indirectly through other words, by pointing out the absence of something that has the nature of being the cause or pervader [of the thing denied] and fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility. |
yathā nāstyatra dhūmo vahnyabhāvāt, nāstyatra śiṃśapā vṛkṣābhāvād iti | As in [the arguments] "there is no smoke here because of the absence of fire" [or] "there is no śiṃśapā tree here because of the absence of trees." |
nahyapratibaddhasyāhetvavyāpakabhūtasyānyasya vinivṛttāvāthā nāstyatra śītasparśo vahner iti sākṣād viruddhasya vahner vidhānācchītasparśaniṣedhaḥ, tadvat sarvajñaniṣedhe 'pi syāt | For the negation of something unconnected that is neither a cause nor pervader does not [prove another's absence], as in [the argument] "there is no cold touch here because of fire" - [here] the negation of cold touch [follows] from the direct affirmation of its contrary, fire - and similarly it would be for the negation of the Omniscient One. |
tat kāraṇaviruddhavidhānād vā, yathā romaharṣādikāraṇaśītaviruddhadahanaviśeṣavidhānācchītakāryaromaharṣādiniṣedhaḥ | Or [negation follows] from affirming what is contrary to its cause, as the negation of horripilation and other effects of cold [follows] from affirming a particular instance of heat that is contrary to cold, which is their cause. |
eṣā copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhabhedatvād ityetad darśayati ata evetyādi | And this shows the distinction regarding the non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility, [as indicated] by the words "precisely for this reason" etc. |
ata eva na dṛśyo 'yaṃ sarvajñas te prasiddhyati | Precisely for this reason, this Omniscient One is not established for you as being visible. |
taddṛśyatve hi sārvajñaṃ tavaiva syād ayatnataḥ | For if [the Omniscient One] were visible, omniscience would belong to you effortlessly. |
sarvārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tavāpi yadi no bhavet | If knowledge of all objects does not exist even for you... |
ata eva svavacanavirodhaprasaṅgān na bhavatā sarvajñaḥ svayam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ | Precisely for this reason, due to the consequence of self-contradiction, you should not accept that the Omniscient One himself fulfills the conditions of apprehensibility. |
anyathā hi svasmin sarvajñatvam abhyupetaṃ syāt | For otherwise, omniscience would have to be admitted in oneself. |
yadi hi sarvārthagocaraṃ tatrā{vā---}pi jñānaṃ bhaved evaṃ te sarvajña upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto bhavennānyathā, nahyasarvavidāṃ sarvavidupalambhagocaro bhavati // | If knowledge were to comprehend all things, only then could the omniscient one be apprehensible to you, not otherwise, for the omniscient one cannot be within the scope of apprehension of non-omniscient ones. |
syād etat mābhūd upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto 'smākaṃ sarvajñastathāpi kimityete 'nupalabdhiprayogās tadabhāvasiddhaye na sambhavantītyāha tenetyādi / | [One might say:] "Let it be that the omniscient one is not apprehensible to us, but why should these arguments of non-apprehension not be possible for proving [his] non-existence?" - this is what [the author] addresses with "tena" etc. |
tenādṛṣṭiviśeṣotthaṃ kāraṇavyāpakātmanām / | [The non-apprehension] arising from the specific non-perception of causes, pervaders and natures... |
prakṛtyā dṛśyarūpatvāt sarvajñasya na siddhyati // | ...does not prove [the non-existence] of the omniscient one, because by nature [he] is not of perceptible form. |
yasmād upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptas tava na bhavati sarvajñastena kāraṇena sarvajñakāraṇavyāpakasvabhāvānām adṛṣṭiviśeṣa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambho na siddhyati / | Because the omniscient one cannot be apprehensible to you, therefore the specific non-perception of [his] causes, pervaders and nature - [even] of things that should be apprehensible - cannot be proven. |
yadyevam anye tarhi śeṣāḥ siddhyantu, tathāpi siddha eva sarvajñābhāva, iti cedāha iyaṃ cetyādi / | If [someone] should say: "Even if this is so, let the remaining [arguments] be proven, for the non-existence of the omniscient one is established anyway" - [the author] states "iyaṃ ca" etc. |
iyaṃ ca trividhā dṛṣṭir viśva{nava---}rūpā pravartate / tat tadviruddhādyagatigatibhedaprayogataḥ // | And this threefold perception proceeds in nine forms, due to the application of the distinctions between non-cognition and cognition of these [three] and their contraries. |
mūlaprabhedarūpāyā asyāḥ sarvavidaṃ prati / sādhite śaktivaikalye vyastā anyā ayatnataḥ // | When the powerlessness of this [perception] in its basic form has been proven with respect to the omniscient one, the other [forms] are refuted without effort. |
iyam evānantaroktā svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇānām adṛṣṭistredhā prapañcyamānā navadhā bhidyate / | This very non-perception of nature, pervader and cause, just mentioned, when elaborated threefold becomes ninefold. |
katham ity āha tat tadviruddhādyagatītyādi / tacchabdena prakrāntaṃ svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇākhyaṃ trayam abhisambadhyate, tena svabhāvādinā viruddhaṃ tadviruddham, tac ca trividham eva bhavati, svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇaviruddhabhedāt, tadviruddhamādir yasya tat tadviruddhādi / | How? [The author] says "tat tadviruddhādi" etc. By the word "tat" the aforementioned three - called nature, pervader and cause - are referred to. That which is contrary to these [three] beginning with nature is "tadviruddha", and this too becomes threefold, due to the distinction of [being] contrary to nature, pervader and cause. That which has these contraries as its beginning is "tadviruddhādi". |
ādiśabdena viruddhakāryakāraṇaviruddhakāryaṃviruddhavyāptāstrayo gṛhyante / | The term "ādi" includes three [types]: (1) the contrary effect, (2) the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) those pervaded by contraries. |
punar dvitīyena tacchabdena tadeva svabhāvāditrayaṃ sambadhyate / | The second "tat" refers again to those same three: (1) svabhāva [nature], (2) vyāpaka [pervader], and (3) kāraṇa [cause]. |
tacca tadviruddhādi ceti tat tadviruddhādīti / yathākramaṃ tayor agatigatī tadviruddhādyagatigatī / tadagatis tadviruddhādivāni{gati}ścetyarthaḥ / | Thus the compound "tat-tadviruddha" refers to [two things]: (a) those three [nature etc.] and (b) their contraries. The [terms] "agati" and "gati" refer respectively to non-cognition and cognition of these, i.e., the non-cognition of nature, pervader and cause, and the cognition of their contraries. |
tayor bhedas tena prayoga iti samāsaḥ / | The compound indicates that the arguments are based on these distinctions. |
tatra tadagatyā sākṣāt trividhā svabhāvakāraṇavyāpakānupalabdhir nirdiṣṭā / | Through that non-cognition, three types of direct non-apprehension have been pointed out: [non-apprehension] of nature, cause and pervader. |
asyā eva trividhāyā adṛṣṭeḥ śeṣānupalabdhayaḥ pāramaparyeṇa sūcikā ityataiyaṃ trividhānupalabdhirāsāṃ mūlabhedarūpā bhavati / tathā hi tadviruddhagatyā svabhāvairuddhopalabdhiḥ vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥkāraṇaviruddhopalabdhiś ca nirdiṣṭā / | All other [types of] non-apprehension are merely indirect indicators of these same three basic non-apprehensions; hence this threefold non-apprehension forms their fundamental basis. Thus, through cognition of contraries are indicated: (1) apprehension of what is contrary to nature, (2) apprehension of what is contrary to the pervader, and (3) apprehension of what is contrary to the cause. |
ādiśabdena viruddhakāryopalabdhiḥ kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir viruddhavyāptopalabdhiś ca saṃgṛhītāḥ / | The term "ādi" includes: (1) apprehension of the contrary effect, (2) apprehension of the effect contrary to the cause, and (3) apprehension of what is pervaded by the contrary. |
etābhiś ca pāramparyeṇa yathāyogaṃ svabhāvavyāpakakāraṇānupalabdhayaḥ sūcyanta ityatastrividhāyā mūlaprabhedarūpāyāḥ sarvajñābhāvasiddhiṃ pratyasāmarthyapratipādanāt tacchāstrābhūtānāṃ yatnamantareṇaiva pratipāditaṃ bhavatīti nāsyāṃ pṛthagasāmarthyapratipādanāya yatnaḥ kāryaḥ, nahi mūle chinne śākhānām avasthitir bhavet / | Through these [types of apprehension], the non-apprehension of nature, pervader and cause are indirectly indicated according to their respective correlations. Thus, by showing that the three fundamental forms of non-apprehension are incapable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient One, it is established without further effort that their derivative forms are [likewise] incapable [of such proof]. Therefore no separate effort need be made to prove the incapacity of these [derivatives]. For when the root is cut, the branches cannot survive. |
paramārthatas tu svabhāvānupalabdhir eva sarvāsāṃ mūlabhūtā, arthāntarabhedāśrayaṇāt tu trividhā mūlatvenoktā / | In ultimate reality, only the non-apprehension of nature is fundamental to all [types of non-apprehension]; the threefold [classification] is called fundamental only with reference to the distinctions among other entities. |
kāryakāraṇatāvyāpyavyāpakatvavirodhitāḥ / dṛśyatve sati siddhyanti yaścātmā saviśeṣaṇaḥ // | Effect and cause, pervaded and pervader, and contrariness—all these, as well as the qualified nature [of a thing], are established only when [the thing] is perceptible. |
sarvajño naca dṛśyaste tena naitā adṛṣṭayaḥ / | [Your] omniscient being is not perceptible; therefore these non-apprehensions [of yours] [are not valid] |
tannirākaraṇe śaktā niṣedhāṅgaṃ nacāparam // | [They are] not capable of refuting him, nor [is there] any other basis for negation |
kāryakāraṇabhāvo vyāpyavyāpakatvaṃ virodhitā ceti dvandvaḥ / | The [compound] "kārya etc." is a copulative compound consisting of: causal relation, pervasion relation, and contrariety |
pratyakṣānupalambhasādhano hi kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ, sarvajñāder adṛśyatvān na tena saha kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddhyati / | The causal relation is established through non-apprehension of what is perceptible; since the omniscient one is imperceptible, no causal relation with him can be established |
nāpi vyāpyavyāpakabhāvastasyāpyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhapūrvakatvāt / | Nor [can there be] a relation of pervaded-pervader, since that too must be preceded by non-apprehension of what is capable of being apprehended |
tathā hi yannivṛttau yanniyamena nivartate sa tena vyāpto vyapadiśyate, nivṛtteś ca nānupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhamantareṇa siddhir bhavati / | For when the absence of something invariably follows from the absence of another, the former is designated as pervaded by the latter; and [such] absence cannot be established without non-apprehension of what is capable of being apprehended |
virodhitāpi dṛśyayor eva vastunoḥ siddhyati nādṛśyayoḥ / | Contrariety too is established only between two perceptible things, not between imperceptible ones |
tathā hi sahānavasthānalakṣaṇas tāvad virodho 'vikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād dṛśyate / | For contrariety, characterized by mutual non-coexistence, is observed when [one thing] is absent in the presence of another, even when its complete cause is present |
bhāvābhāvau ca nānupalabhyasvabhāvayor vastunor niścetuṃ śakyau / | And presence and absence cannot be ascertained for things whose nature is imperceptible |
parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo 'pi virodho yadya{da---}vacchedyānā{na---}ntarīyako yasya paricchedas tayor vyavasthāpyate, yathā kramākramayoḥ / | Also, contrariety characterized by mutual exclusion is established between two things where the cognition of one is invariably concomitant with the non-cognition of the other, as [in the case] of succession and simultaneity |
paricchedaśca nādṛśye sambhavati / | [This] cognition is not possible in [regard to] what is not apprehensible. |
yadyevaṃ bhāvābhāvādīnāṃ kathaṃ virodhasiddhiḥ, nahi tatrobhayor dṛśyatvam asti / | "If [that is] so, how can there be [a] proof of contrariness between existence and non-existence? For certainly neither of these two has perceptibility." |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | This [is] not [a] defect. |
nahi bhāvābhāvau pṛthakparicchidya paścāt tayor vyavacchedavyavacchedakabhāvāt virodho vyavasthāpyate / | For existence and non-existence are not first cognized separately and then established as contrary due to their being mutually exclusive. |
kiṃ tarhipṛthakparicchinnayor eva / | Rather, [contrariness is established] only when they are cognized separately. |
tathāhyekasmin dharmiṇyekakālaṃ tayor virodho vyavasthāpyate natu dharmyantare / | For thus their contrariness is established [only] in one substrate at one time, not in different substrates. |
nahi gorabhāve aśvasya bhāvavirodhaḥ kaścit / | For there is certainly no contrariness between the existence of [a] horse and the non-existence of [a] cow. |
nāpyekatradharmiṇi bhinnakālayos tayor virodhaḥ, nahi prāgabhūtasya vā paścād bhāvābhāvau na sambhavataḥ / | Nor is there contrariness between them in one substrate at different times, for [something] that did not exist before may [come to] exist later. |
ekasmiṃs tu vastuni tayor yugapadaparicchedād virodhaḥ, natu tatraiva, paricchidya vyavacchedāt / | But [their] contrariness [arises] from [their] simultaneous non-cognition in one thing, not from being cognized there and then excluded. |
aparicchinnasya kathaṃ vyavaccheda iti cet / | If [one asks] "How can there be exclusion of what is not cognized?" |
ata eva, yata eva na paricchidyate tatra dharmiṇi tata eva tasya vyavacchedaḥ sambhavet / | [The answer is] precisely because of this: from the very fact that it is not cognized in that substrate, from that very [fact] its exclusion would be possible. |
anyathā tatra paricchinnadharmasya kathaṃ vyavacchedaḥ śakyate kartum / | Otherwise, how could exclusion of [a] cognized property be possible there? |
ayam eva hi tadabhāvavyavacchedo ya eva tat paricchedaḥ, sa evānyābhāvasya tatra paricchedo ya evānyavyatiriktasya tasya paricchedaḥ / | For this very cognition of [a thing] is indeed the exclusion of its non-existence, and that very cognition of the non-existence of something else there is the cognition of what is distinct from that other [thing]. |
tasmād yasya dharmiṇo 'bhāvo vyavacchidyate, bhāvaś ca paricchidyate so 'vaśyaṃ dṛśyo 'bhyupagantavyo nahyadṛśyasya paricchedonāparicchinnāsya tadviparītadharmavyavacchedaḥ sambhavati / | Hence, when the non-existence of a certain thing [dharmin] is excluded and its existence is cognized, then it must necessarily be regarded as 'perceptible'; for what is imperceptible cannot be cognized, and what is not cognized cannot have its contrary properties excluded. |
na tvevaṃ sarvajñe sambhavati, nahi sarve narā dharmiṇo dṛśyāḥ kasyacit, yena teṣvasarvajñatvadharmaparicchedāt sarvajñatvavyavacchedaḥ siddhyet / | This is not possible in the case of the omniscient [person], for all men are not perceptible to anyone, whereby the presence of non-omniscience could be cognized in them and [thus] the exclusion of omniscience could be established. |
tasyaiva sarvajñatvaprasaṅgāt / | For [if it were possible], that very [person who perceives all men] would have to be omniscient. |
tasmād anupalabhyadharmiṇi sarvajñatvāsarvajñatvayor virodho na siddhyati / | Therefore, in the case of an imperceptible subject [dharmin], the contradiction between omniscience and non-omniscience cannot be established. |
svasantāne tu siddhyati / | However, it is established within one's own series [of cognitions]. |
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