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evam anantaroktena nyāyena yadā sarveṣām eva pramāṇānāṃ na svata eva prāmāṇyam iti sthitam | When it is established by the reasoning stated just before that the validity of all means of valid cognition is indeed not inherent |
ato 'yatnenaivātīndriyārthadarśī puruṣaḥ siddha iti na tat siddhaye pṛthakprayatnāntaramāsthīyate | Therefore, a person who sees supersensible objects is established without effort, [and] no separate additional effort is required for establishing that. |
vedasyāpi pramāṇatvaṃ yasmāt puruṣataḥ sthitam | Since the validity of the Veda too is established from a person |
tasya cātīndriyajñatve tatas tasmin pramāṇatā | And when that [person] has supersensible knowledge, from that [follows] the validity in that [Veda]. |
anyathājñānasaṃdehaviparyāsānuṣaṅgiṇi | [When] otherwise [it would be] connected with ignorance, doubt and error |
puṃsi kartari naivāsya prāmāṇyaṃ syāt tadanyavat | In [the case of] a person [who is] an agent, there would be no validity of this [Veda], like other [texts]. |
svargayāgādisambandho jñātvā tadyena bhāṣitaḥ | [The one] by whom the connection between heaven and sacrifice etc. has been stated after knowing it |
tasya ceti / puruṣasya / tata iti / puruṣāt kartuḥ | "Of that" [means] "of the person"; "from that" [means] "from the person [who is] the agent" |
tasminniti / vede / pramāṇatetyetadapekṣādhikaraṇasaptamī | "In that" [means] "in the Veda"; [this is] the locative case in relation to "validity" |
etac ca paramatāpekṣayābhihitam / | This has been stated with reference to other doctrinal views. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi bhavadbhir avaśyaṃ vedasya prāmāṇyam abhyupeyate tadāsya puruṣādiva kartuḥ prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam, na svata iti, etac ca pūrvaṃ pratipāditam / | This means: if you necessarily accept the validity of the Veda, then its validity, like [that] of a human author, is reasonable [to come] from its author, not [to exist] inherently - and this has been established before. |
sa ca vedasya kartā yadyatīndriyadṛgbhavati tadāsya tataḥ kartur api pramāṇatā yuktā, anyathā hi viparītasaṃśayajñānādiyukte kartari satyunmattādivākyavad vedo 'pramāṇatāmevāśnuvīta / | And if that author of the Veda has supernatural perception, then its validity from that author is also reasonable - otherwise, if the author were afflicted with wrong or doubtful knowledge etc., the Veda would attain invalidity just like the words of madmen etc. |
tasmād yo 'sau vedakartā pūrvaṃ śrutiparīkṣāyāṃ prasādhitaḥ parair api mīmāṃsakair atīndriyārthadarśī sāmarthyād aṅgīkartavya iti tat pratikṣepo na kāryaḥ / | Therefore, that author of the Veda who was established earlier in the examination of śruti, [who] must necessarily be accepted as a seer of supersensible objects even by other Mīmāṃsakas - the rejection of that [author] should not be done. |
pramāṇayanti cātra / | And [the authorities] validate [this] here. |
yaḥ pramāṇapañcakavirahasvabhāvābhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahaḥ sa viduṣāmabhāvavyavahāragocaratām evāvatarati, yathā gagananalinam abhāvapramāṇaviṣayīkṛtavigrahaś ca sarvadarśī puruṣa iti svabhavahetuḥ / | That which has a form that is the object of non-existence proof characterized by the natural absence of the five means of valid cognition, that enters only into the domain of negative usage by the wise, just as a sky-lotus and an omniscient person [whose] form is the object of non-existence proof - this is an argument from essential nature. |
vyavahārayogyatāyāḥ sādhyatvāt / | Because fitness for practical usage is what is to be proved. |
abhāvastvabhāvapramāṇata eva siddhaḥ // | Non-existence is established only through the proof of non-existence. |
nanu caitāvadeva sarvaṃ prameyaṃ vastu yaduta pañcaviṣayā rūpādayaḥ tāṃś ca jānanto narā loke 'tipratītā eveti / | [One might object:] "Is not all that is knowable just these five sense objects like form etc., and people who know them are indeed very well-known in the world?" |
tataś ca pratītibādhā pratijñāyā ityetadāśaṅkyāha dharmajñatvaniṣedha ityādi / | Having anticipated this objection that "therefore there is contradiction with [common] experience of the proposition," [the author] states "the denial of knowledge of dharma" etc. |
dharmajñatvaniṣedhaścet kevalo 'tropayujyate / | If only the denial of [the ability to] know dharma is relevant here, |
sarvamanyadvijānānaḥ puruṣaḥ kena vāryate // | who can prevent a person from knowing everything else? |
sarvaśabdaśca sarvatra prakṛtāpekṣa iṣyate / | The word "sarva" [all] is always understood with reference to the context, |
tataḥ prakṛtasarvajñe sati kiṃ no 'vahīyate // | therefore what is lost [by us] if there exists [someone] omniscient regarding the matter at hand? |
sarvaśabdaścetyādi tatra yaḥ sarvaśabdajñaḥ sa sarvajño 'stu nāmataḥ // | [Regarding the phrase] "sarvaśabda", let one who knows all words be called omniscient in name only. |
tena sarveṇa sarvajñas tathāpyastu na vāryate // | Let [such a person] still be [called] omniscient in that [limited] sense - [it] is not prevented. |
kiñca sāmānyākārataḥ viśvasya jagataḥ saṅkṣepaparijñānād vā sarvajña iṣṭaḥ, āhosvid viśeṣākāreṇa vistaraparijñānāt, tatrādye pakṣe siddhasādhyateti darśayati bhāvābhāvetyādi / | Furthermore, is one considered omniscient due to [having] a general knowledge of the universe in summary form, or due to [having] detailed knowledge in specific form? Regarding the first alternative, [the author] shows that it would prove what is [already] proven, [starting with the verse] beginning with "bhāvābhāva-". |
bhāvābhāvasvarūpaṃ vā jagatsarvaṃ yadocyate / | When the entire world is described as having the nature of existence and non-existence, |
tat saṃkṣepeṇa sarvajñaḥ puruṣaḥ kena neṣyate // | who would not accept that a person [knowing it] in this summary form is omniscient? |
evaṃ jñeyaprameyatvasaṃkṣepeṇāpi sarvatām / āśritya yadi sarvajñaḥ kastaṃ vārayituṃ kṣamaḥ // | Thus, if [someone] is [considered] omniscient based on [knowing] the totality [of things] even in summary form as knowable and cognizable, who would be able to deny that? |
sarvam eva hi jagaditaretarābhāvādisvabhāvatvād abhāvasvabhāvaṃ, vidhirūpatayā vyavasthitatvāt bhāvasvabhavam iti yadetad asmābhir bhābhāvābhāvasvabhāvatvaṃ sarvajagadvyāpī sāmānyadharmo varṇitaḥ, tena rūpeṇa sarvajagatparijñānād yadi sarvajñaḥ prasādhyate, tathāpīṣṭameva, na hyetāvatā dharmajñatvaṃ prasiddhyati kasyacit / | Indeed, the entire world has a negative nature due to having the nature of mutual exclusion etc., and a positive nature due to being established in affirmative form - thus this universal characteristic pervading the entire world has been described by us as having the nature of both existence and non-existence; if omniscience is sought to be proved through knowledge of the entire world in this form, even that is acceptable [to us], for knowledge of dharma is not established for anyone merely by this much. |
tadeva bhāvābhāvarūpatvaṃ jagataḥ saṅkṣepaḥ, saṅkṣipyate 'neneti kṛtvā / | This very nature of being positive and negative is the epitome of the world, because it is through this that [the world] is epitomized. |
evaṃ prameyatvādibhiḥ sāmānyadharmaiḥ parijñāne 'pi siddhasādhyatā // | Similarly, even in the case of knowledge through universal characteristics such as cognizability etc., it would prove what is [already] proven. |
padārthā yaiś ca yāvantaḥ sarvatvenāvadhāritāḥ / tajjñatvenāpi sarvajñāḥ sarve tadgranthavedinaḥ // | All those who know the entities that have been determined as constituting everything by certain [thinkers], and [even] those who [merely] know the texts [written] by them, would [then] be omniscient. |
athāpi syād yaiḥ svasmin svasmin śāstre yāvantaḥ padārthāḥ sarvatvenāvadhārya nirdiṣṭāḥ yathā bauddhaiḥ pañca skandhāḥ, vaiśeṣikaiḥ ṣaṭ padārthāḥ, naiyāyikaiḥ pramāṇaprameyādayaḥ ṣoḍaśa, sāṅkhyaiḥ prakṛtimahadādayaḥ pañcaviṃśatirityevamādi, tat parijñānāt sarvavit prasādhyata iti / | It might be argued that [one becomes] omniscient through knowing all the entities that have been determined and specified as constituting everything in their respective systems - such as the five aggregates by the Buddhists, the six categories by the Vaiśeṣikas, the sixteen [categories] including means of knowledge and objects of knowledge by the Naiyāyikas, and the twenty-five principles including prakṛti and mahat by the Sāṃkhyas, and so forth. |
evaṃ satyatiprasaṅgaḥ, tadgranthārthavedino 'nye ye 'dhyetāraḥ te sarvajñāḥ prāpnuvanti // | If this were so, it would lead to an absurd consequence: other students who [merely] understand the meaning of their texts would [also] become omniscient. |
tathā ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇair yaḥ ṣaḍprameyavivekavān / | [A person] who has discriminative knowledge of the six prameyas through the six pramāṇas, |
so 'pi saṃkṣiptasarvajñaḥ kasya nāma na saṃmataḥ // | who indeed would not accept such a person as omniscient in a condensed form? |
athāpi syādyo hi pratyakṣānumānaśabdopamānārthāpattyabhāvākhyaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇair yathāsvameṣāṃ viṣayaṣaṭkaṃ vivekena parijānāti sa sarvajña iti, atrāpi siddhasādhyatā / | If one might say that "one who cognizes through discrimination the six respective objects through the six pramāṇas known as perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption and non-apprehension is omniscient" - [we reply that] this too amounts to proving what is already established. |
tathā hi pratyakṣaṃ rūpādiviṣayapañcakaniyatatvān na dharmādharmaviṣayam / | For perception, being restricted to the five objects beginning with form, cannot have dharma and adharma as its objects. |
anumānam api pratyakṣagṛhītaliṅgasambandhaliṅgiviṣayatvān na tadviṣayam, dharmāder atīndriyatvena kenacit sambandhasya gṛhītumaśakyatvāt / | Inference too, since it envisages an inferential subject related to a mark grasped through perception, cannot have those [dharma and adharma] as its objects, because due to dharma etc. being beyond the senses, no relation [of these] with anything can be grasped. |
śābdaṃ yadyapi sarvaṃ parokṣāviṣayaṃ, tathāpi na tena jñānenātīndriyārthadarśīṃ bhavitum arhati, tasya jñānasya parokṣārthaviṣayatvenāpratyakṣatvāt / | Although verbal testimony pertains entirely to imperceptible objects, nevertheless one cannot become a perceiver of supersensible objects through that knowledge, because that knowledge, having imperceptible objects as its domain, is not perceptual. |
nācāpratyakṣajñānāt saṅgī puruṣaḥ sākṣād darśī yujyate / | And a person attached to non-perceptual knowledge cannot reasonably be a direct perceiver [of supersensible objects]. |
upamānam api sādṛśyatadupādhiviṣayatvān na dharmādharmādiviṣayam, yathoktam | Analogy too, because it has similarity and its adjuncts as its objects, cannot have dharma, adharma etc. as its objects, as has been said: |
"tasmād yat smaryate tasyāt sādṛśyena viśeṣitam / | "Therefore, what is remembered would be qualified by similarity, |
prameyamupamānasya sādṛśyaṃ vā tadāśritam // | or [the object] of analogical cognition would be similarity as dependent on that [remembered thing]." |
arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaśrutārthānyathānupapattiparikalpyārthāntaraviṣayā, nāsau dharmādigocarā, nahi kaścid dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'sti yo dharmādinā vinā nopapannaḥ | Presumption [arthāpatti] envisages only an alternate thing that must be presumed [to exist] because something seen or heard would be inexplicable without it; it cannot apply to dharma and other [such things], since there is nothing seen or heard that would be inexplicable without dharma and such [entities]. |
bhavatu vā dharmādiviṣayatvam arthāpatteḥ, tathāpi tasyā apratyakṣasvabhāvatvān na tatsaṅgī dharmādisākṣād darśī siddhyati | Even if presumption could apply to dharma and other [such things], still, due to its non-perceptual nature, one who relies on it cannot be established as directly perceiving dharma and other [such things]. |
abhāvasya tu prameyābhāvaviṣayatvād evāyuktaṃ dharmādiviṣayatvam | As for non-apprehension [abhāva], since it pertains only to the absence of cognizable things, its application to dharma and other [such things] is inappropriate. |
evaṃ tāvat saṅkṣiptasarvajñaprasādhane siddhasādhyateti pratipāditam | Thus far it has been explained that [there is] redundancy in proving [the existence of] an omniscient being in brief form. |
idānīṃ vistareṇāśeṣajagat parijñānāt sarvajñatvasādhane doṣam āha viśeṣeṇetyādi | Now [the text] states the fault in proving omniscience through detailed knowledge of the entire world, [beginning with] "viśeṣeṇa" etc. |
viśeṣeṇa tu sarvārthasākṣāt pratyakṣadarśinam / yaḥ kalpayati tasyāsau mudhā mithyā ca kalpanā | For one who postulates [the existence of] a direct perceiver of all things in detail, that postulation is both futile and false. |
mudheti niṣphalā puruṣārthasiddhāvanupayogāt | "Futile" means unproductive, because it is not useful for achieving human purposes. |
mithyeti asambhāvanīyārthaviṣayatvād vitathā | "False" means untrue, because it pertains to something impossible. |
ekasyaiva śarīrasya yāvantaḥ paramāṇavaḥ / keśaromāṇi yāvanti kastāni jñātumarhati | Who could know [all] the atoms that are in even a single body, [or] how many hairs and body-hairs there are? |
ekaśarīrāntargatāśeṣaparamāṇupravibhāgaparijñānam eva tāvat khalu puṃsāmasambhāvyam kimutāśeṣajagadgatasūkṣmādiviśeṣaparijñānaṃ bhaviṣyati | Indeed, it is impossible for humans to know the detailed division of all atoms contained within even a single body - what then of knowing all the minute details contained in the entire universe? |
mudhātvaṃ kalpanāyā darśayann āha samastāvayavetyādi | Showing the futility of [such] postulation, [the text] states "samastāvayava" etc. |
avayavāś ca pāṇyādayaḥ, vyaktayaś ca dhavakhadirapalāśādaya ityavayavavyaktayaḥ, samastāś ca tā avayavavyaktayaśceti vigrahaḥ, tāsāmaṇukeśapatrādilakṣaṇaṃ vistaraṃ jānātīti tathoktam | [The compound can be analyzed as follows:] "components" [means] hands and feet etc.; "individuals" [means] particular trees such as dhava, khadira, palāśa etc.; "samasta" etc. [means] all those components and individuals; [one who] knows their details characterized by atoms, hairs, leaves etc. is described thus. |
kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam iti kartari lyuṭ | The suffix lyuṭ [in jñāna] denotes the agent, according to the rule "kṛtyalyuṭo bahulam" |
tasya sādhanaṃ pratipāditam | [Any] proof of that [omniscient person] has [thus] been refuted |
tadanarthakam asambhavitvena dharmādharmāviṣayatvena tu puruṣārthaṃ pratyanupayogitvād iti bhāvaḥ | That [proof] is purposeless because, being impossible and not having dharma and adharma as [its] objects, it has no utility with respect to human purposes - this is the meaning |
etad eva dṛṣṭāntenopapādayann āha yathetyādi | [The author], establishing this very [point] through an example, speaks [beginning with] "yathā" |
yathā ca cakṣuṣā sarvān bhāvān vettīti niṣphalam / sarvapratyakṣadarśitvapratijñāpyaphalā tathā | Just as the claim "one knows all things with [one's] eyes" is futile, so too is the proposition about the existence of one who perceives all things directly |
etena siddhasādhyatvaṃ pratītibādhitatvaṃ ca pratijñāyā yathāyogamuktaṃ bhavati | By this, both the superfluity and the contradiction to common experience of the proposition have been stated as appropriate |
yatra tu vivādo yat sādhane ca puruṣārthopayogitvaṃ taddarśayati svadharmetyādi | [The author] shows where there is dispute and what utility for human purposes [lies] in proving [something], [beginning with] "svadharma" etc. |
svadharmādharmamātrajñasādhanapratiṣedhayoḥ / tat praṇītāgamagrāhyaheyatve hi prasiddhyataḥ | Through proving or refuting [the existence of] one who knows only [his] own dharma and adharma, the acceptability or rejectability of the scripture composed by him becomes established |
tatra sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñatvaprasādhane / asthāne kliśyate lokaḥ saṃrambhād granthavādayoḥ | Therefore, in attempting to prove [the existence of] one who knows all subtle distinctions in the entire world, people unnecessarily trouble themselves through eagerness for composing treatises and [engaging in] debates |
svakīyaścāsau dharmādharmamātrajñaśceti tathoktaḥ, tasya sādhanapratiṣedhāv iti vigrahaḥ / | [This refers to] one's own [teacher] who is cognizant only of dharma and adharma, as stated thus; [and] this is the analysis of [the compound referring to] the proving and refuting of him. |
tat praṇītasyāgamasya grāhyatvaheyatve hi prasiddhyata iti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ / | The acceptability or rejectability of the scripture composed by him becomes established accordingly - this is the [proper] connection. |
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadi sādhanavādī svakīyaśāstāraṃ dharmādharmajñaṃ sādhayati tadā tasya sādhane kṛte sati tat praṇītāgamasya grāhyatā siddhyati / | This means that if the proponent establishes [the existence of] his own teacher who knows dharma and adharma, then when this proof is accomplished, the acceptability of the scripture composed by him becomes established. |
dūṣaṇavādī ca yadi parābhyupagataṃ svadharmādharmamātrajñaṃ pratiṣedhati tadā tasya niṣedhe kṛte sati dūṣitadharmādharmajñapraṇītasyāgamasya heyatvaṃ prasiddhyati / | And if the opponent refutes [the existence of] one who knows only dharma and adharma as accepted by the other side, then when this refutation is accomplished, the rejectability of scripture composed by the refuted knower of dharma and adharma becomes established. |
yat punar dharmaviṣayāṃ citrā{ntā---}mapahāya svaparaprasiddhasya sarvajñasya sakalajagadgataḥ sūkṣmādibhedajñatvājñatvasādhanāya sāṅkhyabuddhādibhir grantharacanāyāṃ vāde vā saṃrambhaḥ kriyate sa kevalam eṣāṃ saṃkleśaphala eva / | However, when one abandons [consideration of] the domain of dharma [alone] and makes an eager attempt either in composing treatises or in debate by Sāṃkhyas, Buddhists and others to prove or disprove the knowledge of subtle distinctions etc. in the whole world [claimed] for an omniscient one acknowledged by both sides - that [attempt] results only in affliction for them. |
sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñatvaprasādhana iti nimittasaptamī / | The locative ending in "sarvajagatsūkṣmabhedajñatvaprasādhana" indicates purpose. |
granthavādayor ityatra tu saṃrambhāpekṣāvadhārasaptamī // | But here in "granthavādayoḥ" the locative ending indicates the locus of the effort. |
syād etad yadi na kaścid dharmādiparijñātāsti naras tadā loke kathaṃ puṇyāpuṇyāvagatirbhava{tī}tyāśaṅkāyām āha sarvapramātṛsambaddhetyādi / | In response to the doubt "if there exists no person who has complete knowledge of dharma etc., then how does understanding of merit and demerit arise in the world?", he states "sarvapramātṛsambaddha" etc. |
sarvapramātṛsambaddhapratyakṣadinivāraṇāt / | Because of the prevention of direct perception connected with all knowers... |
sarvajñavāraṇe yatnas tatkṛtaṃ mṛtamāraṇam // | The effort in preventing [the existence of] the omniscient one is like killing what is [already] dead. |
yadyapyāgamaśabdaḥ sāmānyavacanas tathāpyarthād apauruṣeyāgamniṣṭha eva draṣṭavyaḥ / | Although the word āgama is a general term, still from the context it should be understood as referring specifically to scripture that is not of human origin. |
vicchinnamūlatvād iti / vicchinnaṃ mūlaṃ pradhānaṃ dharmātmakavastuparijñānaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktaḥ / | "[They are called] those whose root [of knowledge] is cut off" - [meaning] those whose principal root, [which is] the knowledge of things that constitute dharma, is cut off. |
tadbhāvas tattvam // | That state [of being] is its true nature. |
sākṣāt pratyakṣadarśitvādyasyāśucirasādayaḥ / | [For one] who claims direct perceptual vision [of things], impure and tasteless things... |
svasaṃvedyāḥ prasajyante ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati // | ...would become self-experienced - who indeed would imagine such a [person to be omniscient]? |
vedāḥ ṛgyajuḥsāmasaṃjñakāḥ, upavedāḥ āyurvedadhanurvedādayaḥ, aṅgāni vedānāṃ ṣaṭ, śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ chando niruktaṃ jyotiṣam iti, pratyaṅgāni tadavayavā dhātvādayaḥ, ādiśabdena tat parikarasya bhāṣyādeḥ parigrahaḥ / | The Vedas named Ṛg, Yajus and Sāman; the Upavedas [such as] Āyurveda, Dhanurveda and others; the six auxiliary sciences of the Vedas, namely Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Chandas, Nirukta and Jyotiṣa; [their] sub-auxiliaries [which are] their components like verbal roots etc.; [and] by the word "ādi" [is meant] the inclusion of their accompaniments like commentaries etc. |
eṣāmartho 'bhidheyas tasya bodhanam pratipādakaṃ vacanaṃ tat tathābhūtaṃ buddhāder na dṛśyate yadvedādyupadiṣṭārthaṃ pratipādayatītyarthaḥ / | The meaning of these [texts] is what is to be expressed, [and] words that provide understanding of that meaning - such [words] of Buddha and others are not seen which would expound the meaning taught in the Vedas etc. |
nahi kasyacid akhilapadārtharāśipratipādakaśāstrapraṇayanaṃ dṛśyate sarvaśāstrāṇāṃ bhinnābhidheyatvadarśanāt // | Indeed, no one is seen to have composed a treatise that expounds the entirety of all categories [of knowledge], because all śāstras are seen to have different subjects. |
sarvajñāḥ kavayaḥ sarve syuḥ svakāvyanibandhanāt // | [If your reasoning were accepted], all poets would be omniscient due to [their ability to compose] their own poetry. |
tenātīndriyārthaparijñātṛtve satīti saviśeṣaṇatvāddhetor na kavibhir vyabhicāra ityāśaṅkyāha sarvajñeṣvityādi / | Anticipating the objection that "because of the qualification 'being a knower of supersensuous objects', there is no deviation [of the reason] through [the example of] poets," [the author] states [the verse beginning with] "sarvajñeṣu." |
tulyahetuṣu sarveṣu ko nāmaiko 'vadhāryatām // | When all [claimed omniscient persons] have equal grounds [for their claims], which single one indeed should be determined [as authoritative]? |
bahutareṣu sugatakapilakaṇabhakṣākṣapādādiṣu tadbhaktaiḥ sarvajñatvenopakalpiteṣu sādhyeṣu katama eko 'tra sarvajñatvenāvadhāryatāṃ niścīyatām, sarveṣām atīndriyārthopadeṣṭṛtvasya sarvajñaniścayahetos tulyatvāt / | Among the many [teachers] – Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda and others – who are regarded by their respective devotees as omniscient and whose omniscience is sought to be proved, which single one should be definitively ascertained as omniscient, since the ground for determining omniscience, [namely] the teaching of supersensuous matters, is equally [present] in all of them? |
naca sarva eva sarvajñā ityavadhāryituṃ yuktam sarveṣāṃ parasparaviruddhārthopadeṣṭṛtvāt / | And it cannot be correct to determine that all [of them] are omniscient, since they all teach mutually contradictory matters. |
nahi parasparahitopadeṣṭāraḥ sarva eva tattvadarśino yuktā vastūnām ekarūpatvena parasparaviruddhānekasvabhāvasaṃsargābhāvāt // | Indeed, [those] who teach mutually contradictory [doctrines] cannot all be seers of truth, because reality has a single nature [and] cannot possess a combination of multiple mutually contradictory properties. |
sugato yadi sarvajñaḥ kapilo neti kā pramā / | "If the Buddha is omniscient, what is the proof that Kapila is not [omniscient]? |
athobhāvapi sarvajñau matabhedastayoḥ katham // | And if both are omniscient, how [can there be] a difference of opinion between them?" |
dvāvapi tarhi sarvajñau bhavetāmiti cedāha athobhavāpītyādi // | If it should be said that both might be omniscient, then [the author] states "If both..." etc. |
gaṇitādyekadeśe tu sarveṣāṃ satyavāditā / jinabuddhādisattvānāṃ viśeṣo nāvadhāryate // | "In one particular field like mathematics, all beings – Jina, Buddha and others – speak the truth; [and] no distinction is discerned among them." |
sarveṣāṃ hi jinabuddhādīnāṃ dehināṃ gaṇitādyekadeśeṣu kvacid avisaṃvādi vaco dṛśyata eva / | For the words of all embodied beings – Jina, Buddha and others – are indeed seen to be non-contradictory in some particular fields like mathematics. |
nahyanalpaṃ pralapatām na kiñcit satyārthaṃ bhavet, yathoktam "nahyekaṃ nāsti satyārthaṃ puruṣe bahubhāṣiṇi" iti / | For it is not [possible] that among those who speak much, nothing would be true in meaning, as it is said: "Indeed, there is not [even] one truth that would not exist in a person who speaks much." |
tataś ca tulyahetutaḥ sarveṣām eva viśeṣānavadhāraṇāt sarvajñatā prāpnoti, nacaitad yuktam, parasparaviruddhārthopadeśād iti pūrvam uktatvāt | Therefore, since the reason [applies] equally [to all] and no distinction can be determined among any [of them], omniscience would [have to] apply [to all]. But this is not correct, as [it was] previously stated [that they have] mutually contradictory teachings. |
yenaiva hetunaikasya sarvajñatvaṃ prasādhyate / svapakṣaprītimātreṇa so 'nyasyāpy upatiṣṭhate | That very same reason by which the omniscience of one [person] is established, merely due to attachment to one's own position, applies to others as well. |
dūṣaṇāni sasaṃrambhāḥ sarvajñajinasādhane / śākyā yāny eva jalpanti jainās tānyeva yuñjate | The very same objections which the Buddhists zealously raise against the proof of Jina's omniscience, the Jainas [also] employ [against Buddha]. |
tatrānavasthitais teṣāṃ bhinnaiḥ sādhanadūṣaṇaiḥ / pratibimbodayagrastair nirṇayaḥ kriyate katham | How can any determination be made with their uncertain and differing proofs and refutations, [which are] consumed by the arising of [their own] reflections? |
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