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hetos tāvat pūrvamanaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditam ityata pakṣadoṣam eva tāvat pratipādayati | Since it has been explained before that the reason is inconclusive, [the author] now proceeds to demonstrate the defect in the thesis itself. |
iha ca svasya śāstuḥ sarvajñatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭaṃ na sāmānyena | And here what is desired to be proved is the omniscience of one's own teacher, not [omniscience] in general. |
tathā hi na vyasanitayā sarvajño 'nviṣyate prekṣāvatā, kiṃ tarhi tadvacanād dharmādharmau jñātvā pravartiṣye nivartiṣye veti pravṛttinivṛttikāmatayā, naca sāmānyena siddhenāpi tena pravṛttiṃ prati puruṣasya kaścid upayogo 'sti, viśeṣaparijñānam antareṇa tadvacanāniścayāt, tasmāt sa eva viśeṣaḥ pravṛttikāmena sādhanīya iti sāmānyapratijñānaṃ pratijñānyūnam eva | Indeed, a wise person does not seek an omniscient being out of mere curiosity, but rather with the desire for engagement and withdrawal [from action], thinking "I will engage in or withdraw from [actions] after knowing dharma and adharma from his words." And even when proved in general, it has no utility for a person's activity, because without knowledge of the particular there can be no certainty about his words. Therefore, that very particular [person] must be proved by one desiring to act, [and] thus the general proposition falls short of [what needs to be] proved. |
sisādhayiṣito yo 'rtha iti / sādhayitumiṣṭo yo 'rthaḥ / sa iti / viśeṣaḥ, svaśāstā | "What is intended to be proved" means what one wishes to establish. "Sa" [refers to] the particular [person], [namely] one's own teacher. |
anayeti / pratijñayā | "Anayā" [means] by the proposition. |
yattūcyata iti / viśeṣāsaṃsparśena ko 'pyati naraḥ sarvajñaḥ kvacid asti sarvajñatvam iti, tenasiddhenāpi na kiñcit prayojanam | "What is stated" [refers to the statement] "some person is omniscient" or "omniscience exists somewhere" without reference to any particular [person], and even when that is proved, there is no purpose [served]. |
katham ity āha yadītyetyādi / | Question: How so? Answer: [As follows in verse 3232] |
sa{se---}ti / | [This is verse 3232] |
kasmān na labhyata ityatrāha yāvad ityādi / | Question: Why cannot [such a person] be obtained? Answer: [As follows in verse 3233] |
tathā hi yāvad buddhasya sarvajñatvaṃ na siddhyati tāvat tadvacanasyāpi na satyatvaniścayo 'sti, na ca sāmānyena sarvajñasiddhau buddhavacanasya satytvaṃ siddhyet, pratibandhābhāvāt // | Indeed, as long as the omniscience of the Buddha is not established, there can be no certainty about the truthfulness of his words. And [even] when the existence of an omniscient being is established in general, the truthfulness of the Buddha's words cannot be established, due to the absence of [logical] connection. |
etad eva darśayati anyasminnityādi / | This very [point] is shown [in the following verse beginning with] "anyasmin" |
anyasminnahi sarvajñe vacaso 'nyasya satyatā / | For when one [person] is omniscient, the truthfulness of another's words [cannot be established], |
sāmānādhikaraṇye hi tayor aṅgāṅgitā bhavet // | Because only when the two [qualities] have the same substratum can there be a relation of principal and subordinate between them. |
kadā nāma tayoḥ pratibandho na bhavatītyāha sāmānādhikaraṇye hītyādi / | Question: When precisely is there no [logical] connection between these two? Answer: [This is explained in the part beginning with] "sāmānādhikaraṇye hi" |
sāmānādhikaraṇyam ekapuruṣāśritatvam / tayor iti / | Co-substrateness means residing in one [and the same] person. [The word] "tayoḥ" [refers to these two qualities]. |
sarvajñatvavacanayoḥ / aṅgāṅgitā / hetuphalatā / | [It refers to the relationship] between omniscience and words; [the term] "aṅgāṅgitā" [refers to] the relation of cause and effect. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati ekāśrayatve sati satyasya vacasaḥ sarvajñatvaṃ kāraṇaṃ bhavet, nānyathātiprasaṅgāt // | What is meant [here] is this: Only when [truth and omniscience] reside in the same substratum can omniscience be the cause of truthful speech; not otherwise, as [if it were otherwise] there would be undesired consequences. |
yat sarvaṃ nāma loke 'smin pratyakṣaṃ taddhi kasyacit / prameyajñeyavastutvair dadhirūparasādivat // | Whatever exists in this world must be perceptible to someone, because [all things] possess the properties of being cognizable objects, knowable things, and entities, like curd, form, taste, and so forth. |
jñānamātre 'pi nirdiṣṭe pakṣanyūnatvamāpatet / | When mere knowledge is specified, [the argument] falls short of [proving] the thesis. |
sarvajña iti yo 'bhīṣṭo netthaṃ sa pratipāditaḥ // | Thus, the "omniscient one" whose [existence] is desired [to be proven] is not established in this way. |
yadi buddhātirikto 'nyaḥ kaścit sarvajñatāṃ gataḥ / buddhavākyapramāṇatve tajjñānaṃ kvopayujyate // | If some person other than the Buddha had attained omniscience, of what use would that knowledge be in establishing the validity of the Buddha's words? |
yat prameyatvavastutvādiyogi tat kasyacit pratyakṣaṃ, yathā dadhirūparasādikaṃ, sarvaṃ ca padārthajātaṃ prameyādisvabhāvam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | Whatever possesses the properties of cognizability, entity-hood, and so forth, is perceptible to someone—like curd, form, taste, and so forth—and all existing things possess the nature of being cognizable and so forth; thus this is a reason based on essential nature. |
atrāpi pūrvavat pratijñānyūnatvaṃ hetoścānaikāntikatvaṃ vaktavyam / | Here too, as before, it must be pointed out that [there is] a deficiency in the proposition and the reason is inconclusive. |
tasmān na viśeṣeṇa nāpi sāmānyena sarvajñatvasya siddhiḥ sambhavati / | Therefore, the establishment of omniscience is not possible, either in particular or in general. |
ato nāsti sarvajña iti siddham / | Hence it is established that there exists no omniscient one. |
tadabhāvāt tadvacanasyābhāva iti na tadvacanāt pravṛttiḥ sambhavati kasyacit // | Due to [the omniscient one's] non-existence, [there can be] no words of such a one; therefore, no activity can arise for anyone from such words. |
athavā sambhavatu nāma sarvajñaḥ puruṣas tathāpi sarvajñapraṇītaṃ vacanaṃ na sambhavatyeva yataḥ pravṛttir bhaviṣyati bhavatām ityetat pratipādayann āha daśabhūmītyādi | Let there be an omniscient person; even then, words proclaimed by [such] an omniscient one cannot exist, from which your activities would proceed. [The author] demonstrates this by saying "daśabhūmi" etc. |
daśabhūmigataścāsau sarvarāgādisaṃkṣaye / śuddhasphaṭikatulyena sarvaṃ jñānena buddhyate | When he has reached the ten stages and all [his] attachment and other [defilements] have been destroyed, he understands everything through [his] knowledge which is like pure crystal. |
dhyānāpannaś ca sarvārthaviṣayāṃ dhāraṇāṃ dadhat | And when absorbed in meditation, maintaining concentration on all objects, |
tathā vyāptaś ca sarvārthaiḥ śakto naivopadeśane | though thus pervaded by all objects, he is not capable of teaching. |
tathā hi kila daśabhūmipratiṣṭhito 'śeṣarāgādimalakalaṅkāpagamācchuddhasphaṭikatulyena jñānena sakalaṃ jñeyamavacchedyata ityevaṃ bhavadbhir varṇyate | For thus indeed it is described by you [Buddhists] that [one] established in the ten stages, due to the complete disappearance of the impurities of attachment etc., comprehends all that is to be known through knowledge which is like pure crystal. |
tataścāsyāṃ tāvadavasthāyāṃ dhāraṇāṃ cittasyaikāgryatāṃ dadhadarthabodha eva vyāpṛtatvānnāsau śaknoti dharmamupadeṣṭuṃ na hīyato vyāpārān kaścitkartuṃ samarthaḥ | And therefore, in this state, maintaining one-pointedness of mind [and] being engaged only in the comprehension of objects, he cannot teach dharma, for no one is capable of performing [multiple] activities simultaneously. |
vyutthāya deśayati cedityāha yadā cetyādi | If [someone] says "He teaches after emerging [from meditation]," [the author] says "yadā ca" etc. |
ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam | That which is spoken by [one who has only] partial knowledge cannot be the speech of an omniscient one. |
tasmin dhyānasamāpanne cintāratnavadāsthite | When he is absorbed in meditation, remaining like a wish-fulfilling jewel, |
niścaranti yathākāmaṃ kuṭyādibhyo 'pi deśanāṃ | teachings flow forth at will even from walls and such. |
tābhir jijñāsitānarthān sarvān jānanti mānavāḥ | By means of these [practices], men come to know all the objects [of knowledge] that they desire to know |
hitāni ca yathābhavyaṃ kṣipramāsādayanti te | And they quickly attain [all] beneficial things according to their destiny |
ityādikīrtyamānaṃ tu śraddadhāneṣu śobhate | Such proclamations appear beautiful [only] among those who have faith |
vayamaśraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe | But we, who lack faith, [are those] who ask for logical reasons |
cintāratnam cintāmaṇiḥ | [Like] a cintāratna [is] a cintāmaṇi |
ayamatra samudāyārthaḥ ye śraddhālavastāvan pratīdamapramāṇakamupavarṇyamānaṃ śobheta | This is the collective meaning here: for those who are faithful, even this teaching being described without proof might appear beautiful |
ye tu punarasmad vidhāḥ pramāṇopapannārthagrāhitayā yuktimeva prārthayante te katham etad ucyamānamapramāṇakaṃ gṛhīṣyanti | But how can those who are like us, who seek only logically established meanings through valid means of knowledge, [and] who ask for reasoning alone, accept this statement being made without proof? |
kuṭyādiniḥsvasṛtānāṃ ca na syād āptopadiṣṭatā | And [teachings] emanating from walls and such could not have the status of being taught by a reliable person |
viśvāsaś ca na tāsu syāt kenemāḥ kīritā iti | And there could be no confidence in them [since one would wonder] "by whom were these proclaimed?" |
kiṃnu buddhapraṇītāḥ syuḥ kiṃnu brāhmaṇavañcakaiḥ | Were they set forth by Buddha, or by deceitful brāhmaṇas? |
krīḍadbhir apadiṣṭāḥ syur dūrasthapratiśabdakaiḥ | Were they taught in play by distant echoes [of Buddha's words]? |
tasmān na tāsu viśvāsaḥ kartavyaḥ prājñamānibhiḥ | Therefore no confidence should be placed in them by those who consider themselves wise |
sarvaṃ subodham // | All this [that was previously stated] is easily comprehensible. |
evaṃ sarvajñatā puṃsāṃ svātantryeṇa nirāspadā / | Thus, there is no basis for independent omniscience of human beings. |
idaṃ ca cintyate bhūyaḥ sarvadarśī kathaṃ mataḥ // | And this is further considered: why is an omniscient being posited? |
yugapat paripāṭyā vā sarvaṃ caikasvabhāvataḥ / | [Does he know] everything simultaneously or in sequence, from a single nature? |
jānanyathāpradhānaṃ vā śaktyā veṣyeta sarvavit // | Or does the omniscient one perceive through [his] power only the principal things? |
jñānaṃ naikadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ bhinnā vā gataḥ kvacit // | Neither has cognition through a single thought been observed, nor have different [cognitions] ever gone [together]. |
bhūtaṃ bhavadbhaviṣyac ca vastvanantaṃ krameṇa kaḥ / pratyekaṃ śaknuyād boddhuṃ vatsarāṇāṃ śatair api // | Who could comprehend in sequence each of the endless objects - past, present and future - even in hundreds of years? |
svabhāvenāvibhaktena yaḥ sarvamavabudhyate / | [Even if] one who comprehends everything through [his] undivided nature, |
boddhā sāmānyarūpasya sarvajñenāpi tena kim / | What [use] is there of such an omniscient one who [only] knows the general form? |
anyākāreṇa bodhena naiva vastvavagamyate // | For an object is never understood through cognition of a different form. |
tadekākāravijñānaṃ samyaṅmithyāpi vā bhavet / | That single-form consciousness could be either true or false. |
samyaktve dṛṣṭabādhaivaṃ prasaktaṃ sarvamadvayam // | If [it is] true, then this contradicts perception, [as] everything would [have to] be non-dual. |
tataś ca śiṣyasarvajñadharmādharmataduktayaḥ / na syur vo bhinnarūpatve svabhāvānavadhāraṇāt // | And consequently, [there would be] no disciples, omniscient ones, dharma, adharma, or their teachings, since their different natures could not be determined. |
mṛṣātve tvekabodhasya bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti sarvavit / | But if the single cognition is false, the omniscient one turns out to be deluded. |
na śraddheyaṃ vacas tasya tadonmattādivākyavat | [His] words are not to be believed, [being] like the words of madmen and such [people]. |
sahetu sakalaṃ karma jñānenālaukikena yaḥ samādhijena jānāti sa sarvajño yadīṣyate | If [it] is maintained that [an] omniscient [person] is one who knows all things together with [their] causes through supernatural knowledge born of meditation, |
pratyakṣamanumānaṃ vā śābdaṃ vā tadatat kṛtam pramāṇam asya sadbhāve nāstīti nāsti tādṛśaḥ | [Then there exists] no means of valid cognition for [proving] his existence - whether perception, inference or verbal testimony - that is not produced by him; therefore such a [person] does not exist. |
yugapat paripāṭyā vā kathaṃ kāryād vinānumā | How [could there be] inference without [an observable] effect, whether [cognition occurs] simultaneously or in sequence? |
sāmarthyam api naivāsti samarthe sarvam eva vā | Either [such a person has] no capacity at all, or if [he is] capable, [he would have] every [capacity]. |
sarve sarvāvabodhe ca kṣetrajñāḥ prabhaviṣṇavaḥ | And [in that case] all conscious beings would be capable of cognizing everything. |
upāyaviphalatvāt tu budhyante nikhilaṃ na te | But due to [their] lack of means, they do not cognize everything. |
tatraikaḥ sarvavitkaścid ityevaṃ niṣpramāṇakam | Therefore the [claim] that "there exists some one person who knows everything" is without valid proof. |
itthaṃ yadā na sarvajñaḥ kaścid apyupapadyate | Thus when no omniscient person whatsoever is possible, |
na dharmādhigame hetuḥ pauruṣeyaṃ tadā vacaḥ | Then human speech cannot be a means for understanding dharma. |
iti mīmāṃsakāḥ prāhuḥ svatantraśrutilālasāḥ | Thus spoke the Mīmāṃsakas, who are devoted to [the idea of] an independent Veda. |
vistareṇa ca vedānāṃ sādhitā pauruṣeyatā | But the human origin of the Vedas has [already] been established in detail. |
kiṃ yugapad aśeṣapadārthaparijñānāt sarvavit, āhosvit paripāṭyo krameṇa, yadvā sarvasya jagata ekena nityādinā rūpeṇa jñānāt, yathā pradhānāvagamād vā yadeva hi puruṣārthopayogi karmaphalādi tasyaiva jñānāt, yadvā sarvapadārthaparijñānasāmarthyayogāt sarvavidcuyate yathāgniḥ sarvaṃ kramayaugapadyābhyām abhuñjāno 'pi sarvabhugiti | Is one called "omniscient" because [one] knows all objects simultaneously, or in succession one after another, or because [one] knows the entire world through one eternal form, or because [one] knows only what is useful for human purposes such as the effects of actions, or is [one] called "omniscient" because [one] possesses the capacity to know all things - like fire which, though not actually consuming everything either simultaneously or successively, is still called "all-consuming"? |
tatra prathame pakṣe kalpanādvayam, ekayā vā dhiyā yugapad aśeṣaṃ jānīyādanekayā vā | In the first alternative, there are two possibilities: would [one] know everything simultaneously through a single cognition or through multiple [cognitions]? |
na tāvad ekayā, parasparaviruddhānāṃ śucyaśucyādīnām arthānāṃ yugapad ekajñānena grahaṇadarśanāt | [It cannot be] through a single [cognition], because mutually contradictory things like pure and impure have never been seen to be grasped simultaneously by a single cognition. |
syād etad viruddhānekapadārthaviṣayā bahvyo buddhyas tasya sakṛdvartanta ity āha bhinnā vā gataya iti | One might argue that "multiple cognitions having mutually contradictory objects occur in him simultaneously," [but to this] he says "or [whether there are] different courses." |
na dṛṣṭa iti vibhaktivipariṇāmena sambandhaḥ | The connection is through case-ending transformation with [the words] "has not been seen." |
nahi yugapad bhinnagatayo dṛṣṭā ekavijñānasantatayaḥ satvā iti | Indeed, different courses of a single consciousness-continuum have never been seen [to occur] simultaneously. |
tena sākṣād eva atīndriyārthānāṃ draṣṭā vidyate, natu nityavacanadvāreṇa, tasya nityasya vacaso 'sambhavāt | Therefore, there exists one who directly perceives supersensuous objects, not through eternal words, because such eternal words are impossible. |
draṣṭaivetyavadhāraṇaṃ bhinnakramaṃ sākṣādityasyānantaraṃ draṣṭavyam | The limiting particle eva after draṣṭā should be understood as following after sākṣāt. |
bhavatu nāma nityasya vacasaḥ sambhavastathāpi na tasyātīndriyārthapratipattiṃ prati kāraṇabhāvo yuktam ityetat pratipādayann āha nityasyetyādi | Even if eternal words were possible, still their causality with respect to the comprehension of supersensuous objects would not be logical - explaining this, he says "of the eternal [word]" etc. |
nityasya vacasaḥ śaktir na svato vāpi nānyataḥ | The power of eternal words [comes] neither from themselves nor from anything else. |
tatra svārthaḥ svakīyamabhidheyam | [The term] "svārtha" [means] what is expressed by [the word] itself |
yadvā svaḥ ātmā, śabdasya svabhāvaḥ, arthaḥ abhidheyaḥ, svaścārthaścasvārthau, tayor jñānam, tasmin samutpādye | Or, "sva" [means] the self [i.e.] the nature of the word, and "artha" [means] what is expressed [by it]; thus [the compound] "svārthajñāna" means the cognition of both the word itself and its meaning, [which is] to be produced |
tat samutpādanāya nityasya vacasaḥ śaktiḥ svato vā bhavennisargasiddhā, anyato vā sahakārikāraṇāt | For bringing about such [cognition], the capacity of the eternal word could be either inherently established by itself or [derived] from other contributory causes |
tatra na tāvat svataḥ, kutaḥ, kramākramābhyāṃ kāryotpādanaṃ prati nityasya virodhāt | Of these [alternatives], [it is] not [possible to be] inherent, why? Because for an eternal [entity] there is contradiction regarding the production of effects through either succession or simultaneity |
nahi kramayaugapadyābhyām anyaḥ prakāraḥ sambhavati yenārthakriyā bhavet | For indeed no other method besides succession and simultaneity is possible by which effective action could occur |
anyonyavyavacchedasthitalakṣaṇatvādanayoḥ | Because these two [succession and simultaneity] have characteristics that are mutually exclusive |
tena kramayaugapadyābhyām evārthakriyā vyāptā | Therefore effective action is invariably connected with either succession or simultaneity |
na ca nityasya vacasaḥ krameṇa svārthajñānotpādakatvaṃ yuktam | And it is not reasonable for the eternal word to produce the cognition of its meaning in succession |
prathamakāryotpādāvasthāyām uttarakālabhāvijñānakāryotpādakasvabhāvāpracyutestanmātrabhāvīni kāryāṇi yugapad eva syuḥ | Because at the time of producing the first effect, [since] there would be no loss of its nature as producer of subsequent cognitions, all those effects would necessarily occur simultaneously |
nāpi krameṇa yuktam uttarakālam api prathamakāryotpādāvasthāvat kāryakāraṇasamarthāvikalasvabhāvānuvṛtter ajanatvavirodhāt | Nor is it reasonable [for effects to occur] in succession, because even at a later time, just as at the time of producing the first effect, due to the persistence of [its] undiminished nature of cause-effect capability, there would be contradiction in [the effect's] non-production |
prayogaḥ yo yadvyāpakadharmarahitaḥ sa tadvyāptadharmavikalaḥ yathā vṛkṣatvadharmaśūnyo ghaṭādis tadvyāptaśiṃśapātvadharmavikalaḥ arthakriyāsāmarthyadharmavyāpakakramākramadharmarahitaṃ ca nityaṃ vedākhyaṃ vacanamityarthato vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ ato na svato nityavacasaḥ śaktisambhavaḥ | [Here is] the formal argument: Whatever lacks a pervading property must lack the properties pervaded by it - just as a jar etc., being devoid of tree-ness, lacks śiṃśapā-ness which is pervaded by it; and the eternal utterance called Veda lacks the properties of succession and simultaneity which pervade the property of capacity for effective action; thus by implication [there is] non-apprehension of the pervader; therefore the eternal word cannot possibly have [this] capacity inherently |
nāpyanyataḥ sahakārikāraṇāt | Nor [can it have this capacity] from any other contributory cause |
tena śaktes tatsvabhāvāvyatiriktāyās tatsvabhāvavat kartumaśakyatvāt / | Since the capacity, being non-different from its own nature, cannot be produced [by any cause], just like that nature [itself cannot be produced]. |
arthāntaratve 'pi sambandhasiddheriti bahudhā carcitam etat / | Even if [the capacity] were different [from its nature], establishing a relation [with a cause] would be impossible - this has been discussed many times. |
tasmād atīndriyārthaparijñānasya nityavacanāśrayatvam anumānabādhitatvād ayuktam // | Therefore, the notion that knowledge of supersensible objects depends on eternal words is untenable, as it is refuted by inference. |
svargayāgādayas tasmāt svato jñātvā prakāśitāḥ / | Therefore, [matters like] heaven, sacrifice and so forth were revealed [by someone] who knew them by himself. |
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