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saviśeṣaṇatvādityabhiprāyaḥ / | [This is] because of [its] being qualified [by specific conditions] - this is the intended meaning. |
na hi laṅghanodakatāpau sakṛd āhitau punar ādhānāya yatnādinirapekṣau vartete / | For neither jumping nor heating of water, once produced, continue without requiring further effort for their repeated production. |
nāpi sthirāśrayau yadi vātrāpi samānajātīyabījavṛttitve satīti viśeṣaṇāpekṣaṇādavyabhicāro laṅghanena iti manyamāna āha na hi tallaṅghanād eveti / tallaṅghanaṃ nahi laṅghanād eva jāyate / | Nor do they have a permanent substrate; or even here, given the qualification that "[the effect] proceeds from a seed of the same kind," there is no deviation [in the argument] regarding jumping - thinking thus [the author] says "indeed not from that jumping alone," [meaning that] jumping indeed does not arise from jumping alone. |
kasmin sati nāma jāyate ity āha laṅghanaṃ balayatnayor iti / | [If one asks:] "From what then does it arise?" [The author] says: "Jumping [arises] from strength and effort." |
bale yatne ca sati laṅghanaṃ bhavati, na tu laṅghane sati / | When strength and effort are present, jumping occurs, but not when [merely] jumping is present. |
tayoś ca balayatnayoḥ sthitaśaktitayā laṅghanasyāpi sthitātmateti bhāvaḥ / | And because these two, strength and effort, have fixed capacities, jumping too has a fixed nature - this is the meaning. |
syād etadyadi balayatnābhyām eva laṅghanaṃ bhavati na laṅghanāt, evaṃ saty ābhyāse yādṛśaṃ laṅghanaṃ puruṣasya bhavati, tādṛgabhyāsāt prāgapi prāpnotīti / | One might object: "If jumping occurs only from strength and effort, not from jumping [itself], then the kind of jumping ability that a person has after practice should be obtained even before practice." |
naiṣa doṣaḥ / | This is not a fault. |
prāktanasya śleṣmādinā dehasya viguṇatvāt paścād ādvan na laṅghanam upajāyate. paścāt tu śanaiḥ prayatnena dehavaiguṇye 'panīte sati yathābalamevāvatiṣṭhate laṅghanam / | Initially, due to the body's impairment by [excess] phlegm and other [humors], [proper] jumping does not arise. Later, however, when the body's impairment is gradually removed through effort, jumping remains [possible] exactly according to one's strength. |
avaśyaṃ caitadevaṃ vijñeyam / | This must necessarily be understood in this way. |
anyathā yadi laṅghanādeva laṅghanaṃ syāt tadā laṅghanasya vyavasthitotkarṣatā na syāt // | Otherwise, if jumping were to arise from jumping alone, then there could not be any fixed gradation in its excellence. |
yadi vā laṅghanasyāpi kāṣṭhāparyantavṛttitā / samādhibalagatyādiviśeṣāt syāt svahetutaḥ // | Or, jumping too can reach its ultimate limit through its own causes, through the special [powers] of concentration, strength, movement and so forth. |
siddhir manojavāsaṃjñā tathāca śrūyate pramā / yathā cintitamātreṇa yāti dūram api prabhuḥ // | [This] power is called "manojava" [swift as thought], and thus we hear evidence that the Lord travels even to distant [places] merely by thinking [of them]. |
nacāpyadṛṣṭimātreṇa tadabhāvaḥ prasiddhyati / | And [its] non-existence is not established merely by [its] non-perception. |
nacātra bādhakaṃ kiñcid vaktumatra paraḥ kṣamaḥ // | Nor is any opponent capable of stating any counter-argument here. |
tathā hi samādhibalaviśeṣaprayogāllaṅghanasyāsmābhir iṣyata evātyantaprakarṣavartitvam yathā bhagavato manojavā nāma siddhiḥ paṭhyate, yasyāṃ sthitasya manasa iva javo bhavati / | Thus indeed, we accept that through the application of special concentration and strength, jumping attains supreme excellence, just as we read about the Lord's power called "manojava," in which one's speed becomes like that of the mind. |
ata eva sā manojaveti prakhyātā / | For this very reason it is known as "manojava" [swift as thought]. |
nacāsyā bādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti / nāpyadarśanamātreṇa pratikṣepo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt // | There is no valid means of knowledge that refutes this, nor is rejection [of it] reasonable merely due to non-perception, as [this would lead to] undesirable consequences. |
rājahaṃsaśiśuḥ śakto nirgantuṃ na gṛhādapi / | A young royal swan is not even able to leave the house. |
yāti cābhyāsabhedena pāramambhaḥpater api // | Through practice, [one] becomes able to go even beyond the ocean. |
āśrayopādhikābhyāsabhedād asya gatir yathā / tādṛśī tādṛśād eva kiṃ na sambhāvyate 'dhikā // | Just as this movement of his occurs through the exercise of the particular conditions of the receptacle [i.e. the body], why cannot similar or even higher [powers] be possible from similar [practice]? |
bodhisattvadaśāyāṃ hi na śaktas tādṛśīṃ gatim / | For in the bodhisattva stage, he is not capable of such movement. |
prāptuṃ prāpte samādhau tu viśiṣṭe śaknuyān muniḥ // | But upon attaining the highest samādhi, the sage would become capable of attaining [such movement]. |
yathā ca rājahaṃsaśāvaḥ prāk svakulāyād api nirgantumaśaktaḥ paścād alpīyasyapy abhyāse sati samupajātapakṣo jaladher api pāramutpatati, tadvadanyo 'pyāśrayaviśeṣopādhikādabhyāsād viśiṣṭām api gatimāsādayatīti sambhāvyam / | Just as a young royal swan is at first unable even to leave its nest, but later, after even minimal practice, once its wings have grown, flies even beyond the ocean, similarly it is possible that another [being] too can attain exceptional movement through practice conditioned by a special receptacle. |
pakṣaviśeṣalābhād evāsau dūrataradeśagāmī bhavatīti nābhyāsabaleneti cet / | [If one objects:] "It is through obtaining special wings that it becomes capable of going to distant places, not through the power of practice." |
nahi sañjātapakṣo 'pi sahasaivoḍḍīya gacchan dṛśyate śakuniśāvaḥ, kiṃ tarhi śākhāntarācchākhāntaragamanakrameṇābhyasya kiyan mātraṃ gamanaṃ paścād apāstaśaṅko dūrataram api deśaṃ vrajati / | Even after its wings have grown, a young bird is not seen suddenly flying up and going [far]; rather, by practicing movement from branch to branch, going small distances at first, later, having abandoned [all] doubt, it travels even to more distant regions. |
kiñca āśrayaviśeṣalābhe sati yathā haṃsādeḥ prāgaśaktasyāpi sataḥ paścād gatir viśeṣyate tathā bhagavato 'pi bodhisattvāvasthāyām aśaktasyāpi sataḥ paścāt samādhiviśeṣalābhād āsāditāśrayaviśeṣasya tathāvidhā gatiḥ sambhāvyata ityevam parametat / | Moreover, just as when a swan and others obtain a special receptacle, though previously incapable, their movement later becomes exceptional, similarly for the Blessed One too, though incapable in the bodhisattva state, later through obtaining special samādhi [and thus] having acquired a special receptacle, such movement becomes possible—this is exactly what is meant here. |
abhyāsagrahaṇamatantram / | The mention of "practice" is not essential. |
prayogaḥ yaḥ sambhavadāśrayaviśeṣopādhirabhyāsaḥ sa sambhavadatyantadūragamanaphalaḥ yathā rājahaṃsaśiśorabhyāsaḥ, sambhavadāśrayaviśeṣopādhir manuṣyāṇām abhyāsa iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | The logical formulation is: That practice which is connected with a possible special receptacle as condition results in possible extremely distant movement, as in the case of a young royal swan's practice; human beings' practice is [also] connected with a possible special receptacle as condition—this is a reason based on essential nature. |
yaduktaṃ daśahastāntaramityādi tadapāstam iti darśayati daśetyādi / | What was said about "ten hands' distance" and so forth—that is refuted, as shown by [the verse beginning with] "ten." |
daśahastāntaravyomnas tadyadutplutya gacchati / śaktiḥ syād īdṛśī hetos tasya dūragatāvapi // | If [someone] can jump up into the sky to a distance of ten hands, through such a cause, that power [could extend] even to greater distances. |
sthirāśrayatve satīti viśeṣaṇopādānād udakatāpena nānaikāntika iti darśayati uṣṇatām | [The author] shows that [the example] of heating water is not a valid counter-example, because of the qualification "when there is a stable substrate." |
ityādi | [As stated] above. |
uṣṇatāṃ nīyamānasya kṣayo bhavati cāmbhasaḥ | When water is being heated, it undergoes diminution. |
syād etat, prajñādes tu sthirāśrayatvam eva kathaṃ siddham ity āha mānasānām ityādi | [One might ask:] "How is the stability of the substrate established for wisdom and other [qualities]?" To this [the author] says "of mental [qualities]" etc. |
mānasānāṃ guṇānāṃ tu cittasantatirāśrayaḥ | For mental qualities, the substrate is the continuum of consciousness. |
sādhārayogato vṛttān na kathañcinnivartate | Due to its connection with [its] receptacle, it never ceases from functioning. |
seti | [Regarding] "that." |
cittasantatiḥ | [It refers to] the continuum of consciousness. |
ādhārayogato vṛttād iti / bodhisattvāśrayalakṣaṇādhārasambandhena pravṛtter ity arthaḥ | [Regarding] "due to connection with [its] receptacle": this means functioning through connection with the receptacle characterized as the bodhisattva's basis. |
viśiṣṭasyādhārasya vivakṣitatvāt | Because a specific receptacle is meant [here]. |
tathā hi paralokasya prasādhitatvād bodhisattvānāṃ ca sātmībhūtamahākṛpāṇām āsaṃsāramaśeṣasattvoddharaṇāyāvasthānāt tadāśrayavartinī cittasantatiratitarāṃ sthirāśrayā / | Since the [existence of the] next world has been established, and since the Bodhisattvas, who are thoroughly imbued with great compassion, remain [in the world] for the purpose of liberating all beings without exception from saṃsāra, the mental continuum that subsists in them has an exceptionally stable basis. |
yā tu śrāvakādīnāṃ santānavartinī sā na sthirāśrayā teṣāṃ śīghrataraṃ parinirvāṇān mandatvāt kṛpāyās teṣām avasthāne yatnābhāvād iti bhāvaḥ // | But that [mental continuum] which subsists in the Disciples and others does not have a stable basis, because they enter parinirvāṇa more quickly, because their compassion is weak, [and] because they make no effort to remain [in the world] - this is the meaning. |
dvitīyam api viśeṣaṇaṃ kathaṃ siddham iti ced āha yāvadityādi / | If one asks "How is the second qualification established?", [the text] states "yāvat" etc. |
etad eva kathaṃ siddham ity āha prabhāsvaram ityādi / | If one asks "How is this itself established?", [the text] states "prabhāsvaram" etc. |
etacca pūrvam eva vyākhyātamasmābhiḥ / ete ca prakṛtyā tattvadarśanātmakatayā cittasya svabhāvabhūtāḥ prajñādayo viśeṣā iti pratipāditam iti svabhāvatvena prajñādīnāṃ sakṛdāhitānāṃ svarasata eva prakṛtir bhavatīti siddham // | This has already been explained by us before. And it has been demonstrated that these special qualities like wisdom etc. are by nature the very essence of consciousness as [consisting in] the perception of reality. Thus it is established that since wisdom etc., once implanted, are [of its] essential nature, [their] nature comes about automatically. |
parabodhātmaniyataṃ ceto yadi hi sambhavet / tadāsiddhopalambhatvād arthavittir na sambhavet // | If consciousness were restricted to cognizing something other than itself, then, since its own apprehension would be unestablished, there could be no cognition of objects. |
tasmāt svasaṃvedanātmatvaṃ cetaso 'sti prakāśanāt / | Therefore consciousness has the nature of self-cognition, because of [its] illuminating [nature]. |
anāropitarūpā ca svasaṃvittir iyaṃ sthitā // | And this self-cognition remains as having a non-superimposed form. |
mukhyaṃ hi tāvaccittasya svasaṃvedanam eva rūpam ityavaśyaṃ sarvavādibhir abhyupeyam, anyathā yadi pareṇa jñānāntareṇa budhyata iti syāt tadāprasiddhopalambhatvenārthavittir na siddhyet / | For the primary form of consciousness is indeed self-cognition - this must necessarily be accepted by all theorists. Otherwise, if it were cognized by another, different cognition, then since its apprehension would be unestablished, the cognition of objects would not be established. |
tasmān mukhyaṃ cetasa ātmaprakāśanam eva rūpam / | Therefore the primary form of consciousness is indeed self-illumination. |
sa cātmā tasyānityādirūpa iti sāmarthyāt tattvadarśanātmakam eva cittaṃ siddham iti bhāvaḥ // | That self is of an ephemeral nature, [and] thus by implication it is established that consciousness is indeed of the nature of truth-perception. |
mārge sātmyamato yāte teta{taista---}syābhibhavo na hi / rāgadveṣādibhir doṣais te hi prāgeva durbalāḥ // | When the path has thus become assimilated [with oneself], there can be no suppression of it by defects such as attachment and aversion, since these [defects] were already weak before. |
sātmībhāvāc ca mārgasya sarvāpakṣālanāśinaḥ / | Due to the assimilation of the path which destroys all defects, |
na yatnena vinā hānir yatno na guṇadarśanāt // | there can be no loss [of it] without effort, and [there can be] no effort [to lose it] due to the perception of [its] virtues. |
ato nirmalaniṣkampaguṇasandohabhūṣaṇaḥ / doṣavātāvikalpyātmā sarvajño gamyate jinaḥ // | Therefore, the Jina is understood [to be] omniscient, adorned with a multitude of pure and unwavering virtues, [and] whose self cannot be disturbed by the winds of defects. |
mārge{rga---}sātmīyabhāvāt prāgapi yadā rāgādayo malā āgantukatayā durbalatvāt mārgamabhibhavitum asamarthās tadā sātmībhāvagate mārge kathaṃ tamabhibhaviṣyanti / | When even before the identification with the path the impurities such as attachment, being adventitious [and] due to [their] weakness, are unable to suppress the path, how then will they suppress it when the path has become [fully] identified [with oneself]? |
kiñca sātmībhāvamupagatasya cetoguṇasya śrotriyasya jodiṃganairghṛṇyavan na yatnamantareṇa prahāṇaṃ śakyaṃ kartum / naca guṇavati vastuni tattvadarśinaḥ prahāṇāya yatnaḥ sambhavati / | Moreover, when the mental quality has become assimilated, it cannot be removed without effort, just like the cruelty of a Vedic sacrificer or a demon, nor is it possible for one who sees truth to make an effort to abandon something possessed of virtues. |
kasmāt guṇadarśanāt / | Why? Because of the perception of [its] virtues. |
etac ca pūrvamāveditam eva / | And this has indeed been explained before. |
apakṣālaḥ doṣaḥ // | Apakṣāla means defect. |
ye ye bhāvyante te te parisphuṭaṃ bhrānti bhāvanāpariniṣpattau | [Those things] which are conceived become clearly manifest at the completion of the conception |
kāmādiviṣayā iva | Just as [in the case of] objects of desire and so forth |
sarvadharmāś ca bhāvyante dīrghakālam anekadhā śūnyānātmādirūpeṇa tāttvikena mahān matiḥ | And all dharmas are conceived by great intellects for a long time and in many ways in their real form as void, selfless and so forth |
śūnyānātmādirūpasya bhāvikatvaṃ ca sādhitam | And the reality of the form of [being] void, selfless and so forth has been proved |
bhūtārthabhāvanodbhūtaiḥ pramāṇaṃ tena tanmatam | Therefore that [conception] arising from the conception of real objects is considered valid knowledge |
tatrāyaṃ maulaḥ prayogo vakṣyamāṇaḥ | Here [follows] this fundamental argument that will be stated |
ye vastutvajñeyatvādidharmayoginas te sambhavadbhāvanāprakarṣaparyantavarttyekajñānasphuṭaprakāśanāḥ tadyathā kāminīputracorādayaḥ kāmādyupaplutair bhāvyamānāḥ sarvadharmāś ca vastutvādidharmayogina iti svabhāvahetuḥ | Those which possess the properties of being real entities, being knowable and so forth become clearly manifest in a single cognition which occurs at the culmination of possible conception - just as a beloved woman, son, thief and so forth [become manifest] when conceived by those afflicted by desire etc. - and all dharmas possess the properties of being real entities etc. - this is a reason based on essential nature |
na ca ayam anaikāntikaḥ | And this [reason] is not inconclusive |
tathā hi yadi | For thus indeed if... |
etac ca śūnyādijñānaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇaṃ sādhayann āha pratyakṣam ityādi | And proving that this knowledge of emptiness etc. is direct valid cognition, he states "direct perception" and so forth |
pratyakṣaṃ vyaktabhāsitvāt pramāṇaṃ vastusaṅgateḥ | [This] is perceptual cognition because of [its] clear manifestation and because of [its] conformity with reality |
cakṣurādyāśrayodbhūtanīlādipratibhāsavat | Just like the appearance of blue and other [colors] arising from the contact with the eye and other sense organs |
sambhavatyekavijñāne sakṛt spaṣṭāvabhāsanam | A single clear manifestation is possible in one cognition |
tathā vibhāvyamānatvād aṅganātmajacoravat | Because [things] are conceived thus, like [the images of] a woman, a son, and a thief |
icchāmātramukhībhāvā bhāvanāpi na durlabhā | Even conceptual awareness is not difficult [to obtain] since it appears merely through wish |
sphuṭapratibhāsitvenāvikalpatayā pramāṇaprasiddhārthaviṣayatvenāvisaṃvāditayā cakṣurādijṇyānavat pratyakṣapramāṇam etat | This is perceptual cognition, like visual and other cognitions, because of [its] clear manifestation, because of [its] being non-conceptual, because of [its] having objects established by valid means of knowledge, and because of [its] being non-contradictory |
tataś ca bhāvanāmātrabhāvini sphuṭapratibhāsitve siddhe siddham eva sarvadharmāṇām ekajñāne yugapat sphuṭapratibhāsanam iti siddhā vyāptiḥ sambhavatyekavijñāne sarvadharmāṇāṃ sakṛtspaṣṭāvabhāsanam iti | When it is established that [there is] clear manifestation in that which arises from mere conceptualization, it is thereby established that all dharmas are clearly manifested simultaneously in one cognition, and thus the pervasion is established that "all dharmas can appear clearly in one cognition simultaneously" |
prayogaḥ ye ye vibhāvyante te sambhavat sakṛdekavijñānasphuṭapratibhāsanā yathāṅganādayaḥ | The application [is as follows]: Whatever things are conceived can potentially be clearly manifested in a single cognition, like a woman and other [images] |
sarvadharmāś ca vibhāvyante iti svabhāvahetuḥ | And all dharmas are conceived - thus [this is] a reason based on essential nature |
nacāyam asiddho hetur mantavya ityādarśayann āha icchetyādi / pūrvaṃ ca vistareṇa bhāvanāsambhavasya pratipāditatvād iti nāsiddho hetuḥ | This reason should not be considered unestablished, as [the text] shows by saying "icchā" etc., and since the possibility of conception was extensively proven before, therefore the reason is not unestablished |
bhāvanotkarṣaniṣṭhaikabuddhispaṣṭaprakāśanāḥ / vastusattvādihetubhyaḥ sarvadharmāḥ priyādivat // | All dharmas must be regarded as being clearly manifested by the single cognition that represents the highest stage of meditation, because of reasons such as [their] being entities [and their] being existent, just like [one's] beloved [wife] and other [things]. |
evaṃ ca yasya vastutvasattvotpādādilakṣaṇāḥ / niścaye hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko na taṃ sādhayiṣyati // | And thus, when the certainty regarding something is capable of being proved by such reasons as [its] being an entity, [its] being existent, [its] being produced and so forth, who would not establish it? |
ekajñānakṣaṇavyāptaniḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ / | [He is one] whose single moment of cognition pervades the entire sphere of knowable objects. |
gamakatvādvaiyadhikaraṇye 'pi bahuvrīhiḥ / | Even in the absence of co-reference, the bahuvrīhi compound is indicative [of the meaning]. |
bhāvanotkarṣaniṣṭhāyām ekabuddhau spaṣṭaṃ pratibhāsanaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ / | Those which are clearly manifested in the single cognition that represents the highest stage of meditation are described as such. |
yasya ca jñāne te tathā bhāsante sa sakṛdekajñānavyāptāśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ sakalasurāsuracūḍāmaṇibhūtaḥ siddhaḥ sarvajña iti // | And he in whose cognition these [things] are thus manifested is one "whose single cognition pervades the entire sphere of knowable objects," who is "the crest-jewel of all gods and demons," and [thus] is proven to be omniscient. |
jñātā dharmādayo vai te kenacid vacanādṛte / satyātmanopadiṣṭatvāt kanakādiviśuddhivat // | Dharma and other [such things] must have been known by someone without verbal expression, because they have been taught by truthful persons, just like [knowledge of] the purity of gold and similar [things]. |
athavā ye satyātmanopadiṣṭās te kenacid viditāḥ, yathā kanakaviśuddhyādayaḥ, satyātmanā copadiṣṭā dharmādaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ // | Or alternatively, those things which have been taught by truthful persons must have been known by someone, like [knowledge of] the purity of gold and similar [things], and dharma and other [such things] have been taught by truthful persons - thus this is a natural reason. |
vedānāṃ pauruṣeyatve siddhe siddhaṃ na sādhanam / ajñātasyopadeśo 'sti tathyo yādṛcchiko naraḥ // | When it has been established that the Vedas are of human origin, [our] proof does not establish what is [already] established, [and] random teaching by a person of what is unknown cannot be true. |
pūrvaṃ śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ vedānāṃ pauruṣeyatvasya prasādhitatvān na siddhasādhyatā / | Because the human origin of the Vedas was previously established in the examination of scripture, there is no proving of what is [already] established. |
athāpi syād ajñatvā yadṛcchayāpyupadeśasambhavād anaikāntikatetyāha ajñātasyetyādi / | It might be argued that "teachings can be imparted by chance even without knowledge [of the subject matter], therefore [your] reason is inconclusive." |
śrutānumānabhinneva sākṣājjñānena nirmalam / munitārkṣyādivijñānaṃ na cet tad gaditaṃ katham // | If [their] knowledge was not pure [and derived] from direct perception different from hearing and inference, how could the sages [like] Tārkṣya and others have spoken of it? |
kiñca yadetan mantrādīnāṃ viṣāpanayanādisāmarthyamatyantaparokṣaṃ tadyadi buddhādibhiḥ sākṣān na viditaṃ tat kathaṃ tair bhāṣitam iti vaktavyam // | Moreover, if the power of mantras and other [means] to remove poison etc., which is entirely beyond perception, was not directly known to Buddha and others, how could they have spoken about it? This needs to be explained. |
anumānato jñātvā bhāṣitam iti cedāha na cānumānata ityādi / | If it is said that "they spoke of these things after having known [them] through inference," [we reply as follows]. |
nahyaviditalakṣaṇasambandhaṃ vastvanumānaviṣayaḥ naca tenātyantaparokṣeṇa vastunā saha kasyacilliṅgasya sambandhaḥ śakyate niścetum // | For nothing can be an object of inference whose characteristic relation has not been recognized, and no relation between any inferential mark and something entirely beyond perception can be determined. |
deśanaivamparaiveyaṃ nānyahetūpakalpanā / hetvantarakṛtāyāṃ hi vṛttau tannāma śaṅkyate // | This teaching must have come from another [person]; no other cause can be supposed. For if [knowledge] were produced by another cause, that [cause] would be suspect. |
tathā vidrumasamprāpter yuktā yādṛcchikī sthitiḥ // | Thus, a chance occurrence [of knowledge] would be [as] appropriate [as] obtaining coral [by chance]. |
parataḥ śrutvā proktam iti cen na tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogāt / | If it is said that "[they] spoke after hearing from another," [we reply] no, because the same question applies to that [person] as well. |
tathā hi tathāpyayaṃ vicāro 'vatarati tenāpi pareṇa kathaṃ jñātam nahyajñātvā tathopadeśaḥ sambhavet tenāpyanyato jñātam iti cet evaṃ tarhyanavasthā syāt tataścandhaparamparāyāṃ satyāṃ sarveṣām anabhijñatvān na samyagupadeśaḥ syāt / | For then this investigation arises: how did that other person know it? For teaching cannot occur without knowledge. If [it is said] that he too learned it from another, then there would be infinite regress. Thus, there being a series of blind [people], since all would be ignorant, there could be no proper teaching. |
Subsets and Splits