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parārthasampadaṃ dīpayann āha sarvalokapiteti / | [The text] indicates [his] superiority conducive to others' welfare by saying "father of all worlds." |
pitā śāstā / | [He is] father [and] teacher. |
sarvasya jagato jñānatrayasugatipratiṣṭāpanāt // | Because he establishes the three kinds of knowledge [and] good destiny for the entire world. |
athetyādinā parasyottaram āśaṅkate / | With [the word] "atha" etc., [the text] anticipates the opponent's reply. |
atha śākhāntaraṃ nedaṃ vedāntargatamiṣyate / tadatra na nimittaṃ vo dveṣaṃ muktvāvadhāryate // | If this recension is not accepted as being part of the Veda, then no reason for this can be determined except your [mere] hostility. |
svarādayaś ca te dharmāḥ prasiddhāḥ śrutibhāvinaḥ / kartumatrāpi śakyāste narecchāmātrasambhavāt // | And those Vedic properties like accents are well-known to exist in śruti texts; they can be produced here too, since they arise from mere human will. |
idam iti nimittākhyaṃ śākhāntaram / | "This" [refers to] the recension called Nimitta. |
tadatretyādinā pratividhatte // nanvityādinā parasyottaramāṅkate / | With [the phrase] "tadatra" etc., [the text] provides the response. With [the word] "nanu" etc., it presents the opponent's reply. |
nanu naivaṃ pa{tatpa---}ro nityaḥ śakyo labdhumihāgamaḥ / nityaścedarthavādatvaṃ tatpare syād anityatā // | "Indeed, no eternal scriptural text supporting this can be found here; if [it were] eternal, it would be mere praise, and if [it] referred to a person, it would be non-eternal." |
evaṃ pa{etatpa---}ra iti / sarvajñapratipādanaparaḥ / | "[He says] 'to this effect', [meaning] focused on establishing [the existence of] the Omniscient One." |
kathaṃ na śakyo labdhumityāha nityaścetyādi / | "[Someone] asks: 'Why can it not be obtained?' [and he] states 'it is eternal' etc." |
yadyasau sarvajñapratipādanapara āgamo nityaḥ syāt tadā niyamenārthavādatvam anyārthatvam asya draṣṭavyam / | "If this scripture that is focused on establishing [the existence of] the Omniscient One were eternal, then it would necessarily have to be seen as having the nature of arthavāda [mere praise] and having a different meaning." |
athārthavādatvaṃ tasya neṣyate tadā niyamād anityatvam asyāpadyeta // | "If its nature as arthavāda is not accepted, then necessarily its non-eternality would follow." |
kasmāt punar nityatve satyarthavādatvamāpadyata ity āha āgamasya cetyādi / āgamasya ca nityatve si{ddhe ta}tkalpanā vṛthā / | "[Someone] asks: 'Why again, if it is eternal, must it have the nature of arthavāda?' [and he] states 'and of scripture' etc. [meaning] 'When the eternality of scripture is established, that assumption is futile.'" |
tat kalpaneti sarvajñakalpanā / | "'That assumption' [means] the assumption of [the existence of] the Omniscient One." |
kimiti vṛthetyāha yata ityādi / tata iti nityādāgamāt // | "[Someone] asks: 'Why futile?' [and he] states 'because' etc. 'From that' [means] from the eternal scripture." |
kintvetasya prasiddhasya prāmāṇyopagame sati / | "But when the validity of this well-known [scripture] is accepted..." |
yadyapyayamṛgādivedaḥ / svarūpato 'tiprasiddhaḥ tathāpyasya nityatvam asiddham / | "Although this Ṛgveda and other [Vedas] are very well-known in their essential nature, nevertheless their eternality is not established." |
katham ity āha yaditi / | "[Someone] asks 'How?' [and he] states 'because' etc." |
yasmād arthe / | 'yat' [in the text] stands for 'yasmāt' [meaning] "because" |
yat prayatnānantarajñānaṃ kramajñānaphalaṃ vā tadanityaṃ yathā ghaṭādi tathā ca veda iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | That cognition which follows effort, or which produces successive cognitions, is non-eternal—just as [in the case of] a jar and other [things]; and so is the Veda; thus [this is] a svabhāvahetu [natural reason]. |
asya ca śrutiparīkṣāyām asiddhatādi vistareṇa nirastam iti nātrābhidhīyate / | The [possible] charges of inadmissibility and other [faults] against this [reason] have been extensively refuted in the examination of śruti, hence they are not stated here. |
etasyeti vedasya // | [The word] "etasya" [refers to] the Veda. |
anyathāśrutyanuktatvaṃ saṃdigdhaṃ tasya te bhavet // | [If it were] otherwise, your [claim about] its non-mention in śruti would become doubtful. |
anyatheti yadyavedatvamasya na jñāpyate tadā yattvayā śrutau vede anuktatvaṃ tasya sarvajñasyoktaṃ tat sandigdhāsiddhaṃ bhavet // | "Otherwise" means: if you do not establish its non-Vedic nature, then what you have stated about the omniscient one's non-mention in śruti would become doubtful and thus inadmissible [as a reason]. |
yaccoktaṃ tat pare syād anityatetyatrāha nityatvaṃ cāstvityādi / | As for what was said about [the text] possibly referring to another [person and thus being] non-eternal, the response is given [in verse 3522]. |
kasmād iti pṛṣṭaḥ sanpara āha nāśyarthasaṅgater iti / nāśinārthena saṅgateḥ sambandhāt kāraṇād anityatvaṃ prāpnoti // yadyevam ityādinā naikāntikatvam udbhāvayati / | When asked "why?", the opponent says "because of connection with perishable meaning"—[meaning] it becomes non-eternal because of its connection with perishable meaning. The [subsequent verse] beginning with "if this were so" points out the inconclusiveness [of this argument]. |
ājyam ghṛtam / | ājya means clarified butter |
nīvāro vrīhiviśeṣaḥ / | nīvāra means a particular kind of rice |
cāmīkarajaṭaḥ agniḥ / | "Cāmīkarajaṭa" is [the deity of] Fire. |
teneti vedena // | [This is known] "by tena" [i.e.] through the Veda. |
jātirityādinā parasyottaramāśaṅkate | Through [the statement beginning with] "jāti", [the text] anticipates the opponent's reply. |
tanmātravacane vāco nacājyādau matir bhavet // tasyāpi vacane vāco nityatā kiṃ na hīyate / | "When only that [universal] is expressed by words, why should there not be understanding in the case of clarified butter and other [things]? And when that too is expressed by words, why should permanence not be established?" |
tadetad asamyak / | This [argument] is incorrect. |
sāmānyaparīkṣāyāṃ jāter vistareṇa nirākṛtatvāt / | Because the [concept of] universal has been refuted in detail in the examination of universals. |
bhavatu vā jātis tathāpyājyādiśabdājjātimātrābhidhāyino vyaktau pratyayo na prāpnoti / | Even if the universal exists, since the word 'clarified butter' and similar [words] denote only the universal, cognition of the particular would not arise. |
tataś ca vyaktisādhyārthino jātyabhidhānamanarthakam eva syāt / | And consequently, for one who seeks to accomplish something achievable [only] through the particular, the expression of the universal would be entirely purposeless. |
nāntarīyakatayā vyaktiḥ pratīyata iti cet na / | If [you say] that "the particular is cognized because of [its] inseparability [from the universal]" - no. |
pratītiviprakarṣābhāvāt / | Because there is no remoteness in [such] cognition. |
nahi śabdādanantaraṃ jātau prathamataram upajāyate matiḥ paścānnāntarīyakatayā vyaktipratītiḥ | It is not [the case] that after a word [is uttered], first a cognition arises regarding the universal and then necessarily follows the cognition of the particular. |
kiṃ tarhi avyavadhānenaivārthakriyākāripadārthādhyavasāyo loke śabdād udeti | Rather, in ordinary experience, the determination of the practically effective thing [i.e., the particular] arises from the word directly. |
tat pratipipādayiṣayaiva ca śabdaṃ prayuṅkte | And [people] use the word with the very intention of conveying that [particular thing]. |
ato na yuktaṃ vaktuṃ na vyaktipratyayaḥ śabdād iti | Therefore it is not right to say that "the cognition of the particular does not arise from the word." |
yadi ca jātim eva śabdo 'bhidadhīta na vyaktim / tathā balīvardadohacodanāvadasambandhābhidhāyitvam avagamya prekṣāvannaiva vyaktau śabdāt pravarteta | If the word were to denote only the universal and not the particular, then a rational person, understanding that [such a word] expresses something unconnected [with action], would not be prompted to activity by the word regarding particulars, just like [in the case of] an injunction to milk a bull. |
atha mābhūd eṣa doṣaprasaṅga iti tasyābhivyaktirūpasyābhidhānam aṅgīkriyate tadā nityatāhānirvedasya kathaṃ na prasajyate | If, [thinking] "let this fault not arise," the denotation of that [universal] in its manifested form is accepted, then how would the loss of the Veda's eternality not follow? |
kiñca bhavatu nāma mukhyato jātyabhidhānaṃ śabdānāṃ nāntarīyakaṃ tadvyaktyabhidhānam | Moreover, let it be granted that words primarily denote universals [and] necessarily denote their particulars. |
ekasminnapi hi sarvajñe 'vasthābhedaparikalpitanānātvena jātiśabdavācyatvam upapadyate kiṃ punar aparimitānādisarvajñaparamparāsu | For even in [the case of] a single omniscient one, being denoted by a universal term is possible through multiplicity conceived through different states, what to speak of [the case of] endless series of omniscient ones. |
tadā ca vedavākyānāṃ svātantryeṇārthaniścayaḥ | Then, the meaning of Vedic statements [could] not be determined independently. |
vedāt svataḥ parasmāc ca mohādivivaśātmanaḥ | [Neither] from the Veda, from oneself, nor from another whose self is under the influence of delusion and other [afflictions]. |
tenāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma iti śruteḥ / jinaḥ sarvajña ityevaṃ nārtha ityatra kā pramā | Therefore, what proof is there that the meaning of the Vedic text "One desiring heaven should offer the Agnihotra" is not "Jina is omniscient"? |
vedavākyānāṃ hi nityatayā svātantrye sati na tato vedārthaniścayo jāyate nahyayaṃ vedaḥ ayaṃ mamārtho nānya ityevaṃ virauti / | [Even] if the words of the Veda are independent due to [their] eternality, their meaning cannot be ascertained from them, for this Veda does not proclaim "this is my meaning, not another." |
nāpi pratipattuḥ svataḥ svātmanaḥ parasmād vā vyākhyāturarthaniścayo bhavati sarveṣām eva bhavan matyā mohādibhir viplutatvāt / | Nor can the meaning be ascertained by the learner himself, or from another [person] as an expounder, since all these [persons], according to you, are afflicted by delusion and other [defects]. |
tenāgnihotrādivākyād bhagavān sarvajña ityayam apyarthaḥ sambhāvyata eva / | Therefore, from the words concerning the Agnihotra and so forth, even the meaning "the Blessed Lord is omniscient" could be possible. |
ko prameti naiva kācit // | [There would be] no certainty whatsoever. |
svargāpavargamātrasya vispaṣṭamupadeśataḥ / pradhānārthaparijñānāt sarvajña iti gamyate // | [That one is] "omniscient" is understood from [his] clear teaching about heaven and liberation alone, [and] from [his] complete knowledge of the principal matters. |
samudrasikatāsaṅkhyāvijñānaṃ kvopayujyate / tasyāsmākam ato 'nyārthajñānasaṃvedanena kim // | Of what use is the knowledge of counting the ocean's sand? What use do we have for knowledge of other things beyond that? |
yaccoktam ---{gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaṃ iti, tatrāha} gauṇatvenetyādi / | As for what was said [earlier] about "it must be spoken of figuratively," the response to that follows. |
gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaḥ so 'pi mantrārthavādavit / ityayaṃ niyamaḥ siddhyet sarvajñe tu nirākṛte // | This rule that "he too must be spoken of figuratively, like [one who] knows mantras and arthavādas" would be established only if [the existence of] the omniscient one were disproven. |
pūrvoktabādhakāyoge sādhite tu savistaram / | But [his existence] has been proven in detail through the absence of the previously mentioned contradictions. |
yadi hi pramāṇena sarvajño nirastaḥ syāt tadānyathānupapattyā gauṇārthatvam asya niyataṃ syāt nānyathā mukhyārthatvasyāpi sambhāvyamānatvāt / | If the omniscient one had been disproven by valid means, then due to the impossibility of any other [explanation], its figurative meaning would be certain - but not otherwise, since the primary meaning is also possible. |
naca nityasya vacaso 'rthavādatvaṃ yuktam anyābhiprāyadeśanā hyarthavādaḥ na cābhiprāyarahite vacasi vivakṣāmantareṇa sā yuktā // | It cannot be right to regard the eternal Word as mere arthavāda, because an arthavāda [statement] is [only valid] when some other meaning is intended; and in speech devoid of [such] intention, without a speaker desiring to express [something else], that [classification as arthavāda] is not possible. |
yadvā prakṛtadharmādijñānādityādāvāha dharmādītyādi / | Or else, [if] one speaks about knowledge of dharma and so forth being primary, [one says] "dharma and so forth." |
dharmādigocarajñānamātrāpratighatā yadi / saphalā varṇyate vyaktaṃ tadā buddhair jitaṃ jagat // | If unimpeded knowledge merely concerning dharma and similar [matters] is described as successful, then clearly the world has been won by the Buddhas. |
kathaṃ jitam ity āha yasmād ityādi / yasmād abhyudaye mokṣe sahaitaiḥ sādhitaṃ puraḥ / | [One] asks "How has it been won?" [The answer is] "because" and so forth: "Because previously [this] was established together with these [arguments] regarding prosperity and liberation." |
pūrvaṃ hi bhagavato niḥśreyasajñānamapratighaṃ prasādhitamityato bhagavata evāvaiṇikamasādhāraṇaṃ dharmādijñānam iti svavācaiva sarvajño nā{a---}bhyupetaḥ syāt // | For previously the Lord's unimpeded knowledge of the highest good was established, therefore [his] extraordinary and unique knowledge of dharma and so forth [belongs] to the Lord alone - thus by [the opponent's] own words, [the Lord] would be accepted as omniscient. |
yaccoktam yadvātmanyeva vijñānam iti, tatrāpi bhagavatyeva tathāvidhajñānasambhavān na kiñcid aniṣṭamāpāditam ityādarśayann āha yaccātmanyevetyādi / | And regarding what was said "Or knowledge of self alone," even in that case, because such knowledge is possible in the Lord alone, nothing undesirable is established - showing this, [he] says "And what [was said about] self alone" and so forth. |
tasyāpyapratighātitvaṃ teṣāṃ pūrvaṃ prasādhitam // | The unimpeded nature of that [self-knowledge] also was previously established for them. |
tasyāpīti / ātmajñānasya / | "Of that also" [means] "of self-knowledge." |
buddhānāṃ bhagavatām / | "Of them" [means] "of the revered Buddhas." |
pūrvam iti | "Already" [as discussed] under [text verse] 3434. |
etad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadviśuddhātmadarśanam / āgantukamalopetacittamātratvavedanāt // | That alone is [true] knowledge of the self which consists in the perception of the pure self, since [therein] is only the cognition of pure consciousness freed from adventitious impurities. |
avedyavedakākārā buddhiḥ pūrvaṃ prasādhitā / | It has been established previously that cognition is devoid of the forms of the knowable and the knower; |
dvayopaplavaśūnyā ca sā sambuddhaiḥ prakāśitā // | and this [cognition], free from the two delusions, has been expounded by the Perfectly Enlightened Ones. |
saṃsārānucitajñānās tena siddhā mahādhiyaḥ / yadādhipatyabhāvinyo bhāsante 'dyāpi deśanāḥ // | Thus are proven [to have been] those of great intellect whose knowledge was not conducive to saṃsāra, [and] under whose authority the teachings shine forth even today. |
pūrvam iti bahirarthaparīkṣāyām / | "Before" [refers to what was discussed] in the examination of external objects. |
saṃsārānucitamananukūlaṃ jñānaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ // kāḥ punas tāstadādhipatyabhāvinyo deśanāḥ śūyanta ity āha prakṛtyā bhāsvara ityādi / | Those whose knowledge is not conducive to [and not favorable to] saṃsāra are spoken of thus. [When asked:] "What are those teachings that were promulgated under their authority?" [the answer follows with] "naturally luminous" etc. |
dvayanairātmyabodhe ca stryādisaṅkalpabhāvinaḥ / rāgadveṣādayo doṣāḥ saṃkṣīyante 'prayatnataḥ // | And when there is understanding of the selflessness of both [subject and object], the defects such as attachment and aversion, which arise from thoughts about women and so forth, disappear without effort. |
idaṃ tatparamaṃ tattvaṃ tattvavādī jagāda yat / sarvasampatpradaṃ caiva keśavāder agocaraḥ // | This is that supreme truth which the teacher of reality proclaimed, which bestows all prosperity and which is beyond the reach of Keśava and others. |
dvayākārāvimūḍhātmeti prahīṇagrāhyagrāhakābhiniveśaḥ / | [One] whose mind is not deluded by duality [means one] who has abandoned the obsession with [the duality of] apprehender and apprehended. |
dvayanairātmyabodha iti pudgaladharmanairātmyabodhe / yadvā dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ca tasya nairātmyaṃ naiḥsvābhāvyam iti vigrahaḥ / | [This refers to] the understanding of the non-self nature of the two, [namely] the understanding that persons and phenomena lack self-nature; or alternatively, the analysis is that "the two" means the apprehended and apprehender, and their "non-self nature" means their lack of inherent existence. |
keśavāder agocara iti keśavo hariḥ ādiśabdeneśvarādiparigrahaḥ // | "Beyond the reach of Keśava and others" [means that] Keśava [refers to] Hari [i.e., Viṣṇu], and by the word "and others" Īśvara and the rest are included. |
atha keśavāder api viśuddhamātmadarśanaṃ kasmānneṣyata ity āha jñāyate hītyādi / | [If one asks:] "Why is not the perception of the self by Keśava and others also considered pure?" [The answer] is stated [in the following verses] beginning with "jñāyate hi." |
jñāyate hi sthirātmānyaiḥ śuddhasphaṭikasannibhaḥ / | For others [like Keśava] cognize the self as permanent, resembling pure crystal; |
sa ca teṣāṃ viparyāso nityātmapratiṣedhanāt // | and this is their error, because [the existence of] a permanent self has been refuted. |
ātmagrāhi ca vijñānamātmano yadi jāyate / tataḥ sarvātmavijñānaṃ yugapat samprasajyate // | If cognition grasping the self arises from the self, then cognition of all selves would necessarily occur simultaneously. |
atha tasmān na jāyeta nityaṃ vābhyupagamyate / tadā tadviṣayaṃ na syāt puruṣāntaracittavat // | If it does not arise from that [self], or if it is accepted as permanent, then it could not have that [self] as its object, like the thoughts of other persons. |
anyair iti keśavādibhiḥ / | "By others" [means] by Keśava and others. |
ātmaparīkṣāyām ātmano nirastatvāt tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ viparyastatvād aviśuddham / | Because the existence of the self has been rejected in the examination of the self, any cognition having it as its object is impure due to being erroneous. |
kiñca yadetannityātmaviṣayaṃ teṣāṃ jñānam upavarṇyate tat kiṃ tata ātmano jāyate āhosvinneti pakṣadvayam | Furthermore, regarding the knowledge of these [people] concerning the eternal Self that is described - does it arise from that Self or not? These are the two alternatives. |
tatra prathame pakṣe yugapad aśeṣaṃ tadviṣayaṃ jñānamavikalakāraṇatayā jāyeta | In the first case, all knowledge concerning that [Self] would arise simultaneously due to [having] an unimpaired cause. |
atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tatrāpi tannityaṃ vā syād anityaṃ vā | Then in the second case too, would that [knowledge] be eternal or non-eternal? |
yaccoktam etad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadviśuddhātmadarśanam iti tatrāha grāhyetyādi | Regarding what was said - namely that "this knowledge consists in the vision of the pure Self" - on this [point] he states [the verse beginning with] "grāhya" etc. |
grāhyalakṣaṇavaidhuryād vistareṇa ca sādhitāt | Because of [its] lacking the characteristics of what is cognizable, as has been proved at length. |
naitad eva hi tajjñānaṃ yadi śuddhātmadarśanam | If [you say] this knowledge consists merely in the vision of the pure Self, [that is not correct]. |
athāpi jñānarūpatvam ātmano 'bhyupagamyate dṛśyadarśananānātvabhāvānnaivam api grahaḥ | And if the Self is accepted to be of the nature of consciousness, [there can be] no apprehension [of it] thus either, due to there being no difference between the seen and the seeing. |
svayamprakāśarūpatvaṃ tajjñānasyeṣyate yadi svasaṃvittis tadā prāptā pratyakṣā ca matir bhavet | If that knowledge is accepted to be of self-illuminating nature, then self-awareness would follow and cognition would become perceptible. |
yadi tāvad ātmā jaḍarūpo 'bhyupagamyate tadā tadviṣayaṃ jñānamaviśuddham eva prakṛtyā sarvajñānānāṃ grāhyagrāhyakavaidhuryasya bahir arthaparīkṣāyāṃ prasādhitatvāt | If first the Self is accepted to be of unconscious nature, then knowledge concerning it must be impure by nature, since the lack of apprehender and apprehended in all cognitions has been established in the examination of external objects. |
atha cidrūpa ātmeti pakṣas tadāpi dṛśyadarśanayor abhedād grāhyagrāhakabhāvānupapattes tadviṣayaṃ jñānam iti na syāt bhede hi viṣayaviṣayiṇor viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ syāt | If on the other hand the position is that the Self is of the nature of consciousness, then even in that case, due to non-difference between the seen and seeing, and the impossibility of the relation between apprehender and apprehended, there could not be knowledge concerning it, for [only] in difference could there be a subject-object relation between subject and object. |
atha pradīpavat prakāśatayātmaviṣayatvamasyābhyupagamyate tadā svasaṃvitter anabhimatāyāḥ prasaṅgaḥ syāt jñānasya cāpratyakṣatvam iṣṭaṃ vyāhanyeta | If then it is accepted that, like a lamp, it has the Self as its object through [its] luminosity, then the undesired consequence of self-awareness would follow and the accepted imperceptibility of cognition would be contradicted. |
taddarśayati pratyakṣā ca matir bhaved iti | This is what he shows by [saying] "and cognition would become perceptible." |
Subsets and Splits