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yathoktam naivañjātīyakeṣvartheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyamupaiti andhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣviti / | As has been said: "In matters of this kind, human statements cannot attain validity, like the statements of blind people about specific colors." |
syād etad avisaṃvāditvaṃ ghuṇā kṣaravadyādṛcchikam api sambhāvyata ityāśaṅkyāha na yadṛcchetyādi / | [One might think that] this non-contradiction could be accidental like [the accidental marks made by] a woodworm, [to which he] responds "na yadṛcchā" ["not by chance"] etc. |
anyārthasamīhayā pravṛttasyārthāntarasaṃvādo yādṛcchikaḥ sambhāvyate / | When one sets out with the intention [of achieving] one purpose, conformity with another purpose can be accidental. |
yathā nadīdeśopasarpaṇābhiprāyeṇa pravṛttasya vṛkṣamūlopasarpaṇam / | For example, when someone who sets out intending to go to a riverbank [accidentally] comes upon the root of a tree. |
nacātrānyārthābhiprāyeṇa pravṛttiḥ sambhavati tathā hi dharmaṃ vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmītyevaṃ pratijñāya pravṛtter dharmādyupadeśaparaiveyaṃ deśanā nānyārthaparetyavasīyate / | But here [in this case] there cannot be an undertaking with any other intention, because having declared "O monks, I shall teach you Dharma," this teaching, proceeding [from this declaration], is determined to be focused only on the exposition of Dharma and related matters, not on any other purpose. |
vāhinī nadī / | "Vāhinī" means "river." |
vidrumo vṛkṣaḥ / pravālaṃ vā // | "Vidruma" means "tree" or "coral." |
mohād apyupadeśasambhavād anaikāntikateti cedāha vikṣiptacetasām ityādi / | If [someone] objects that "[the reason] is inconclusive because teaching could also arise from delusion," [the author] responds with "vikṣiptacetasām" ["those with disturbed minds"] etc. |
niyatānukramaṃ hīdaṃ prakṛṣṭaṃ phalasādhakam // | [This teaching follows] a fixed sequence and accomplishes excellent results. |
nahi niyatānupūrvīkaṃ pūrvāparāvyāhataṃ puruṣārthasādhakaṃ vākyaṃ vikṣiptacetobhir analpaṃ bhāṣituṃ śakyam / | For those with disturbed minds cannot utter at length statements that follow a fixed sequence, are free from earlier-later contradictions, and accomplish human purposes. |
tasmāt siddhaṃ kenacit sākṣād dharmādayo vijñātā iti // | Therefore it is established that someone directly knew Dharma and related matters. |
syād etat yadi nāma sāmānyena siddham tathāpi sugate dharmajñatvaṃ sādhayitum iṣṭam tat te kathaṃ siddhyatītyāśaṅkya bhagavati dharmajñatvaṃ sādhayann āha yo 'śrutānumitamityādi / | [One might say:] "Even if it has been established in a general way, how do you prove what you wished to prove - [namely] the fact that the Sugata possesses knowledge of dharma?" Anticipating this [objection], [the author] proceeds to demonstrate [the Buddha's] knowledge of dharma by saying "One who [teaches] unheard and uninferred [truths]" etc. |
pratyakṣadṛṣṭanīrādir yathānyaḥ pratipādakaḥ / aśrutānumitaṃ satyaṃ tat parasvārthamuktavān // atīndriyaṃ parājñātasāmarthyaṃ pariniścayāt / | Just as someone else who has directly perceived [something] instructs [others about it], [the Buddha] taught unheard and uninferred truths for the benefit of others [and taught about] the supersensuous [and] that whose power is unknown to others, [all this] through perfect determination. |
prayogaḥ yastatparo 'śrutānumitasatyārthopadeśī {sa} sākṣād vividitatadarthatattvaḥ, yathā pratyakṣajñātasalilādis tadupadeṣṭā, tathā ca bhagavāniti svabhāvahetuḥ / | The logical formulation is: Whoever is intent on that [truth] and teaches the truth about unheard and uninferred things, has directly known the true nature of those things - just as one who teaches about water etc. that he has directly perceived; and such is the Blessed One. This is a reason based on essential nature. |
satyatvādeḥ prasādhitatvānnāsiddhatā hetoḥ / nāpyanaikāntikateti pratipāditam etat / | Since the truthfulness etc. has [already] been established, the reason is not inadmissible. Nor is it inconclusive, as has been demonstrated. |
sarveṣāṃ ca hetūnāṃ sapakṣe sattvān na viruddhateti mantavyam / | And since all [our] reasons are present in similar cases [where the probandum is present], they should not be considered contradictory. |
parājñātasāmarthyam iti / parair ajñātaṃ sāmarthyaṃ yasya mudrādes tat tathoktam // yaduktam tasmād atiśayajñānair ityādi, tatrāha tasmād ityādi / | [Regarding] "power unknown to others": That whose power is unknown to others, such as gestures etc., is called thus. As for what was said [earlier] beginning with "therefore by those with superior knowledge" etc., [the author] responds to that beginning with "therefore" etc. |
ekāpavarakasthatyetyādāvāha eketyādi / ekāpavarakasthasya pratyakṣaṃ yat pravartate / | Regarding [the opponent's statement] beginning with "while staying in a single room" etc., [the author] says "in one [room]" etc.: "The perception that occurs for one staying in a single room..." |
ityetat sarvasattvasthasāmarthyānubhave sati / | This [statement is valid only] when there is experience of the capacity present in all beings. |
niścetuṃ bhavato yuktamanyathā kiṃnibandhanam // | [Only] then would your determination be justified - otherwise, what would be its basis? |
etat pratijñāmātrapramāṇakam evoktaṃ bhagava{bhava---}tā, nahyarvāg darśinām anupalambhamātreṇa sarvapuṃsāmatīndriyārthajñānāśaktir niścetuṃ pāryate // syād etat nānupalambhamātreṇāsmābhir aśaktiniścayaḥ kriyate / | This has been stated by you based merely on [your] assertion alone, for those of limited vision cannot determine the incapacity of all persons to know supersensuous objects merely through non-apprehension. [One might object:] "We do not determine [their] incapacity merely through non-apprehension." |
kiṃ tarhi puruṣatvādibhyo hetubhyaḥ / | [We infer it] from such reasons as puruṣatva [being human] and so forth. |
tathā hi sarva eva puruṣā dūravyavasthitādiparārthaparijñānāsamarthāḥ puruṣatvavastutvajñeyatvādibhyo yathāhamiti | For instance, [the argument goes that] all humans are incapable of perceiving things that are remote, concealed and other [such things], because of [their] being human, being entities, being cognizable, just like myself. |
atrāha ātmodāharaṇenetyādi / | To this [argument], [the author] responds with [the verse] beginning with "by using oneself as an example." |
ātmodāharaṇenānyasāmarthyābhāvaniścaye / | [This refers to] the deduction of others' lack of capability through using oneself as an example. |
niścaya ityetasya kāryaṃ ityetena sāmānādhikaraṇyam / | The term "niścaye" [in deduction] is to be construed as co-referential with "kārye" [in effect]. |
atrānaikāntikatā hetūnām atiprasaṅgāt / | Here the reasons are inconclusive due to [their] leading to undesirable consequences. |
tathā hi idam api śakyaṃ vaktum sarva eva puruṣā jaḍabuddhayaḥ puruṣatvādibhyo yathā bhavāniti / | For instance, one could equally say: "All humans are stupid because of [their] being human and so forth, just like yourself." |
na caivaṃ bhavati / nahyekatra puruṣe 'dṛṣṭasya dharmasya sarvatrābhāvaḥ śakyo 'vasātum puruṣāṇāṃ viśeṣadarśanāt // | But this is not so, for when a quality is not seen in one person, its absence cannot be established everywhere, because differences are observed among people. |
naikatra pariniṣṭhāsti jñānasya puruṣe kvacit / | There is no absolute limit to knowledge in any single person. |
itīdam api vāṅmātramahetukam udāhṛtam // | Therefore this too is merely a verbal statement without [proper] reasoning. |
athavātmasamānpuruṣānabhisandhāya ṛtuparṇena bhāṣitam tenāvirodhād ajñāpakam etad ityādarśayann āha svasamānityādi / | Or [it may be that] Ṛtuparṇa spoke with reference to people of similar [limited] capacity as himself, [and] thus showing that this [statement] is not contradictory [and] not indicative [of the impossibility of omniscience], [the author] states [the verse] beginning with "similar to oneself." |
adhikṛtya tathā vākyamṛtuparṇena kīrtitam // | [A verse] has been declared by Ṛtuparṇa regarding [that] statement. |
pramāṇaṃ vistareṇoktaṃ sarvajñasya ca sambhave / bādhakaṃ ca pratikṣiptaṃ tasya pūrvaṃ paroditam // | The proof regarding the possibility of [the existence of] an omniscient one has been stated in detail, and the objection to it has been previously refuted as stated by others. |
tathā hi bādhakedṛṣṭe sādhake cāprakāśite / | Thus indeed, when an objection is seen and the proof is not revealed, |
saṃśayo jāyate tena yāti sambhāvanām asau // tasmin sambhāvyamāne ca niyamastena siddhyati / | doubt arises; through that [doubt] it attains probability, and when that [probability] is being considered, the rule is thereby established. |
vedenaiva svatantreṇa dharmo lakṣyata ityayam // | This [statement that] "dharma is known through the Veda alone as an independent [source]" |
svenātmanā samāstulyāḥ svasamāḥ // | "Svasamāḥ" [means] those who are equal to oneself in their own nature. |
anāgate na dṛṣṭam ityādāvāha anāgate cetyādi / anāgate ca vijñeye pratyakṣasya tathā bhavet / sāmarthyaṃ yoginām uktaṃ tantraikālyaparīkṣaṇe // | In regard to what is said beginning with "it is not seen in the future," etc., [the text] states "and in the future" etc. The capacity of perception of yogins regarding future knowables has been stated in the examination of the three times. |
tantraikālyaparīkṣaṇa iti / | [This refers to] the examination of the three times. |
tatra hyevam uktam sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatāḥ tatra vartamānam eva vastvatītasya sākṣāt pāramaparyeṇa vā kāryabhūtam anāgatasya tu kāraṇabhūtam / | For therein it has been stated thus: "All entities indeed attain the state of cause and effect either directly or indirectly. There, a present thing is indeed the effect of the past either directly or indirectly, and [is] the cause of the future." |
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatam / yadrūpaṃ vartamānasya tadvijānanti yoginaḥ // | Yogins perceive directly, or through succession, that form of the present which has entered into a causal relationship [with past and future]. |
anugacchanti paścāc ca vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ / śuddhalaukikavijñānais tattvato viṣayair api // | They subsequently follow [this perception] through conceptual cognitions and through purely worldly knowledge along with [their] objects in reality. |
samāśritya pravartante 'tītānāgatadeśanāḥ // | [Based on this], teachings about the past and future proceed. |
etac ca sautrāntikānāṃ neṣṭaṃ sarvatra bhagavataḥ sākṣād darśitvābhyupagamād | This is not accepted by the Sautrāntikas, since [they] accept that the Blessed One has direct perception of everything. |
yadi vā yogasāmarthyād bhūtājātanibhaṃ sphuṭam / liṅgāgamanirāśaṃsaṃ mānasaṃ yogināṃ bhavet // | Or, through the power of yoga, yogins may have a clear mental [perception] resembling what has occurred and what has not occurred, [one that is] independent of inference and scripture. |
yathāhi satyasvapnadarśino jñānamaviṣayam api paramārthato liṅgāgamānapekṣaṃ cāśrayaviśeṣavaśād utpadyamānam avisaṃvādi bhavati | Just as for one who sees true dreams, although [their] cognition is without an [present] object, nevertheless it arises through the power of a special basis, independent of inference and scripture, and is non-contradictory in reality. |
tathā yogināṃ yogabalena yathaiva tadabhūd bhaviṣyati vātītamanāgataṃ vastu tathaiva sphuṭapratibhāsaṃ liṅgāgamānapekṣaṃ jāyate | Similarly for yogins, through the power of yoga, past and future things arise as clear appearances exactly as they were or will be, independent of inference and scripture. |
tac ca pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam iṣyate | And this perception is accepted as a valid means of knowledge. |
svātmāvabhāsasaṃvittes tatsvalakṣaṇagocaram | Because of the awareness of its self-manifestation, it has the particular as its object. |
spaṣṭāvabhāsasaṃvedāt tacca pratyakṣamiṣyate | And because of the awareness of its clear appearance, it is accepted as perception. |
tasmād atīndriyārthānāṃ sākṣād draṣṭaiva vidyate | Therefore there exists a direct perceiver of supersensible objects. |
nityasya vacaso 'sattvāt tena kaścin na paśyati | Due to the non-existence of eternal speech, no one perceives by means of that. |
yadyapyatītādi vastu svalakṣaṇato nāsti, tathāpyātmasaṃvedanāt svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvena śāstre nirdiṣṭamityavirodhaḥ / | Although past and similar [objects] do not exist as specific characteristics [svalakṣaṇa], yet since [they are known] through self-cognition, they are described in the śāstra as having specific characteristics as their object - thus there is no contradiction. |
tacca sphuṭapratibhāsatayā prakalpanāpoḍhaṃ tathāvidhavastvavisaṃvādāccābhrāntam ityataḥ pratyakṣalakṣaṇopetatvāt pratyakṣam iti siddham // | And since this [cognition] is clear in its manifestation, free from conceptual construction, and non-erroneous due to its non-deviation from the nature of such objects, [and] since it possesses the characteristics of perception, it is established as perception. |
atīndriyārthavijñānaṃ pūrvoktādanumānataḥ / muneḥ sumatayaḥ prāhur nānyatastvagamāt kṛtāt // | The wise ones have declared that the sage's knowledge of supersensible objects [comes] from the inference mentioned before, not from any created scripture. |
pūrvoktādanumānāt siddhamāgamanirapekṣaṃ bhāvanābalaniṣpannamarthasākṣātkāri yadatīndriyārthavijñānaṃ tan muner bhagavataḥ sudhiyaḥ saugatāḥ prāhur nānyasmāt kṛtakādāgamādityataḥ tadanabhyupagamād adūṣaṇam eva // | The wise Buddhists have declared that the sage's [i.e., the Blessed One's] knowledge of supersensible objects, which directly apprehends objects [and] is accomplished through the power of meditation, is established through the aforementioned inference independently of scripture, [and] not from any created scripture - therefore, since we do not accept this [view], there is indeed no fault [in our position]. |
kartṛkritrimavākyānām ucyate na tvanāditā / prāmāṇyasiddhaye yasmāt sāpramāṇe 'pi vartate // | Beginninglessness is not asserted for [either] the author or constructed sentences for establishing their validity, since [beginninglessness] exists even in invalid [cognitions]. |
tathā hi nāstikādīnāṃ tathā tadvacasām api / vedānāṃ ca pravaktṛṇāṃ nānāditve 'pi mānatā // | For indeed, neither the nihilists and their words, nor the Vedas and their expounders, [possess] validity even in [their] beginninglessness. |
nahyanāditāsmābhiḥ prāmāṇyasiddhaye sādhanatvenocyate / | For beginninglessness is not asserted by us as a means for establishing validity. |
tathā vipakṣe 'pi vṛtter anaikāntikatvāt / ato 'dhyāropya dūṣaṇaṃ bhavatābhihitam // | Because of [its] occurrence even in the counter-instance, [such reasoning would be] inconclusive. Therefore, you have stated [your] objection by attributing [to us a position we do not hold]. |
kiñca bhavatām eva vedaprāmāṇyasiddhaye vedapravaktṛṇāṃ vedānāṃ cānāditvaṃ sādhanaṃ bruvatāṃ sarvam etad dūṣaṇaṃ sphuṭataramavataratīti darśayann āha vaktṛkṛtrimavākyānām ityādi / | Moreover, showing that all these objections apply more clearly to you yourselves who assert the beginninglessness of the Vedic expounders and the Vedas as proof for establishing the validity of the Vedas, [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "vaktṛkṛtrimavākyānām" [etc.]. |
vaktāraścākṛtrimavākyāni ceti dvandvaḥ / tatra vaktāro vedānāṃ vyākhyātāraḥ // | The compound is to be analyzed as "vaktāraḥ" ["expounders"] and "akṛtrimavākyāni" ["eternal sentences"]; here "vaktāraḥ" refers to those who expound the Vedas. |
kathaṃ niṣiddhyanta ity āha vaktāra ityādi / | [Someone asks:] "How is [their] beginninglessness denied?" [The other one] speaks [starting with] "vaktāraḥ." |
vaktāraḥ kartṛbhis tulyās tadapekṣā ca mānatā / | The expounders are equal to the composers, and [the Vedas'] reliability depends on them [i.e., the expounders]. |
vedānāṃ tatkṛtākhyānād arthapratyayajanmataḥ // | [This is] because the understanding of the Vedas' meaning arises from the explanations made by them. |
katham ity āha tatkṛtākhyānād iti / | [Someone] asks "How?" [The answer is given with] "tatkṛtākhyānāt." |
tair vaktṛbhiḥ kṛtād vyākhyānād arthapratītyutpatteḥ kāraṇāt tadapekṣā mānatā vedānām // | Because the understanding of meaning arises from the explanations made by those expounders, therefore the authority of the Vedas depends on them. |
tataś ca ko doṣa ity āha ata ityādi / | [Someone asks:] "And what is the fault in that?" [The other one] speaks [starting with] "ataḥ." |
ato na vedavākyānāṃ pāratantryātpramāṇatā / | Therefore, due to [their] dependency, the Vedic sentences cannot be authoritative. |
apaśyatāṃ svayaṃ dharmaṃ vaktṝṇām api naiva sā // | And since the expounders themselves do not perceive dharma, they too can never have authority. |
tadīdṛśāṃ pravaktṝṇāṃ kalpyamānāpyanāditā / aprāmāṇyapadasthatvān nāstikāder na bhidyate // | Even if beginninglessness is postulated for such expounders, because [this postulation] occupies a position of non-authority, it is no different from [the beginninglessness postulated by] atheists and others. |
tadajñānaviśeṣatvāt sarvaṃ yātyatra tulyatām | Due to this lack of differentiated knowledge, everything here comes to [be regarded as] equal |
na mānatvāpramāṇatve syātām evamanādinī | Neither reliability nor unreliability would thus be beginningless |
naiveti / pramāṇateti sambandhaḥ | [It] can never be [thus], this relates to reliability |
yadā caivaṃ vedavākyānāṃ pāratantryāt pramāṇatā nāsti | When thus, due to [their] dependence [on other things], the Vedic sentences cannot have reliability |
tat pravaktṛṇāñca sarveṣām andhaparamparāvaddharmamapaśyatām aprāmāṇyam | Then all their expounders, not seeing dharma [directly], are unreliable like a line of blind men |
siddhe hi vaktrakṛtrimavākyānāṃ prāmāṇye pramāṇatvasyānāditvaṃ syāt | For if the reliability of the speakers and [their] artificial statements were established, [then] reliability could be beginningless |
yāvatā na siddham ityayuktaṃ dvayor anāditvam | [But] since this is not established, it is incorrect [to claim] the beginninglessness of both |
yadvāstyeva viśeṣo 'yaṃ munau tadvacaneṣu ca | Or rather, there is indeed this distinction regarding the sage and his words |
tathā hi prasādhitam etat | For this has been established thus |
yathā bhagavān sākṣād dharmaṃ dṛṣṭavānnirdiṣṭavāṃśceti | That the Blessed One directly saw dharma and taught [it] |
ato 'paśyatāṃ svayaṃ dharmam ityetad asiddham | Therefore, this [claim] about those not seeing dharma themselves is not established |
syād etat dharmamuktavān sa ityetad eva kathaṃ siddham | This might be [questioned]: "How is it established that he taught dharma?" |
yato niṣpattir iti sambandhaḥ / | [This indicates] the relation [in terms of] "from which [there is] attainment." |
tatrābhyudayaḥ sukhaṃ mokṣo niḥśreyasam / | In this context, abhyudaya means happiness, and niḥśreyasa means liberation. |
sa dharma ucyate tādṛg iti / yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharma iti vacanāt // | This is what is called dharma, as [is clear] from the statement that "dharma is that from which follows the accomplishment of abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa." |
bhavatu nāmābhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhihetur dharmaḥ asya tu sugatavacanasya kathaṃ taddhetutvaṃ siddham yenāsya dharmajñatvaṃ bhaved ity āha taduktetyādi / | [Let it be granted that] dharma is indeed the cause of the accomplishment of abhyudaya and niḥśreyasa; but how is it established that the Buddha's words are the means of [knowing] that [dharma], by which [his] knowledge of dharma would be [proven]? |
taduktamantrayogādiniyamād vidhivatkṛtāt / | [It is established] from the rules concerning mantras, yoga, and other [practices] that were properly established [by him]. |
tena bhāgavatoktaścāsau mantrayogādiniyamaśceti vigrahaḥ / | The compound is to be analyzed as "those rules concerning mantras, yoga, and other [practices] which were spoken by the Blessed One." |
yogaḥ samādhiḥ / | Yoga means samādhi [meditative concentration]. |
ādiśabdena mudrāmaṇḍalādiparigrahaḥ / | By the word ādi [and so forth], mudrās [ritual gestures], maṇḍalas [sacred diagrams], and similar [practices] are included. |
dṛṣṭadharmo 'pīti / asminneva janmani na kevalaṃ paraloka ityapiśabdena darśayati // | [The phrase] "even visible dharma" indicates through the word api that [the results are seen] in this very life, not only in other worlds. |
evam abhyudayahetutvam upadarśya niḥśreyasahetutvaṃ darśayann āha samastetyādi / samastadharmanairātmyadarśanāt tat prakāśitāt / | Having thus shown [its] being the cause of abhyudaya, [he] shows [its] being the cause of niḥśreyasa by saying "samasta" etc.: [it is] from the realization of the selflessness of all dharmas as taught by him. |
ātmātmīyadṛgākārasattvadṛṣṭiḥ pravartate / ahaṃ mameti māne ca kleśo 'śeṣaḥ pravartate // | The perception of reality appears in the form of [seeing] a self and what belongs to the self, and when the conceit of "I" and "mine" [operates], the entire mass of afflictions becomes active. |
sattvadṛkpratyanīkaṃ ca tannairātmyanidarśanam / | And that demonstration of selflessness is opposed to the perception of reality. |
abhyāsātsātmyamāyāte tasmin sā vinivartate // tanmūlakleśarāśiś ca hetvabhāvāt pratīyate / | When that [selflessness] becomes familiar through practice, that [perception of reality] ceases; and the mass of afflictions rooted in that [perception] is understood [to cease] due to the absence of [its] cause. |
tasminnasati taddhetur na punar jāyate bhavaḥ // | When that [mass of afflictions] is absent, existence, which is caused by it, is not born again. |
tadatyantavinirmukter apavargaś ca kīrtyate / advitīyaśivadvāram ato nairātmyadarśanam // | Due to complete liberation from that [existence], [this] is declared [to be] final release; therefore the vision of selflessness is the door to unequaled bliss. |
sarveṣām api tīrthyānām ahaṅkāranivartanāt / muktiriṣṭātmasattve ca nāhaṅkāro nivartate // | According to all sectarians, liberation [comes] from the cessation of ego-sense; but when the existence of a self is accepted, the ego-sense cannot cease. |
Subsets and Splits