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vedakāras tavāpyasti tādṛśo 'tīndriyārthadṛk // | Even according to your view, the author of the Veda must be such a person who perceives supersensible objects. |
pradhānapuruṣārthajñaḥ sarvadharmajña eva vā / | [He must be] either one who knows primordial matter and spirit, or one who knows all dharma. |
tasyānupagame na syād vedaprāmāṇyamanyathā // tenārthāpattilabdhena dharmajñopagamena tu / | Without accepting such [an author], the authority of the Veda would not be possible; therefore, through arthāpatti [presumption], the existence of one who knows dharma must be accepted. |
svata iti / | [The phrase] "by himself" [means] |
svātantryeṇa / | independently |
vedānapekṣeṇa jñānenetyarthaḥ / | that is to say, through knowledge that is independent of the Veda |
tādṛśa iti / yādṛśo bhavadbhiḥ pratikṣipyate / | "Such a [person]," that is, the like of whom you are denying. |
vedaprāmāṇyābhyupagamasāmarthyalabdhena / | [Knowledge] acquired through the force of accepting the authority of the Veda. |
ata evābhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahatvam apyasiddham, arthāpattyā viṣayīkṛtatvāt // | For this very reason, [the claim of his] being comprehended through negative proof is unestablished, because [he] is comprehended through presumption. |
yac ca sarvaśabdasya prakṛtārtho{rthā---pekṣitvaṃ bahudhā vikalpya dūṣaṇam uktam tannāvataratyeva / | What has been stated regarding the term "sarva" [requiring] reference to context, and the various alternative objections raised [against it], does not apply [here]. |
asya pakṣasyānabhyupagamāt / | Because we do not accept this position. |
nahyasmābhir dharmādivyatiriktavivakṣitāśeṣārthābhijñatayā sarvajño 'bhyupagamyate yena tatra dūṣaṇam āsajyeta / | For we do not accept an omniscient being as one who knows all intended objects other than dharma and so forth, to which [your] objections would apply. |
kiṃ tarhi yasya sakalakleśajñeyāvaraṇamalavyapagatena cetasā sakalam eva dharmādikaṃ jñeyamavabhāsate sa sarvajño 'bhīṣṭaḥ / | Rather, the omniscient one whom we accept is one whose mind, freed from all afflictions, obstacles to knowledge, and impurities, comprehends all objects of knowledge including dharma and so forth. |
tatra ca bhavatā na kiñcid bādhakaṃ pramāṇabhyadhāyi / | And against this [conception], you have not presented any contradictory proof. |
yaccoktam ekasyaiva śarīrasya yāvantaḥ paramāṇavaḥ ityādi tatkevalaṃ pratijñāmātram apramāṇakam uktam / | And what was said about "how many atoms there are in a single body" and so forth, that is merely an unsupported assertion stated without proof. |
naca pratijñāmātrād upapattiśūnyād arthasiddhiḥ sambhavati / | And no conclusion can be established from a mere assertion that is devoid of supporting reasoning. |
sarvasya sarvārthasiddhiprasaṅgād ityetat sarvamāgūryāha kiñcetyādi | Because there would be [the unwanted consequence of] the establishment of all things for everyone, having considered all this, [the author] states "kiñca" etc. |
akāraṇam iti na vidyate kāraṇam upapattis trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṃ yasya tat tathoktam | [The term] "without basis" [means that which] has no basis, i.e., that for which there exists no proof in the form of a three-characterized inferential mark. |
kleśajñeyāvaraṇamalaviviktatvān nirmalaṃ māratīrthikaparihāṇa{---}samīraṇākampyatvād akampyaṃ yadeva jñānaṃ tadeva dīpaḥ | [This] knowledge is "pure" because it is free from the impurities of afflictions and the obscurations of the knowable; [it is] "unwavering" because it cannot be shaken by the winds of [arguments from] Māra and other sectarians; this very knowledge is [called] "light". |
prakāśasāmyāt | [It is called "light"] because of [its] similarity to illumination. |
sāpekṣatve 'pi gamakatvāt samāsaḥ | Even though [the terms are] mutually dependent, the compound is [formed] because of [their] indicative power. |
atroktaṃ na bādhakam iti / pramāṇam iti śeṣaḥ / na kevalaṃ noktam, nāpyatra | Here it is said "[there is] no invalidating [proof]" - the word "proof" is to be supplied. Not only has [such proof] not been stated, but it does not exist here at all. |
tathā hi na tāvat pratyakṣaṃ bādhakam, tasyātadviṣayatvāt | For indeed, perception is not an invalidating [proof], because that [supreme being] is not an object of it [i.e., perception]. |
yadeva hi vsatu pratyakṣeṇa yathā viṣayīkriyate tatra pratyakṣaprasiddhe viparīto dharmo 'bhyupagamyamānaḥ pratyakṣeṇa bādhyate | For only when an object is cognizable through perception, and a contrary property is accepted regarding what is well-established through perception, [then] it is invalidated by perception. |
yathā śabde dharmiṇi aśrāvaṇatvaṃ śrāvaṇatvena | As [for example], regarding sound as the subject, [the property of] being inaudible [is invalidated] by [its property of] being audible. |
na tu yatra pratyakṣasyāpravṛttiḥ | But [there can be no such invalidation] where perception has no operation. |
naca parasantānavartini cetāṃsi sarvāṇi pratyakṣato 'sarvajñena viṣayīkriyante kenacit | Indeed, all the cognitions occurring in other people's mental continua cannot be perceived by anyone who is not omniscient. |
yena tatra sarvajñatvaṃ pratijñāyamānaṃ pratyakṣeṇa bādhyeta | [Only] by this [direct perception] could the claim of omniscience be refuted through perception. |
sarveṣām evārvāgdarśitvāt | Because all [beings] have limited vision. |
viṣayīkaraṇe vā sa eva sarvajña ityapratikṣepaḥ | Or if [someone] could perceive [all cognitions], that person would indeed be omniscient—[this is] an irrefutable [fact]. |
syād etat na vayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pravartamānamabhāvaṃ sādhayatīti brūmaḥ | One might say this: "We do not claim that perception actively proves [the omniscient person's] non-existence." |
tathā hi yatra vastuni pratyakṣasya nivṛttis tasyābhāve 'vasīyate, yathā śaśaviṣāṇasya | For where perception is absent regarding an object, that [object's] non-existence is ascertained, as in the case of a hare's horn. |
yatra pravṛttis tasya bhāvaḥ, yathā asyādeḥ | Where [perception] occurs, that [object] exists, as in the case of a sword and such things. |
na ca sarvajñaviṣayaṃ kadācit pratyakṣaṃ pravṛttam ityatas tannivṛttes tadabhāvo 'vasīyata iti | "And since perception has never occurred with respect to an omniscient being, from this non-occurrence [of perception], their non-existence is ascertained." |
tadetad asambaddham | This [argument] is incoherent. |
nahi pravṛttapratyakṣanivṛtter yo bhavati niścayaḥ sa pratyakṣād bhavati | For the certainty that comes from the non-occurrence of active perception does not arise from perception. |
abhāvābhāvayor ekatravirodhāt | Because presence and absence cannot coexist in one [place]. |
naca pratyakṣanivṛttir vastu{stva---}bhāvena vyāptā, yenāsauvastvabhāvas tato niścīyate / | [And] the non-operation of perception is not invariably concomitant with the non-existence of a thing, by which that non-existence could be ascertained from it. |
satyapi vastuni vyavahitādau pratyakṣasya nivṛttidarśanāt / | Because perception is seen to be non-operative even when a thing exists, [such as] in cases of [objects that are] concealed and so forth. |
syād etat na pratyakṣanivṛtteḥ sakāśād abhāvaniścaya iti brūmaḥ / kiṃ tarhi nivṛttaṃ pratyakṣamabhāvaṃ sādhayatīti / | One might say this: "We do not say that non-existence is ascertained from the non-operation of perception; rather, [we say that] perception, when non-operative, proves non-existence." |
tadetacchabdānyatvaṃ kevalaṃ bhavatocyate / | This is merely stating a verbal difference by you. |
natvarthabhedaḥ / | [But there is] no difference in meaning. |
na ca śabdānyatvamātrād arthānyatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / | And a difference in meaning cannot [arise] from mere verbal difference, as [this would lead to] an unwanted consequence. |
tathā hi nivṛttir vastusattāniṣedha ucyate / | For 'non-operation' means the negation of the existence of a thing. |
nivṛttaśabdenāpi paramārthataḥ sa evābhidhīyate / | By the word 'non-operative' also, in reality, the very same [meaning] is expressed. |
kevalam eko bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇa tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ tamāha aparastvapratikṣepeṇeti viśeṣaḥ / | The only distinction is that one expresses it through negation of other differences when inquiring about that alone, [while] the other [expresses it] without negation. |
paramārthatas tu dvābhyām asattvam eva vastunaḥ pratipādyate / | In reality, by both [terms] the non-existence of the thing alone is established. |
navāsato hetubhāvaḥ sambhavī sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvāt tasya / | And what is non-existent cannot possibly be a cause, because it is characterized by the absence of all capacities. |
tasmād yasya yadutpādakaṃ prakāśakaṃ vā tat tasyotpādane prakāśane ca sannihitasattākam eva bhavati natu nivṛttasvabhāvaṃ yathā bījāṅkurasya dīpo vā rūpasya / | Therefore, whatever is productive or illuminative of something is productive or illuminative of it only when its existence is present, not when its nature has ceased, as [in the case of] a seed [being productive] of a sprout or a lamp [being illuminative] of color. |
nahi tau nivṛttāvaṅkuraghaṭarūpādyutpādanaprakāśane samarthau bhavataḥ / | For these two, when ceased, are not capable of producing or illuminating sprouts, pots, colors, etc. |
api ca nivṛttaṃ pratyakṣamabhāvaṃ sādhayatīti ko 'trārtho 'bhimataḥ | Further, what is the intended meaning here [in the statement] that "perception, having ceased, proves non-existence"? |
yadi tāvad vartamānādadhvano nivṛttam ityarthas tadā sāmarthyād atītānāgatāvasthām ityevam uktaṃ syāt | If the meaning is that [perception] has ceased from the present time-state, then by implication it would mean that it exists in past and future states |
nacātītānāgatavastu vidyata iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam | And it has been previously established that a past or future thing does not exist |
tat katham asato vyāpāraḥ siddhyet | So how could there be any operation of what is non-existent? |
atha vartamānam api sadyadyatra viṣaye notpadyate tat tato nivṛttamity ucyate | If, alternatively, it is meant that although existing in the present, it does not arise with respect to a certain object and is thus said to have 'ceased' [from that object] |
evam api nāto vastvabhāvasiddhir vyabhicārāt | Even in this case, the non-existence of the thing is not established, due to [the reason being] inconclusive |
nahi cakṣur vijñānaṃ gandharasādiviṣaye notpadyata ityetāvatā tatas tadabhāvaḥ siddhyet | For the mere fact that visual cognition does not arise with respect to odor, taste etc. does not thereby prove their non-existence |
tasmān na pratyakṣataḥ kasyacid abhāvasiddhiḥ | Therefore, the non-existence of anything cannot be established through perception |
yadyevaṃ katham anupalambhākhyāt pratyakṣāt ghaṭādyabhāvasiddhiḥ pradeśāntare bhavadbhir varṇyate | [Opponent:] "If this is so, then how is it that you describe elsewhere the establishment of the non-existence of jars etc. through perception in the form of non-apprehension?" |
naitad asti | This is not [correct] |
nahi tatrābhāvaviṣayīkaraṇāt pratyakṣam abhāvaṃ sādhayatītyucyate / kiṃ tarhi ekajñānasaṃsargayogyayor arthayor anyatarasyaiva yā siddhiḥ sāparasyābhāvasiddhir iti kṛtvā | For it is not said there that perception proves non-existence because non-existence is made its object; rather, [it is said that] when two things are capable of being associated in a single cognition, the establishment of just one [of them] amounts to establishing the non-existence of the other |
yatas tayoḥ sator naikarūpaniyatā pratipattiḥ sambhavati | Because when both [things] exist, their apprehension cannot be restricted to just one form |
na caivaṃ sarvajñatvasya kenacit saddharmamekajñānasaṃsargitā niścitā, yasyakevalasyopalambhāt tadabhāvaṃ vyavasyāmaḥ | And omniscience has not been definitively determined to have association in a single cognition with any existent property, the mere apprehension of which [property] could lead us to ascertain its [omniscience's] non-existence |
tasya sarvadaivātyantaparokṣatvāt / | Since that [omniscient person] is always absolutely imperceptible. |
evaṃ tāvat pratyakṣaṃ sarvavido{na}bādhakaṃ sambhavati / | Thus perception cannot be a refutation of [the existence of] the omniscient one. |
nāpyanumānaṃ sarvajñābhāvaṃ sādhayati / | Nor can inference prove the non-existence of the omniscient one. |
tasya vidhiviṣayatvābhyupagamāt / yato 'bhāvam eva pramāṇam abhāvaviṣayam upavarṇyate nānyat / | Because it [inference] is accepted to have [only] positive things as its objects, since non-apprehension alone, and nothing else, is described as having negative things as its objects. |
ata evārthāpattyādīnāṃ trayāṇām api bā{nasā---}dhakatvam / | For this very reason, the three [means of knowledge] beginning with arthāpatti [presumption] also cannot serve as refutation. |
athāpi syāt nāsmābhiḥ prasajyarūpeṇa sarvajñābhāvaḥ prasādhyate, kiṃ tarhi sarvanarān pakṣīkṛtya paryudāsavṛttyā teṣvasarvajñatvaṃ sādhyate, tenānumānādīnāṃ vyāpāro bhavatyeveti / | One might object: "We do not prove the non-existence of an omniscient one in an absolute way, but rather, taking all humans as the subject, we prove their non-omniscience through relative negation, and thus there certainly is scope for the operation of inference and other [means of knowledge]." |
bhavatvevam, tathāpyanumānaṃ tāvan na sambhavati, sarvanareṣvasarvajñatvāvyabhicāriliṅgāpraisiddheḥ / | Let it be so, but even then inference is not possible, because no invariable mark [liṅga] of non-omniscience is established [as present] in all humans. |
yadapi ca prameyatvavaktṛtvādikam uktaṃ tadapi vyabhicārīti paścāt pratipādayiṣyate / | And whatever has been stated like "being knowable" and "being a speaker" and so forth - that too is inconclusive, as will be demonstrated later. |
nāpyarthāpattirasarvajñaṃ sādhayati / | Nor does presumption prove non-omniscience. |
satyapi vā pramāṇāntaratve nārthāpattis tāvad asarvajñasādhane paryāptā yato dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyate ityadṛṣṭaparikalpanārthāpattiḥ / | Even if [presumption] is a separate means of knowledge, presumption is not sufficient for proving non-omniscience, since presumption is the postulation of something unseen [on the grounds that] a seen or heard thing cannot be explained otherwise. |
na cāsarvajñatvam antareṇa sarvanareṣu kaścid artho dṛṣṭādir nopapadyate, yatas tadarthāpattyā kalpyeta | And there is no fact, whether seen or heard, among men that cannot be explained without [assuming] non-omniscience, which therefore would need to be presumed through implication. |
na apy upamānaṃ kṣamaṃ, tathā hi smaryamāṇam eva vastu purovartipadārthasadṛśyopādhi sādṛśyamātraṃ vā purovartinā smaryamāṇavastugatam upamānena pratīyate | Nor is analogy capable [of proving non-omniscience], for what is cognized through analogy is either the remembered object qualified by similarity to the present object, or mere similarity between the present object and the remembered object. |
yathā anubhūtagodarśanasya puṃso 'raṇyagatasya gavayadarśanāt pūrvānubhūte gavi tat sādharmyajñānam | For instance, when a person who has [previously] perceived a cow goes to the forest and sees a gavaya, [he recognizes] its similarity with the previously perceived cow. |
yathā uktam "tasmād yat smaryate tat syāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam / prameyam upamānasya sādṛśyaṃ vā tadanvitam" | As it has been stated: "Therefore what is remembered, qualified by similarity, or the similarity connected with it, becomes the object of analogy." |
tasmāt smaryamāṇa eva dharmī upamānasya viṣayaḥ, anubhūtam eva ca vastu smaraṇena viṣayīkriyate, na anyat | Therefore, only the remembered subject is the object of analogy, and only what has [previously] been experienced can be made an object of memory, nothing else. |
na ca sarvavarasantānavartini cetāṃsi kenacit sarvavidā anubhūtāni, yataḥ smaraṇena viṣayīkriyeran | And no omniscient being has experienced the cognitions occurring in the mental continuum of all persons, whereby they could be made objects of memory. |
na ca anubhūyamānasya vastunaḥ sarvanarair asarvajñatvasādhāraṇadharmaniścayo 'sti, yadvaśād asarvajñatvaṃ sarvanareṣu upamīyeta | Nor is there anything experienced by all people that is definitely known to possess properties common with non-omniscience, by virtue of which non-omniscience could be analogically cognized in all persons. |
yad api sattvādikaṃ kvacid asarvajñatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tad api na asarvajñatvasādhāraṇaṃ siddham | Even the quality of existence etc. that is observed in some non-omniscient [being] is not established as being common with non-omniscience. |
sarvajñasya api sattvādy avirodhāt | Because existence etc. is not incompatible with [the nature of] an omniscient being. |
na hi gave sattvādidharmadarśanād ghaṭādīnām api gavayasādṛśyam upamīyate | Indeed, the perception of properties like existence in a cow does not lead to the analogical cognition of similarity between jars etc. and a gavaya. |
bhavatu nāma sarvanarāṇāṃ sattvādinā sādharmyamasarvajñatvaṃ tu na siddhyati / | Let it be that all men are alike on account of [their sharing the property of] existence; [but] their non-omniscience is not thereby established. |
etenaiva tat pratyuktam, yaduktam narān dṛṣṭetyādi / | By this very [argument] that [objection] is refuted which was stated [beginning with the words] "having seen men..." |
nāpi śabdākhyaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarvavido bādhakam asti / | Nor is verbal testimony as a means of valid cognition capable of negating [the existence of] the omniscient one. |
yattāvat pauruṣeyaṃ tadapramāṇam eva svayaṃ mīmāṃsakair atīndriyārthaviṣaye 'bhyupagamyate, yaccāpauruṣeyaṃ tadapyapramāṇam iti niveditam / | Whatever [word] is of human origin, that is accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves as non-authoritative regarding supersensible matters, and whatever [word] is not of human origin, that too has been shown to be non-authoritative. |
nacāpi kiñcid vaidikaṃ vacanaṃ sarvanarāsarvajñatvapratyāyakam upalabhyate / | Nor is any Vedic statement found which establishes the non-omniscience of all men. |
naca tatrānupadeśād arthāntarābhāvaḥ siddhyati, sarvavastūnāṃ śāstropadeśe 'nadhikṛtatvāt / | Nor is the non-existence of something established merely from its not being mentioned there [in the Veda], because not all things are meant to be taught in the scripture. |
anyathā hi bhavan mātṛvivāhādīnām apyabhāvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt, tatrāpāṭhāt / | For otherwise, there would follow the non-existence even of your mother's marriage and such things, due to their not being mentioned there [in the Veda]. |
nacaikadeśaṃ kvacit pāṭhādarśanāt sarvatrāpāṭhaniścayo yuktaḥ, anekaśākhāśatāntarhitaśravaṇād anyatrāpi pāṭhasya sambhāvyamānatvāt / | Nor is it reasonable to conclude [something's] non-mention everywhere merely from not seeing its mention in some particular place, because given that revelation is hidden in hundreds of different branches [of the Veda], its mention elsewhere remains possible. |
śākhāntare sphuṭataram eva sarvajñaḥ paṭhyata iti paścāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ / | We shall establish later that the omniscient one is indeed quite explicitly mentioned in another branch [of the Veda]. |
nāpyabhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtatvāt sarvavido 'sattvasiddhiḥ / tathā hi yadi pramāṇanivṛttimātraṃ prasajya lakṣaṇam abhāvapramāṇaṃ varṇyate tadā nāsau kasyacit pratipattir nāpi pratipattihetur iti na tena viṣayīkaraṇaṃ yuktam avastutvāt / | Nor can the non-existence of the omniscient one be established from [His] being the object of the means of cognition [called] non-apprehension. For if non-apprehension as a means of cognition is described as having the mere absence of [any other] means of cognition as its characteristic, then it is neither a cognition of anything nor a cause of cognition, and thus making [the omniscient one] its object is not reasonable due to [non-apprehension's] lack of reality. |
ato nāsau pramāṇam / | Therefore this [negation] cannot be a pramāṇa [valid means of knowledge]. |
atha paryudāsāvṛttyā pramāṇākhyād bhāvād anyo bhāva evābhipretaḥ evam api pramāṇād vyāvṛttyātmatayā na prāmāṇyaṃ siddhyet / | If, alternatively, negation is intended to be a positive entity different from what is called pramāṇa through relative negation, even then, being of the nature of exclusion from pramāṇa, [its] validity could not be established. |
nahi brāhmaṇādanyo brāhmaṇa eva yuktaḥ / | For indeed someone other than a brāhmaṇa cannot possibly be a brāhmaṇa. |
syād etat na sarvapramāṇavyāvṛtto 'sau varṇyate / kiṃ tarhi vivakṣitapramāṇapañcakavyatirekeṇānyaḥ pratyayaviśeṣa eva / | One might object: "This [negation] is not described as excluded from all pramāṇas; rather, [it is] simply a specific cognition different from the five intended pramāṇas." |
yadyevaṃ kimākāro 'sāvīti vācyam / | If this is so, then it must be stated what form this [cognition] has. |
yasmāt pramāṇapañcakāgocaras tasmād asau sarvajño nāstītyevam ākāra iti cet / | If [you say] it has the form "Because [he] is not cognizable by the five pramāṇas, therefore that omniscient one does not exist." |
yadyevam ākāro na tarhi pramāṇam vyabhicārāt / | If [it has] this form, then [it is] not a pramāṇa due to being inconclusive. |
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