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vikalpe sti vaktṛtvaṃ sarvajñaścāvikalpataḥ | Speakership exists [only] in conceptual thought, while omniscience [exists only] without conceptual thought. |
na hyāviṣṭābhilāpena vastu jñānena gamyate | For indeed, a real entity is not apprehended by cognition that is pervaded by verbal expression. |
atrāpi ye pravaktṛtvaṃ vitarkānuvidhānataḥ / sarvajñasyābhimanyante na tair vacanasambhave | Those who think that the speakership of the omniscient one follows from cogitation do not [actually] admit the possibility of speech [in an omniscient being]. |
sarvajña iṣyate nāpi vikalpajñānavṛttitaḥ | Nor is omniscience admitted through the operation of conceptual knowledge. |
tasmin kṣaṇe vikalpe tu vaktṛtvaṃ na prasiddhyati | And at that moment, when there is conceptual thought, speakership is not established. |
kecid bhagavato vaktṛtvaṃ vikalpasaṃmukhībhāvād eveti pratipannāḥ | Some hold that the Lord's speakership occurs precisely due to the manifestation of conceptual thought. |
anye tu pūrvāvevaśavaśādevāvikalpyato 'pi vacanapravṛttir bhagavata iti varṇayanti | But others explain that the Lord's speech activity occurs even without conceptual thought, solely due to previous impressions. |
tatra prathame darśane yadi vikalpāvasthāyām asarvajñatvaṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā | In that regard, according to the first view, if non-omniscience in the conceptual state is what is being proved, then it is [merely] proving what is [already] proved. |
iṣyata eva tais tasyāmavasthāyāṃ bhagavato 'sarvadarśitvam | For they themselves accept that in that state the Lord does not see everything. |
athāvikalpāvasthāyām asarvajñatvaṃ bhāvayitum iṣṭam | If, on the other hand, what is desired to be established is non-omniscience in the non-conceptual state [then that is problematic]. |
tadā hetor asiddhatā | [There is] invalidity of the reason at that time |
nahi tasyāmavasthāyāṃ vacanapravṛttir asti, samutthāpakasya vikalpasya tadānīmabhāvāt | Indeed, in that state there is no occurrence of speech, because at that time there is no existence of conceptual content which could prompt [speech] |
sarvajñatāsamākṣepādataḥ saṃvādanaṃ bhavet | Due to [his] omniscience having displaced [non-omniscience], there should be agreement |
anubhūya yathā kaścid auṣṇyaṃ paścāt prabhāṣate | Just as someone, having experienced heat, speaks [about it] afterwards |
tasmād vastvavisaṃvādas tadarthānubhavodbhavāt | Therefore there is no contradiction with reality, because [the speech] arises from direct experience of those objects |
tena sarvajñatākāle hetor asyāprasiddhatā | Thus, at the time of [his] omniscience, this reason [of the opponent] is not established |
vyāhāravṛttikāle tu bhavet siddhaprasādhanam | But at the time of verbal activity, [the opponent's] argument would prove what is [already] established |
yadyapi tasyāmavasthāyām asarvajñas tathāpyasarvajñapraṇītatvam asya na bhavati, kutaḥ, sarvajñatayā samākṣiptatvāt tasya | Although in that state he is not omniscient, nevertheless his [words] are not [those] composed by a non-omniscient person - why? - because that [non-omniscience] has been displaced by [his] omniscience |
ata eva sarvajñajñānabalotpannavikalpasamutthāpitatvāt tasya pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibandhād anumānavikalpavat prāmāṇyam api bhavati | For this very reason, because [these words] are prompted by conceptual content produced by the force of omniscient cognition, they also have validity, like inferential conception, due to their indirect connection with reality |
atraiva dṛṣṭāntamāha anubhūyetyādi | On this very point, he states an example beginning with "having experienced" |
tadarthānubhavodbhavād iti | [This is] because [the speech] arises from the experience of those objects |
tasyoṣṇārthasyānubhavāt pāramparyeṇa vikalpasyodbhavād ity arthaḥ / | Because the conceptual cognition [vikalpa] arises indirectly from the direct experience of that hot object. |
syād etat yadi sarvajñasya vikalpapratyayo 'sti tadā bhrāntaḥ prāpnoti, vikalpasya prakṛtyā svapratibhāsenā{'na---}rthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛtter bhrāntatvād iti / | One might object: "If the Omniscient One has conceptual cognitions, then [He] would necessarily be mistaken, since conceptual cognition is by its very nature erroneous, as it operates through determination of an object in what is not [really] that object through its own appearance." |
naitad asti / | This is not so. |
yadyāropitasya tāttvikasya ca rūpasya vibhāgaṃ na jānīyāt tadā bhrānto bhavet, yāvatā vikalpāviṣayamāropitātmanā eva niścinvan bāhyaṃ ca vastu nirvikalpakajñānagocaraṃ pṛthag eva tāttvikaṃ tāttvikātmanā paśyan kathaṃ viparyasto nāma / | [He] would be mistaken only if [He] did not know the distinction between the imposed form and the real form; however, since [He] determines the object of conceptual cognition as merely imposed while seeing the external object—which is the scope of non-conceptual cognition—as something quite separate and real in its real nature, how could [He] be called mistaken? |
yadyaviparyastaḥ katham āropayati vikalpāvasthāyām iti cet / | If [someone objects]: "If [He] is not mistaken, why does [He] impose [forms] during the conceptual state?" |
na / | Not so; |
śabdapravṛttyupāyajñatvāt / | because [He] knows the means by which verbal usage functions. |
yato nānyamāropakavikalpavyatirekeṇa śabdasya samutthāpakaṃ paśyati, nāpi śabdārthamāropitād anyamupalabhate, ataḥ śabdapravṛttyupāyajño jagadanukampayā yathāvad adhigataṃ tattvam apratipādya parasmai nāsituṃ samarthaḥ saṃs tat pratipipādayiṣayā śabdapravṛttyupāyam āropakaṃ vikalpamāropyaṃ ca śabdābhidheyamāracayati / | For [He] sees no other prompter of speech apart from the imposing conceptual cognition, nor does [He] apprehend any other meaning of words apart from what is imposed; therefore, knowing the means by which verbal usage functions, [He] out of compassion for the world, being unable to remain idle without explaining to others the truth [He] has properly understood, creates—with the desire to explain that [truth]—both the imposing conceptual cognition as the means of verbal usage and the imposed [content] as what is to be denoted by words. |
etac ca paścād āśaṅkya codyaṃ parihariṣyati / | And [the author] will later raise this objection and address it. |
asmābhis tv atra prastāvāgatatvād ity abhihitam / | We have mentioned [this] here because it came up in [this] context. |
ata eva vaktṛtvād rāgitvānumānamapyayuktamanyathāpi vacanapravṛttisambhavāt | For the same reason, inferring [his] being affected by passion from [his] speakership is also incorrect, since speech can proceed from other causes. |
nahi rāgādīnām eva kāryaṃ vacanaspandādayaḥ, vaktukāmatāsāmānyahetutvāt | For speaking, movement and such [actions] are not exclusively effects of passion etc., since [they] are caused by the mere desire to speak. |
vaktukāmatā vītarāgasya karuṇayāpi sambhavatīti vyabhicāraḥ | This desire to speak is possible even in one free from passion due to compassion; hence [there is] deviation [in the reasoning]. |
saiva karuṇā rāga iti cet | If [you say] "that very compassion is passion" |
na | [We reply:] No. |
nāmakaruṇa kiñcidaniṣṭamāpadyate | Because compassion does not bring about anything undesirable. |
kiṃtu nityasukhātmātmīyadarśanākṣiptaṃ sāśravavastuviṣayaṃ cetaso 'bhiṣvaṅgaṃ rāgamāhuḥ | Rather, they call "passion" that attachment of mind which relates to impure objects [and] which is indicated by the notion of permanent happiness, self, and what pertains to self. |
tat pūrvakaścātmātmīyoparodhini pratihatir dveṣaḥ | And hatred is resistance, preceded by that [passion], against what obstructs [one's sense of] self and what pertains to self. |
ātmātmīyagrahaś ca moho na caiva kṛpā | And the grasping of self and what pertains to self is delusion, but compassion is not thus. |
tasyā asatyapyātmagrahe duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇābhyāsabalenaivotpādāt | Because it [compassion] arises even without grasping of self, merely through the force of repeated observation of particular forms of suffering. |
tathā hi vītarāgāṇāṃ dharmādyālambanā maitryādayaḥ śāstre varṇitāḥ | Indeed thus friendliness and other [feelings] based on dharma etc. are described in scripture for those free from passion. |
samastavastuvijñānaśaktyapākaraṇe 'pi te / | Even in [the case of] refuting the capacity for knowledge of all things |
syād etadyadi sarvaviṣayajñānāsaṃmukhībhāvamātraṃ sādhyate, tathāpi siddhasādhyatā bhavedyāvatā samastavastutattvavistarajñānāśaktatā sādhayitumiṣṭā | If [one argues that] only the non-presence of knowledge of all objects is being proven, then [our argument] would be proving what is [already] proven, since what is desired to be proven is the incapacity for detailed knowledge of the truth of all things |
ato na siddhasādhyatā nāpi hetor asiddhatā vyāhārasāmarthyamātrasya hetutvena vivakṣitatvāt | Therefore there is neither proving the proven nor invalidity of the reason, since only the capacity for speech is intended as the reason |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvaṃ tadavasthaṃ prasajyate vyāhāravṛttisāmarthye hetutvenāpi saṃmate | Even when the capacity for verbal activity is accepted as the reason, the doubt regarding [its] exclusion still remains |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvena naikāntikatā hetoḥ | Due to the doubtful exclusion, there is no non-conclusiveness of the reason |
atha yeṣām avikalpato 'pi bhagavato vacanapravṛttir iti pakṣas tatrāha cakretyādi | Now regarding those who hold the view that words proceed from the Blessed One even without conceptual thought, [the author] speaks of the wheel, etc. |
cakrabhramaṇayogena nirvikalpe 'pi tāyini sambhārāvegasāmarthyād deśanā sampravartate | Even when the potter is free from conceptual thought, through the connection with the wheel's rotation, teaching proceeds by the force of accumulated momentum |
yathāhi cakrasyoparate 'pi daṇḍapreraṇavyāpāre pūrvāvegavaśād bhramaṇam evaṃ bhagavati pratyastamitasamastakalpanājāle 'pi sthite pravartata eva pūrvapuṇyajñānasambhārāvegavaśāddeśaneti sudhiyaḥ saugatāḥ kecana vijñānavādinaḥ pratipannāḥ | Just as even when the activity of stick-pushing has ceased, rotation [continues] due to previous momentum, similarly even when the Blessed One remains with the entire web of conceptual thought set aside, teaching proceeds due to the force of momentum from previous accumulation of merit and knowledge - thus some wise Buddhist Idealists maintain |
tān prati sphuṭataramasiddhatādoṣo hetoravasīyata eva | Against them, the fault of invalidity of the reason is clearly established |
syād etadasmin darśane sarveṣām eva svapratibhāsānubhavamātratvāt paramārthato na kasyacid vaktṛtvam asti | One might object that in this view, since everything is mere experience of one's own appearance, ultimately there is no speakership of anyone |
kiṃ tvadhyavasāyavaśād avadatyapi parasmiṃs tathā pratibhāsivijñānotpattāv adhipatipratyayabhāvena sthite vaktṛtvābhimāno loke | Rather, due to determination, even when [someone] speaks, when reflected consciousness arises similarly in another [person], remaining as the dominant condition, there is the worldly conception of speakership |
tadevādhyavasāyikaṃ lokapratītaṃ vaktṛtvaṃ hetutvenābhipretam | That very determinative, worldly-conceived speakership is intended as the reason |
nahi siddhāntaprasiddho hetur dharmo vā kriyate, kiṃ tarhi lokapratīta eva | Neither the reason nor the property is established according to [our] doctrine, but rather according to worldly conception |
ityato nāsiddhatā hetor ityāśaṅkyāha vaktṛtvam ityādi | Therefore there is no invalidity of the reason - thinking thus, [the author] speaks of speakership, etc. |
vaktṛtvaṃ yat tu lokena matamādhyavasāyikam tatra tādṛśi hetoḥ syāt sandigdhavyatirekitā | But regarding that determinative speakership which is conceived by people, in such a case there would be doubtful exclusion of the reason |
atra api pūrvavat sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvād anaikāntikatā hetoḥ | Here too, just as before, due to the exclusion from the contrary of the probandum being doubtful, the reason becomes inconclusive. |
nanv ityādinā paro yad asiddhatvam atra vijñānavādanaye proktaṃ tad vighaṭayati | With [the words] beginning with "nanu", [the opponent] refutes that inadmissibility which has been stated here against the doctrine of Vijñānavāda. |
evam manyate ya eva tu ubhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vā, na anyataraprasiddhaḥ sandigdhavācī, punaḥ sādhanāpekṣaṇād iti nyāyāt | [The opponent] thinks thus: "Only that which expresses what is ascertained by both parties can be either a proof or a refutation - not what is established by only one party or what expresses something doubtful, according to the principle that [such arguments] would require further proof." |
apramāṇopapanne 'smin vijñānavādamate katham asiddhatodbhāvyate | How can inadmissibility be raised against this doctrine of Vijñānavāda which is not established by any valid means of cognition? |
na hi svecchāmātreṇa siddhatvāsiddhatvaparikalpanāyāṃ dūṣaṇaṃ bhavati, kiṃ tarhi pramāṇabalopapāditāyāṃ siddhāsiddhau vā | For a refutation does not occur through mere arbitrary assumption of establishment or non-establishment, but rather when [something's] establishment or non-establishment is supported by the force of valid means of cognition. |
na ca pramāṇabalād vijñānanayaḥ siddhaḥ, asya vistareṇa nirastatvāt | And the doctrine of consciousness [Vijñānavāda] is not established by force of valid means of cognition, because it has been extensively refuted. |
ucyata ityādinā pratividhatte | [The author] responds with [the words] beginning with "ucyate." |
ucyate yadi vaktṛtvaṃ svatantraṃ sādhanaṃ matam tadānīm āśrayāsiddhaḥ sandigdhāsiddhatā athavā | It is said: if speakership is considered to be an independent reason, then [it is] either one whose substratum is not established or one whose establishment is doubtful. |
asya ca arthasya sandehāt sandigdhāsiddhatā sthirā | And due to doubt about its meaning, its doubtful non-establishment is certain. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ tasmāt tvayā vaktavyam īdṛśam | Therefore, such an argument must be stated by you as a prasaṅga [reductio ad absurdum]. |
tatra ca āgamamātreṇa siddho dharmaḥ prakāśyate | And therein, the property that is established merely through scripture is made manifest. |
na tu tadbhāvasiddhyarthaṃ jñāpakaṃ vidyate param | But there exists no other means of cognition for establishing its existence. |
atra vikalpadvayaṃ kadācid vaktṛtvaṃ svātantryeṇa sādhanaṃ vā abhipretaṃ bhavet, prasaṅgasādhanaṃ vā | Here there might be two alternatives intended: either speakership as an independent proof, or as a prasaṅga [argument]. |
tatrādye pakṣe viśeṣeṇa āśrayo na siddha iti āśrayāsiddhatā hetoḥ | In the first alternative, because the substratum is not established specifically, there is non-establishment of the basis of the reason. |
atha sāmānyena āśrayo vivakṣitas tathāpi yāvat prativādinaṃ prati pramāṇena vaktṛtvaṃ na sādhyate tāvat sandigdhāsiddhatā, ya eva tu ubhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanam iti nyāyāt | If the substratum is meant generally, even then, as long as speakership is not proven to the opponent through a valid means of cognition, there remains doubtful non-establishment, according to the principle that only that which expresses what is ascertained by both parties can be a proof. |
asyeti / vaktṛtvasya / | "asya" [refers to] "of speakership" |
tasmān mābhūdayaṃ doṣa iti prasaṅgasādhanam aṅgīkartavyaṃ tvayā / | Therefore, in order that this fault may not arise, you must accept [that your argument is] a reductio ad absurdum. |
tatrāpi prasaṅgasādhane ya evāvicāraramaṇīyāgamamātrāt parasya prasiddho dharmaḥ sa eva sādhanatvena prakāśanīyaḥ parasparavirodhodbhāvanāya natvasau pramāṇena sādhanīyo niṣprayojanatvāt / | Moreover, even in [such] a reductio ad absurdum, what should be presented as the reason is only that property which is known to the opponent solely from [their] scripture [and] which cannot withstand scrutiny, [and this is done] to expose mutual contradiction, but that [property] need not be proved by means of valid cognition, as this would be purposeless. |
naca vaktṛtvaṃ parasyāgamamātreṇa prasiddhamityubhayathāprasiddhatā hetoḥ / | And speakership is not known solely from the opponent's scripture, therefore the reason is inadmissible in both ways. |
evaṃ yasya prameyatvavastusattādilakṣaṇāḥ / nihantu hetavo 'śaktāḥ ko na taṃ kalpayiṣyati // | When reasons such as 'cognizability', 'entityness', 'existence' and so forth are unable to refute [the existence of] someone [omniscient], who would not accept [the possibility of] such a one? |
vedavādimukhasthaivaṃ yuktilaukikavaidikī / na kācid api śakyograsarpajñānaviṣāpahā // | Thus no reasoning, whether worldly or vedic, [when] situated in the mouth of a defender of the Veda, is capable of removing the poison of the terrible serpent in the form of the [Buddha's] knowledge. |
dṛgviṣair iha dṛṣṭo 'pi khalpaśaktir dvijo jaḍaḥ / ucchvāsam api no kartuṃ śaknoti kimuvāsitum // | Indeed, the powerless and dull-witted twice-born, even when merely glanced at by the poison from [that serpent's] eyes, becomes unable even to breathe, let alone to remain [in its presence]. |
vedavādimukhasthā tu yuktiḥ sādhvyapi durbhagā / | But reasoning, even when valid, becomes unfortunate when situated in the mouth of a defender of the Veda, |
kaṇṭhikā carastheva jaghanyāśrayasaṃsthiteḥ // | like a necklace [when] placed at [one's] feet, due to residing in a base substrate. |
ko na taṃ kalpayiṣyatīti sambhavitveneti śeṣaḥ / | "Who will not accept him?" [means] "as a possibility" - this is what remains [to be understood]. |
yato bādhakānupalambhād eva tasya sambhāvanā siddhyatīti bhāvaḥ / | This means that the possibility [of his existence] is established merely from the absence of contrary evidence. |
āstāṃ tāvad etat yadasādhvī yuktir vedavādimukhasthā naiva śobhata iti naivātra citram kiṃtu sādhvyapyāśrayadoṣeṇa bhavatocyamānā na bhrājate // | Let this [matter] rest for now. It is not surprising that an unsound argument appearing in the mouth of a Vedic scholar does not shine; what is strange, however, is that even a sound argument, when stated by you, fails to shine due to the defect of its substratum. |
katham ityatrāha pāvakāvyabhicāritvam ityādi / | [When asked] "How [is that]?", he responds with [the discussion of] "non-deviation from fire" and so forth. |
pāvakāvyabhicāritvaṃ dhūmasyāpi na śakyate / | [He] cannot establish even the non-deviation of smoke from fire; |
vaktuṃ tena yatu dhūmas tanmate 'nyatra vartate // | because according to his view, smoke exists elsewhere also; |
ekavastusvarūpatvād udanvatyapi vartate / | due to [everything] having the nature of a single entity, it exists in the ocean also; |
tatrāpyanalasadbhāve vyatirekaḥ kimāśrayaḥ // | and if fire exists there also, what would be the basis for [its] absence? |
dhūmasya hi dahanapratibaddhajanma tathā tadavyabhicāritvamāgopālamatipratītameva tasyāpi tvayā sarvasya jagato vastutvādinā pāramārthikamaikyaṃ varṇayatā dahanābyabhicāritvaṃ na śakyaṃ pratipādayitum vastusvarūpatvenodake 'sya bhavan matena dhūmasya paramārthato vṛtteḥ / | Indeed, that smoke's origin is dependent on fire and that it never deviates [from fire] is known even to the simplest cowherd; yet you, who describe the entire world as ultimately one through [its] entity-nature and so forth, cannot establish [smoke's] non-deviation from fire, because according to your view, smoke ultimately exists in water also due to [everything] having the nature of entity. |
syād etat avyabhicāritaivetyāha tatrāpītyādi / tatrāpyudanvati tādātmyena yadyanalasvabhāvo 'ṅgīkriyate tadānale sādhye jalādir na vipakṣaḥ syāt / | [If] this [objection] were raised that "there is indeed non-deviation," [the author] responds with "there also" and so forth. If it is accepted that the ocean has the nature of fire due to [their] identity, then when fire is to be proved, water etc. could not be the counter-instance. |
tataś ca vipakṣābhāvād dhūmāder liṅgasya kimāśrayo vipakṣād vyatireko bhavet // | And thus, due to the absence of a counter-instance, what would be the basis for the exclusion of the probans (smoke etc.) from the counter-instance? |
tadrūpakāryavijñaptiḥ kiṃ vā tatrāpi no bhavet / vilakṣaṇātmabhāve vā vastubhedo 'stu tattvikaḥ // | Why then would there not be cognition of [fire's] form and effects there [in water] also? Or [alternatively], if [they have] distinct natures, then the difference between entities must be real. |
yadi jaladhau paramārthato dahano 'vasthita iti matam, kimiti tadrūpopalabdhir dāhapākādilakṣaṇakāryanirbhāsā ca vijñaptir na jāyate / | If [there is] the view that fire truly exists in water, then why does there not arise [both] the cognition of its form and the cognition manifesting [its] effects characterized by burning, cooking, and so forth? |
etac ca vistareṇa syād vādaparīkṣāyāṃ vicāritamityās tāṃ tāvad etat // yaduktam ekena pramāṇenetyādi, tatrāha samastetyādi / | This has been discussed in detail in the examination of Syādvāda, so let this [topic] rest for now. As for what was said regarding "by one means of knowledge" and so forth, to that [he] says "complete" and so forth. |
samastavastusambaddhatattvābhyāsabalodgatam / sārvajñaṃ mānasaṃ jñānaṃ mānamekaṃ prakalpyate // | The only valid means of knowledge that is proposed is mental cognition of omniscience, [which is] produced by the power of repeated practice of truth connected with all things. |
natu netrādivijñānaṃ tataḥ kimidam ucyate / nūnaṃ sa cakṣuṣā sarvātrasādīn pratipadyate // siddhaṃ ca mānasaṃ jñānaṃ rūpādyanubhavātmakam / | Not visual and other cognitions. Therefore, how can it be said that he cognizes taste and so forth through the eye? And mental cognition consisting of the experience of color and so forth is established [as valid]. |
varṇyate hi smṛtis tena rūpaśabdādigocarā / | For memory, which has color, sound and so forth as its objects, is described through that [mental cognition]. |
svapne ca mānasaṃ jñānaṃ sarvārthānubhavātmakam // | And in dreams there is mental cognition consisting of the experience of all objects. |
tataścāniyatārthena mānasena prakalpite / sarvajñe cakṣuṣā kasmād rasādīn pratipadyate // cākṣuṣeṇaiva tat klṛptāvayaṃ doṣo bhavedapi / | Therefore, when the omniscient one is postulated through mental [cognition] which has unrestricted objects, why would he cognize tastes and so forth through the eye? This fault would apply only if [omniscience] were established through visual [cognition] alone. |
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